Category Archives: German Imperialism

European ICMLPO Members: No to the Anti-Social, Anti-Democratic and Militarist European Union

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Regional conference of parties and organizations of the International Conference of Marxist-Leninist Parties and Organizations (ICMLPO)

The recovery of the global capitalist economy is not on the agenda. The recovery is constantly being announced for tomorrow, but for the vast majority of countries, there is stagnation or recession. The so-called emerging countries are in turn caught up in the crisis.

Within the European Union, the governments of the right, social-democrats or coalition governments are imposing brutal austerity policies and the European Commission is charged with controlling their strict implementation. In the Euro zone, it exerts even a priori control of the budgets of the various governments, ensuring that they meet the neoliberal criteria of reduction of the budgets and the indebtedness of states.

This neoliberal dogma of reduction of state debts up to 3% of GDP has become the “rule of steel” especially written into the Merkel-Sarkozy Treaty (the “fiscal pact”), a real war machine against the social gains, social welfare and public services.

The offensive of the bosses, the governments and the European Commission focuses on the drastic lowering of wages and increased productivity, which combined make for increased profits of the monopolies. The crisis is a formidable pretext to generalize flexibility and oppose the rights and gains of the working class and the toiling masses. The policy of mega-austerity imposed by the “troika” (European Central Bank, European Union and IMF) on Greece, implemented by the coalition government of the right and social-democracy, is causing immense social harm, an unprecedented decline in the standard of living, a decrease in life expectancy and the health of the population, not to mention the exodus of young people and skilled workers, who have left their country in the hope of finding work in other countries. The same thing is taking place in Spain, Italy and Portugal, where unemployment has skyrocketed, especially among the young workers, and where millions of families live below the “official” poverty line.

Europe is synonymous with the policy of austerity, social regression, etc.

For the workers and peoples, the youth and women of the popular strata, the EU stands for the policy of austerity, social regression, the competition of all against all, social dumping, mass unemployment and misery. In all the EU countries, the working class and the toiling masses are in a chorus of protest against this policy: a massive protest, with strikes, demonstrations and mobilizations that put millions of people in the streets, of urban and rural workers, the retired, etc., in short of all the victims of this policy. The media controlled by the monopolies pass over this in silence, because the financial oligarchy, the governments at its service and the European Commission are its instrument, fearing above all that those fights against the same policies will reinforce each other, and that the working class and the toiling masses will become conscious of their strength and their common interests and they will lead all strata that are victims of these austerity policies in their fight.

and of reaction

To impose these policies of austerity and competitiveness, the financial oligarchy, the monopolies and banks do not hesitate to put in place unelected governments, governmental alliances including parties of the extreme right, and to impose European norms and directives that have the force of law, which are binding on the governments, parliaments and national institutions. Thus also in Italy, the troika began by imposing the first non-elected government and gave its support to a third government, also unelected, led by a reformist liberal leader who wants to speed up imposing anti-worker measures and an authoritarian presidential system. Austerity goes along with with more reaction, more repression against all those who oppose it and further criminalization of social protest.

This only emphasizes the anti-social and anti-democratic character of the EU. The real power is in the hands of the heads of states and governments and the unelected European Commission, which decides and develops directives that are imposed on states, under pressure from representatives of lobbies of the monopolies. The superabundant European Parliament discusses these constantly, but its decisions have little effect. It serves as a “democratic” pretext to an EU that is not democratic.

No to Fortress Europe, No to Militarist Europe

This is a EU that takes refuge behind an arsenal of laws, of military ships, of walls, in order to hunt down potential migrants crammed into boats, of whom thousands have capsized in the Mediterranean. With “Frontex” [the EU agency that controls external borders – translator’s note], detention camps such as that of Lempedusa, the walls of barbed wire, this “fortress Europe” wants to “defend” the men and women who are fleeing poverty and wars for which it is itself responsible.

Indeed, it is the EU which today is intervening militarily in the Central African Republic, an intervention decided and implemented on the ground in the first place by French imperialism, which called on its EU allies for help. Some governments have sent troops, other logistical support, but none have condemned the intervention, which is turning into a quagmire, like all imperialist military interventions in Africa. Their principal objective is the maintenance of neocolonial domination and the control of sources of raw materials, particularly uranium deposits. The most aggressive and belligerent imperialist powers in the EU, particularly French imperialism, British imperialism, and more and more German imperialism, are playing a particularly dangerous and reactionary role in order to push the EU to acquire military means to defend “their” interests, particularly in Africa, which it considers its “exclusive hunting ground.” This policy is carried out in close collaboration with U.S. imperialism, which gobbles up billions and is pushing militarization in all the EU countries. It is openly directed against the struggles of the peoples of Africa, who are fighting to get rid of imperialist domination and the reactionary cliques in power in these countries, which are its instruments.

Secret negotiations on the “Great Transatlantic Market”

For months the European Commission has been negotiating in secret the terms of a trans-Atlantic agreement with representatives of the governments, the Ministries of Commerce and the big U.S. companies. It is a neoliberal “free trade” treaty that seeks to break the norms of protection of food quality and the environment and to expand the opening of all markets, in particular public markets, to the appetites of the monopolies. These agreements would allow the monopolies to bring the States before a private court that could sentence them for obstructing “free” competition. This treaty was presented by Obama as a “NATO” in commercial matters, aimed at combating the economic power of China and other competitors of the US-EU alliance, according to the formula: Unite against the rest of the world and set off together in the economic war for the conquest of markets and the control of raw materials and sources of energy. This agreement is a war machine against the workers and peoples of the whole world, through the competition of all against all. The only beneficiaries of the “free and undisturbed competition” are the most powerful monopolies. It is urgent that a large movement be developed in all EU countries to demand an end to these negotiations.

The dangerous situation in Ukraine

This policy has led to the current dangerous situation in Ukraine and throughout the region, which threatens to escalate into a large-scale military confrontation.

First, there are the inter-imperialist contradictions, the policy of eastward expansion of the EU, under the impetus of German imperialism, which is seeking to strengthen its leadership in the EU and thus carry more weight in the competition among the imperialist powers on a world scale.

Ukraine is a large country with very important resources and occupies a geostrategic position that is essential for Russia. To swallow up Ukraine into the sphere of influence of the EU would be a great blow to Russia and the ambitions of its leaders to make their country a major imperialist power. No one should ignore this. But this is exactly what made the EU leaders not hesitate to support the reactionary forces, including openly fascist forces, who took power through a coup. Putin’s reaction was immediate. U.S. imperialism openly came into action to take control of the management of this crisis and to place itself at the head of its European allies, who for years have built economic ties with Russia. French imperialism sells it weapons, German imperialism depends in part on its gas supplies, British imperialism needs billions from the Russian financial oligarchy, and a large portion of the gas consumed by EU countries runs through Ukrainian pipelines. Taking advantage of this crisis, NATO is expanding to the East, still closer to the borders of Russia, which only fuels the tension.

The big imperialist powers are directly involved and are adversaries. If today none of them wants a direct military confrontation, an unstable situation has taken hold in the region amid a revival of militarism. The EU appears more and more clearly as an imperialist bloc whose ambitions threaten peace. While there is not complete unity within it, this is the course that the dominant imperialist powers within it are imposing and are developing on its behalf.

The identity of views between the social-democratic parties and the conservative parties should be noted here. They all supported the Allied response to the extreme right in Ukraine and they all welcome the return of NATO to the stage. The way the appointment of Stoltenberg, a leader of Norwegian social-democracy, as Secretary General of NATO was hailed by all of these forces is an example.

The workers and peoples reject this Europe

This whole policy is now the object of a profound rejection by the workers and peoples. This protest continues to grow everywhere. The progressive, revolutionary and anti-imperialist forces, the Marxist-Leninist parties and organizations, have an urgent duty to stand at the head of this vast protest that affects all strata of the people, starting with the working class. To stand at the head of this protest means to fight relentlessly against the austerity policies that the governments and the EU are imposing. It is to support the aspirations and struggles of the workers and peoples against the anti-democratic character of the EU, against the imperialist nature of its policy and against the denial of the right of the peoples to decide their own future.

The reactionary and extreme right forces, the openly fascist groups and parties want to take advantage of this protest to lead it on the dangerous path of nationalism, division and xenophobia. For them, the enemy is not the capitalist system, but the other peoples or the “foreigners.” These forces want to utilize the European elections to strengthen themselves, to elect deputies and receive funding from the EU to extend their work.

The position of the Marxist-Leninist parties and organizations in the European elections

We Marxist-Leninist parties and organizations, the signatories of this declaration, will develop our analysis of the nature of the EU and its policies and make known our positions on the occasion of these elections. These elections are a reflection of European construction; this is a caricature of democracy.

In countries where there are forces that are taking part in these elections on positions of the fight against the EU of austerity, reaction and war, we call for a vote for these lists. In countries where this is not the case, or where the choice is between forces supporting the EU and forces that criticize it in certain aspects, without questioning its foundations or its objectives, and develop illusions about possibility of reforming it, we do not endorse any of these lists and develop an active policy in favor of abstention.

In the countries where the progressive forces are fighting for the withdrawal of their country from the EU, or where they have popular support or they are engaged in broad fronts that are taking part in lists on this basis, we call for a vote for them. We will popularize these lists on an international level, in the name of the right of the peoples to decide their own fate. We denounce any blackmail, any attempt to conceal their fight or to distort its meaning and range.

In all cases, we put forward the following main lines:

Down with the imperialist EU
Stop the austerity policies of the EU
No to the EU of austerity and reaction
No to the Europe of criminalization of social protest
No to the war policy of the EU
No to the Transatlantic Treaty
No to the project of the United States of Europe
No to imperialist Europe
For the right of the peoples to withdraw from the EU
Yes to the solidarity of the workers and peoples.

Regional conference of member parties and organizations of the International Conference of Marxist-Leninist Parties and Organizations

Germany, April 2014

Denmark: Communist Workers’ Party of Denmark – APK; France: Communist Party of the Workers of France – PCOF; Germany: Organization for the construction of a Communist Workers Party (Arbeit Zukunft); Italy: Communist Platform of Italy; Norway: Marxist Leninist Group Revolution; Spain: Communist Party of Spain Marxist-Leninist – PCE-ml; Turkey: Party of Labor EMEP

Source

The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee and the Anti-Jewish Plot

Solomon Mikhoels, chairman of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, at the grave of Sholem Aleichem in New York in 1943.

Solomon Mikhoels, chairman of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, at the grave of Sholem Aleichem in New York in 1943.

This article was published by Alliance (Marxist-Leninist) as part of the publication Alliance, issue #30, “Marx, Lenin and Stalin on Zionism.”

The Effects of The War Upon the Jews of the Soviet Union

As the Nazis entered the USSR in their war of aggression, they organised killing squads against the Jews of the former Pale of Settlement, within the USSR:

“The former ‘Pale of Settlement’ – fell under German occupation. In the territories annexed by the Soviet Union after September 1939 – the Baltic, eastern Poland, Bessarabia and the Bukovina – live 1,910,000 Jews; in the Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Crimea and other areas of the RSFSR overrun by the German forces are 2,160,000 Jews. Of these, 1.5 million manage to flee before the German troops arrive. More than 2.5 million are trapped, 90 percent of which live concentrated in less than 50 towns. In the months before the attack, the Nazi leadership has designed a method for these particular circumstances: the mobile killing units.. “Einsatzgruppen,”..of SS men, German police and local helpers… Outside cities with large Jewish populations, mass killings of unprecedented scope and speed take place – in Babi Yar outside Kiev, in Ponar outside Vilna, in the VII.Fort outside Kaunas. In the first five months of operation, the “Einsatzgruppen” shoot 100,000 Jews per month… about 2 million Jews are still alive after the first sweep in November 1941.. Jews are forced into “ghettos” and the population Aselected” for immediate killing, deportation or for forced labor. From 1942 onward, these ghettos are Aliquidated” and the remaining population shot. By the end of 1943, another 900,000 Jews are killed.”

WWW Site: “Beyond the Pale”; Op Cit; at:
http://www.friends-partners.org/partners/beyond-the-pale/english/53.html

During the war anti-Semitic chauvinism continued to be expressed against the Jews despite high involvement of the Soviet Jews in the resistance:

“The Jews of the Soviet Union took an active part in the fight against Nazi Germany. About half a million served in the Red Army, and many volunteered for service at the front. Jewish soldiers ran an extra risk: when taken prisoner, they were bound to be shot immediately. An estimated 200,000 Soviet Jews died on the battlefield. During the war, the old anti-Semitic stereotype of Jews as cowardly soldiers was resurrected. Rumours circulated that Jews are “draft dodgers..” http://www.friends-partners.org/partners/beyond-the-pale/english/53.html

The Soviet state took action to organise the Jewish partisans and fighters, and to publicise their actions in the West. This took the concrete from within the Soviet Union of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee (JAFC). Its’ organisation was approved of, and supported by both Stalin and Beria.

“The Soviet authorities in April 1942 allow the establishment of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee. Its aim is to organize political and material support for the Soviet struggle against Nazi Germany from the Jewish communities in the West.”

(See Web site at “Beyond the Pale”; Op Cit p.61: http://www.friends-partners.org/partners/beyond-the-pale/english/61.html).

“One should bear in mind that attempts to organise an international Jewish committee in the Soviet Union during the first months of the War were sponsored by Beria, head of the Soviet Security Police. Individuals connected with the security apparatus also preformed a significant role within the Soviet Antifascist Committee which emerged in Spring 1942.”

Redlich Shimon:”Propaganda and Nationalism in Wartime Russia-The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee in the USSR, 1941-1948″; 1982; USA; p.11.

There is some dispute as to the origin of the idea of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee.

Two members of the “Bund,” from Poland, were imprisoned by the Soviets after the annexation of Eastern Poland under the terms of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, in 1939. These two men were Henrych Erlich and Wiktor Alter.

They proposed to set up an international Jewish Committee in the USSR. Upon the arrest of the two, international pressure mounted to release them. This included Polish socialists such as Wanda Wasilwska and the American Federation of Labor, and the British government. As a letter written from the Foreign Office explained, this would strengthen the hand of the “moderate Poles” led by General Sikorski:

“A letter from the British Foreign Office to the British Embassy in Moscow listed Erlich and Alter among eight outstanding Polish specialists whose release was sought by the British ‘to strengthen General Sikorski’s hand with his people,’ ie to bolster the moderate Poles.”

Redlich Shimon: “Propaganda and Nationalism in Wartime Russia-The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee in the USSR, 1941-1948″; 1982; USA; p.14.

But when Beria became involved in their case, the previously announced death sentences were lifted and they were released. They were then allowed to assist in the formation of the Committee. As Redlich points out, the Soviet Government was actively thinking about such steps, and a parallel Slav Committee, had already been created “within a few weeks after Hitler’s attack”. (Redlich Ibid; p. 11.)

Claims that Alter and Erlych were primarily responsible for a similar idea in respect of the Jews, are impossible to verify. It is however, certainly the case that both were then later executed.

Who would gain from their executions?

Although both of them were Bundists, and thus anti-Bolshevik, both were working towards the ridding of Poland from Nazi rule and the establishment of a democratic and social-democratic state in Poland. Their contacts with the Polish ambassador in Moscow, Professor Stanlsilaw Kot had assured their allegiance to:

“The New Plan.. Which will shape the fate of the future Europe in the spirit of political freedom social justice and national equality… Kot subsequently reported to his superiors in London that the “Bund delegates told me that the Soviet Government (NKVD) asked their assistance in spreading propaganda especially in America. They promised their help on condition that they would conduct the propaganda themselves, not as figure heads, and that it would be under the control of the (Polish) ambassador.”

Redlich Ibid; p. 24,

Despite evidence that is acknowledged, that they had established links with visiting social democrats such as Water Citrine of the British Trades Union Congress and members of the Soviet – British Trade Union Committee, it appears that Alter and Erlych were genuinely interested in the liberation of Poland.

They therefore objectively assisted the Soviet struggle.

It is clear then, that their murder did not objectively help the USSR.
Yet they were suddenly re-arrested on December 4th 1941.

Even Shimon Redlich, the anti-Marxist-Leninist historian of the JAFC, finds the arrests inexplicable, from the point of view of both Stalin and the desperate struggle of the USSR state against Hitlerism.

In the absence of further data, Alliance is forced to interpret this as another attempted sabotage (See above for other documented war time sabotage).

However the decision had been taken, somehow the fact of their executions; had subsequently to be explained to the world. Vyshinsky accused them of: “working on behalf of Germany.” Redlich Ibid; p. 30. This seemed to many to be a rather un-convincing allegation. There was considerable negative international response to their re-arrest. Workers circles in the USA especially, were split by the news of these two executions. However, the executions were indeed confirmed by Litvinov in early 1943, who stated that both of them had argued for a Peace with Germany. (Redlich Ibid; p. 33).

Further documentary data on this matter is still awaited.

However by the time the arrests of the Bund-ists, had occurred, a Jewish Anti-fascist Committee had been established.

Information provided in an internal party document, “Pursuant to the inquiry of Comrade Shumeiko” upon the JAFC, confirms that the Jewish Anti-fascist Committee in the USSR (JAFC) was formed soon after a rally organised in Moscow of the representatives of Athe Jewish people” Vaksberg A, Ibid, p. 107. It occurred after the:

“First antifascist radio broadcast political rally of representatives of the Jewish people, which was held in Moscow in August 1941. The Committee consists of 70 members … and its executive committee has 19 members.”

From Library of Congress site WWW: “The Jewish Antifascist Committee Jewish in the USSR”; Find at: http://lcweb.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/jewi.html

In a memo of 21 June 1946: “To Comrade M.A.Suslov”; the members were itemised. The leading elements were in the main, long standing party members:

“1. Secretary of the Committee, whose duties (following the death of Comrade Shakhno Epshtein) are carried out by the writer I. Fefer, member of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) [VKP(b)] since 1919.
2. Deputy Secretary of the Committee, Comrade S.M. Shpige’glias, VKP(b) member since 1919 and formerly a party worker.”

Memorandum of JAFC ; 21 June 1946; To “Comrade M. A. SUSLOV, Director Section For Foreign Policy of the Central Committee Of the Communist Party”; At Library of Congress site on web: http://lcweb.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/m2antfac.html

But, as a leading representative of the politburo, Solomon Lozovsky was the political representative. He was then Deputy Commissar of Political Affairs, and deputy chief of Sovinformburo. It was he who officially announced the formation of the committee, talking to foreign correspondents in Kuibyshev in April 1942:

“All the anti-fascist committees arose in connection with Hitler’s treacherous attack on the USSR.. The Jews have created an anti-fascist committee to help the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the USA.”

Redlich Op Cit; p. 40.

The JAFC published a paper- “Eynikayt“, from the summer of 1942, until late 1948. The key members of the JAFC included, Solomon Mikhoels (the Jewish actor, and Director of the Moscow Jewish State Art Theatre), Shakhne Epstein, the executive secretary, and Itzik Feffer was a poet as well as a Red Army Colonel; Ilya Ehrenburg the noted writer; David Bergelson the writer; Perets Markish the Soviet-Yiddish poet.

Of all these, undoubtedly the most popular figure in the JAFC was Solomon Mikhoels, famous for his stage roles and this Theatre. It is said that Stalin had nick-named him as “The Wise Solomon”, (Teller, Judd L: “The Kremlin, The Jews & The Middle East”; New York; 1957; p.41.”) though this is specifically repudiated by other sources. Rapport; Ibid).

After the victory of Stalingrad, in 1943, a tension erupted over a dual potential role for the JAFC:

Firstly, to defend Jewish refugees and provide assistance and rehabilitation to Jewish expatriates; and
Secondly to “activate” foreign Jewry for the defence of the USSR. (Redlich Ibid; p. 43-44).

The latter view predominated, and Mikhoels and Feffer were sent on a speaking tour of the West. They succeeded in convincing Jewish people in the West to support and donate to the Russian anti-war efforts:

“The Jewish Anti-fascist Committee in the USSR has sent during its entire existence one delegation, composed of Comrades Mikhoels and Fefer, to the United States, England, Canada, and Mexico. This delegations’s trip report has been published in the book: “The Jewish People against Fascism.”
Memorandum to Comrade Suslov; Ibid; AT:
http://lcweb.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/m2antfac.html

The leading lights of the Western Jewish intelligentsia met them such as those of the American Committee of Jewish Writers & Scientists, with Albert Einstein, Sholom Asch, Lion Feuchtwangler, Howard Fast, Lilian Hellmann and others. The trip succeeded in raising funds for at Aleast one thousand aeroplanes and five hundred tanks and uniforms and food etc. Vaksberg Ibid; p.118

There is little doubt that Mikhoels and Feffer made a significant impact upon world Jewry, and garnered respect and enthusiasm for the USSR.

“In 1943 Solomon Mikhoels and the writer Itzik Feffer embark on a seven-month official tour to the USA, Mexico, Canada and Great Britain. They are received everywhere with great enthusiasm: for a long time, no official contact with one of the largest Jewish communities of the world had been possible. Especially in the United States, where many Jews have not forgotten their ties with Russia, the tour is a great success, and many millions of dollars are raised for the Russian war effort. The JAFC becomes the focal point of a national awakening for Soviet Jewry at a time when its very survival is in danger. Many Jews turn to the JAFC with requests for help, among them survivors from the Nazi camps who find their houses occupied upon their return.” WWW Site Beyond the pale:
http://www.friends-partners.org/partners/beyond-the-pale/english/61.html

One important achievement of the JAFC was that several prominent Jews from all over the world came to the USSR as guests of the committee:

“Over two years, representatives of a series of foreign Jewish antifascist organizations have visited the Committee: Deputy Chairman of the Jewish Antifascist Committee of Bulgaria, Mr. Zhak Vradzhali; one of the leaders of the Union of Jews of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Rozenberg; representatives of Jewish organizations of France, Poland, et al. Recently Mr. Ben Zion Goldberg (Waife), the son-in-law of Sholem Aleichem, visited the Soviet Union. He is a prominent public figure in the United States, a member of the executive committee of the Soviet-American Friendship Society (headed by Lamont), chairman of the Committee of Jewish Scientists, Writers, and Artists of the United States (Albert Einstein is president of the Committee), vice-president of Ambidjan, the All-American Society for Aid to Birobidzhan (president of Ambidzhan– Steffenson). Mr. Goldberg is also a major American journalist.. Mr. Goldberg was received in Moscow by M. I. Kalinin and S. A. Lozovskii.. Met Soviet writers .. representatives of the Soviet Jewish community (at the Jewish Antifascist Committee in the USSR headquarters), with leaders of the State Jewish Theatre, with the chief rabbi of the Moscow Jewish congregation, Shliffer, and with leaders of the Red Cross, among others… During his stay in the Soviet Union, Mr. Goldberg dispatched via the Soviet Information Bureau 33 articles to the American, Canadian, English, Palestinian, Polish, and Yiddish press. The articles were extremely friendly toward the Soviet Union. Before his departure, Mr. Goldberg began to write a book in English entitled England, the Opponent of Peace, and a book in Yiddish entitled Jewish Culture in the Soviet Union.”

Memorandum to Comrade Suslov; Ibid; AT:
http://lcweb.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/m2antfac.html

Further requests were being received by the USSR from prominent Jews in “several countries”:

“Such requests were received from: N. Goldman, the chairman of the executive committee of the World Jewish Congress; Dr. Stephen Wise, chairman of the American Jewish Congress; Louis Levine, chairman of the Jewish Union for Soviet Aid under Russian War Relief; Mr. Raiskii, the editor-in-chief of the newspaper Presse Nouvelle in Paris; et al.”

Memorandum to Comrade Suslov; Ibid; AT:
http://lcweb.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/m2antfac.html

At this stage, the Jewish AFC proposed a detailed plan to make the Crimea the site of a Homeland for oppressed Jewish people from all over the world, including all the refugees from the war.

This was proposed by the JAFC in a letter to Stalin dated February 15, 1944.

It seems that only part of this letter has been made public to date. That fragment reads:

“The creation of a Jewish Soviet Republic will once and forever, in a Bolshevik manner, within the spirit of Leninist -Stalinists national policy, settle the problem of the state legal position of the Jewish people and further development of their multi century culture. This is a problem that no one has been capable of settling in the course of many centuries. It can be solved only in our great socialist country.”

Cited From Literatunaya Gazeta July 7th; 1933.; By Sudoplatov Ibid; p. 286.

As mentioned above, Stalin had approved the formation of the committee. Even the virulently anti-Stalin figure Vaksberg notes that Stalin had written to the JAFC the following note:

“Please convey to the working Jews of the Soviet Union who collected an additional 33,294,823 rubles for the construction of air force squadron Stalin’s Friendship of the Peoples and tank column Soviet Birobidzhan my fraternal greetings and the gratitude of the Red Army J.Stalin”.

Vaksberg A; AStalin Against the Jews”; New York; 1994; p. 116.

Why therefore, as various Zionists state, should Stalin have turned against the JAFC? They allege “anti-Semitism.”

Was Stalin himself known to hold anti-Semitic views?

The major allegations made on a personal level about this charge are frankly ludicrous. Thus for instance, reliance upon Khrushchev and moreover upon an unclear source reveals this:

“The first symptoms of Stalin’s anti-Semitic policy are rooted in his personality and may be traced to the pre-revolutionary period. Many people who knew him well, such as Khrushchev, suggested that his Judaeophobia was pathological. Stalin’s struggle against Trotsky and his numerous Jewish supporters fuelled the anti-Semitic trends in the Kremlin dictator’s policy. ‘Anti-Semitism and anti-Trotskyism reared their heads simultaneously’, Trotsky wrote.”

Iakov Etinger, “The Doctors’ Plot: Stalin’s Solution to the Jewish Question”; in Editor: Yaacov Ro’i:”Jews & Jewish Life in Russia & the Soviet Union”; Ibid; p.103.

It is remarkable that Trotsky then, himself a Jew never commented that this was the reason for his “persecutions” in a more visible and public forum. Nor indeed do Trotsky’s followers including Isaac Deutscher his primary biographer use this charge. What else does Professor I. Etinger have for us?

“Stalin’s secretary, Boris Bazhanov, recollects that Stalin made crude anti-Semitic outbursts even when Lenin was still alive. In 1907 Stalin wrote a letter in which he referred to the Mensheviks as a ‘Jewish faction’ and to the Bolsheviks as a ‘truly Russian’ one.’ It would do no harm to us Bolsheviks if we staged a pogrom inside the party’, he suggested.”

Etinger, “The Doctors’ Plot,” Ibid; p. 104; citing V.Solov’ev, E. Klepikov, op cit p.216.

Other comments from Vaksberg, indicate the same source for other various anecdotes. But interestingly, the most virulent anti-Stalin Vaksberg records other facts that show Stalin was not anti-Semitic. So Vaksberg, although interspersed with sly digs and innuendoes throughout, must note that Stalin was vociferous against anti-semitism:

“The composer Dmitri Rogal-Levitsky… was in 1944 commissioned to orchestrate the new state anthem.. His notebooks .. Record the conversation (of a banquet)…

“Stalin asked how many conductors there were at the Bolshoi Theatre. They told him seven of whom three were Jews…

‘Do you have Nikolai Golovanov there?’ Stalin asked…
‘We were planning to entrust two or three productions to him’ began Tsazoksky… ‘And?’ Interrupted Stalin.
‘He refused.’
‘Good thing!’ Stalin said, striking a match.
‘I don’t like him… He’s an anti-Semite. Yes a real anti-Semite. A crude anti-Semite. He should not be allowed into the Bolshoi Theatre.. It’s like letting a goat into the cabbage patch,’ he said laughing.

Then the conversation turned. But a while later without any obvious connection, Stalin returned to the first theme:

‘But that Golovanov is an anti-Semite.’
‘I’ve not dealt with him in that sense.’
‘Don’t worry you will, if you let him into the Bolshoi Theatre… Golovanov is a real anti-Semite, a dangerous, principled anti-Semite.. You cannot let Golovanov into the Bolshoi Theatre. That anti-Semite will turn everything upside down.'”

Vaksberg A; “Stalin Against the Jews”; New York; 1994; p. 29-30.

Yet ultimately, Vasberg dismisses this all, as an elaborate facade behind which Stalin’s own “anti-Semitism” could be hidden. Vaksberg refers to Stalin’s daughter having “destroyed” Svetlana Alliluyeva’s first marriage because it had been to a Jew – Grigory Morozov (Moroz). Such personal testimony is liable to selective “filtering.” But even Svetlana’s own words are somewhat self-contradictory. She states that Stalin did not stand in her way regarding her marriage, but he refused to allow her husband to visit him. Perhaps the real reason that Stalin disliked him, was not that he was a Jew, but lies in what he told her:

“He’s too calculating, that young man of yours.. Just think it’s terrible at the front. People are getting shot. And look at him. He’s sitting it out at home.”

Alliluyeva, Svetlana, “Twenty Letters to a Friend”; New York; 1967; p.187.

It is true that Svetlana says later on, that Stalin told her that the “Zionists had thrown the first husband” into her way. (Alliluyeva, Svetlana, “Twenty Letters to a Friend”; Ibid; p.196). However the marriage appears to have failed of its’ own accord, Svetlana is quite clear on this.

The net definite “evidence” to prove the racism of Stalin must be in doubt by an open mind.

The real “proof” for the accusers, who convict Stalin of “anti-Semitism”- appears to lie in the matter of the so called “Zionists’ Plot” and the “Doctor’s Plot.”

Was Beria Personally an anti-Semite?

The same general problem is faced by Zionists, who although they accuse Beria of being an anti-Semite, confront and cannot explain data that in reality shows the opposite:

“There is also the mystery of Beria’s comportment towards Jews in Georgia. The New York Times correspondent Salisbury discovered in Tiflis Georgia in 1951, a Jewish ethnological Museum which featured painting depicting Jewish religious rites reconstructions of early Georgian synagogues, and a record of Jewish Soviet heroes in World War II. That the museum should have survived the liquidation of Jewish culture everywhere else in the USSR was curious; the information that Beria had inspired it was even more curious”. He had also sponsored in the 1920’s an occupational rehabilitation programme for Georgian Jewry. This programme included Jewish trade schools and farms.”

Teller Ibid; p. 91-92.

“There is also reason to believe that (Beria) was helpful to Jews in Georgia. The American journalist Harrison Salisbury who visited Georgia after the war, discovered that Beria as Georgian party leader, had instigated the establishment of a program for rehabilitating Georgian Jews. The program included a Jewish charitable society and a Jewish ethnological museum in Tbilisi. It might be added that Beria’s sisters’ husband was a Jew and that Beria had several Jews in his retinue: Mil’stein, Raikhmna, Mamulov, Sumbatov-Topuridze and N.I.Eitington to name a few. Although many Jews lost their jobs in the late 1940’s as a result of the anti-Semitic campaign, these men survived.”

Knight A; Ibid; p.147

Furthermore, it must be noted firstly that it was Beria, who after Stalin’s death – first repudiated the “Doctor’s Plot”, as being a sham:

“Beria’s position as chief of the security services and the police place him in an invidious position as the likeliest candidate for indictment and castigation for all persecutions that has taken place .. Stalin’s successors have fingered him as the author of the so-called Doctor’s Plot… Yet after Stalin’s death it was Beria who exposed the indictment which in itself, disputes his executioners’ contention that he was its author. The Minister of State Security the real boss of the secret police at the time that this evidence was manufactured, was Semyon D.Ignatiev, Beria’s political enemy. Although publicly pilloried for his central role in concocting the indictment, Ignatiev was restored to favour at the Kremlin immediately after Beri had been purged. The post-Beria Kremlin significantly had maintained that there was not anti-Semitic intent behind the doctor’s indictment.. Which in turn invites speculation that the charge might not have been dismissed had not Beria exposed them in his life time.”

Teller Ibid; p. 90-91.

“Not only did Beria denounce the Doctor’s Plot was a hoax after Stalin’s death, he also took it upon himself to attempt a revival of Jewish culture immediately after Stalin died.”

Knight A; Ibid; p.148.

Following this Pravda ran an editorial that stated:

“Every Soviet worker kolkhoz members and intellectual is under the protection of Soviet law. The citizens of the great Soviet state may be certain that all the rights guaranteed them by the Soviet Constitution are sacred and will be guarded by the Soviet Government…. Careful investigation had ascertained the fact that members of Riumin’s clique (responsible for the doctors libel -ed) had slandered the People’s Artist Mikhoels who was an upright communal worker.”

Teller Ibid; p. 125-126.

To Summarise:
Data does not support that the Marxist-Leninists Stalin and Beria were personally anti-Semitic. What of the revisionist politicans?

Khrushchev’s Attitude to the Jews

Khrushchev by several accounts, was well known to be an anti-Semite. Amy Knight puts it as follows:

“Khrushchev… first secretary in the Ukraine, favoured the dissolution of the Union of Jewish Writers Kiev, and the closure of Jewish literary journal.”

Knight M; Ibid; p.148.

That Stalin ensured that Khrushchev was in effect repudiated upon the issue of anti-Semitic pogromists was clear, when Malenkov was sent to the Ukraine to correct the “blindness” of Khrushchev to anti-Semitic abuses:

“Khrushchev’s case is different. Even before his name was generally known outside the USSR, he had acquired notoriety in the Jewish press… for an episode in Kiev when the war ended. He was then boss of the Ukraine. Jewish wartime refugees, braving the local populations; anti-Jewish animus and the Kremlin’s bruited displeasure, trickled back to their devastated homes in the Ukraine. One day in a scuffle over an anti-Semitic remark, two Red Army officers one Jewish and the other Ukrainian, fired their guns at each other. The Ukrainian died, and the result was a pogrom in Kiev. The Ukrainian was buried with military honours and Khrushchev marched in the funeral procession. The pogromists went unpunished until Malenkov arrived to restore order.”

Teller Ibid; p. 92.

This view is substantiated more recently by Knight’s biography of Beria:

“In May 1944 Mikhoels wrote a letter to Molotov complaining about discrimination against Jews in liberated Ukraine. On receiving a copy of the letter, Beria issued instructions to Ukrainian Party Chief Khrushchev to “take the necessary measures to improve the living and working conditions of Jews in the newly liberated areas.”

Knight M; Ibid; p.147

Mikhoels would pay a price for his request for intervention, addressed to the Marxist-Leninist Molotov. But who was it that wrote his bill?

The Murder of Solomon Mikhoels

As discussed above, Stalin had supported the JAFC and sent it congratulatory telegrams.

It seems though, that the general attitude inside the USSR to the JAFC changed after the war.

One of the signs of this change was that the previous plan to publish a book – the so called “Black Book” – cataloguing the Nazi genocide of the Jews, and the Jewish partisan struggles, was only brought to fruition in the USA but not in Russia:

“The contacts with American-Jewish organizations result in the plan to publish a Black Book simultaneously in the USA and the Soviet Union, documenting the anti-Jewish crimes of the Nazis and the Jewish part in the fighting and resistance. In 1944, the writer Ilya Ehrenburg sends a collection of letters, diaries, photos and witness accounts to the USA to be used in the book. The Black Book is published in New York in 1946. But no Russian edition appears. The typefaces are finally broken up in the printing press in 1948, a year in which the situation of Soviet Jews has once more deteriorated sharply.”

See WWW site: “Beyond the Pale”; page 61 at:
http://www.friends-partners.org/partners/beyond-the-pale/english/61.html

But the death of Mikhoels – allegedly in a murder committed at the direct order of Stalin, is the event that is usually cited as the beginning of the alleged anti-Semitic campaigns of the Soviet USSR.

It is alleged by many, including Sudoplatov, that Stalin feared the potential power that Mikhoels would have, and had him assassinated in January 1948:

“Mikhoels .. had been at the heart of the discussions to establish a Jewish Crimean republic. Stalin feared that Mikhoels would unleash forces that could not be controlled and would lead to unpredictable political consequences. Stalin feared a truly independent Jewish homeland. Mikhoels had the stature of a leader with world recognition, and Stalin could not risk his developing his own power base. Mikhoels was murdered in January 1948, under the direct order of Stalin.”

Pavel & A Sudoplatov; with JL &LP Schecter:”Special Tasks”; Boston; 1995; p. 296.

But as noted in the foreword, Sudoplatov’s memoirs have been seriously discredited.

It is true that other sources also refer to the death of Mikhoels and all assume that Stalin “ordered the murder of Mikhoels.”

In fact, the mysterious death of Solomon Mikhoels in Minsk on January 13, 1948, served to rob the USSR of a valuable and respected figure. For all these other sources, this contradiction, is not apparently a difficult issue – since they all pre-judge Stalin as variously, mad, irrational, capricious.. etc.

However this line of reasoning is countered by the facts previously adduced.
(See Previous issues of Alliance on Personality Cult :(1) The Cult of
Personality (Talk at The Stalin Society (UK) May 1991) AT: http://ml-review.ca/aml/STALIN-TXT/WBBPERSONALITY1991.html2) Stalin – Myths and Reality: Talk intended for the Third ISML Conference Paris October 1999: http://ml-review.ca/aml/STALIN-TXT/WBBSTALINMYTHSPARIS1999.html

The most detailed source, of the actual last days of Mikhoels life, is found in Arkady Vaksberg. (ibid pp159-170). As Amy Knight points out, the assumption is usually made that Beria performed the killing:

“Many had assumed that Beria as responsible for the murder, since he oversaw the police apparatus.”

Knight A; Ibid; p.147.

However it seems that Beria related the facts of the case, in a letter to Malenkov, after the death of Stalin.

According to this letter, Beria questioned Abakumov in prison, where Abakumov had remained following Stalin’s death. Beria learnt that the key players were Ogol’tsev and Tsanava. Knight insists that Stalin “ordered” the killing:

“Stalin had ordered Abakumov to have Mikhoels killed, a task carried out by Deputy Minister of State Security S.I.Ogol’tsev and Belorussian MGB chief Tsanava. Mikhoels and his companion were lured into a car and taken to Tsanava’s dacha outside Minsk, where they were murdered. Their bodies were then dumped on the side of the road. When Beria learned of Tsanava’s complicity, he ordered his arrest along with that of Ogol’tsev.”

Knight A; Ibid; p.147.

In fact Knight reminds us that Beria had:

“Supported the idea in 1942 of creating the Jewish Anti-fascist Committee in order to harness the war efforts of Soviet Jews at home and abroad and had maintained direct contacts with JAFC leaders after that. Indeed he seems to be have been sympathetic to their cause.”

Knight A; Ibid; p.147.

But, she fails to remind us that Stalin had also supported Mikhoels and the JAFC.

So was ultimately responsible for the murder of Mikhoels?

It seems that the revisionist S.D.Ignat’ev (or Ignatiev) was heavily involved:

“It may not be a coincidence that in addition to First Secretary Gusarov… who was in the Belorussian CC Secretariat at the time of the Mikhoels murder: S.D.Ignatiev, who was to replace Abakumov as USSR MBG chief in mid-1951. Ignatiev later helped to fabricate the case against the doctors.”

Knight A; Ibid; p.148.

Who was pushing for action on the “anti-Zionist plot?”

Vaksberg claims that Abakumov was supported by Malenkov and Mikhail Suslov. We would argue that of these, Suslov was an out and out revisionist and at best, Malenkov was a vacillator.

On October 12, 1946 Abakumov (after having taken over from Vsevolod Merkulov, the Ministry of State Security) wrote a memorandum entitled: “On Nationalistic Manifestations of Some Workers of the Jewish Anti-fascist Committee”, accusing them of:

“Forgetting the class approach which has been replaced by an approach on national lines,” and of “establishing foreign contacts on the same national principles”. Also in foreign editions about the life of the Soviet Jews, it “exaggerated their contribution to the achievements of the Soviet Union in science, technology, and culture.” And finally a special section of the memo.. Noted that the committee “has taken on the function of the chief representative of the affairs of the Jewish population and intermediary between that populations and the Party-Soviet organs. The summary conclusion to the memo was that the Afurther activity of this committee is politically harmful and intolerable”.. The Minister was supported by one of the new members of the hierarchy.. Mikhail Suslov. In his appeal to Stalin on November 26th 1946, he also called for liquidation of the committee.”

Vaksberg; Op Cit; p.195

It was finally on March 1948 that Abakumov forwarded a report to the Central Committee arguing that JAFC leaders and Mikhoels had:

“conducted anti-Soviet nationalist activities.”

Knight A; Ibid; p.148.

This report went to the Central Committee and was copied to Stalin, Molotov, Zhdanov, and Kuznetsov.

By 20 November 1948, the Politburo adopted the resolution approving a decision of the Council Of Ministers to disband the JAFC.

This resolution was adopted after the sudden death of Zhdanov in August 1948, and thereafter the correct anti-cosmopolitanism campaign, was crudely transformed into the incorrect anti-Semitic campaign.
(For Bland’s article on the anti-cosmopolitanism article see: http://ml-review.ca/aml/CommunistLeague/COSMOPOLITANISM-COMPASS131-1998.HTM

Abakumov continued to send memos to Stalin over this issue, calling the JAFC a “hot-bed of Zionism” in a memo of the March 1, 1948. (Vaksberg; Op Cit; p.196. )

It was after September 3rd, 1948 that action was finally taken against the JAFC. On that date, it is alleged by Vaksberg and other bourgeois commentators that the “mass rallies” greeting Golda Myerson (later to be known as Golda Meir) in her post as the first Israeli ambassador, “frightened” Stalin.

Yet as Vaksberg himself states, in the spring of 1945 Stalin had allowed open and massive Jewish rallies to commemorate the Jewish dead of the war:

“On the recommendation of the World Council of Rabbis meeting in Jerusalem, Stalin permitted Moscow Jews to organise a memorial service for the six million Jewish victims of the Nazis…. Major governmental figures marshals, and generals and celebrated artists attended – over 20,000 people.. Raising over half a million rubles for the postwar restoration of the country. The solemn Kadish was repeated in 1946. In 1947 it was banned.”

Vaksberg; Op Cit; p.185.

By March 26th 1948, Abakumov had sent a memo to Stalin, Molotov and CC Secretaries Zhdanov and Kuznetsov entitled “On the Espionage and Nationalistic Activity of the Jewish Anti-fascist Committee”, stating that Mikhoels was:

“Known long before the war as an active nationalist, he was a kind of banner for nationalistic Jewish circles.”

Vaksberg; Op Cit; p.197-198.

On November 20th 1948, item no.81 on the agenda of the Politburo of the CC stated:

“On the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee: Confirm the following resolution of the Bureau of the Council of Ministers of the SSR: “The Bureau of the Council of ministers of the USSR instructs the MGB USSR to disband the JAFC immediately, because as the facts show, this Committee is the center of anti-Soviet propaganda and regularly provides anti-Soviet information to organs of foreign intelligence. In conjunction with this, the publishing organs of the Committee are to be shut down and the Committee’s files confiscated. For the time being no one is to be arrested.”

Vaksberg; Op Cit; p.198-199.

Thus far at any rate, the “facts” are not quite so obvious as made out by the Zionists who attack Stalin as anti-Semitic. There is a clear implication from Vaksberg, that a compromise decision had been made, with the final statement just cited, regarding an explicit counter-manding of further arrests.

Nonetheless, David Goldstein had already been arrested in September, and on December 24th Fefer was arrested. Vaksberg; Op Cit; p.200-201. Lozovsky was arrested on January 16th. Vaksberg; Op Cit; p.202.

A little complicating, but true, is that Salmon Lozovsky was also a hidden revisionist (partially discussed previously by Alliance – See Alliance issue Number 15); who had subverted correct trade union tactics in the Comintern and the trade union international Profintern (led by Lozovsky).

However, Alliance argues, until further evidence can be adduced, that the net effect of these arrests, was once more to alienate the Marxist-Leninist wing of the Bolsheviks Party from a section of the working class.

Moreover it served to strengthen the hand of international support for Israel, and to serve as an instrument of propaganda against the USSR.

It was the Writers Union under Alexander Fadeyev who pushed for a resolution that called for closing associations of Jewish writers and closing Yiddish almanacs. That the hand of the revisionists was heavy in making these decisions is made clear by Shimon Redlich in his history of the JAFC. He points out that another key revisionist involved was Boris Ponomorarev:

“Sources suggest that Boris N. Ponomorarev was personally active in the liquidation of the Committee. Ponomorarev, an ex-functionary of the Comintern, and Deputy Director of the prestigious Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute after the War, was appointed Deputy Director of the Sovinformuro in late 1948 or early 19489. When Lozovskii was arrested in late 1948 to early 1949, Ponomorarev became Head of the Bureau for a short while.”

Redlich Shimon: “Propaganda and Nationalism in Wartime Russia-The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee in the USSR, 1941-1948″; 1982; USA; p.167-8.

As Redlich points out, various hypotheses linking the affair with an alleged Malenkov-Zhdanov hostility; or to an attempt to discredit Beria; simply do not make any sense.

He is left only to explain it as Stalin’s fear of the international contacts that Soviet Jewry had built with overseas Jews. He himself acknowledges Stalin’s previous support of these contacts:

“Although encouraged and supported by Stalin at the time, these contacts were regarded in retrospect as dangerous and treacherous.”

Redlich S; Ibid; p.169.

Another potential “reason” leading Stalin to take this step, is cited by Redlich as the following:

“It is well known to Soviet official circles and to Stalin himself that the Committee had attempted to perform functions and took upon itself responsibilities far beyond the initial purpose of its establishment. Mikhoels and other top personalities of the JAFC approached various Soviet authorities both on matters concerning individual Jews and on Jewish cultural and national issues…. The JAFC was apparently regarded by Stalin as a structure which organised and expressed Jewish national interests and since he viewed such interests as a security risk to the regime, and to himself it seemed to him a matter of prime importance to wipe out this potentially dangerous organisation.”

Redlich S; Ibid; p.169-70.

Alliance finds that the evidence to date, suggests that Mikhoels was murdered, and was not the victim of an accident.

This is dealt with directly below, in a citation from Beria.

As to who was responsible, there continues to be disagreement.

Only one piece of evidence links Stalin to this directly.
That is evidence provided by the cross examination of Abakumov while he was imprisoned.

This was referred to above, from the biography of Beria by Knight (see page above). The full cited is the following, and is drawn from a document upon Abakumov, available in Russian only. Significant sections are cited from the English text of a piece by Iakov Ettinger, based on reports in Russian cited by Stoliarov:

“Col.-Gen. V. S. Abakumov, Minister of State Security from 1945-1…Russian researcher Kirill Stoliarov summed up the results of his painstaking and profound study of the materials in the case of State Security Minister Abakumov in his book “Golgofa” (Calvary).”

Iakov Etinger:”The Doctors’ Plot: Stalin’s Solution to the Jewish Question”; in Editor: Yaacov Ro’i: “Jews & Jewish Life in Russia & the Soviet Union”; citing Storilaov; Ibid.

After Stalin’s death, Beria investigated the Mikhoels events further. It emerged again from Abakumov’s testimony, still being in jail, that Abakumov had asserted not only that Mikhoels had been killed, but that Stalin had ordered him to perform this murder:

“Meanwhile Beria made another move. On 2 April 1953 he sent a letter to the party Presidium addressed to Malenkov stating:

“An examination of the materials in the Mikhoels case has revealed that in February 1948, in Minsk, former USSR MGB Deputy Minister Ogol’tsov and former Belorussian MGB Minister Tsanava carried out an illegal operation to liquidate Mikhoels on orders from USSR MGB Minister Abakumov.. In this connection Abakumov has been interrogated at the MVD and explanations have been received from Ogol’tsov and Tsanava. Abakumov gave the following evidence…
“As far as I can remember, in 1948, the head of the Soviet government I. V. Stalin gave me an urgent assignment – to promptly organize the liquidation of Mikhoels by MGB personnel and charge specially selected people with the task. Then it came to our knowledge that Mikhoels and his friend, whose name I do not remember, had gone to Minsk. When this was reported to Stalin he immediately ordered us to carry out the liquidation in Minsk…After Mikhoels was liquidated Stalin highly praised the operation and ordered that the people who had performed it be decorated, which was carried out.”

Etinger I: Ibid; p. 120-121; Citing :’Argumenty i Fakty 2′; 1992.

Beria’s letter then outlines that the murder of Mikhoels was disguised by crudely staging a motor vehicle accident:

“The letter goes on to describe in detail how Mikhoels was “liquidated”. There were several options for eliminating Mikhoels: a) a car accident, b) running him over with a lorry in a deserted street. Since neither gave a 100 per cent guarantee the following course was decided upon: to invite Mikhoels, through one of our agents, to visit an acquaintance of his late at night, provide a car from the hotel he was staying in, allegedly to drive him there, take him to Tsanava’s dacha and liquidate him. Then the body was to be put in an out-of-the-way deserted street and run over by a lorry. And that is how it was done. To keep the matter secret, agent Golubov, who accompanied Mikhoels on this fatal visit, was also done away with (they were run over by a lorry near the dacha). At the end of the letter Beria declared:

The MVD deems it necessary:
a) to arrest and initiate proceedings against former USSR Deputy MGB Minister S. I. Ogol’’tsov and former State Security Minister of Belorussia L. F. Tsanava,
b) to repeal the Supreme Soviet decree conferring honours on the participants in the murder of Mikhoels and Golubov.”

Etinger I: Ibid; p. 120-121; Citing: ‘Argumenty i Fakty 2′; 1992.

In Conclusion: Alliance argues the following:

1. If it is agreed that Beria was a Marxist-Leninist, his letter indicates the primary responsibility for the attacks on the JAFC are laid on the door of low level operatives S. I. Ogol’tsov and L. F. Tsanava.

2. Backing up these individuals but at a higher level were the revisionists Malenkov and Suslov and Ponomoranev. Of these the first, was possibly a “vacillator” but the other two were definitely revisionists.

3. There remains the matter of Stalin. We argue that Stalin had nothing to gain by the murder of Mikhoels, that his “ego” definitely did not require this as bourgeois sources claim; and that it was not in his interests. However Abakumov’s testimony “fingers” Stalin. What then? Barring a “mistake” upon Stalin’s part, we suggest the following two possibilities:

i) Abakumov’s testimony cannot be simply discounted. We argue, that his testimony on the so called “Doctor’s Plots” shows him to be a basically honest individual (see below);
We further argue that if this is the case, then on the earlier issue of the JAFC, he was mis-led on the matter of Stalin’s orders;
Beria’s ‘testimony’ was ‘extracted’ by Khrushchev who of course went on to kill Beria.

OR:

ii) Another possibility exists: That Beria for some reason lied about Abakumov’s testimony. If so two possible reasons for this can be adduced:
Either Beria was NOT a Marxist-Leninist;
OR Beria decided that as a Marxist-Leninist – what was critical was that as far as possible the security apparatus be purged of revisionists in order to fight on for Marxism-Leninism. He may have reasoned that Stalin was dead and Abakumov was virtually dead anyway.

We believe the data thus far shows that Beria was a consistent Marxist-Leninist.
We believe therefore that the most likely conclusion is that Abakhumov was tricked by the revisionists into effecting Mikhoels murder.

It is very remarkable that the newer generation of revisionist leaders of the USSR – those who actually dissolved the state- held a Politburo Commission and declared the direct responsibility to lie with Malenkov.

It is pretty inconceivable that these individuals who hated Stalin, would not publicise evidence linking Stalin with this issue if it in truth existed:

“A Politburo Commission created by Mikhail Gorbachev and chaired by Alexander Yakovlev came to the conclusion on late 1988 that the “direct responsibility for the illegal repression of people arrested in the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee case was borne by G.M.Malenkov, who was directly involved in the investigation and trial.” Vaksberg; Op Cit; p.202-3.

The Case of Polinya

The wife of Molotov – Polina Zhemchuzhina – was Jewish. She had held high ranking posts for the Bolsheviks such as People’s Commissar of the Fish Industry, head of the State Perfume Trust, as well as being on the Bolshevik Central Committee. It is alleged that she incurred Stalin’s’ wrath as she had been the last person to see Nadezdha Allilueva alive before she committed suicide. This according to Vaksberg was the reason for her removal from the Central Committee for “failure in work.” Previously she had received a reprimand for neglect and, for allowing in 1939, some German spies to penetrate her area. According to Golda Meir’s testimony, Polinya “wished the Zionists in Palestine well” saying:

“If things go well for you, then things will be good for the Jews the whole world over.”

Vaksberg; Op Cit; p.188.

This conversation was monitored and the Central Committee was informed. According to Vaksberg, Stalin reportedly told Molotov:

“It is time for you to divorce your wife.”

Vaksberg; Op Cit; p.189.

It is important to recognise that as so often, the primary source for this conversational tit-bit of information is the revisionist Khrushchev.

In late 1948 the Molotovs were divorced, and in February 1949 Zhemchuzhina was arrested.

Prior to this, some bizzare personal charges including one of an extraordinary adultery involving a juniro employee, and espionage were laid at a meeting of the Politburo.

However even Vaksberg, is in agreement that various documents were indeed missing, from the Ministry of Light Industry textile branch, then being run by Zhemchuzhina.

Nonetheless the various charges against Zhemchuzhina also included:

“Being present at the memorial service at the synagogue on March 14th, 1945; enjoying the nationalistic play Freileks produced by the Jewish bourgeois nationalists Mikhoels at the Jewish Theatre; and of attending the funeral of Mikhoels.”

Vaksberg; Op Cit; p.192.

It is likely that some of these latter minor charges are true. Whether that made her an enemy of the state is debateable in the view of Alliance currently. But it is notable that Zhemchuzhina never repudiated Stalin, even after years in prison (Vaksberg; Op Cit; p.192).

It seems most likely that both she and Molotov were aware that there were inner-party battles going on that explained the turn of events.
In fact although Stalin is blamed for these events, it is most unclear why Molotov should have been targeted. For not only did his wife suffer imprisonment, but observers agree that he himself was demoted in rank although he remained within the Politburo. (Knight M; Ibid; p.147).

Alliance argues then, that the general aim of the revisionists to take over leading positions of state power was assisted by the direct and in-direct attack upon Molotov – as far as we know a reliable Marxist-Leninist, while Stalin was alive.

Source

The Changing Leadership of the Secret Service

Nikolai_Yezhov_conferring_with_Stalin

This article was published by Alliance (Marxist-Leninist) as part of the publication Alliance, issue #30, “Marx, Lenin and Stalin on Zionism.”

THE CHANGING LEADERSHIP OF THE SECRET SERVICE

It is accepted by most if not all Marxist-Leninists, that at various times, revisionists within the USSR Bolshevik party took control of the secret services.

Since that is the case, determining whether particular campaigns undertaken by the secret services – were really in the interests of the Marxist-Leninists, or the interests of the revisionists – needs to take into account several specific facts of the campaign as well as the personality of the chiefs of the secret service at the particular time in question.

In assessing the evidence regarding the alleged Zionist Plot, it is therefore necessary to understand those who made the allegations and effected the arrests.

The Case of Ezhov And the Appointment of Beria To The Secret Services

Stalin’s attempts at creating a trusted and close network of Marxist-Leninists around him in foreign policy (See Part Two of this article), matched a similar strategy in the secret service. In previous Alliance issues, we have discussed how, Stalin attempted to either root out, or at worst, to contain the counter-revolutionary terror, that was striking at the best of the Bolsheviks, as intended and organised by the hidden revisionists.

Firstly Yagoda was removed from heading the secret service after his Trotskyite affiliations became clear. His substitute was Nikolai Ivanovich Ezhov, who became the head of the Secret Police the NKVD. But again it appears that this office had been infiltrated by hidden revisionists.

For example, Arch Getty has shown how Stalin obstructed Ezhov in his “mass” arrests and expulsions from the party. For example, this exchange shows the antagonism between the two:

Ezhov: Comrades as a result of the verification of party documents we expelled more than 200,000 members of the party.
Stalin: [Interrupts] Very many.
Ezhov: Yes very many. I will speak about this..
Stalin: [Interrupts] If we explained 30,000..(inaudible remark) and 600 former Trotskyites and Zinoviev-ists it would be a bigger victory.
Ezhov: More than 200,000 members were expelled. Part of this number.. were arrested.”

Cited from Stenographic Records. Cited In AStalinist Terror, New Perspectives.”Ed. J.Arch Getty & Roberta T. Manning. Cambridge University Press, 1993. p.51).

Zhdanov (a close comrade-in-arms of Stalin) tried to place further brakes upon Ezhov, as shown when:

“In a highly publicized attack Zhdanov accused the Saratov kraikom (party leadership-Ed) of “dictatorship” and “repression”.. At the Feb 1937 Central Committee Plenum, Zhdanov gave the keynote speech on democratizing party organisations, ending bureaucratic repression of “little people,” and replacing the co-option of party leaders with grass roots elections. Indeed under pressure of this line, contested secret ballot party elections were held in 1937.”

Cited from Stenographic Records. Cited In AStalinist Terror, New Perspectives.”Ed. J.Arch Getty & Roberta T. Manning. Cambridge University Press, 1993. p.51).

In the case of Avel Enukidze, then Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of Soviets, Ezhov had wanted to expel him. But Stalin and Molotov defended Enukidze.

After further pressure from Ezhov, he was expelled.

But then Molotov and Stalin moved for him to be re-admitted. Though the plenum agreed with Stalin and Molotov, this re-admission never happened – having been arrested, he was shot in 1937. The record shows a clear pattern here – where Stalin was set versus Ezhov. (Arch Getty & Manning; Ibid; p.54).

Even in the case of the arch-Right revisionist Bukharin, (a leading ex-Bolshevik whose prominence and past service made him especially controversial – yet especially important to deal with. Precisely just in case he did become the focus of further organised opposition) – even his execution was controversial. Stalin wanted him expelled, and not even put on trial, let alone executed.

The opposition to Stalin on this matter were: Ezhov, Budennyi, Manuilskii, Shvernik, Kosarev and Iakir (who voted to shoot Bukharin without trial); and Litvinov, Postyshev, Shiriatov, and Petrovskii (Who voted to send Bukharin to an open trial).

The Plenum voted for Stalin’s line by a majority. But the documents of agreement were altered (in Mikoian’s handwriting) and Stalin’s advice was simply ignored. (Arch Getty & Manning; Ibid; p.58).

Even a very hostile Sudoplatov, records that Stalin’s attitude was surprisingly the opposite of the conventional portrait painted of a vindictive dictatorial individual. According to Sudoplatov, Stalin preferred private rebukes rather than prosecution, for example when dealing with instances of “corruption“:

“I learnt from Malenkov’s deputy- Anna Tsukanova.. That the Central Committee did not always prosecute corruption reported by the Party Control Commission and security organs. Stalin & Malenkov preferred to reproach an errant high-ranking official rather than to prosecute him, but if the man landed in the wrong power group, then the incriminating evidence was used to demote or purge him.”

Sudoplatov; Ibid; p. 319

It can only be reasonably concluded, that Stalin was trying hard to limit the damage being done by a revisionist taking cover behind a Left-ist and zealot position.

In this situation, Lavrentii Beria was put in this sensitive and critical job. Stalin himself put Beria into this job, after Ezhov had tried to prepare a case against Beria. Beria appealed to Stalin, who appointed Beria initially as Ezhov’s Aassistant”. Beria became first deputy chairman of the USSR NKVD at the end of August 1938, having been relieved of his prior position as first secretary of the Georgian party organisation. (Amy Knight: “Beria-Stalin’s First Lieutenant”; Princeton New Jersey 1993; p. 87-88). On 17 November 1938, Sovnarkom and the Central Committee adopted a report issued by Beria’s investigation entitled: “On Arrests – Supervision By the Procuracy And the Conduct of Investigations”, which passed a resolution. This was a:

“Strongly worded, lengthy resolution.. (it) Completely renounced the purges. Directed at party, Procuracy and NKVD officials in the republic it was highly critical of the “gross violations of legal norms” that had been committed during arrests and investigations in particular the reliance on confessions extracted from the accused and the failure to keep records. Furthermore the resolutions stated,
‘The NKVD has gone so far in distorting the norms of the judicial process that very recently questions have arisen about giving it so called limits on the process of mass arrests”. According to the resolution, Aenemies of the people” who had penetrated the NKVD and the Procuracy were falsifying documents and arresting innocent people”. The resolution forbade these organs from continuing their policy of mass arrests and exile. Henceforth arrests were to be made only with the consent of the court or the Procurator; the noxious NKVD troikas which decided cases of the spot were to be abolished.'”

Amy Knight: “Beria-Stalin’s First Lieutenant”; Princeton New Jersey 1993; p. 89.

Immediately after, in the words of Amy Knight, his biographer, Beria “cleansed” the NKVD. As far as he could, he tried to only place trusted Bolsheviks in the key positions. As he had personal knowledge from Georgia of who was reliable or not, many of the appointees were from Georgia. This has been labelled as a “Georgian mafia” controlled by Beria. But since the objective was to place trusted comrades in key positions, and Beria knew these people best – this derogatory term is un-justified. As Knight puts it, Beria:

“Set about “cleansing” the NKVD of undesirable elements, in other words he initiated a full-scale purge of the Ezhovites, executing or imprisoning hundreds of officials…. By early 1939 Beria had succeeded in arresting most of the top and middle level hierarchy of Ezhov’s apparatus, replacing these men with members of his Georgian group. It is possible to identify at least 12 Beria men…. appointed to key NKVD posts… Vsevold Merkulov.., Vladimir Dekanozov,… Bogdan Kobulov… Solomon Mil’shtein… Iuvelian Sumbatov-Topuridze.. Sardeon Nadaraia.”

Amy Knight: “Beria-Stalin’s First Lieutenant”; Princeton New Jersey 1993; p. 90-91

It is accepted by even hostile and anti-Marxist-Leninist writers, that following Beria’s changes, thousands of prisoners in the camps were released:

“There was a general feeling that the NKVD would eschew the excesses of the Ezhov period and people began to talk about a ‘Beria thaw’.”

Amy Knight: “Beria-Stalin’s First Lieutenant”; Princeton New Jersey 1993; p. 92

Many bourgeois reports and Khruschevite revisionists have labelled Beria as a man who was both a political evil and a sexual debauchee given to raping young girls. But these are dubious, as Knight herself acknowledges:

“It should be noted that the stories have been disputed by some who knew Beria. One former NKVD employee expressed strong doubts that Beria was raping young girls, noting that he was known in police circles as a man with exceptional self-control who worked extremely hard.”

Amy Knight: “Beria-Stalin’s First Lieutenant”; Princeton New Jersey 1993; p. 97.

As an enemy of both bourgeois and Khruschevite revisionists, Beria is bound to attract negative and libellous comments. But Marxist-Leninists are aware that Beria effectively cleared the NKVD of revisionist practices and revisionist personnel. His later treatment at the hands of the revisionists led by Khrushchev, who were now in power, after the death of Stalin – lends credence to the view that Beria was a Marxist-Leninist. That case has been well summarised by W.B. Bland in an article published by the Stalin Society of London UK.” (Bland: “The Doctors Case & The Death Of Stalin”; Stalin Society; London nd ca 1992. NB: soon to be placed on the web site of Alliance).

The Post-War Reshuffle That Removed Beria From Sole Control of the Secret Services – The Atomic Threat

Beria had proven himself capable of running the necessarily vigilant, but controlled secret service that a socialist state must have, faced by an imperialist combination.

However after the war, a new danger arose – the atomic bomb monopoly by the USA. It was essential to have in charge of the Russian Atomic Bomb project, someone who was an utterly reliable Bolshevik. Stalin ensured that Lavrentii Beria was given this mandate. This very serious and onerous task could not be done well with divided attention.

The future safety of the USSR critically depended upon its success. Therefore, Beria was duly relieved of his post as the sole Commissar of Internal Affairs which he had held from 1938 to December 1945. He ceased to be solely in charge of security and intelligence in the USSR and overseas – excepting for all security problems directly connected with his job as manager of the Special State Committee on Problem Number One – the creation of the atomic bomb. (Sudoplatov P, Ibid; p.315)

The secret services had already been divided into three arms in April 1943.

Probably this was likely to be because the work load was already too great to enable only one agency to entirely cover the work. Thus the former People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) was split into three arms:

1) The NKVD – still under Beria but who was now no longer responsible for state security but only for economic security:

“The NKVD under the leadership of Beria, was thereby relieved of the heavy problems of state security and became more and more an “economic’ organisation.”

B.Levytsky: “The Uses Of Terror: The Soviet State Security: 1917-1970″; London; 1971; p.160.

2) The Peoples Commissariat of State Security (NKGB) headed by Vsevolod Merkulov. He was known to be a close ally of Beria’s:

“He was one of Beria’s closest and trusted collaborators.”

B.Levytsky: “The Uses Of Terror: The Soviet State Security: 1917-1970″; London; 1971; p.141.

3) The Counter-Espionage Department of the People’s Commissariat for Defence (SMERSH) headed by Victor Abakumov.

After the war in 1946, SMERSH was abolished, and the NKVD was re-named the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and was headed by Sergey Kruglov who was later openly revisionist. The NKGB was renamed the Ministry of State Security (MGB) and remained under Abakumov.

Today most Marxist-Leninists are in agreement on the class affiliations of Beria, Kruglov, and Merkulov.

It is true that some Indian Marxist-Leninists (of Revolutionary Democracy) have recently raised questions about Beria, but these have not been to date, substantiated in print. We therefore will not deal with these purely verbal allegations.

But there still remains some significant queries about whether Abakumov was a Marxist-Leninist, or whether he was a revisionist.

We are forced to consider this matter for the correct interpretation of several later events – including the matter of Stalin’s death. Also, at least in part, the correct interpretation of the alleged Zionist Plot – hinges on this matter. We msut examine the question:

Was Victor Abakumov A Marxist-Leninist?

The Case for Abakumov Being a Marxist-Leninist:

Essentially as far as Alliance can discern, the case on behalf of Abakumov rests on two matters as follows:

i) An Alleged Friendship with Beria:

As the British Marxist-Leninist W.B. Bland views it, Beria and Abakumov were associated as close comrades. By this reasoning, Abakumov must have been a Marxist-Leninist. Bland cites the following views of historians of the Soviet secret services- Levytsky and Wolin & Slusser:

“Beria’s adversaries in the Party (i.e. the opponents of M-L-ism-Ed).. Achieved a notable victory in late 1951, with the replacement of V.S.Abakumov, an associate of Beria’s by S.P.Ignatiev a Party official, as head of the MVD”

S.Wolin & R.Slusser :”The Soviet Secret Police”; London; 1957; p.20.

“Abakumov, Beria’s intimate friend was removed from his post and replaced by S.D.Ignatiev.”

Levytsky op cit p.204

In corroboration of Bland’s point of view, it is also alleged by Sudoplatov that Abakumov was an ally of Beria (Sudoplatov; Ibid; p.324). However this view is contested by Amy Knight- who is undoubtedly the most extensive biographer of Beria (albeit a bourgeois historian), available in the English language. Knight claims that:

“Beria’s loyal deputy Merkulov was replaced by Victor Abakumov as head of the MGB late in the summer of 1946. This change was not instigated by Beria who was distressed to lose Merkulov.”

Knight Ibid; p.141.

Knight maintains that Stalin placed Abakumov in charge of the MGB. This is very possible as the pressures on Beria had to be relieved somehow. But it is most unlikely that it was done for the purpose, as Knight maintains, that Stalin wanted to:

“Limit Beria’s pervasive influence on the security organs.”

(Knight Ibid; p.141).

The pressures dictating that Beria should be freed for the work on the nuclear bomb, meant that several loop-holes had opened, for the revisionists to squeeze themselves back into the security apparatus with a view to renewing disruption. As the changes took place, several opportunities arose:

“The following months witnessed numerous changes in both the MVD and MGB as several new deputies arrived, apparently under the auspices of Abakumov and Kruglov. These changes may also have been influenced by the arrival of a new CC secretary A.A.Kuznetsov, who took over party supervision of the police. With the exception of Stepan Mamulov, a longtime Beria crony who became a deputy minister in the MVD, none of the new men were part of Beria’s “Georgian Mafia”, although most had been in the security or internal affairs organs for a long time.”

(Knight Ibid; p.141).

ii) Khrushchev ordered the execution of Abakumov

Abakumov was arrested while Stalin was still alive.

It is thus highly plausible that the arrest itself, coming under Stalin’s life time, might have been a part of the revisionist strategy or the Marxist-Leninist strategy.

However, there is no doubt that Abakumov was tried, after Stalin’s death, in Leningrad before the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court presided over by Lieutenant-Colonel E.L. Zeidin. He was charged with “committing the same crimes as Beria”, and also with having:

“Fabricated the so-called Leningrad Case’, in which many Party and Soviet officials were arrested without grounds and falsely accused of very grave state crimes”.

In Bland: “The Doctors Case & The Death Of Stalin”; Stalin Society; London nd ca 1992; p.66.

Thus Abakumov was then sentenced to death by shooting, by the revisionists. This pro-Abakumov evidence seems to Alliance fragmentary at best.

If Stalin was still alive while Abakumov was imprisoned, it suggests that Stalin did not try to obtain his release. One suspects that were Beria to be imprisoned, Stalin would have moved heaven and earth to get him out.

What evidence is there against Abakumov?

The Case Against Abakumov

i) Abakumov’s other Allegiances

In 1947, Abakumov revealed the responsibility of Malenkov for some defects in aviation production that were apparently concealed from the state. (Sudoplatov; Ibid; p.315).

Malenkov was given a party reprimand, demotion & a temporary exile to Kazakhstan and removed from the CC secretariat. However Malenkov’s duties were then taken by Aleksei A. Kuznetsov. Sudoplatov claims that: “Kuznetsov & Abakumov soon became friends.”

But if this is truly so, this must shed some doubt and suspicion upon Abakumov’s identity as a Marxist-Leninist, since Kuznetsov was well known to be a close ally of the revisionists Vosnosenky and Khrushchev. As Bland has pointed out in the Marxist-Leninist Research Bureau Report no 2 (reprinted as Alliance Number 17) the Politburo of the CC of the CPSU(B):

“adopted a resolution “On the Anti-Party Actions of the Comrades Aleksey A. Kuznetsov, Mikhail I Rodionov and Pyotr S Popkov.”

Bland ML Research Bureau; Report No.2; London; nd circa 1992; p. 25

Also, as W.B.Bland had previously made clear in the now classic “Restoration of Capitalism in the USSR,” Kuznetsov was an ally of the arch-revisionists Vosnosenky and Khrushchev:

“Party leaders confide that … Vosnosensky and Kuznetsov … (were) in 1949… trying to establish a separate Communist organisation in the Russian Soviet Republic .. With headquarters in Leningrad instead of Moscow.”

C.L. Sulzberger:”The Big Thaw”; New York; 1956;

Also See Bland In “Restoration”; Wembley 1988; reprinted Alliance Number 14; p.342.

Also find Appendix 3 “The Leningrad Plot” at: http://www.virtue.nu/allianceml/

But Stalin is said to have fought for Malenkov’s reinstatement from Sudoplatov’s testimony:

“Stalin however allowed Malenkov to return to Moscow after two months & appointed him deputy prime minster. Beria in this period strongly supported Malenkov.” (Ibid).

Malenkov was a later vacillator and not a firm Marxist-Leninist. But Stalin had clearly recognised the anti-Marxist-Leninist behaviurs of Kuznetsov.

(ii) The General Zhukov Affair

Abakumov was apparently behind various attempts to destroy the career of General Zhukov, and his efforts resulted in the dismissal of Zhukov from the Bolshevik party CC. Using evidence from the imprisoned General Nivikov, Zhukov was charged with conspiracy. In these charges, Novikov had described Zhukov as being of a man of:

“Exceptional ambition” and… A man “namoured with himself”, who loved glory and honour. He was officious and would not tolerate opposition.”

Chaney, Preston: “Zhukov”; 1976; Norman Oklahoma; p. 371.

But as Zhukov’s biographer makes clear, Stalin only reluctantly agreed to an enforced and temporary retreat for Zhukov, pending full investigation saying:

“Nonetheless Comrade Zhukov, you will have to leave Moscow for a while.”

Chaney Ibid; p. 373.

Zhukov was sent to Odessa to run the Military District from June 13th to December 1947.

He was reprimanded in June 1947 for the only single objective negative fact that had emerged on him. What was this? Zhukov had in peacetime awarded an actress with a medal. He was therefore reprimanded then for:

“Improperly rewarding artists in his district. The right to reward reverted in peacetime to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.”

Chaney Ibid; p. 374.

In December 1947 Zhukov was summoned to the Central committee Plenum where he heard his charges read out. Upon hearing that no new facts were stated he refused to argue, and when he saw that the ensuing vote had expelled him from the Central Committee, he simply marched out. All other allegations, against Zhukov remained un-proven. But as Chaney says, Stalin remained unconvinced of Zhukov’s “error”:

“Despite their relentless effort to have Zhukov arrested, Beria and Abakumov failed to convince Stalin of the Marshall’s guilt. As Khrushchev told Zhukov later, Stalin said to Beria:
“I don’t believe anyone that Zhukov would agree to this. I know him well. He is a straightforward person; he is sharp and can say unpleasant things to anyone bluntly, but he will never be against the Central Committee.”
Another version was that Stalin said:
“No, I won’t arrest Zhukov. I know him well. For four years of war, I knew him better that my own self.”

Chaney Ibid; p. 375.

Thus it was Stalin who resisted the attacks on Zhukov, in which to a large extent Abakumov was involved. Naturally, others were also involved in the complex battles, and the inter-relationships become important, to attempt to systematically work out.

From 1947 General Rukhadze was placed in the Ministership of state security of Georgia, having been in the war years, the head of SMERSH in the Caucasus. According to Sudoplatov his anti-Beria inclinations were well known. (Sudoplatov; Ibid; p.321.)

He was assisted by Ryumin, who later becomes a key figure in the subsequent anti-Marxist-Leninist plots, that became known to the world at large as the “Anti-Zionist Plot” and the “Doctors’ Plot.”

We will return to Abakumov below, when we examine his testimony on the murder of Mikhoels and the Doctor’s Plot (See below).

But at least some evidence cited to this point in this report, continues to identify Abakumov as an honest Marxist-Leninist.

Given the obvious truth that the revisionists were responsible for his death, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that as Bland has it, Abakumov was an honest Marxist-Leninist.

Source

“Legalizing” the Formation of the State of Israel by the United Nations Partition & the USSR Recognition – 1947

israel-palestinian-loss-of-land

This article was published by Alliance (Marxist-Leninist) as part of the publication Alliance, issue #30, “Marx, Lenin and Stalin on Zionism.”

At the early stages of the Comintern, the views of Lenin were still unchallenged by the later revisionist opposition, who would finally succeed in hi-jacking the Comintern, only by 1928.

Even when Stalin took over the leadership of the CPSU(B), until 1925 his views were not easily ignored. Matters within the Comintern, were however dominated by the succeeding revisionist factions – first of Zinoviev, and then those of Bukharin, and then by that of Dimitrov-Kuussinen-Manuilsky.

At the early stages then, policies were in general correctly Marxist-Leninist. For instance, article (11f), was passed at the Second Congress of Comintern (still attended by Lenin), that condemned the attempts of foreign imperialism to establish the divisive “Jewish” state of Israel; in Arab Palestine.

“(11 f) It is essential constantly to expose and to explain to the widest masses of the working people everywhere, and particularly in the backward countries, the deception practiced by the imperialist Powers with the help of the privileged classes in the oppressed countries in creating ostensibly politically independent States which are in reality completely dependent on them economically, financially, and militarily. A glaring example of the deception practiced on the working classes of an oppressed nation by the combined efforts of Entente imperialism and the bourgeoisie of that same nations is offered by the Zionists’ venture (And by Zionism as a whole, which under the pretense of creating a Jewish state in Palestine in fact surrenders the Arab working people of Palestine, where the Jewish workers form only a small minority to exploitation by England). In present international circumstances there is no salvation for dependent and weak nations except as an alliance of Soviet republics.”

Theses 2nd Comintern Congress: AThe National & Colonial Question A; Ed J.Degras; Vol 1; p.144.

It must be asked then, why Andrey A. Gromyko, the UN representative of the USSR, and the Soviet ambassador to the USA, voted at the United Nations, to recognise the formation of the state of Israel in 1947? While the European Communist Parties were being ideologically re-educated by the Cominform, in the weakened state of the USSR it turned out that Andrei Gromyko was appointed to the United Nations. Gromyko’s later overt revisionism was clear. But at that time, he was not revealed as a revisionist.

The Palestine Communist Party had been agitating very publicly that there should be no division of the territory of Palestine between Jewish immigrants and the local indigenous Palestinians Arab population. However at the very first session of the UN in San Francisco, Gromyko voted for the division of Palestine and the establishment of the state of Israel. This policy went against the long history of Marxist-Leninists, who had argued that Jews should be assimilated in the country they lived, and should join the class struggle there.

The result was a temporary victory for the revisionist faction inside the leading echelons of the CPSU(B), led by Khrushchev.

As Walter Laquer, one of the most well known historians of the Zionist movement puts it, Gromyko was very much in the vanguard of the push for an independent Israel. Even propelling the hesitant President Truman and the USA into his wake:

“President Truman and his advisers were firmly resolved not to give any lead to the United Nations but to wait for the emergence of a consensus. Much to the surprise of the Zionists the Soviet attitude was much more positive. This first became evident when the Jewish Agency asked to be permitted (as a matter of simple justice’) to appear at the UN on behalf of the Jewish people since the Arabs were already represented there. They had the immediate support of the Soviet delegation, and on May 15 Gromyko spoke not without sympathy about the aspirations towards Palestine of a considerable part of the Jewish people, of the calamities and sufferings they had undergone throughout the last war, (which defy description’) and the grave conditions in which the masses of the Jewish population found themselves after the war. He mentioned partition as one of several possible solutions. This unexpected support continued throughout 1947 and led later that year to the Soviet decision to vote for partition. Traditionally the Soviet attitude to Zionism had been extremely hostile, and since Moscow reverted to is earlier position not long after the state of Israel came into being once can only conclude that the short-lived rapprochement came exactly at the right moment for the Zionists. Without it they would not have stood a chance… On 15 may 1947 the General Assembly approved the establishment of a committee of eleven to investigate the Palestine question to make proposals for a settlement…The UNSCOP committee (United Nations Special Committee on Palestine) majority came out in favour of partition.. And were published on 31 August 1947. Both the majority and the minority reports were drafted by the same man – Dr Ralphe Bunche…. a hesitating President Truman gave his assent to the partition scheme on 9 October 1947… The vote was taken on 29 November and the motion carried by 33 to 13…. The state of Israel came into being at a meeting of the National Council at 4 pm on Friday 14 May 1948.. The first country to recognise the new state was the USA.. Within the next few days the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala Uruguay and other countries followed.”

Laquer W; AA History of Zionism”; New York; 1976; p. 578; 582; 586.

It is clear that Gromyko was also fighting a propaganda war for an independent state of Israel based in Palestine, inside the USSR. Clearly even members of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee (see below) such as Solomon (or Shlomo) Mikhoels were influenced by this, as related by Teller:

“In a small and select group the conversation turned to Gromyko’s speech on the Palestine question. Actor-director Shlomo Mikhoels alluded to a passage in one of the Yiddish classics by Mendel Mocher Sefarim in which a Jew ask a Russian peasant to point him the way to the Land of Israel. “Gromyko”, said Mikhoels in exaltation, “is that good Gentile who shows us the way to the Land of Israel.”

Teller, Judd T: “The Kremlin, The Jews and the Middle East”; p.106; New York; 1957;

What seems to have happened is apparent from recent detailed memorandums that reveal that the USSR first did take a principled Marxist-Leninist line which was then subverted.

In order to be clear, we show this process below, citing both the primary and the secondary source.

The tremendous refugee problem after the war, obviously consisted of a huge Jewish population. The USSR government was already aware of proposals that this should be remedied by the formation of a state inside Germany:

“20 February 1945, the Third European Division of the USSR People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (NKID) sent a memorandum (from the Jewish Committee – dated 11.11.1944 – ed) to Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs V. G. Dekanozov. It informed him that the Soviet Embassy in Italy had forwarded two letters to the NKJD, one addressed to I. V. Stalin, the other to V. M. Molotov, from the Rome-based Jewish Committee of the International Union of Emigrants and Refugees. Enclosed with the letters was a proposal for creating an independent Jewish state on German territory and a map of Germany where the prospective state was delineated.”

Strizhov I;:” The Soviet Position on the Establishment of the State of Israel”; Op Cit; p.303

As will be discussed later, proposals were also made by the progressive Soviet Jews for the resolution of the problem in the Crimean republic of the USSR. However by now, the Zionists had already made Palestine their goal.

Initially the objective reality of a larger settler population – whether illegally arrived or not – inside Palestine was to be confronted by the remaining Marxist-Leninists within the CPSU(B), by the correct insistence that the mandate of Britain over Palestine should be lifted; and possibly replaced by a Mandate responsible to the entire UN.

It was rightly pointed out, by the CPSU(B) Marxist-Leninists, that the British had “failed” to peacefully resolve the situation.

This was articulated on 27 July 1945 in a memo signed by M.M.Litvinov in his post as, Chairman of the “Committee on Preparing Peace Treaties and the Postwar Order.” Although Litvinov was at best a vacillating Marxist-Leninist, and at worst a concious enemy of the USSR state [as several sources can attest to] – nonetheless the key memo itself had been set up by the diplomats within the USSR People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (NKID), who:

“Sent a memorandum entitled ‘The Palestine Question'” to Stalin, Molotov and the Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Its conclusion read:

1. No matter how hard the British may try to prove that their present policy in Palestine conforms to the Balfour Declaration, it is obvious that they have failed to live up to the mandate entrusted to them. This was admitted in the.. statements by high-ranking British statesmen. This is sufficient justification for taking the Palestine mandate away from the British.

2.The Palestine question cannot be duly settled without impinging upon the wishes and rights of Jews or Arabs, or perhaps both. The British government is in equal measure subject to the influence of the Arab states and world Jewry. Hence its difficulties in choosing the correct means to settle the Palestine problem.

3. The US government is subject to the same influences. While British Palestine policy is necessarily affected mainly by orientation towards Arab interests, the American government is subject in the first place to the influence of the powerful US Jewry. It should be recalled that at the latest presidential elections both the Democratic and the Republican parties felt compelled to issue declarations on their attitude to Palestine, demanding unrestricted immigration of Jews and unrestricted rights for Jews to their own land. At the same time, the US government would hardly choose to quarrel with the Arabs, in view of the fact that the oil pipeline from Saudi Arabia in which they have a stake will run through hundreds of kilometres of Arab territory. That would put the US government in as difficult a position regarding Palestine as the British government.

4. The USSR, free from either Arab or Jewish influence, would be in a better position to tackle the Palestine issue. This at least entitles it to request a temporary trusteeship over Palestine until a more radical solution is found.

5. The British attach to Palestine, which guards the approaches to the Suez Canal and has an outlet for Iraqi oil on its territory, too much importance for us to expect them to consent even to a temporary transfer of Palestine to the hands of another state, particularly, the USSR.

6. In the event that the Soviet request is rejected the following solution suggests itself: transfer of Palestine to the collective trusteeship of three states – the USSR, USA and Britain. These three powers will be able to take the requisite decisions collectively, paying less tribute to the opinion of the Arab or the Jewish population than either the American or British government acting on its own would feel obliged to do.

7.The provisions of collective trusteeship shall be bound neither by the Balfour Declaration nor by any promises Britain has earlier given as the mandatary power, so that the new collective administration could tackle the Palestine problem in all fairness, in accordance with the interests of the entire population and the new imperatives of political realities and general security.”

Strizhov I;:” The Soviet Position on the Establishment of the State of Israel”; Op Cit; p.304-305; Citing 5.Arkhiv vneshnei politiki MID SSSR (AVP),fond (f.) . 07,opis’ (op.) 12a, papka (pk.) 42, delo (d.) 6, pp. 36-8

This generally correct line, given the new circumstances, continued to hold until May 1946.

By then the British and the USA imperialists had continued the general policy of divide and rule. They had established the Anglo-American Committee, which had alienated both Jews and Arabs:

“In December 1945 an Anglo-American Committee was set up to investigate the situation in Palestine. It was entrusted with a wide range of tasks connected with the Palestine problem as a whole. The Committee’s report was made public in April 1946 and was met with an outburst of violent recriminations throughout the Arab states and with bitter disappointment on the part of the Jews.”

Strizhov I;:” The Soviet Position on the Establishment of the State of Israel”; Op Cit; p.305

The previous line of the USSR was brought up to date, in order to acknowledge that the Anglo-American Committee had attempted to continue the British imperialist mandate “jointly.”

In the circumstances, the correct Marxist-Leninist line was taken – to use the UN to “reveal the aspirations” of the imperialists to “prevent the interference of other countries” in settling the issue.

It was correctly stated (and consistent with previous Marxist-Leninist views) that anti-racism and anti-Semitism was a reflection of larger forces and could not be dealt with simply by creating a state – that anyway could not “house” every one subject to racism.

Moreover it correctly noted that in the current situation unless the issue was brought up, the British and USA would succeed in enforcing their will – “our silence on the Palestine issue.”

The correct approach however was to allow the Arabs to raise the question at the UN. This was put in an up-dated memo to Dekanozov, Molotov’s Deputy:

“A memorandum entitled ‘The Palestine Question’, based on the results of the Litvinov Committee, was compiled by the Middle East Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry and on 15 May 1946 was sent to Dekanozov. It read: ‘Attempts by Britain and the US jointly to continue the British mandate outside the framework of the UN reveal their aspiration to prevent the interference of other countries in the settlement of the Palestine question until Palestine is fully under the control of the US and Britain. Our silence on the Palestine issue might be interpreted by the US, Britain, Arabs and Jews as the Soviet Union’s partial approval of the proposals put forth by the committee. Bearing this in mind and in view of the fact that official and unofficial representatives of both Arab states and Jewish organizations are running to the Soviet Union in order to have the Palestine problem settled it would be expedient to set forth the Soviet point of view on the Palestine problem in two or three articles to be published in the press. Later our diplomatic representatives may refer to these articles in private conversations if they are approached by Arab or Jewish representatives in connection with the Palestine question.”

Strizhov I;; Op Cit; p.305 citing: AVP, f. 06, op. 08, pk. 42, d. 694, pp. 2-4

After this preamble, the most likely Marxist-Leninist position advisable, was crystallised as being to reject the Anglo-American Committee’s position as “incompetent” and to insist upon abrogation of the British mandate in Palestine:

“Presumably, our position on the Palestine question should be as follows:

1.The Anglo-American committee set up to study the Palestine question without the participation of the UN was not competent to discuss. ..and tackle the Palestine problem without the participation of the parties directly concerned.

2.The Jewish question in Europe cannot be solved through Jewish immigration to Palestine, inasmuch as only complete eradication of racism and the democratization of European countries can create normal conditions for the existence of the Jewish masses.

3.The British mandate in Palestine should be abrogated since it is impeding a radical solution of the Palestine question and jeopardizing security in the Middle East. All foreign troops should be withdrawn from Palestine.

4. Palestine should be placed under the trusteeship of the UN which within a certain period of time will lay the groundwork for a sovereign and democratic Palestine. We must not submit the Palestine question for consideration by the UN. It should be raised by the Arab UN members themselves. We should only voice our opinion and uphold it. It would be expedient to postpone the publication of articles on the Palestine question until the session of the Council of Foreign Ministers has completed its deliberations.”

Strizhov I; Op Cit; p.305 citing: AVP, f. 06, op. 08, pk. 42, d. 694, pp. 2-4

The best elements of the Jewish immigrants into the Palestine lands, were the left wing Poalei-Tsion (led by L. Levite and M. Erem) and the Hashomer-Hatsair Workers Party (led by Y.Barzilai), had participated in the Palestine-USSR Friendship League. They were already in contact with the Soviet Ambassador to Poland V.Z. Lebedev.

As he wrote to Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister A.Ia Vyshinskii, the Hasomer-Hatsair were in agreement with the principle of a federation of an Arab-Jewish state with two national chambers. This differed from the Poalei-Tsion. (Strizhov I; Op Cit; p.306).

The US Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles now showed the USA policy response, which was to accept the challenge of ensuring an imperialist led take-over of the United Nations.

Accordingly the British were persuaded to agree publicly to their failure:

“In mid-February 1947 the British government officially admitted that since it was unable to find a solution to the Palestine problem, it was going to ask the United Nations to recommend one.”

Strizhov Op Cit; p.307; citing Sumner Welles, We Need Not Fail (Boston:1948), p.41.

Even as late as 5 March 1947, the Middle East Department of The USSR Foreign Ministry were pursuing a correct Marxist-Leninist line.

They sent Vyshinskii a memo entitled “The Palestine Problem” (October 1946-February 1947), which based itself upon the previously cited points 2 and 3 of the May memo.

But more public stands were shortly to be needed by the Soviet hidden revisionist representatives to the UN. By 6 March the UN Soviet delegate Boris Shtein had noted that although until then, the UN had “refrained from formulating its stand on the Palestine question,” the fact that the discussion was now tabled would force a public stand by the USSR.

This was an ideal opportunity for the Soviets take the principled Marxist-Leninist line: to demand the withdrawal of British troops, the full independence for Palestine, and a full democratic statute.

But since Arab-Jewish “contradictions” would still exist, the resolution could only be exercised via a United Nations “collective trusteeship” – specifically thereby rejecting a British “trusteeship” only.

At least this would ensure the possibility of real Soviet brakes upon the Zionist settlers and their wars against the Arabs for land.

This line was indeed put, or outlined, in the following internal memo to Vyshinsky:

“Up until now the USSR has refrained from formulating its stand on the Palestine question. However, the upcoming discussion of the issue by the UN impels us to formulate our position. First of all, the USSR must come out resolutely for the abrogation of Britain’s Palestine mandate. Britain has not coped with its responsibilities as the mandatary power. Throughout the duration of the mandate… Britain has not succeeded in establishing order in the country and preventing almost un-intermittent bloodshed. Substituting British trusteeship for the mandate is also out of the question. The change of signboard will not change anything. What could be considered is collective trusteeship over Palestine by the UN as an organization or by several nations (in effect, permanent Security Council members). However, this possibility is excluded by the fact that the population of the country, both Arabs and Jews, are mature enough for independence. Neither Arabs nor Jews would agree to any trusteeship whatsoever and want complete independence. The Soviet Union cannot but support the demand for full independence for Palestine.. The withdrawal of British troops from the country should be the first and obligatory precondition for the independence of Palestine. Still, granting independence to Palestine would not take the edge off Arab-Jewish contradictions in the country. The Soviet Union cannot see any way of settling them other than by democratic means. Thus, alongside independence, Palestine should obtain a democratic statute ensuring full and genuine equality (civil, political and national) for the population of Palestine as a whole. The statute is to be worked out by the UN Organization, which is subsequently to become a guarantor of its implementation. The fact that Britain has relegated the Palestine question to the United Nations for discussion, enables the USSR for the first time not only to voice its views on the issue but also to take an active part in Palestine’s fate.”

Strizhov I; Op Cit; Citing p.308; AVP, f. 07, op. 12, pk. 42, d. 6, pp. 140-1.

In Gromyko’s speech of 17 May 1947, made to the UN, he correctly pointed out, in accordance with the general USSR line, that:

“The mandate administration established in Palestine in 1922 has not proved itself.”

Strizhov I; OP Cit; p.308.

He even went on to note, that no single West European state had protected the “elementary rights” of the Jewish people, and that “vast numbers” were homeless and without subsistence. Again this was consistent with the line evolved previously.

But then he radically departed from the previously agreed line – of setting up a democratic Palestine with “full and genuine equality for all the population of Palestine as a whole.”

Instead Gromyko proposed a Partition of Palestine, seemingly as a fall-back position, if a democratic Palestine was not agreeable.

In reality this unacceptable and revisionist line was designed to open the door on an imperialist settlement of the Palestine question:

“Gromyko pointed out that neither past history’ nor the conditions now obtaining in Palestine’ justified a one-sided settlement of the Palestine question’ that ignored the legitimate rights’ of both the Arab and Jewish populations. The Soviet delegation had come to the conclusion that the legitimate interests of both the Jewish and the Arab peoples of Palestine could be safeguarded only if an integral Arab Jewish democratic state’ were established. If this variant proved unattainable’ due to the deterioration of Arab-Jewish relations, then it would be necessary to consider the second variant, which had gained currency in Palestine: the partition of Palestine into two independent sovereign states – one Jewish and one Arab.”

Strizhov I;:Op Cit; p.309; 1zvestiia, 16 May 1947.

It is not surprising, that some Zionist observers were surprised by this line from someone claiming to be the representative of the USSR, as the line was quite in “contradiction to the explicitly anti-Zionist attitude”:

“Gromyko’s speech, an Israeli diplomat commented many years later, ‘was in complete contradiction to the explicitly anti-Zionist attitude which both communist ideologists and practical politicians had expressed repeatedly and consistently over several decades.. therefore came as a great surprise.”

Strizhov I;:Op Cit; p.309; Avigdor Dagan, Moscow and Jerusalem” (London, 1970), pp. 19-20.

On the 15 May 1947, UNSCOP (United Nations Special Committee On Palestine) was established and it reported to the General Assembly on 13 October 1947. Speaking in support of partition, the Soviet representative Tsarapkin:

“Pointed out that the Jews’ desire to create their own state was understandable, and it would be unjust to deny the Jewish people the right to realize these aspirations. The creation of a Jewish State has become a ripe and urgent issue’.Having supported in principle the recommendations submitted by a majority in the special committee’ for the partition of Palestine, he declared: If this session of the General Assembly decides to establish a Jewish and an Arab state, it would be a big stride forward in the settlement of the Palestine question as a whole.”

Strizhov I;:” ASoviet Position”; Op Cit; p. 309-310; Pravda, 16th October 1947.

The final proposals were put to the General Assembly after having been agreed to by the ad hoc committee including the Soviet Ukrainian and Belorussian delegates:

“On 25 November 1947 the ad hoc committee adopted the proposal for the partition of Palestine into two states, one Arab and one Jewish. The Soviet, Ukrainian and Belorussian delegates all voted for the proposal. The Partition Plan was considered and put to the vote at the General Assembly plenary sessions held between 26-29 November 1947. The session’s proceedings were marked by heated debate.”

Strizhov I; “Soviet Position”; Ibid; p. 310.

When on 26 November 1947, Gromyko addressed the plenary session, he defended Partition on the grounds that it met the demands of the Jewish people, and he insisted that the Soviet delegation had been insistent and quite un-ambiguous upon this matter:

“The resolution of the question of Palestine on the basis of its partition into two independent states will have great historic significance inasmuch as it meets the legitimate demands of the Jewish people…In the opinion of the Soviet delegation, the plan for the settlement in Palestine submitted by the committee and stipulating that the Security Council is to be entrusted with its practical implementation, fully coincides with the interests of maintaining and strengthening international peace and the promotion of inter-state cooperation. Therefore the Soviet delegation supports the recommendation for the partition of Palestine. Unlike some other delegations, the Soviet delegation has from the very outset taken a clear-cut and unambiguous stand upon this question and is consistently upholding it. It will not engage in manoeuvring or manipulations with votes as is regrettably the case at the Assembly, in particular in connection with the debates on the Palestine issue.”

Strizhov I; Ibid; p. 310; vnethnaiapohuha Soretskogo Sniuza (Moscow, 1948), pp. 244-2, 244-5.

On 29 November 1947 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 181(11) on the partition of Palestine into two states. This decision, endorsed the establishment of the State of Israel.

Resolution 181(11) established in January 1948, a special UN commission to “supervise” preparations for the creation of the Arab and the Jewish states.

While this objectively supported the long term imperialist plans for the Middle East, a certain myopia on the part of the imperialists prevented their seeing immediately that they should be pleased.

Initially therefore, it encountered opposition from the British who obstructed its’ work. On the floor of the UN, the US supported the British and argued that it was not possible to perform the task of partition peacefully. But the USA in turn was heatedly opposed by Gromyko who insisted that there should be no such problem:

“The work of the commission generated acrimonious debate and differences in the UN Security Council which was to ensure the implementation of the resolution. At the Security Council meeting on 19 March 1948 the United States representative Warren Austin submitted a proposal for convening the 2nd Special Session of the General Assembly ‘to establish UN trustee-ship over Palestine’, claiming that ‘it is allegedly impossible to carry out the Palestine partition program.. .by peaceful means’. In reply, Soviet representative Gromyko declared that the US stand had nothing in common with the General Assembly resolution and that the Soviet Union could not agree with that position.”

Strizhov I; “Soviet Position”; Ibid; p.310; Pravda, 21 March 1948.

Because of the impasse, it was sponsored that the UN establish a trusteeship plan. This had been the original Soviet intention as shown by the above memos put to the Foreign Ministry.

Now however, Gromyko expressly argued against these plans, and in effect, Gromyko ensured that partition would occur with very likely, a quick Israeli take-over of the whole of Palestine:

“On 30 March 1948 when two US resolutions providing for an immediate truce between the Arabs and the Jews and the convocation of a special General Assembly session to reconsider the earlier decision on partition were submitted to the Security Council, Gromyko criticized the US trusteeship plan, characterizing the partition of Palestine as a just solution and insisting that US allegations about the impossibility of effecting the partition by peaceful means were groundless. He said the Palestine Commission should continue its work in order to carry out the partition ‘so long as the General Assembly decisions remained in force’. “

Strizhov I; “Soviet Position”; Ibid; p.310-311; Pravda, 1 April 1948.

Now that in effect the damage had been done, the Soviet delegation promptly abstained from the decision to convene a special General Assembly. But at the General Assembly hearing on 20 April 1948, Gromyko again severely attacked the USA and Britain for refusing to accept partition:

“They are out to torpedo the partition decision and impose on the United Nations their decision on Palestine’s future, prompted by the self-seeking interests of the US ruling circles..have put forward new.. proposals to establish trusteeship over Palestine.”

Strizhov I; “Soviet Position”; Ibid; p. 311; Izvestiia, 23 April 1948.

The rejection of the previously “acceptable” UN trusteeship line, was now masked in high flown language as expressed by Tsarapkin:

“On 3 May 1948 Tsarapkin, addressing the 1st Committee, rejected the US attempts to impose a trusteeship regime on the peoples of Palestine’. He said: The high level of cultural, social, political and economic development of the Jewish people is indisputable. Such a people should not be put under trusteeship. Such a people has every right to a sovereign state of its own. Any attempts to impose trusteeship on such a people will only discredit the main idea and essence of trusteeship. And are the Palestinian Arabs less deserving of independent existence in their own state than Arabs living outside Palestine? Certainly not. Both the Jewish and the Arab people in Palestine have undoubtedly reached such a stage of political, economic and social development that placing them under trusteeship of any kind is out of the question.”

Strizhov I; “Soviet Position”; Ibid; p. 311; Izvestiia, 6 May 1948.

What was therefore the USA and British motives in now delaying?

It is true that the certain perceptive USA diplomats probably correctly and honestly, viewed the Partition as “un-workable.” Loy Henderson’s memorandum of September 22 was entitled “Certain Considerations Against Advocacy by the USA of the Majority Plan” and argued against Partition as follows:

“In summary, Henderson’s main points were that support of the majority plan would undermine US relations withe the Arab and Moslem worlds; that the USA would be expected to make a major contribution to the implementation of the Plan; that any plan for partitioning Palestine was unworkable; that adoption of the plan would not dispose of the Palestine problem; and finally that the proposals in the plan Awere not based on any principle of an international character…. but in definite contravention of… the Charter of the UN as well as the principles on which American Concepts of government are based.”

Wilson E.M. “Decision On Palestine-How the US Came to Recognise Israel”; Stanford;1979; p.117

But the real reason of the higher politicians of the USA, was to enable the maximum possible land grabbing by the Zionists.

While the filibustering at the UN was going on, the Jewish settlers were feverishly grabbing land and terrorising the Palestinians. This reality was referred to, but in a veiled manner by Gromyko who in effect – again simply justified the on-going practical “partition” as a “reality”:

“At the 1st Committee Session on 4 May 1948, Gromyko called on the General Assembly to admit that partition was in fact being implemented. This, he said, was clear from a statement made by a representative of the UN Secretariat, from reports of the Jewish Agency and publications in the US and elsewhere. ‘While the General Assembly is engaged in discussions, the Jewish state will become a reality despite the efforts of some UN members to create all kinds of obstacles’, he asserted.”

Finally the discussions were ended by the practical establishment of the state of Israel.

It was claimed by Pravda that the USA had “suffered a fiasco”:

“On 14 May 1948 the Special Session of the UN General Assembly ended, for on that day the establishment of the State of Israel was proclaimed in Tel Aviv. Pravda commented: ADevelopments at the Special Session of the General Assembly showed that the US, on whose initiative it had been convened, suffered a fiasco. The initial plans of the US were frustrated. The US delegation did not even dare to put its proposal for establishing a trusteeship regime over the whole of Palestine to the vote. The General Assembly also rejected the British proposal for a provisional regime for Palestine. This proposal, amounting to trusteeship but presented in a disguised form, was criticized by the delegation of the USSR and some other countries. In the course of the debate on the Palestine issue, the USSR pursued a consistent policy, upholding the decision on the partition of Palestine and exposing all scheming with respect to Palestine.”

After the fait accompli, when “On 16 May 1948 Moshe Shertok (later Sharett), Foreign Minister of the Provisional Government of Israel, sent a cable to Molotov”, asking for official recognition it was granted:

“In a telegram to Shertok of 17 May 1948 Molotov replied:
‘This is to inform you that the Government of the USSR has decided to extend official recognition to the State of Israel and its Provisional Government. The Soviet Government believes that the creation by the Jewish people of its sovereign state will serve the cause of strengthening peace and security in Palestine and the Middle East and expresses confidence that friendly relations between the USSR and the State of Israel will develop successfully.”

Strizhov I;:” ‘Soviet Position”; Ibid; p. 313; Pravda, 18 May 1948.

Soon after, within a month later, on 26 June 1948, the appointments were announced of P.I. Ershov, as “USSR Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in the State of Israel”; and of Mrs. Golda Meyerson “Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the State of Israel in the USSR”. (Strizhov I;:” ASoviet Position”; Ibid; p. 313). On 7 September 1948 Golda Meyerson, was received by Molotov in Moscow:

“After presenting her credentials, she said that her government had instructed her to take the first opportunity to express to Molotov the gratitude of the people and Government of the State of Israel for the help rendered by the Soviet Union in the United Nations….. The Soviet Government, Molotov replied, regarded this as its duty, all the more so in that it was fully in keeping with Soviet USSR policy vis-a-vis other peoples’… Molotov pointed out that the State of Israel was off to a good start and that there was a basis for the creation of a viable state.”

Strizhov I; “Soviet Position”; Ibid; p.314; AVP, f. 06, op. 10, pk. 46, d. 623, p.1.

As only one of the outstanding issues (leaving aside the whole matter of the Arab peoples’ response to this “legalised theft” of their lands) was that of continued Jewish immigration, and from where this would come? Would there be immigration from the USSR?

It was asserted by the diplomatic heads of the USSR that this would be from the “capitalist countries” if at all, and not from the Soviet countries. This was the previous Marxist-Leninist line of the Soviet Foreign Ministry until it was subverted by Gromyko:

“On 15 September 1948, while on a protocol visit to I. N. Bakulirt, head of the Middle East Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry, Meyerson declared:
‘The State of Israel will become viable when its population increases several-fold”.
Bakulin, like Deputy Foreign Ministers V. A. Zorin and F. T. Guseev to whom Meyerson also paid her respects on 15 and 17 September, respectively, made it clear that this immigration would have to come solely from the capitalist countries and that Israel could not even cope with all the repressed and persecuted Jews from these countries.”

Strizhov I; “Soviet Position”; Ibid; p.314;AVP, f 06, op. 10, pk. 46, d. 624, p.1.

There are as far as we know, no documents that show an approval of Gromyko’s step in the partition of Palestine – a step that allowed the formation of a singular state of Israel – by Stalin or the other minority Marxist-Leninists of the Central Committee.

This apparent volte-face by the USSR leaders of the international communist movement, totally alienated the Palestinian communists who were left very weakened. It has certainly assisted the alienation of the best of the Arab militants from the Marxist-Leninist movement. In Gromyko’s own English version of his memoirs, there is no discussion of this episode. (Gromyko “Memoirs”; New York; 1989. )

Nor is there any discussion of this episode in the official “History of Soviet Foreign Policy” edited by Gromyko himself, with another revisionist B.N. Ponomarev. (Gromyko A.A. & Ponomorev B.N. Ed:”Soviet Foreign Policy; 1945-1980″; Vol II; Moscow; 1980). Nonetheless, Gromyko does point out that a key member of the Soviet delegation to the UN was another arch-revisionist – Dmitri Manuilsky:

“At San Francisco and later at the first four sessions of the General Assembly and a number of other international meetings up to 19563 the Soviet Ukrainian delegation was invariably headed by Dmitri Zakharyevich Manuilsky, for whom I had the deepest regard.”

Gromyko “Memoirs” Ibid; p. 128.

The argument is today raised that: “Stalin sabotaged the Palestinian struggle”.
Various explanations to supposedly “explain Stalin’s support of the formation of Israel” are offered by non Marxist-Leninist sources.

We examine these below.

Standard Non Marxist-Leninist Explanations For “Stalin’s Support of Israel”;

1. “Stalin wanted to alienate the Arab Nations from the British”

Sudoplatov, amongst others, suggests it was deliberate ploy to undermine British rule:

“Clearly the intention was to strengthen the Soviet stand in the Middle East and to undermine the British influence among Arab states who objected to the Jewish state, by showing their inability to stop the Jews.”

Sudoplatov; op cit; p.292-293.

It is also alleged by Sudoplatov that Stalin said to Vetrov, who was Molotovs’ assistant & later an Ambassador to Denmark:

“Let’s agree to the establishment of Israel. This will be a pain in the ass for the Arab states & will make them turn their backs on the British. In the long run it will totally undermine British influence in Egypt, Syria, Turkey and Iraq”.

Albert Axell, “Stalin’s War Throughout the Eyes of His Commanders”; New York; 1997; p.296.

This tortuous explanation, in an alleged quotation from Stalin (rather like the older school of historians who state that in 1066 on a certain date and hour, William had a vision after eating grapes and said that he dreamed of his dynasty etc…) is buttressed by a “conversation with a confidential source”, who yet… remains nameless.

2. “Stalin wanted to justify pre-emptively an attack upon Soviet Jewry”:

He “wanted to neutralize the rumors about his changed course on the nationality policy… He felt that he had a psychological and political alibi for future events (arrests exiles, propaganda campaigns).” Vaksberg; Op Cit; p.184

We reject these “explanations” as self-evidently superficial, and again rather strained. But then what does explain these events?

A MARXIST-LENINIST ARGUMENT TO UNDERSTAND WHAT HAPPENED

We argue instead, that the only logical answer is two-fold:

(1) Firstly, the USSR, was not under Stalin’s full un-impeded control. Even following the victory of the Great People’s Anti-Fascist War, revisionist influence within the CPSU and in the leading echelons of the so called People’s Democracies undermined Marxist-Leninist policies; Stalin and the Marxist-Leninists, were in a minority in the Central Committee of the CPSU(B).

(2) Secondly, that post Second World War, Stalin and the USSR were in a position of a temporary objective weakness with respect to the foreign imperialism of the USA. Although epitomised by the “Atomic Gap”, closing that gap still left the USSR in an objectively weaker position than the USA.

PREMISE 1: Stalin And Marxists-Leninists Were In A Minority

Many lines of evidence make clear that revisionists had gone underground in order to continue subverting the Soviet Union, and outnumbered the honest Marxist-Leninists. Even astute observers of the USSR like President Harry S. Truman of the USA, who was a deadly foe of Communism, observed that:

“Stalin was a prisoner of the Politburo’.”

Resis A: ’Stalin, the Politburo & Onset of the Cold War. 1945-1946″, no.701, Carl Beck papers, Pittsburgh 1988; p.9. Citing D.Yergin: the Shattered Peace.”; Boston; 1977.; pp 101-104.

Previous issues of Alliance have discussed the general analysis underpinning this premise. In order to erect a facade behind which the revisionists could operate, a cult of Stalin was built. As time goes by, more evidence supporting this view emerges. We cite a participant in the Second World War:

“Konoplyanko, ex-KGB officer:
“I would put the blame for Stalin’s cult not so much on Stalin himself, but mostly on his environment – the cult was launched from the top not from the bottom.. His toadies and bootlickers competed in currying favour with him by praising him to the skies.”

A.Axell Ibid; p.179-180

It is true that the victory of the USSR in the Second World War gave the Marxist-Leninists strength. This victory was gained, in spite of the enormous sabotage performed from within the party and the army, both penetrated by traitors to the Soviet Union. This is confirmed by interviews with several of Stalin’s generals. For instance with General Shavrov:

“Author: General what puzzles me is why would Stalin undercut himself, I mean weaken the army with the pre-war purges? (Von Rauch says that of 6,000 of Stalin’s highest ranking officers who were arrested on charge of treason, 1500 were executed.”

Shavrov: “The T-34 tank was delivered to the army in 1939.. The weak points (were identified).. In two months time after the tanks was sent back to the factory, the whole research team on the T-34 was arrested.. Who gave the order? We don’t think it was Stalin. Nobody knows for certain who was responsible. Was it treason? Of course Hitler was interested in this.. I know another case.. The Lake Khasan Battle against the Japanese army in 1938. When the Japanese struck were about 200 miles away… That night and for a few more days, our regimental commanders, divisional commandeers, and senior commanders were arrested. At the very moment of the Japanese attack!.. Who did it? This question is still un-answered.”

A.Axell Ibid; p.20.

General Sergeyev has a similar view of the degree of sabotage:

“In 1990, General Igor Sergeyev, who was Deputy Commander-in-chief of Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces disclosed that 35,000 commanders’ were expelled from the Party and arrested in 1937-8. Between 1932 and 1939, the army’s numerical strength actually decreased. He said that experienced soldiers were replaced with hastily trained men’”.

A.Axell Ibid; p. 34

Similar is the testimony of the Czech President Eduard Benes:

“The Czech President Eduard Benes in his post war memoirs said that he learned in 1937 of the existence of the anti-Stalin clique in the Red Army which had close contacts with the Nazi officers.. Czech officials are said to have been shocked to learn that their country’s’s military secrets hitherto known only to the Russians through their mutual aid alliance, were also know to the German high Command. The secrets they claimed were given to Berlin by Marshall Mikhail Tukhachevsky. Some corroboration came from G.E.R. Gedye, the Prague correspondent of the New York Times, who cabled on 18 June that Atwo of the highest officials in Prague” say that the they have ‘definite knowledge that secret connection between the German General Staff and certain high Russian generals have existed since Rapallo.”

A.Axell Ibid; p.35

Stalin’s general response to this sabotage, within the Marxist-Leninist movement, both internally and externally of the USSR, was to weld together a small group of solidly Marxist-Leninist elements around him; to continue to pursue a correct line both outside and within the USSR.

Externally, the approach led to the creation of the Cominform, to pursue the task of ensuring Marxist-Leninist leadership in the Peoples’ Democracies. This occurred after a certain consolidation had taken place.

Internally within the USSR, this policy led to among other things, the creation of a Foreign Policy bureau to deal with the post Second World War manipulations of imperialism. Stalin took the Politburo function of foreign relations into his own hands, and he placed key tasks in the safekeeping of a few chosen comrades, a “sextet” of proven Marxist-Leninists upon whom Stalin could place trust:

“In the conduct of his postwar foreign policies Stalin had no use for the ordinary type of foreign ministry.. he reserved all important decisions to himself.. For a number of years the Politburo was practically eliminated; to Akeep some members away from participation in the decision,” a Asextet” was appointed to deal with international as well as a number of other issues. Among the members of the small committee, in addition to Stalin were Vyacheslev Molotov, Lavrenti Beria, Georgi Malenkov, and until his death in 1948, Andrei Zhdanov.”

Dallin D.J. “Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin”; Philadelphia 1961; p.3.

Stalin attempted to place strategically important branches of the foreign department directly under his own control:

“No less important than the sextets’ and septets’ was the large Foreign Department of the CC of the CPSU, the existence of which was not publicly acknowledged.. It was divided into sections by countries. The ties between these sections and the corresponding offices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were often very close. While the official Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not always headed by a member of the supreme Politburo-Presidium (For example neither Maxim Litvinov or Andrei Vyshinsky was a member of the Politburo), the foreign department of the CC was the organ of the “general” or “first” secretary.. This left the ultimate power.. In the hand of the party’s leader.”

Dallin D.J. “Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin”; Philadelphia 1961; p.3.

Even then the revisionists were too numerous to be kept entirely out of influential positions. For example, Nikolai Voznosensky – who was a revisionist already under suspicion but only later unmasked by Stalin, was added to the small “sextet” group. It is extremely doubtful that this was “on Stalin’s suggestion” as suggested by Dallin. As detailed elsewhere, Stalin had already realised the nature of Voznosensky’s revisionism. (See For instance Issues Number 12 and 14 of Alliance.)

But in fact it was only later, in 1949 in fact to effect Voznosensky’s arrest and execution. But wherever possible, Stalin ensured that the more steadfast and resolute Marxist-Leninists took the leading and responsible roles. Zhdanov was in the highest and most trusted category:

“In the early 1940’s the Foreign department of the CC was headed by Georgi Malenkov. Malenkov was succeeded by Andrei Zhdanov, whose role was enhanced when the leadership of the dissolved Comintern was incorporated into one of the departments of the CC.”… In 1944-45 under Zhdanov’s direction the Foreign Section of the CC carried out the remarkable operation of dispatching to the respective countries the leaders of the future governments of the satellites selected among emigres in the Soviet Union. The foreign Ministry acquired growing importance in the postwar era as the channel for relations with the communist parties of the satellites.”

Resis; Ibid; p. 4.

Again attempting to ensure Marxist-Leninist control, Stalin removed Ivan Maisky and Maxim Litvinov from diplomatic functions in London and Washington. But since all posts could not possibly be filled without recourse to skills that the revisionists undoubtedly still retained, they were given a post in heading two commissions – respectively the commission for state reparations and the commission for postwar peace treaties. (Vladislav Zubok & Pleshakov, Constantine “Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War-From Stalin to Khrushchev”; Cambridge Mass; 1996; p.28).

The two key ambassador posts in the USA and England were filled initially by Molotov. Litvinov in particular was suspected of secret contacts with the Western ruling classes. This was confirmed when he met with the CBS correspondent Richard C. Hottelet, and warned him to alert the West that “they had to beware of Soviet ambitions for territory,” saying:

“The outmoded concept of security in terms of territory – the more you’ve got the safer you are”.. No Western concessions would satisfy the Soviet leadership.”

Zubok & Pleshakov, Ibid p.37-38.

“If the West acceded to Soviet demands.. It would lead to the West being faced, after a more or less short time, with the next series of demands.”

D.Holloway; Op Cit; p.167

It was fully intended by Litvinov, that President Truman would be informed of this conversation, and “in secret” he was so informed. However Soviet Security was also aware of what had transpired. Within a month Litvinov was relieved of his position. One year later Litvinov told Alexander Werth a Western journalist in Moscow:

“That Russia could have cashed in on the goodwill that it had accumulated during the war, but that Stalin & Molotov did not believe that goodwill provided a lasting basis for policy; they had therefore grabbed all they could while the going was good.”

D.Holloway; Op Cit; p.167

In Summary, even though the Bolshevik party, was penetrated by revisionists, Stalin tried to ensure a personal control of the Ministry of Foreign affairs. However, given the paucity of Marxist-Leninists in the leading echelons of the CPSU, revisionists like Gromyko and Manuilsky, and Vosnoskensky were able to slip into key positions like that at the UN.

PREMISE 2: The Objectively Weak Post-war Soviet Union

How can it be legitimately argued that the Soviet state was objectively weak – even if only temporarily – over 1945-1948? After all the Soviet Union had just in effect, been the decisive factor in liberating the world from German and Japanese fascism. The heroic self-sacrifice of the USSR and its peoples in the war had gained many admirers in the working classes of the world. However, the Soviet people had been through an enormously costly war, moreover one on its own land, and a new frightening technology of the atomic bomb had been used.

(i) Human and Material Losses of the USSR in the Second World War

Neither the USA nor even the British had suffered the degree of destruction of either the industry, or the human resources that the USSR had. Professor John Erikson estimated in 1994, that the German invasion had led to 49 million solider and civilian deaths in Russia, far more than the previous conservative estimate of 20-25 million. In addition there was a drastic decline in Russian’ birth rate. (Cited by Axell A, Ibid; p. 177). The material damage was huge also :

“In July 1944 the Emergency State Commission headed by Niklai Svernik put a preliminary figure of damage at 375 billion rubles, not including damages to a large portion of Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Baltic countries, and the Finnish Karelia. The Maisky Commission (Ivan Maisky was head of the Reparations Commission of the Soviet Union-ed) assessed the overall damage Amust be no less than 700-800 billion rubles… surpassing the national wealth of Germany or England..”

Zubok & Pleshakov; Ibid; p.31.

Stalin pointed out to US Senator Claude Pepper on September 15th 1945, that (Cited Resis p. 3 Ibid. From:FRUS 1945, Vol V 881-893; dated Sep 15th 1945):

“Our people are tired, they couldn’t be induced to make war on anybody anymore.”

It is apparent that a certain degree of war weariness was bound to affect decision making. This affected the manner in which re-building the Soviet Union was approached.

(ii) The Post-Hiroshima Reality

As early as March 1942, the highest echelons of Soviet government were aware of the activities in the West towards the bomb. The secret British Maud Report of July 1941 had concluded that:

“It will be possible to make an effective uranium bomb which, containing some 25 il of active material, would be equivalent as regards destructive effect to 1,800 tons of T.N.T.; and would also release a large quantity of radioactive substances which would make places near to where the bomb exploded dangerous to human life for a long period.”

D.Holloway:”Stalin and the Bomb”; New Haven, 1994; p.79

Details of this were obtained by Anatolii Gorskii (codename Vadim) the NKVD London resident, and John Cairncross and Klaus Fuchs and transmitted to Beria. (D.Holloway:”Stalin and the Bomb”; New Haven, 1994; p82). Beria sent a memorandum to Stalin and the State Defence Committee urging evaluation of this information. (D.Holloway:”Stalin and the Bomb”; New Haven, 1994; p.84). Although a USSR nuclear programme was undertaken soon, the reality was that the decision itself was taken during the siege of Stalingrad. Consequently initial progress was understandably slow.

The scientific advances made under the Manhattan Project in the USA were also well known to the USSR. As the war proceeded, the imminent defeat of the Germans raised the question of joint Allied intervention against Japan. At Yalta, the meeting took place between Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, at which plans for the post war period were drawn up. In the section entitled “Agreement Regarding Japan”, it was made clear that after Germany’s surrender (“in two or three months time”), the USSR would enter into war against Japan on condition that the USSR regained its rights in the border zones with Japan, and was granted the Kurile Islands. In full these conditions were that:

“1. The status quo in Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian People’s Republic) shall be preserved.
2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz:
a) The southern part of Sakhalin as well as the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union;
(b) The commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded, and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U.S.S.R. restored;
(c) The Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad, which provide an outlet to Dairen, shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese company, it being understood that the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain sovereignty in Manchuria;
3. The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.”

(February 11, 1945. “A Decade of American Foreign Policy : Basic Documents, 1941-49; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC: 1950. WWW: World War II Page WW II Conferences Page; Avalon Home Page: William C. Fray & Lisa A. Spar.).

It was explicitly noted that reference to Outer Mongolia would require the “concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek.” But this was to be pursued by the USA President Roosevelt, and these claims of the USSR were to Abe unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.” But then, by the next meeting of the Allied leaders, at the Potsdam Conference of July 1945, the USA had successfully exploded a test device at Alamogordo on July 16th. In the interim Roosevelt had died.

Marshall Zhukov relates how Stalin and Molotov discussed the seemingly “casual” probing statement of the new USA President- Harry Truman, to Stalin that the USA had a “new weapon of unusual destructive force”:

“They’re raising the price,” said Molotov.
Stalin gave a laugh, “Let them. We’ll have to.. speed up our work.”

Holloway D; Ibid; p. 117.

Obviously both Stalin and Molotov understood the implications of Truman’s remark.

The USA exploded the first nuclear devices used in warfare – at Hiroshima on August 6th 1945 and Nagasaki on August 9th 1945. At this stage, the USSR programme was still incomplete.

So the USA possession of the atomic bomb was a potent threat, as both the American and the Soviet state leaders understood. As Yuli Khariton, a scientist who became one of the Soviet creators of the bomb said (Zubok & Pleshakov; Ibid; p.43):

“The Soviet Government interpreted Hiroshima as atomic blackmail against USSR, as a threat to unleash a new even more terrible and devastating war.”

This assessment accords with that of the British Ambassador to the USSR, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr who wrote to then Foreign Secretary Eden:

“The victory over Germany had made the Soviet leaders confident that national security was at last within their reach.
“Then plumb came the Atomic bomb.. At a blow the balance which had seemed set and steady was rudely shaken. Russia was baulked by the West when everything seemed to be within her grasp. The three hundred divisions were shorn of much of their value.”

Cited in D.Holloway:”Stalin and the Bomb”; New Haven, 1994; p.154.

This atomic possession, grounded a new threatening approach of the USA. This was manifested when Truman demanded the “right” of safe entry to any world port they “needed for security”. This threat, was specified in Truman’s Navy Day Address when he announced the so called 12 Principles of operating for the USA state:

“On Navy Day October 27 1945, President Harry S.Truman set forth his views … Although the US was demobilizing rapidly.. It would still retain the largest Navy. in the world, and one of the largest air forces. It would retain the atomic bomb .. The US needed this vast peacetime force not for territorial aggrandizement, because: Outside the right to establish necessary bases for our own protection, we look for nothing which belongs to any other power.’ A large military force was also needed to uphold the peace & the twelve fundamentals of US foreign policy.. Emphatically he said: “We shall refuse to recognise any government imposed upon any nation by the force of any foreign power.”

Resis Ibid, p. 4.

The Hiroshima bombing called into question the diplomatic gains won first at Yalta and Potsdam by the USSR. The Japanese had been on the verge of surrendering, and had posed by the time of Hiroshima no significant military threat. Moreover the entry of the Soviets into the Far Eastern theater of war, had been previously agreed at Yalta, between the Allies.

But if the USSR entered the theater, the USA was worried that concessions would have to be made to it. Hiroshima was therefore both a pre-emptive strike against the USSR presence in the Japanese-Pacific arena, and a threat for the future post-war realpolitik’.

Nonetheless the Soviets entered the Far Eastern war there as they had promised, and as they had been asked to by the USA previously. From August 9th at 00.10 am the Red Army attacked the Japanese in Manchuria. Thus the USA had not fully achieved their goal of preventing the USSR entry into the Far eastern war.
(See Holloway; Ibid p. 128.).

As Resis comments, the Navy Day speech of Truman (see above) was an assertive speech that

“Plainly coupled implicit threat with explicit friendliness”.
(Resis Ibid, p. 5).

For the Soviet Government, Molotov replied 10 days later in a speech to commemorate the 28th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. He stated that the imperialists were “exploiting the atomic bomb in international affairs”, and predicted the USSR would have atomic energy also.(Resis Ibid, p. 6).

He pointed out the continuing attempt to isolate the USSR in a renewed anti-Soviet bloc. Kaganovich warned in a speech in Tashkent, that:

“Our country still finds itself in capitalistic encirclement.”

Cited Resis Ibid, From Pravda, p. 10, Feb 8, 1946.

Molotov warned of the need to return to the task of “overtaking and surpassing the economically most developed countries of Europe and the USA,” in per-capita industrial production in the near future. This required a strategic decision regarding heavy or light industry. There was a division in the ranks of even the Marxist-Leninists on this question. Malenkov and Voroshilov explicitly pumped for heavy industry. Voroshilov in a speech in 1946, arguing that anyone who called for a priority to light industry was a latter-day “servitor of fascism”. (Resis Ibid, p. 11). Yet Zhdanov, only the previous day on Feb 6th had called for light industry priority. He said:

“Because the people who over the course of many years of war bore sacrifices and privations, legitimately demanded that material and every-day living conditions should speedily improve. All this is no trifle. The task of improving every-day living conditions and material well-being of the masses, improving the production of consumers’ goods, is a cause which must be defended, fought for, and invested with the same Bolshevist enthusiasm with which we moved in solving war tasks. The people will only thank us for this.”

Resis Ibid, p. 11

Clearly this difference of viewpoint, reflected a genuine debate about the merits of the case, in which legitimate differences were being though over.

Later Stalin pointed out in a key speech in February 9th 1946, preceding the elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet, that although there had been an alliance of “freedom loving states”, including the USSR, UK, USA, the process of uneven capitalist developments had continued unabated. Inevitably there would be another war, although this would be some time off – some 15-20 years. This could allow “special attention” to be “focused to expand the production of consumer goods.” (Resis Ibid, p. 16, Pravda February 10th, 1946).

Stalin also predicted that the next world war would be a war started between the imperialists in order to re-divide the world.

That the rulers of the USA were indeed in a bellicose and belligerent mood, is shown by the manner in which Stalin’s speech was interpreted. The USA Charge d’affaires, George Kennan in Moscow was requested to analyze Stalin’s speech. Kennan wrote the infamous “long telegram”, in which he insisted that the USSR was preparing to go to war for expansion. But this interpretation did not fit with either the speech of Stalin, or the message being sent out consistently by the Soviets, as noted by later independent historians such as Albert Resis.

Other interpreters of Moscow included the British Charge d’affaires in Moscow, Frank Roberts. He cabled to both London and Washington, that Moscow really did want peace at this juncture. (Resis Ibid, p. 19. ). And Stalin’s actions fully corroborated this.

Resis points out the “conciliatory deeds” of Stalin made in order to convey peaceful intent:

“In September 1945, despite Soviet claims on Bear Island and Spitzbergen, Moscow had announced the withdrawal of the Soviet Command from Norway without any quid pro quo and before the Western Allies withdrew their troops. This action was followed on April 6th 1946, when Moscow announced the withdrawal of the Soviet Command from the Danish Island of Bornholm, leaving no Soviet troops in Scandinavia. On the same day Moscow stated that it would complete evacuation of Soviet troops from China by the end of April. Moscow also announced (or was compelled to announce) that it would complete evacuation of all troops from Iran within one-month and a half. On May 22, 1946, Moscow announced that Soviet troops had been completely withdrawn from Manchuria, and on May 24 that the evacuation of Soviet troops from Iran had been completed. At the Paris Peace Conference the Soviet Union abandoned its request for a trusteeship over Tripolitania in favour of its passing to Italian trusteeship under United nations control.”

Resis A; Ibid; p. 25.

The Breaking of the Atomic Monopoly

However all signals from the USSR assuring the imperialists of the USSR peaceful intentions were in vain. The USSR was again being isolated. Therefore, on August 20th, ten days after the bombing of Nagasaki, the State Defence Committee correctly decreed that a special committee would:

“direct all work on the utilization of the intra-atomic energy of uranium.”
Holloway D; Ibid; p. 129.

As previously noted, the Special Committee on the Atomic Bomb was headed by Lavrenti Beria. It was set up by a special decree with extraordinary powers, and reported directly to Stalin himself. This special body was only dissolved by the Khrushchev revisionist controlled Politburo meeting after Stalin’s death, in fact the same one that arrested Beria. Yet it was this same Special Committee, that had succeeded in developing the bomb for the USSR and closing the USA military superiority:

“Focusing all the country’s forces on the solution of this complex problem called above all for the establishment of a new state management body endowed with appropriate power. Such a body, which was entrusted with practically unlimited authority, was the Special Committee, headed by L. P. Beria (a member of State Defense Committee and Vice Chairman of the USSR Council of People’s Commissars) and was founded by the USSR State Defense Committee’s Resolution No. GOKO-9887 of 20 August 1945. The Committee was founded under the State Defense Committee, but after the State Defense Committee was abolished in September 1945, the Special Committee functioned as a body of USSR Council of People’s Commissars (and after March 1946 as a body of the USSR Council of Ministers). In reality, the Special Committee was an independent state control body directly subordinate to Soviet leader J.V.Stalin. It functioned for almost eight years until it was abolished in accordance with a CC CPSU Presidium Resolution of 26 June 1953 at the same tumultuous meeting at which Beria was arrested. Thus, the Special Committee’s activities covered a most important, formative period of the Soviet atomic project, that is, the establishment and growth of the USSR atomic-energy industry, the development and testing of the first Soviet atomic bomb (in 1949) and early improved atomic bomb designs, and the development and virtual completion of the first Soviet hydrogen bomb (RDS-6), which was first tested in August 1953.”

Cold War International History Project; WWW: “Research Notes: the Russian Nuclear Project..the A-bomb Effort, 1946″ by G. A. Goncharov, N. I. Komov, A. S. Stepanov http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/CWIHP/BULLETINS/b8-9a38.htm

But again it was not possible to exclude fully the evident and known revisionists, such as Nikolia Vosnosensky, still the head of Gosplan, let alone political waverers like Malenkov. (Holloway D; Ibid; p. 134). Gosplan had apparently already expressed disapproval of the Plan, at an earlier stage of the Soviet plans. (Holloway, reference 78 note to p.86) . The industrial managers on the committee were Vannikov, Zaveniagin and Pervukhin. Two scientists on the committee were Khurchatov and Peter Kaptisa. In addition the NKVD representative was General V.A.Mekhnev. Beria reported to Stalin weekly on the progress. The mandate of the Committee of necessity had to be broad, and encompassed special dispensations for all matters related to the production of uranium:

“Considering and resolving all the most basic issues which arose in the course of the early Soviet atomic project, the Special Committee was empowered to supervise all work on the use of atomic energy of uranium:- the development of scientific research in this sphere;- the broad use of geological surveys and the establishment of a resource base for the USSR to obtain uranium…;- the organization of industry to process uranium and to produce special equipment and materials connected with the use of atomic energy; and the construction of atomic energy facilities, and the development and production of an atomic bomb”

Cold War International History Project Op Cit; Goncharov et al; Web site http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/CWIHP/BULLETINS/b8-9a38.htm

The USSR atomic bomb followed the design of the USA bombs, and they were termed the RDS systems. By August 1949, RDS-1 was successfully exploded:

“RDS-1 meant the analog of the first U.S. plutonium-239 implosion type atomic bomb tested on 16 July 1945 in New Mexico (and of the U.S. atomic bomb exploded over Nagasaki on 9 August 1945). This bomb was successfully tested in the USSR on 29 August 1949. RDS-2 signified the analog of the uranium-235 gun type bomb exploded over Hiroshima on 6 August 1945. This bomb passed a design verification in the USSR, but was not tested. Later the abbreviation RDS-2 was used to denote the improved plutonium-239 implosion type atomic bomb tested in 1951. During the period through 1954 the USSR verified and tested three more types of improved atomic bombs: RDS-3, RDS-4, and RDS-5.”

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/CWIHP/BULLETINS/b8-9a38.htm

The speed of the USSR catch-up of the technological gap, surprised the USA imperialists. The speed was no doubt, owed in part to successful Soviet espionage. However, even authors hostile to Marxism-Leninism recognise the achievements of Soviet science, and industry which had to overcome the appalling devastation of Nazi invasion:

“The short duration and arrangement of the parallel works became possible thanks to… intelligence materials about the designs of the U.S. atomic bombs Fat Man and Little Boy, prototypes of RDS-1 and RDS-2, Soviet atomic bombs, which the leaders of the USSR atomic project decided in 1946 should be copied as closely as possible from the American designs. It should be emphasized that the availability of the intelligence materials could not substitute for independent experimental, theoretical, and design verification of the Soviet atomic bombs which were being prepared for testing. Owing to the extraordinary responsibility of the leaders of and participants in the Soviet atomic project, RDS-1 was tested only after thorough confirmation of the available information and a full cycle of experimental, theoretical, and design studies whose level corresponded to the maximum capabilities of that time.”

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/CWIHP/BULLETINS/b8-9a38.htm

Since on December 25th 1946 the first Soviet nuclear reactor started a controlled chain reaction, the imminent likelihood of a tangible USSR atomic weapon had become clear. This began to tilt the balance of power back into the hands of the USSR.

It was at this juncture that the Szalarsa Poremba, First Cominform meeting was held in September 1947.

This exposed the French and Italian parties for revisionist tendencies, and laid the planks for exposing Titoite revisionism (See Alliance 18). Previous leaders of the ECCI such as Dimitrov, were deliberately excluded by Stalin. There is only one rational explanation – that Stalin had become convinced of their inability and sabotage, during the life of the previous Third International:

“As early as June 1946, Stalin had spoken with Dimitrov and Tito about the need of establishing an Information Bureau.. Rather than simply reviving the Comintern, on which Stalin heaped a torrent of insults and abuse which caused Dimitrov to become alternately pale and flushed with repressed anger”

Eugenio Reale :”Founding of the Cominform”, In M. M.Drachkovitch & Branko Lazitch (Eds): “The Comintern..”; Stanford (USA); 1966; p. 257-60.

The Continuing USSR Weakness Following the Acquisition of the Bomb

As we saw, the temporary military and political weakness of the USSR in being able to counter the atomic intimidation of the USA, had partially ended with the successful completion in August 1949, of the USSR atomic bomb. But even then the sharpest imperialist observers of the USSR noted military weaknesses. On just the atomic front the USA had already stockpiled over a hundred atomic bombs by the time the USSR was successful in building and exploding one. In fact, the Western imperialists remained confident that the German Nazi invasion had left the USSR significantly weakened. As the USA ambassador to the USSR, Admiral Alan G. Kirk, commented at a meeting of U.S. ambassadors at Rome, March 22-24, 1950:

“There were certain weaknesses in the Soviet Union which should be considered. The two basic shortages in terms of raw materials were those of rubber and petroleum. It was generally believed that there were no more large unexploited oil reserves available to the Russians. The other important weakness was that of the transportation system which in all respects, rail, highway, and water, was not highly developed in a modern sense.”

FRUS 1950-, Volume III, p. 823.

This was certainly not an isolated view, despite the public shrill fear-mongering of the USSR, that the Western Imperialists actively fanned. Colonel Robert B. Landry, Air Aide to President Truman in 1948, reported the weakness of the Russian mobilisation capability when directed at the West:

“I was told at the G-2 [intelligence] briefing that the Russians have dismantled hundreds of miles of railroads in Germany and sent the rails and ties back to Russia. There remains, at present time, so I was told, only a single track railroad running Eastward out of the Berlin area and upon which the Russians must largely depend for their logistical support. This same railroad line changes from a standard gauge, going Eastward, to a Russian wide gauge in Poland, which further complicates the problem of moving supplies and equipment forward.”

Cited Frank Kofsky: “The War Scare of 1948″, London; 1993, 1995. pp. 293-94.

As a recent commentator has pointed out, the highest levels of the US officialdom knew very clearly how affected the USSR had been by the war:

“In a memorandum to Secretary of State Dean Acheson dated April 5, 1950, Willard L. Thorp, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, offered his view of the Soviet Union’s economic condition vis-a-vis the United States’s. Thorp wrote this memorandum in response to a draft of NSC-68, the “State-Defense Staff Study,” which high-level State Department officials like Thorp received on March 30, 1950. They were instructed to provide written comments on it prior to the delivery of the final version of NSC-68 to President Truman set for April 7, 1950. Thorp’s comments concerned the overall economic conditions of the two countries and the amount each country devoted to military spending in relation to its total expenditures.

Disagreeing with the draft’s thesis that Athe USSR is steadily reducing the discrepancy between its overall economic strength and that of the United States,” Thorp stated:

“I do not feel that this position is demonstrated, but rather the reverse.. that the gap is actually widening in our favour.”


He pointed out that the United States’s economy increased twofold over the Soviet Union’s economy in 1949. Steel production in the U.S. outpaced steel production in the Soviet Union by two million tons, and stockpiling of goods and production of oil far exceeded Soviet amounts. Furthermore,

“if one compares the total economic capacity [of the two countries],” Thorp writes, “the gap is so tremendous that a slight and slow narrowing [on the part of the Soviets] would have little meaning.” As for Soviet military investment, Thorp opines: “I suspect a larger portion of Soviet investment went into housing.”

FRUS: 1950, Volume I, pp. 218-20. Cited In an Internet exchange dated October 1997, Upon a Controversy between Lloyd Gardner & John Gaddis; See MA Thesis of Curt Cardwell.

That Stalin tried hard to remain at peace with the Western imperialists was even accepted by A High Priest of The Cold War Warrior Western Academics, John Lewis Gaddis:

“What is often forgotten about Stalin is that he wanted, in his way, to remain ‘friends’ with the Americans and the British: his objective was to ensure the security of his regime and the state he governed, not to bring about the long-awaited international proletarian revolution; he hoped to do this by means short of war, and preferably with Western cooperation.”

John Lewis Gaddis: “Intelligence, Espionage and Cold War Origins”, DH, Spring 1989, 209.

Other academic Cold War historians, already cited above, have agreed with Gaddis’ view, such as V. Mastny; and Zubok and Pleshakov.

It is now necessary to detail the changing roles and leadership of the Soviet Security apparatus, in order to then correctly interpret the events of the so called Zionist Plot and the Doctors Plot. This forms the next section of this article.

Source

The Underlying Objective for the Zionist Calls for “Anti-Assimilation” was an aid to Nazi Germany

Mildenstein medal, with a Swastika on one side and a Star of David on the other  Photograph courtesy of Arnon Goldfinger (c) 2014

Mildenstein medal, with a Swastika on one side and a Star of David on the other.
Photograph courtesy of Arnon Goldfinger (c) 2014

This article was published by Alliance (Marxist-Leninist) as part of the publication Alliance, issue #30, “Marx, Lenin and Stalin on Zionism.”

The desire to be free of oppressions from pogroms is naturally understandable. But could that desire lead to an alliance with forces of fascism that would promote the worst pogrom known to us to date? It is most “politically incorrect” to say that it did.

However Lenni Brenner clearly illustrated this indeed occurred. He has described this well in the book: “Zionism in the Age of Dictators.”

The natural consequence of a Zionist ‘separatist’ mentality was described by Mussolini as only being correctly understood by one of the founders of Israel – a fellow “fascist” – Vladimir Yabotinsky:

“The highest.. accolade was from Mussolini who, in 1935, told David Prato, later to become chief rabbi of Rome, that: For Zionism to succeed you need to have a Jewish state, with a Jewish flag and a Jewish language. The person who really understands that is your fascist, Jabotinsky.”

Bar-Zohar, “Ben-Gurion-The Armed Prophet”, p. 46. Cited by Brenner, Lenni in Chapter 10:”Zionist- revisionism and Italian Fascism; in: “Zionism in the Age of Dictators”; 1983, Kent; ISBN (GB) 0-7099- 0628-5; p.117;

Web site of International Secretariat of the War & Holocaust Tales Ancient Amateurs’ Association; (WHOTAAAN) in 1996;
http://abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad.html

As shown by Brenner, the Zionists across Europe were in fact, at best ambivalent to fascist regimes, and informed many of the key Zionist colonists of Palestine including the notorious Stern Gang. Brenner’s contentions inflame Zionists. But the objective reality was that Zionist Jews turned their views and thoughts towards, what was for them a “Zion”, but which was in reality the Arabic Palestine. Zionists had agreed that their current place of residence was only a temporary historical stopping over.

We will now follow Brenner, and cite Brenner at great length, to illustrate the objective logic of “Zionist separatism” versus “Assimilation” during the Second World War, up to 1945.

In the First Phase the Zionist forces obstructed the anti-Nazi United Front;
Secondly and later on, they denied that the extermination of the Jews was occurring.
Thirdly, in yet another phase, the highest echelons of the Zionists indicated that they were prepared to “sacrifice” a substantial part of European Jewry, as the Allies post-war would now accept the need for a seperate “Jewish Homeland”.
Fourthly: Zionist sympathies were not primarily given to the only potential forces – communism and socialism – that could stop fascism. This especially applied to German Jews:

“German Jewry was deeply loyal to the Weimar Republic which had put an end to the discriminations of the Wilhelmine era. Germany’s Jews, (0.9 per cent of the population) were generally prosperous: 60 per cent were businessmen or professionals; the rest artisans clerks, students, with only insubstantial numbers of industrial workers. Most were for liberal capitalism with 64 per cent voting for the Deutsche Demokratische Partei (DDP). About 28 per cent voted for the moderate Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD). Only 4 per cent voted for the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD), and the rest were scattered Rightists.”

Lenni Brenner:” Zionism in the Age of Dictators”; Chapter 3; “German Zionism & The collapse of the Weimar Republic”; p. 27; or http://www.abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad3.htmlOn web; Ibid 1996;

When Hitler appeared to be gaining ground in Germany, Jewish organisations led by their youth, did belatedly try to counter the worst fascist atrocities:

“Religious Jewry turned to its traditional defence organisation, the Centralverein, the Central Association of German Citizens of the Jewish Faith; now, for the first time, the department store owners, who had become a prime target for the attentions of the Nazi brown-shirts, began to contribute to the CV’s efforts…younger members of the CV pushed aside the old leadership and were able to get the CV .. to subsidise the SDP’s anti-Nazi propaganda. After the DDP’s betrayal, the SDP picked up approximately 60 per cent of the Jewish vote. Only 8 per cent went Communist.”

Brenner Chapter 3; op Cit; p.27
Web Citation. http://www.abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad3.html

Elsewhere it has been pointed out by the Marxist-Leninists of the Communist League, that the effective resistance to the Nazis was sabotaged by the criminal sectarianism foisted upon the KPD by the revisionists of the KPD and the revisionist leaders of the Communist International led by Dimitrov. (Compass Issue 1996.)

Brenner correctly points out that if both the SDP & the KPD did not organise effectively against fascism – neither did the German Zionists:

“If the SDP and the KPD must bear their full measure of guilt for Hitler’s triumph, so too must the Zionistische Vereinigung fur Deutschland (the Zionist Federation of Germany-ZVfD). Although conventional wisdom has always assumed that the Zionists, with their dire view of anti-Semitism, warned the Jews of the Nazi menace, this is in fact not true….. a diligent search of the pages of the Jeudische Rundschau, the weekly organ of the ZVfD, will not reveal.. prophecies (foretelling Hitler’s accession to power-Ed). When a Jew was killed several hundred Jewish stores looted in a November 1923 hunger riot in Berlin, Kurt Blumenfeld, the Secretary (later President) of the ZVfD, consciously played down the incident:

‘There would be a very cheap and effective kind of reaction, and we … decisively reject it. One could incite deep anxiety among German Jewry. One could use the excitement to enlist the vacillating. One could represent Palestine and Zionism as a refuge for the homeless. We do not wish to do that. We do not wish to carry off by demagoguery those who have stood apart from Jewish life out of indifference. But we wish to make clear to them through [our] sincere conviction where the basic error of Jewish galuth [exile] existence lies. We wish to awaken their national self(awareness. We wish … through patient and earnest educational; work [to] prepare them to participate in the upbuilding of Palestine.”

From Brenner Ibid; Chapter 3; p. 29; also citing Stephen Poppel, Zionism in Germany’ 1897-1933, p.119.

Brenner cites Stephen Poppel, author of “Zionism in Germany 1897-1933″, to the effect that until 1931 “Far from warning and defending the Jews, prominent Zionists opposed anti-Nazi activity.” The logic of the Zionists in Germany was to agree with the Nazis that Jew and Gentile could not in fact co-exist:

“It had been the German Zionists who had most fully elaborated the ideology of the World Zionist Organization (WZO) before 1914 and in the 1920s they developed the argument to its logical conclusion: Judaism in the Diaspora was hopeless. There was no possible defence against anti-Semitism and there was no purpose in trying to develop Jewish cultural and community institutions in Germany. The ZVfD turned away from the society in which they lived. There were only two Zionist tasks: instilling nationalist consciousness in as many Jews as would listen and training youths for occupations useful in the economic development of Palestine. Anything else was useless and palliative.”

Brenner Chapter 3; op Cit; p. 30; Or at Web Citation. http://www.abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad3.html

The rigorous extent to which this type of logic was taken is instructive when assessing the claims of present day Zionists proclaiming the Anecessity” of the state of Israel in its current form. Thus In 1925 the “total abstentionist” Jacob Klatzkin, a co-editor of the “Encyclopedia Judaica” stated:

“If we do not admit the rightfulness of antisemitism, we deny the rightfulness of our own nationalism. If our people is deserving and willing to live its own national life, then it is an alien body thrust into the nations among whom it lives, an alien body that insists on its own distinctive identity, reducing the domain of their life. It is right, therefore, that they should fight against us for their national integrity. Instead of establishing societies for defence against the anti-Semites, who want to reduce our rights, we should establish societies for defence against our friends who desire to defend our rights.”

Jacob Agus, The Meaning of Jewish History, vol. II, p. 425; cited Brenner; p. 30.

After the June 1930 elections in Saxony, where Nazis obtained 14.4 per cent of the vote:

“The Berlin Jewish community put pressure on the ZVfD to join a Reichstag Election Committee in conjunction with the CV and other assimilationists. But the ZVfD’s adherence was strictly nominal; the assimilationists complained that the Zionists put barely any time or money into it, and it dissolved immediately after the election… Siegfried Moses, later Blumenfeld’s successor as head of the federation, demonstrated the Zionists, indifference to the construction of a strenuous defence:

“We have always believed the defence against anti-Semitism to be a task which concerns all Jews and have clearly stated the methods of which we approve and those which we consider irrelevant or ineffective. But it is true that the defence against anti-Semitism is not our main task, it does not concern us to the same extent and is not of the same importance for us as is the work for Palestine and, in a somewhat different sense, the work of the Jewish communities.”

“Reactions Jewish Press to Nazi Challenge”, Leo Baeck Inst. Yr Bk, V (1960), p. 312; In Brenner; ibid; p. 31.

It is not the case that all Jews were so blind to the dangers. Obviously the position of the Zionists was directly contrary to that section of the Jewish population that had accepted and welcomed assimilation:

“The ZVfD leaders could never effectively unite with the assimilationists on defence work. They were total abstentionists politically, and they were volkists they did not believe in the CV’s fundamental premise that the Jews were Germans. Their concern was that the Jews should emphasise their Jewishness. They reasoned that if Jews started to consider themselves a separate national minority, and stopped interfering in ‘Aryan’ affairs, it would be possible to get the anti-Semites to tolerate them on a basis of a dignified’ coexistence. The assimilationists would have none of this; to them the Zionist position was just an echo of the Nazi line. There is no doubt that the assimilationists were correct.”

Brenner Chapter 3; op Cit Web Citation.

But in the face of the KPD sectarianism the best of the Jewish assimilationists had no effective United Front to go to. Moreover, to their own youth, the Zionist leadership preached fervent anti-communism, describing it in 1932 as “red assimilation” (See Donald Niewyk, The Jews in Weimar Germany, p. 30).

Sections of the Jewish bourgeoisie, such as Georg Kareski, a banker, disagreed with the Zionists. In 1919 he founded the “Juedische Volkspartei”. But in 1930, he unsuccessfully stood for the Reichstag on a Catholic Centre platform. He then set up the “Organisation of Jewish Centre Party Voters”. Even the left wing of the Jewish population was dominated by the idea of a Zion:

“On the Zionist left the German branch of the Poale Zion backed the incompetent leadership of the SDP. Before 1914 the SDP refused to associate with Zionism, which it saw as separating the Jews from other workers, and only those elements on the far right of the SDP that supported German imperialism in Africa patronised the Labour Zionists, whom they saw as fellow socialist colonisers. The Socialist International only established friendly relations with Poale Zion during and after the First World War, when the left-wing anti-colonialist forces joined the Communist International. The Labour Zionists joined the SDP with one central purpose: to gain support for Zionism.”

Brenner Chapter 3; p. 33; op Cit; Or at:
Web Citation. http://www.abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad3.html

Even after Hitler’s accession to power, the Jewish leaders did not organise effectively. The Zionists position has been explained. However the assimilationists also were tragically short sighted. They wished to not create waves to draw attention to them. This is perhaps understandable. However the attitude of actively identifying with the Nazi concept of “Volk” was also adopted by sections of Zionism:

Gustav Krojanker, editor at the Judischer Verlag, the oldest Zionist publishing house in Europe, also saw the two movements’ common roots in volkist irrationalism, and drew the conclusion that Zionists should look positively at the nationalist aspects of Nazism. A benign approach toward their fellow volkists, he naively reasoned, would perhaps bring forth an equivalent benevolence toward Zionism on the part of the Nazis.”

Brenner Ibid; p. 35-36; citing Herbert Strauss, Jewish Reactions to the Rise of Anti-Semitism in Germany, p. 13.

As far as Krojanker and many other Zionists were concerned, democracy’s day was over. Harry Sacher, a Briton, one of the leaders of the WZO in the period, explained Krojanker’s theories in a review of Krojanker’s book, “Zum Problem Ausutschen Nationalismus”:

“For Zionists, Liberalism is the enemy; it is also the enemy for Nazism; ergo, Zionism should have much sympathy and understanding for Nazism, of which anti-Semitism is probably a fleeting accident.”

Harry Sacher, review of Gustav Krojanker, Zum Problem des Neuen Deutschen Nationalismus, Jewish Review (London, September 1932), p. 104; Cited By Brenner Ibid; p. 36.

Thus international Jewry was not only confused about the nature of fascism, but often its leaders took mis-guided steps to dissuade even any moderately active anti-Nazi organisation, such as goods boycotts:

“Certainly those Jewish groups like the JWV, the Anti-Nazi League and the AJC were ineffectual, but there were those in the Jewish community in America and Britain who specifically opposed the very notion of a boycott. The American Jewish Committee, the B’rnai B’rith (Sons of the Covenant) fraternal order and the Board of Deputies of British Jews refused to back the boycott. They feared that if the Jewish workers, and others as well, took it into their heads to fight Hitler, perhaps they would stay in motion and come after their own rich closer to home. These worthies confined themselves to charity efforts for German Jewry and its refugees and prayed that Hitlerism would not spread. The Agudas Yisrael (Union of Israel), the political arm of the most extreme wing of traditional Orthodoxy, opposed the boycott on religious grounds as well as their social conservativism. They claimed that ever since the ancient Jewish kingdom was destroyed by the Romans, the Talmud had forbidden Jews to revolt against Gentile authority in the Diaspora; they interpreted the boycott as rebellion and therefore forbidden. However, of all of the active Jewish opponents of the boycott idea, the most important was the World Zionist Organisation (WZO). It not only bought German wares; it sold them, and even sought out new customers for Hitler and his industrialist backers. The WZO saw Hitler’s victory in much the same way as its German affiliate, the ZVfD: not primarily as a defeat for all Jewry, but as positive proof of the bankruptcy of assimilationism and liberalism. Their own hour was at hand. Zionists began to sound like tent-revivalists: Hitler was history’s flail to drive the stiff-necked Jews back to their own kind and their own land.”

Lenni Brenner: “Zionism in the Age of Dictators”; Chapter 6″The Jewish Anti-Nazi Boycott and the Zionist-Nazi Trade agreement”; Op Cit p. 58;
or at: Web site for index, as before: http://abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad.html

It is true that some were far more aware, such as the American rabbi, Abraham Jacobson, who:

“Protested against this insane idea, which was still quite widespread even as late as 1936: “How many times have we heard the impious wish uttered in despair over the apathy of American Jews to Zionism, that a Hitler descend upon them? Then they would realize the need for Palestine!”

Lenni Brenner: “Zionism in the Age of Dictators”; Chapter 6″The Jewish Anti-Nazi Boycott and the Zionist-Nazi Trade agreement”; p. 60; Op Cit; or at: Web site. http://abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad.html

However most of the leaders were drawn to the prospect of using Nazism as a vehicle for the creation of a Zionist homeland – kicking out the resident Palestinians.

This desire, was the vehicle by which the WZO itself destroyed even the weak boycott of Nazi German goods. They supported and then took over the 1933 independent proposal of a Sam Cohen:

“The owner of Ha Note’a Ltd, a Tel Aviv citrus export firm. Even under Chancellor Bruning the German government had put a flight tax on capital leaving the country and Cohen had proposed that Zionist emigres be allowed to avoid the tax by purchasing goods in Germany which would later be turned back into cash after sale in Palestine. Bruning had no interest in the idea, but in 1933 Cohen, on his own, presented the plan again. The Nazis were already worried about the effect even the spontaneous and lamentably organised boycott was having on their balance of trade, and Heinrich Wolff, the German Consul in Jerusalem, quickly grasped just how useful Cohen’s proposition could be. He wrote to his ministry:

“In this way it might be possible to wage a successful campaign against the Jewish boycott of Germany. It might be possible to make a breach in the wall.’

The Jews, he argued, would be put in a quandary. Further boycott would be seen as imposing problems on emigrants seeking to find new homes for themselves in Palestine or elsewhere. Because of his location, Wolff was one of the first Germans to perceive the growing importance of Palestine in the Jewish equation, and in June he wrote again to Berlin:

‘Whereas in April and May the Yishuv was waiting boycott instructions from the United States, it now seems that the situation has been transformed. It is Palestine which now gives the instructions… It is important to break the boycott first and foremost in Palestine, and the effect will inevitably be felt on the main front, in the United States.’

Brenner Chapter 6; p. 61; Op Cit;
or at Web Site. http://abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad.html

Accordingly contracts were soon signed that were then taken over by the WZO. Moreover the WZO now used this lever to transfer monies out of Germany ear-marked for buying land in then Palestine:

“In early May 1933 the Nazis signed an agreement with Cohen for one million Reichmarks ($400,000) of Jewish wealth to be shipped to Palestine in the form of farm machinery. At this point the WZO intervened. The Depression had badly affected donations and in March 1933 they had desperately cabled to their followers in America pleading that if funds were not forthcoming immediately’ they were heading for imminent financial collapse. Now Menachem Ussischkin, head of the Jewish National Fund, got Cohen to arrange for the release of frozen JNF monies in Germany via Ha Note’a. The bait for the Nazis was that the cash was needed to buy land for the Jews whom Hitler would be pushing out. Cohen also assured Heinrich Wolff that he would operate: Behind the scenes, at a forthcoming Jewish conference in London to weaken or defeat any boycott resolution’. Dr Fritz Reichert, the Gestapo’s agent in Palestine, later wrote to his headquarters reminding them of the affair:

‘The London Boycott Conference was torpedoed from Tel Aviv because the head of the Transfer in Palestine, in close contact with the consulate in Jerusalem, sent cables to London. Our main function here is to prevent, from Palestine, the unification of world Jewry on a basis hostile to Germany… It is advisable to damage the political and economic strength of Jewry by sowing dissension in its ranks.'”

Brenner Chapter 6; p.62; Op Cit;
or at Web Site. http://abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad.html

But the WZO had even grander aims than Sam Cohen. They saw an opportunity to draw enough money and immigrants into Palestine to drown by weight of numbers the indigenous and inconvenient Palestinian Arabs. The calculations involved the tacit approval of the British. This was a plan woven by a self-proclaimed “Socialist-Zionist,” named Chaim Arlosoroff. Brenner describes the secret calculation as “cold”:

“Sam Cohen was soon superseded.. by Labour Zionist, Chaim Arlosoroff, the Political Secretary of the Jewish Agency, the WZO’s Palestine centre. ..In 1932 he had concluded that they had failed to attract enough immigrants to overcome the Arabs’ numbers and they were not drawing enough Jewish capital. Hitler in power would mean war within ten years… Now.. he had the way for Zionism to solve its difficulties: with Britain’s agreement, they could get both the immigrants and the capital needed through extending Cohen’s project. In an article in the Rundschau .. he coldly explained that this could only be done in complete co-operation with Berlin:

‘Naturally, Germany cannot expose herself to the risk of upsetting her currency and exchange balance in order to meet the Jews, but a way out can be found to adjust these different interests… It would be worth while, leaving all sentimentalities out of the question, to reach such an agreement with Germany.
The self-styled “Socialist-Zionist” then proposed the ultimate alliance, a deal between the Zionists, the Nazis, the Fascists and the British Empire, to organise the evacuation of Jewry from Germany:

‘It could also be possible to establish a company, with the participation of the German State and other European, primarily British and Italian interests, which would slowly liquidate the particular properties by issuing letters of credit… [and creating… a guarantee fund.”

Brenner Chapter 6; p. 62-63; Op Cit;
or at Web Site; http://abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad.html

Harry Hopkins related the events of a meeting on 27 March 1943 between President Roosevelt, Anthony Eden and others on the question of saving Bulgarian and other Jews. Eden said:

“We should move very cautiously about offering to take all Jews out of a country like Bulgaria. If we do that, then the Jews of the world will be wanting us to make similar offers in Poland and Germany. Hitler might take us up on any such offer and there simply are not enough ships and means of transportation in the world to handle them.”

Lenni Brenner: Chapter 24:”The Wartime Failure to Rescue”; p. 228; Ibid; or at http://www.abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad24.html

Brenner points out that according to Churchill, the Arabs were no better than a backward people who eat nothing but camel dung’. (Lenni Brenner: Chapter 24:”The Wartime Failure to Rescue”; p. 228; or at web: http://www.abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad24.html )

As far as the British were concerned they could control the Arabs better than they might be able to control the Zionists. They temporarily therefore favoured the Arabs. Most sections of the Zionists therefore saw merit in “currying favour” with the British. They tried to consider the benefits of the war to Jewry:

“Their first thought was how to turn the war to their advantage in Palestine. Yoav Gelber of the Yad Vashem Institute (Israel’s Holocaust Institute-ed) gives a good account of this view among the Labour Zionists in September 1939:

‘The majority of the leaders tended to Palestine and its problems as the touchstone of their attitude towards the war. They were inclined to leave the front-line fighting as such, if unconnected to Palestine, to the Jews of the Diaspora.'”

Lenni Brenner: Chapter 24:”The Wartime Failure to Rescue”; p.229; ?Ibid; or at web: http://www.abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad24.html

In fact there was very little attention to the plight of the European Jews from the Jewish Agency Executive. Zionist leaders in the USA were also not only unhelpful, but argued not to assist even with food packages as this relieved pressure on the Nazis:

“Furthermore, the American Zionist leadership campaigned against those Jews who were trying to aid the stricken. Aryeh Tartakower, who was in charge of aid work for the World Jewish Congress in America in 1940, has told some of the story:..:

‘We received a call from the American Government, from the State Department and they brought to our attention that sending parcels to the Jews in Poland was not in the interests of the Allies… The first one to tell us to stop immediately was Dr Stephen Wise… He said: ‘We must stop for the good of England.”

Lenni Brenner: Chapter 24:”The Wartime Failure to Rescue”; p. 229; Ibid;
http://www.abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad24.html

The Zionist-Nazi Pact And Trade

In 1933, a Zionist-Nazi Pact was announced.
This is a little known -yet extraordinary event. It’s lack of reporting must be compared to the constant malignment of the USSR for the so-called Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

That USSR-German pact was essential for the survival of the USSR against imperialist machinations’ and the USSR had tried repetitively before hand, to get a united front against German fascism. The Western imperialists had refused and had sabotaged even their own weak-kneed commitments to protecting the sovereignity of several countries, that German Nazism blithely ignored with no repercussions to itself. In fact the clear and obvious strategy of the Western imperialists was to drive Germany against the USSR by so-called “appeasement.” (See articles by Communist League & Alliance elsewhere).

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact “spiked the guns of the imperialists”, buying vital time to move the industry East of the Urals and continue fevered preperation for inevitable war.

But, the Zionist-Nazi Pact was quite different – it was simply another instance of how far Zionists were prepared to go to create a Zionist homeland in Palestine.
The Pact allowed the Zionists to ship 3 million Reichmarks worth of Jewish wealth, in the form of German export goods, to Palestine.

The Zionist leaders of the WZO tried to prevent any serious discussion of this manouevre of theirs:

“The Zionist-Nazi pact was announced by the Nazis in time for the 18th Zionist Congress in August in Prague. Hitler’s shadow completely dominated the Prague Congress. The WZO’s leaders knew that the Nazis were interested in a deal and they determined to avoid offending Germany by limiting discussion of the situation there to the barest minimum. The regime as such was not condemned… No plan was proposed to put pressure on the world body, nor was any specific action called for.”

L.Brenner; WWW; Ibid; Chapter 6: “The Jewish Anti-Nazi Boycott”; p.63; ibid;
or via web: See index page at: http://abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad.html

This news, of the “Zionist-Nazi Pact,” effectively discouraged adoption of an anti-Nazi Boycott. To further facilitate and absolutely ensure this rejection further, the case for the Boycott was actually presented by the fascist Zionist Vladamir Jabotinsky, whose brown shirted troops, had thoroughly alienated the Congress:

“The Zionist-Nazi pact became public the day before a boycott resolution was to be debated, and it may be speculated that the Nazis did this so as to discourage endorsement of the boycott. The leader of the right-wing .. Vladimir Jabotinsky, presented the boycott case.. Jabotinsky’s support for the boycott, and his opposition to the pact, was dismissed as the raging of a terrorist opponent of the democratically elected moderate leadership. His resolution was defeated by a vote of 240 to 48.”

L.Brenner; WWW; Ibid; Chapter 6: “The Jewish Anti-Nazi Boycott”; ibid; p.63; or at http://abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad.html

However when the Nazis publicised the pact, the floor of the Congress was furious. The leaders of the WZO lied about their role:

“When the Nazis announced that they had signed an agreement with the Zionists allowing German Jews to ship three million Reichmarks’ worth of Jewish wealth to Palestine in the form of German export goods.. pandemonium broke loose. The leadership.. tried to protect themselves by outright lying; the Labour leader, Berl Locker, brazenly proclaimed: the executive of the World Zionist Organisation had nothing to do with the negotiations which led to an agreement with the German government’. No one believed this crude fabrication.”

L.Brenner; WWW; Ibid; Chapter 6: “The Jewish Anti-Nazi Boycott”; p. 64;
or at http://abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad.html

The Zionist leaders pretended the blame lay solely with a bank. But since it was their bank, this shallow pretence was clearly seen through:

“The Political Committee”.. leaders did not dare take official responsibility for the Ha’avara’ or Transfer Agreement, and pretended that it only bound Germany and the formal signatory, the Anglo-Palestine Bank. But, since the bank was their own bank, they only succeeded in making themselves look ridiculous.. The debate over the Zionist-Nazi pact continued angrily until 1935.”

L.Brenner; WWW; Ibid; Chapter 6: p. 64; “The Jewish Anti-Nazi Boycott”; http://abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad.html

The financial trading associated with the Zionist-Nazi Pact was considerable, and laid at least some of the basis for the colonisation of the Arab owned Palestine. It did operate under Nazi rules, and it did have a top limit of cash transfer. This meant that the richest fractions of the Jews transferred monies (somehow) elsewhere. But the proportion sent purely for a Zionist Palestine was critical at that time:

The Ha’avara rapidly grew to become a substantial banking and trading house with 137 specialists in its Jerusalem office .. in essence the agreement was always the same: German Jews could put money into a bank inside Germany, which was then used to buy exports which were sold outside Germany, usually but not exclusively in Palestine. When the emigres finally arrived in Palestine, they would receive payment for the goods that they had previously purchased after they had finally been sold. …its attraction to German Jews remained the same: it was the least painful way of shipping Jewish wealth out of Germany. However, the Nazis determined the rules, and they naturally got worse with time; by 1938 the average user was losing at least 30 per cent and even 50 per cent of his money. Nevertheless, this was still three times, and eventually five times, better than the losses endured by Jews whose money went to any other destination. The top limit through the Ha’avara scheme was 50,000 marks ($20,000 or ) per emigrant, which made the Ha’avara unattractive to the richest Jews. Therefore only $40,419,000 went to Palestine via Ha’avara, whereas $650 million went to the United States, $60 million to the United Kingdom and other substantial sums elsewhere. Yet if, in terms of German Jewry’s wealth, Ha’avara was by no means decisive, it was crucial to Zionism. Some 60 per cent of all capital invested in Palestine between August 1933 and September 1939 was channelled through the agreement with the Nazis.”

L.Brenner; WWW; Ibid; Chapter 6: ” The Jewish Anti-Nazi Boycott”; p. 65; or at:
http://abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad.html

The rank and file of the Jewish workers in many countries abhorred and organised against the Pact:

“The great majority of Jews opposed the Ha’avara. It had no defenders outside the WZO, and trading with the Nazis was not popular with many inside its own ranks. Protests started pouring in while the Prague Congress was still in session. The pact was extremely unpopular in Poland, where the Jews feared that if there was no resistance to the anti-Semitism next door, their own Jew-haters would start demanding that the Polish government imitate the Germans. In America and Britain, each with a more or less democratic tradition, many Zionists, including some of the leading names in the movement, opposed it (like-ed) the prominent Cleveland rabbi, Abba Hille Silver.”

L.Brenner; Ibid; Chapter 6: “The Jewish Anti-Nazi Boycott”; ibid; p. 66;
or at: http://abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad.html

But the unconcern of the leaders of the WZO with the anti-Nazi attitudes of many Jews continued even up to the 1935 Lucerne Congress. The leaders’ attitudes remained that Nazism assisted the formation of Israel:

“But by far the best example of the leadership’s unwillingness to resist the Nazis was Weizmann’s statement:

“The only dignified and really effective reply to all that is being inflicted upon the Jews of Germany is the edifice erected by our great and beautiful work in the Land of Israel… Something is being created that will transform the woe we all suffer into songs and legends for our grand-children.”….

(This cynicism was roundly condemned by Jews in Britain and in the USA -Editor Alliance] …

“Press criticism was immediate. London’s ‘World Jewry’, then the best Zionist magazine in the English language, excoriated their own World Congress:

‘Dr Weizmann went as far as to state that the only dignified reply the Jews could give was a renewed effort for the upbuilding of Palestine. How terrifying the proclamation of the Congress President must have sounded in the ears of Herren Hitler, Streicher and Goebbels!”

In America the opposition to the Ha’avara was particularly intense in the garment industry trade unions, with their hundreds of thousands of Jewish workers. Most of the Jewish labour leaders had always looked upon Zionism with contempt. Many of them were from Russia and knew about the fateful Herzl-Plevhe meeting and how their old enemy Zubatov had backed the Poale Zionists against the Bund. As far as they were concerned the Ha’avara was just Zionism up to its old tricks, and in December 1935 Baruch Charney Vladeck, the Chairman of the Jewish Labor Committee, and himself an ex-Bundist from Poland, debated Berl Locker, the organisational head of the Palestinian Poale Zion, before an overflow crowd in New York. Locker was compelled to take a defensive position, insisting that the agreement was purely in the interest of the German Jews.”

Brenner Ibid Chapter 6; p. 71; 72; 73.
or at http://abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad.html

But some wanted further manifestations of the ‘apartheid” mentality of Herzl:

“If the majority of Jews did oppose the Ha’avara as treason, there was one at least who was willing to go on record as complaining that Weizmann and his friends were not going far enough. Gustav Krojanker.. one of the leaders of the Hitachdut Olei Germania (the German Immigrants Association in Palestine) in 1936 the association published.. “The Transfer: A Vital Question of the Zionist Movement”. To him Zionism was stark calculation, nothing more, and he was more than willing to draw the logical conclusions already inherent in the Zionist-Nazi pact. He claimed to see Nazism and the opportunities it opened up for Zionism in the authentic Herzlian manner: … he perceived two political factors –an organisation of the Jewish people on the one side, and the countries concerned on the other. They were to be partners in a pact.”

Brenner Ibid Chapter 6; p. 74;
http://abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad.html

The WZO extended the agreements that busted the boycott to other countries and goods:

“In March 1936, Siegfried Moses’s negotiations had finally created the International Trade and Investment Agency (INTRIA) bank in London to organise sales of German products directly in Britain itself. The Nazis had to content themselves with the satisfaction of the further demoralisation of the boycott forces, as fear of Jewish and general British hostility to boycott–scabbing made it impossible for INTRIA to go so far as to allow British currency to come directly into German hands. Instead, the goods were bought in Germany for marks and their value was credited to Jewish capitalists needing the Pounds sterling 1,000 entry fee required of over-quota immigrants into Palestine. Zionist-Nazi trade relations continued to develop in other spheres as well. In 1937 200,000 crates of the ‘Golden Oranges’ were shipped to Germany, and 1/2 million more to the Low Countries under the swastika flag.[(50)] Even after Kristallnacht –11 November 1938.. the manager of Ha’avara Ltd, Werner Felchenfeld, continued to offer reduced rates to would-be users of Nazi boats.”

Brenner Ibid Chapter 6; p. 75
http://abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad.html

The consequences of this episode were to assist the Nazis. As Eduard Benes said to a later “remorseful” Nahum Goldmann at:

“At a dramatic meeting he had with the Czech Foreign Minister, Eduard Benes, in 1935… had warned:

‘Don’t you understand’, he shouted, ‘that by reacting with nothing but half-hearted gestures, by failing to arouse world public opinion and take vigorous action against the Germans, the Jews are endangering their future and their human rights all over the world?”

Brenner Ibid Chapter 6;
http://abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad.html

Molotov Warns Jews of the Killing Squads But the Zionists Do Not

Amongst the fervid anti-Stalin accusations of Arkady Vaksberg, is the charge that the USSR was silent about the fate of the Jews behind the German lines.
In reality Vaksberg has to assert this, given the shocking attempts of Western leaders and leading Western Jewish individuals to silence the real news.
Brenner asks when it was that:

“The Western Jewish establishment and the Allies discover that Hitler was systematically killing Jews? Reports of slaughter in the Ukraine started reaching the Western press in October 1941.”

It should be remembered that the USSR was then fighting for its’ very life. Yet the Molotov Announcement explicitly analysed the work of the Einsatzgruppen (the Nazi killing squads, especially instructed to kill Jews) in January 1942:

“The Soviets issued a detailed report, the Molotov Announcement’ which analysed the workings of the Einsatzgruppen. The memorandum was dismissed by the WZO in Palestine as Bolshevik propaganda.”

Lenni Brenner: Chapter 24: p. 230; “The Wartime Failure to Rescue”; citing Gelber, Zionist Policy and the Fate of European Jewry’‘ p. 190; at: http://www.abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad24.html

It is instructive to follow in historical time, what happens next, and the various delays introduced at the highest levels of the self-appointed leaders of the international Jewish population.

It emerges that it was not until November (ie let us be clear: Our simple calculation is From January to November is 8 months exclusive of the whole months of January & February – How many died in those months?) – that an alarm was publicly given to the Jewish populations of those area by organisations such as the World Jewish Congress (WJC). These facts are verified as Brenner makes clear in his text, by independent Jewish sources:

“In February 1942 Bertrand Jacobson, the representative of the Joint Distribution Committee in Hungary, held a press conference on his return to the USA and relayed information from Hungarian officers about the massacre of 250,000 Jews in the Ukraine. In May 1942 the Bund sent a radio message to London that 700,000 Jews had already been exterminated in Poland, and on 2 July the BBC broadcast the essence of the report in Europe. The Polish government in-exile used the Bund alarm in its own English-language press propaganda. Yet on 7 July 1942, Yitzhak Gruenbaum, then leading the Jewish Agency’s Vaad Hazalah (Rescue Committee), refused to believe similar accounts of massacres in Lithuania, because the numbers of the estimated dead were larger than the pre-war Jewish population in the country. On 15 August Richard Lichtheim in Switzerland sent a report to Jerusalem, which was based on German sources, about the scope and methods of extermination. He received a reply, dated 28 September:

‘Frankly I am not inclined to accept everything in it literally… Just as one has to learn by experience to accept incredible tales as indisputable facts, so one has to learn by experience to distinguish between reality –however harsh it may be– and imagination which has become distorted by justifiable fear.”

Gruenbaum and his Rescue Committee acknowledged that terrible things were going on, but he kept minimising them as ‘only’ pogroms. On 8 August Gerhart Riegner of the Geneva office of the WJC obtained detailed accounts of the gassing programme from reliable German sources, and he forwarded these to the WJC’s London and New York offices via British and American diplomats. The WJC in London received the material, but Washington withheld the message from Rabbi Wise. On 28 August the British section of the WJC sent Wise another copy, and he called the State Department and discovered that they had kept back the information. They then asked him not to release the news to the public pending verification; he agreed and said nothing until 24 November –88 days later– when the State Department finally confirmed the report. Only then did Wise make a public announcement of a Nazi plan to exterminate all the Jews in their grasp. On 2 December he wrote a letter to Dear Boss’, Franklin Roosevelt, asking for an emergency meeting and informing him that:

‘I have had cables and underground advices for some months, telling of these things. I succeed, together with the heads of other Jewish organisations, in keeping them out of the press.”

Lenni Brenner: Chapter 24:”The Wartime Failure to Rescue”; p.230-231. or at
http://www.abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad24.html

The same delays were engineered by the Jewish Agency in Palestine that declared publicly that the Nazis were exterminating Jews, ONLY in November. Yet as Brenner shows, as early as April leaders of the Agency had known this to be the case:

“On 17 April 1942, even before the Bund broadcast, Moshe Shertok wrote General Claude Auchinleck, the commander of the Eighth Arm in North Africa. He was concerned with what might happen to Palestine’s Jews, if the Afrika Korps broke through Egypt:

‘The destruction of the Jewish race is fundamental tenet of the Nazi doctrine. The authoritative reports recently published show that that policy is being carried out with a ruthlessness which defies description… An even swifter destruction, it must be feared would overtake the Jews of Palestine”.

Lenni Brenner: Chapter 24; p. 232 :”The Wartime Failure to Rescue”; http://www.abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad24.html

Even after this the Jewish state in former Palestine remained the objective for these Zionists, and both the numbers killed and the effects of the Nazi killings were toned down:

“Dov Joseph, the acting director of the Jewish Agency’s Political Department, cautioned them against: APublishing data exaggerating the number of Jewish victims, for if we announce that millions of Jews have been slaughtered by the Nazis, we will justifiably be asked where the millions of Jews are, for whom we claim that we shall need to provide a home in Eretz Israel after the war ends.”

Yoav Gelber tells us of the immediate effect of Dov Josephs’ intervention:

‘Vociferous protests were therefore toned down and instead, ways of responding more ‘constructively, were sought.”

Lenni Brenner: p.232; Chapter 24:”The Wartime Failure to Rescue”; http://www.abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad24.html

What sort of logic would impel these types of behaviour?

These were not “wicked”people, and they knew very well, what leaving the Jews of Europe to Hitler meant. The abiding logic appears to have been that the higher goal – that of Zion in Palestine – meant hard present sacrifices.

Indeed one Zionist leader put explicit words on the lines of “buying with blood” the right to Zionists Palestine, in reply to pleas sent to him by a Jewish volunteer agent for Aguda, in Slovakia. The story is told by the youth who later became famous for demanding of the Allies that they bomb Auschwitz; and who was later to be known as Rabbi Michael Dov-Ber Weissmandel.

In 1942 he twice contacted the Nazi agent for Eichmann – Dieter Wisliceny, asking him:

“How much money would be needed for all the European Jews to be saved?.. in early 1943 word came… For $2 million they could have all the Jews in Western Europe and the Balkans. Weissmandel sent a courier to Switzerland to try to get the money from the Jewish charities. Saly Mayer, a Zionist industrialist and the Joint Distribution Committee representative in Zurich, refused…. The courier who brought Mayer’s reply had another.. from Nathan Schwalb, the HeChalutz (The Pioneer Centre, in charge of training youth for the kibbutz movement in Palestine- ed) representative in Switzerland. Weissmandel described the document:

‘There was another letter in the envelope (saying).. ‘We are writing to the group that they must constantly have before them that in the end the Allies will win. After their victory they will divide the world again between the nations… now, at the war’s end, we must do everything so that Eretz Yisroel will become the state of Israel, and important steps have already been taken in this direction…. all the Allied nations are spilling much of their blood, and if we do not sacrifice any blood, by what right shall we merit coming before the bargaining table when the nations and lands at the war’s end? Therefore it is silly, even impudent, on our part to ask these nations who are spilling their blood to permit their money into enemy countries in order to protect our blood –for only with blood shall we get the land. But in respect to you, my friends, atem taylu (escape to refuge-ed), and for this purpose I am sending you money”.

Lenni Brenner: p.236-237; Chapter 24:”The Wartime Failure to Rescue”; http://www.abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad24.html

All this inaction on the part of empowered and rich Western Jewry had its’ reaction on both the left and the fascist right.

On the left, sections of both the Trotskyite wing, and the Marxist-Leninists – raised their voices and tried to propagate information on the Jewish extermination.

On the Jewish fascist right – the Irgun launched rallies in the West aiming to raise the public awareness of the need for action in the European theatre and also they promoted armed struggle inside Palestine against the British.

As regards the British – in this they were objectively with the aims of the Zionists and would ultimately they would win them over. They were known to be positively orientated towards fascism.

Brenner’s verdict is impossible to correct:

“Zionism had come full turn: instead of Zionism being the hope of the Jews, their blood was to be the political salvation of Zionism.”

Lenni Brenner: p. 238; Chapter 24:”The Wartime Failure to Rescue”; http://www.abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad24.html

Establishing the Physical Presence of the Jews in Palestine

Brenner notes the increasing numbers of Jewish immigrants into Palestine were of necessity, “illegal” immigrants since the British had theoretically placed embargoes on the number of Jews entering Palestine, in order to placate the Arab Palestinian inhabitants. Nonetheless the numbers of “illegals” were high:

“It is not known exactly how many illegal immigrants were smuggled into Palestine before and during the Second World War. Yehuda Bauer estimates that approximately 15,000 illegal immigrants entered in the years 1936-9.. He breaks down this number to 5,300 brought in by Revisionist ships, 5,000 by the Labour Zionists and 5,200 by private vessels…The British listed 20,180 as having arrived prior to the end of the war. William Perl, the prime organiser of the Revisionist effort, doubles that figure to more than 40,000.. Yehuda Slutzky gives 52,000 as having reached Palestine during the war, but this number includes both legals and illegals.”

Brenner Ibid; Chapter 23; p.220; :”Illegal Immigration”; On WWW; http://www.abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad23.html

Brenner points out that the Zionists claim credit for “saving European Jewry from Hitler,” by aiding them to Palestine.

But he also points out that firstly they were bringing in specific, young “warriors” for a forthcoming war with the British and with the Arab possessors of the land:

“At the time neither the revisionists nor the WZO saw themselves as rescuing Jews per se; they were bringing in specially selected settlers to Palestine. The Revisionists returned to illegal immigration during the Arab revolt. The immigrants were mostly Betarim brought in as reinforcements for the Irgun, which was engaged in a terrorist campaign against the Arabs… All had been given weapon-training earlier at their camp at the Revisionist estate at Kottingbrunn.. for.. the final battle against the British occupiers.”

Brenner Ibid; Chapter 23; p. 220:”Illegal Immigration”; On WWW; op cit. http://www.abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad23.html

As Brenner says the claims of an “unselfish rescue of all Jews irrespective of belief,” was “simply untrue”:

“The 1947 statement of Otto Seidmann, the former leader of the Viennese Betar, who wrote that:

“We had to save the lives of Jews – be they Communists or capitalists, members of Hashomer Hatzair or General Zionists’,

was simply untrue. Betarim were always preferred over any other Zionists, right Zionists over left Zionists, and any kind of Zionist over a non-Zionist.”

Ibid; p. 222; or at:
http://www.abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad23.html

When the WZO also again began to sponsor illegal immigration, they held to the same selection criteria for young future warriors. It is true they were more circumspect than the Ultra-Zionists, but this was as they banked on future British cooperation:

“The revisionists were more daring in organising the illegal immigration, because they did not care what London thought. They had come to understand that they would have to fight Britain, if they were ever to realise their Zionist state; the WZO, however, still expected to get a Jewish state with the approval of the British at another Versailles Conference after the Second World War. They argued that Britain would only reward them if they accommodated to her plans during the war, and London most definitely did not want more refugees in Palestine.”

Brenner Ibid; p. 223; Chapter 23:”Illegal Immigration”; On WWW; http://www.abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad23.html

During this period, the British intention to divide and rule in the Middle East – between the Arab land owners and the minority Zionist settlers is graphically shown by Brenner, who cites the first military Governor of Jerusalam, Sir Ronald Storrs, from his memoirs as saying:

“The Zionist’s enterprise was one that blessed him that gave as well as him that took, by forming for England ‘a little loyal Jewish Ulster”in a sea of potentially hostile Arabism”.(Ronald Storrs, Orientations, p. 405; cited Brenner). This was the spirit of the Peel Commission’s proposal in July 1937 that Palestine be divided into three parts. All of it would stay under British overlordship; Britain would directly retain a strip from Jerusalem to Jaffa, and would hold Haifa for ten years, after which it would be seconded to a Zionist statelet of two pieces with a combined area the size of the English county of Norfolk. The tiny Zionist entity would contain an enormous Arab minority, some of whom the Commission contemplated moving to the Arab state which would get the rest of the country.”

Brenner Ibid; p. 95 Chapter 8; or at:
http://www.abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad8.html

The goals of the Zionists had been achieved by the end of the Second World War, even though they had not wanted them to be attained in such horrific circumstances. Nonetheless, some real and new objective circumstances had been created by the end of the war. As cited by Strizhov, former US Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles said:

“When the Second World War broke out, the chances for the establishment of a Jewish Commonwealth in the Holy Land seemed indeed to have vanished. Yet, the forces that the war had brought into being had a determining effect in arousing world public opinion to the imperative need of finding a solution for the Palestinian problem.”

Iurii Strizhov:” The Soviet Position on the Establishment of the State of Israel”; In “Jews & Jewish Life in Russia & The Soviet Union”; Editor: Yaacov Ro’i; London; 1995; p.303.

From the first days of the war, David Ben-Gurion, one of the Zionist leaders had noted:

“The question that absorbed us was Palestine’s future after the war. I was certain that we had to exert ourselves to set up a Jewish State.”

Iurii Strizhov:” The Soviet Position on the Establishment of the State of Israel”; In AJews & Jewish Life in Russia & The Soviet Union”; Editor: Yaacov Ro’i; London; 1995; p.303.

The new objective circumstances can be summarised as:
1. A substantial Jewish immigrant population in Palestine had taken place- many of them had been trained in warfare.
2. A world spotlight had been trained on the inhumanity of anti-Semitism.
3. A new re-division of the world’s territories was taking place following the war.

It is in this context that the relevance of the proposals put forward by the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee – for an international Jewish Refuge – a socialist homeland – in the Crimea become of relevance.

This was the only possible, other “solution”, (to the establishment of a Zionist state of Israel) for the displaced remnants of European Jewry.

BUT: For the imperialists and for the Zionists, this would unacceptably strengthen the state of the USSR.

It would require the joint efforts of the hidden revisionists within the Soviet Union and the combined imperialist forces within the newly formed United Nations to both:

a) destroy any plans for the Socialist Jewish Autonomous Republic in the Crimea, and;
b) to establish a pro-imperialist semi-fascist state of Israel, in hitherto Arab Palestine.

Source

Marx, Lenin & Stalin on Zionism: Introduction & Preface

This poster was from a campaign waged against anti-Semitism at the end of the 1920's.

This poster was from a campaign waged against anti-Semitism at the end of the 1920’s.

Preface

Bourgeoisie nationalists, whether of Zionist and Pan-Islamic persuasions, both accuse the USSR of the socialist era (from 1917-1953) of racism, aimed against either Jews or Arabs respectively. But, in reality Lenin and Stalin gave an even-handed and single reply, to both the Pan-Islamists and to the Zionists. This reply was to eschew a narrow bourgeois nationalism, in order to create socialism.

In Alliance 30 we attempt to put the recent history of Jewry into a Marxist-Leninist context. This means we will first examine the views of Marx, Lenin and Stalin upon the ideologies of Zionism and its precursors. Next we discuss the Jewish Autonomous Region of Birobidzhan established by the Soviets. Of necessity we examine the so called “Jewish Plot” and the “Doctor’s Plot” in the USSR. This is necessary to sensibly to discuss how it was that the USSR would come to agree at the United Nations, to a recognition of the imperialist-led partition of Palestine, and the planting of the colony of Israel.

In the companion Alliance Number 31, we will examine the views of Lenin and Stalin on Pan-Islamism. The form Pan-Islamism took in the USSR, was known as Sultan-Galiyev-ism. We then briefly examine the versions of Pan-Islamism represented by the Ba’ath Party ideology of Syria and Iraq; and finally we will assess the views of Samir Amin.

A Methodological Foreword Upon Recent Sources For Marxist-Leninists

Alliance has always tried to punctiliously show its source material with as precise references as is possible. This is not an academic peccadillo- to be disdained as “armchair Marxism.” Rather it is essential to root a Marxist-Leninist view of the world in an objective and clear manner. Only this permits any possible rebuttals that are based on facts rather than those of opinion. It has not been necessary to comment on this matter till now. However three new issues have arisen, regarding source materials that directly affect the Marxist-Leninist movement.

Firstly: Certain documents have been released in the Gorbachev era and more recently, from the Soviet archives. This is generally of benefit to Marxist-Leninists, who try to explain the real events inside the former USSR in its Marxist-Leninist days of Stalin’s life time. Previous readers of Alliance, will know that we generally try to highlight the most significant of such documents; and we draw readers’ attention to the confusion that this raises in the bourgeois academic circles. For instance, we previously discussed how the school of so called “revisionist” historians – such as Arch Getty Junior – have tried to struggle with such evidence that contradicts the standard Trotsky influenced bourgeois academic histories. But a caveat must be introduced. It is very unlikely that ALL relevant documents will surface in our lifetime. Moreover, we do not know what documents of Stalin’s and other relevant leading personalities may have been destroyed. All the written archival materials are unlikely to be made available to us anyway, since some of these will be deemed “too sensitive.” Why should the Russian state behave any differently to the British Kew Gardens Archives for instance? We therefore simply raise a caution regarding the appropriate interpretation of documents that may become available. These are likely to be only “spotty” and unlikely to give us all the facts.

Secondly: As a corollary, this leaves some to a continuing abundance of the hear-say, “he said-they said,” type of scurrilous evidence. This leads to a dilemma for the Marxist-Leninists, as to whether to even use this type of evidence at all. But to ignore it is to ignore the charges that the authors lay at Stalin. This does not help Marxists-Leninists currently since one of our current tasks – is to counter the bourgeois historiography and lies. On the other hand, in using these sources it is necessary to be highly selective. Instances are provided in Alliance 30 of two especially problematic sources.

Very little written is available on Stalin’s attitude to the Jewish Question. A new low in scurrilous writing on Stalin is provided by the virulent Arkady Vaksberg in “Stalin Against The Jews,” New York; 1994. Much of the tone and a large measure of the content of this book is scurrilous. For instance – Vaksberg alleges that Stalin did not really research and write the famous article on “The National Question.” Nonetheless we will use the Vaksberg source – albeit with caution – since little else is available on the subject.

Another such problem source is the memoirs of Pavel Sudoplatov, published in 1994. After 1939, he was the officer in charge of the NKVD (later MGB) special operations. Several attacks upon Sudoplatov’s honesty and reliability have been made. Sudoplatov claimed that he organized the assassination of Trotsky under direct orders from Stalin, and that the Soviet atomic bomb was only made possible by secrets divulged by the Danish physicist Niels Bohr.

Both claims are untrue. David Holloway has exposed the latter lie in an article in “Science,” (Holloway D; Science May 27th, 1994), and the former lie is contrary to key facts as discussed by the CL. (CL article reprinted Alliance Issue Number 7.) It is interesting that these memoirs were recorded from Sudoplatov by Jerrold L. & Leona P. Schecter. This same couple first fully published Khrushchev’s memoirs in 1970, in an association between Life magazine & Little Brown Publishers. (See Pavel & A Sudoplatov; with JL & LP Schecter: “Special Tasks”; Boston; 1995 p.xxiii) . It is also not a coincidence that one of the most anti-Communist writers, Robert Conquest, exonerates Sudoplatov of falsification in a glowing foreword.

Of course, Conquest is careful to cover himself by saying that:

“Sudoplatov is by no means immune from error”

(Ibid; p.xv).

Nonetheless Conquest ends by lauding the memoirs:

“But it will be seen that (criticisms-ed) are of little consequence compared with the solid substance we Sudoplatov offers is.. A unique document.. The most valuable of all possible sources for important matters over the whole period of High Stalinism”

(Ibid; p.xiv.)

We reply that the most solid evidence about the period is in Stalin’s own writings. The fragmentary additional evidence must be sensibly pieced together using in addition, Marxist-Leninist theory.

Thirdly: We have increasingly over the last few months/years used sources derived from the world wide web. We caution however that it is sometimes difficult to know who is posting these various documents on the web. We thus attempt to use these documents sparingly. Above all, if web sources are used, we attempt to fully reference the web site.

Introduction

When Zionists attack Lenin and Stalin for their alleged racism against the Jewish peoples, the accusation devolves onto one issue. That issue is that Lenin and Stalin denied at the turn of the century, that the Jewish people had a national status.

After German fascists, aided by Western imperialism launched the genocide against Jews, before and during World War II, a national identity was then formed in the state of Israel. In fact the German fascists helped to weld a later national possibility for Jews in the imperialist stooge state of Israel. This later event was not one that could have been dealt with by Lenin or Stalin in their early writings. In “The National Question,” Stalin had pointed out, that nations come into being and pass away. Obviously a different situation arose after World War II, engineered by imperialism, which before turned a blind eye to the genocide of the Jews. This was part of the overall strategy of turning Germany against the USSR. But some imperialisms, especially the USA promoted the migration of Jews into former Palestine, to consolidate their position against other imperialisms. This created a further tension between the British imperialists and the USA imperialists.

It was not racism that informed the views of Lenin and Stalin. The attitude of Lenin and Stalin was to destroy separatist tendencies that would ghetto-ise and narrow the proletariat. Lenin quoted with approval the words of Ernest Renan, which quickly summarize the views that Lenin had on ghettos and racism of all sorts:

“‘When the National Assembly of 1791 decreed the emancipation of the Jews,'” writes Renan, “It was very little concerned with the question of race.. It is the business of the Nineteenth Century to abolish all ‘ghettos,’ and I cannot compliment those who seek to restore them. The Jewish race has rendered the world the greatest services. Assimilated with the various nations, harmoniously blended with the various national units, it will render no less services in the future than in the past.”

(Lenin, Quoting Ernst Renan of Paris, 1887, in : “The Position of Bund In The Party” 1903)

Source

Marxist-Leninist Organisation of Britain on the 1973 Yom Kippur War

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Originally published in Class Against Class, organ of the Marxist-Leninist Organisation of Britain, No. 2 Special Edition, October 1973.

Web edition by Alliance Marxist-Leninist July 2003

THE WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST

War Has Come Once Again To The Middle East

On October 6th, 1973, the armed forces of Egypt and Syria, crossed the cease-fire line established after the war of June 1967 into Israeli –occupied territory seized from these states in that war.

But the new war differs from that of 1967 in one very important respect – for reasons that will be analysed later, Israel no longer enjoys the full support of world imperialism, even in the eyes of United States imperialism. Already in the first few days of the war the powerful Israeli war machine has suffered great losses in men and machines, already the first arrogant communiques of the Israeli High Command have given way to gloomy admissions that the war is likely to be long and bitter, already the myth of the “invincibility” of the Israeli armed forces has melted away.

The Foundation of Israel

Zionism, the political philosophy of the Israeli ruling class, has been since its inception at the end of the 19th. century an ideology serving objectively the interests of developed capitalism, of imperialism. It presents workers and petty bourgeois of Jewish descent as members of “a Jewish nation,” as “aliens” in the countries in which they live; it tells them that, to be “free,” they must emigrate to their ancient “national homeland” in Palestine. Thus, the participation of a Zionist worker in the struggles of the working class for a better life, for socialism, can at best be only half-hearted, for he regards himself as an “outsider” whose eyes are directed towards “his own” country, which has now taken concrete shape in the state of Israel. Thus, Zionism is complementary to anti-semitism in its reactionary divisive effect.

The desire of the British imperialists to win the support of the Zionist movement for the Allied war effort in the First World War brought the Balfour Declaration of November 1917; this promised that the British Government would facilitate the setting up of “a National Home for the Jewish People” in Palestine. The British imperialists were unworried by the fact that two years earlier, in July 1915, they had won Husein ibn Ali, the Grand Sherif of Mecca, to the side of the Allies by promising to support the establishment of “an independent Arab state” in Palestine and that in 1916 they had signed a secret treaty with the French imperialists dividing a Palestine between them. Palestine became simply “the much promised land.'”

When the First World War was over, the British and French imperialists took over the Arab Near East disguising their colonial rule under the cloak of “League of Nations mandates.” As Jewish immigration continued, both legally and illegally into Palestine, the rise of Arab national liberation movements led the imperialists to adopt neo-colonial manoeuvres: Iraq was granted “independence” in 1932, Syria and Lebanon in 1941, Jordan in 1946. And in 1947 the British government announced that it was ending its rule over Palestine in May of the following year and was transferring its “responsibilities” there to the United Nations.

The United Nations envisaged the partition of Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state, with Jerusalem as an independent city. But it’s scheme was never put into effect. On May 14th, 1948, the Zionists proclaimed most of Palestine “the state of Israel.

The Palestinian Refugees

At the time of its formation, the state of Israel contained 1.3 million Arabs and 0.7 million Jews. The Zionists took steps to establish a Jewish majority. As Michael Bar-Zhchar says in his sympathetic biography of the founder of Israel:

“Ben Gurion never believed in the possibility of coexistence with the Arabs. The fewer Arabs within the frontiers of the future state the better … A major offensive against the Arabs would … reduce to a minimum the proportion of the Arab population within the state …. He may be accused of racism, but in that case the whole Zionist movement would have to be put on trial.”

Thus, even before the declaration of “independence” Zionist armed gangs had begun a campaign of massacre and terror against the Arab population, driving great numbers of them to seek refuge in the neighbouring Arab states. By 1950 a million Arab refugees from Palestine were officially receiving United Nations aid, and by 1971 2.6 million of the 3.0 million population of Israel were Jews.

Dependence upon Imperialism

The establishment of a Jewish racist state in the heart of, and hostile to, the Arab world gave world imperialism a valuable bridgehead against the Arab national liberation movement – a bridgehead dependent upon the active support of world imperialism for its very existence.

At first Israel continued to depend upon British imperialism. It was Britain, together with France, which collaborated with Israel in the war of aggression against Egypt which began in October 1956. But the more powerful US imperialists were unwilling to allow their British and French rivals to extend their influence in the Middle East, and compelled the British, French and Israeli forces to withdraw ignominiously from Egyptian territory.

From this time on, the Israeli ruling class transferred their dependence to US imperialism which supplied huge quantities of military “aid” to Israel. It was as a result of this military “aid” that in June 1967 Israel was able to launch its war of aggression against Egypt, Syria and Jordan, compelling these states to accept a cease-fire which left Israel in control of large areas of their territory.

Later, in the UN General Assernbly, the United States representative defended the Israeli aggression as an action of “self-defence,” but in November 1967 the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution, drafted by, Britain, which demanded that Israel withdraw all troops to her former boundaries and bring about a just settlement of the refugee problem. The Council appointed Gunnar Jarring, of Sweden, as UN Special Representative charged with securing the fulfillment of the resolution, but the Israeli government has always refused to carry cut its terms.

The Palestine Liberation Movement

The 1967 defeat of the Arab states, and the new numbers of Arab refugees which the war added to those of earlier years, stimulated the rise of a Palestine national liberation movement, formed largely from among these, refugees. Although, this resistance movement soon fragmented into a considerable number of rival organisations, and their declared aim of the liberation of Palestine was greatly retarded when the leaders of some of these organisations turned from organised guerrilla warfare to acts of individual terrorism in various countries, it remained a significant force.

Washington’s New Plan

By the summer of 1970 it had become clear to the most influential section of the United States imperialists that it would be essential for the USA to import large quantities of oil in the next few years from the Arab states in the Middle East. This meant that full support of Israel against these Arab states was no longer in the best interests of the US imperialists.

From this time on the US imperialists made their position clear to the Arab Middle East governments. They would endeavour to persuade the Israeli government to withdraw “voluntarily” to the boundaries existing before the war of 1967. And if those attempts failed, they would hold back (without discontinuing entirely) their military “aid” to Israel and would tacitly approve of an all-out war on the part of the Arab state provided:

1) the Palestine national liberation movements were effectively liquidated; and
2) the representatives of Soviet imperialism were expelled from the Arab states.

Whatever the military outcome of such a war might be, it would gravely weaken the military and economic power of Israel and facilitate the imposition upon its government of a new cease-fire compelling it to accept the terms of the Security Council resolution of November 1967. The European imperialist powers – even more dependent upon Middle East oil than the USA – could be depended on to take the initiative in this imposition.

The Execution of the Plan

In 1970 and 1971 the US government pressed its “peace plan” through visits to, the Middle East by Secretary of State William Rogers, Assistant Secretary of State: Joseph Sisco, and diplomats Donald Bergus and Michael Sterner. The Israeli government, over-confident of its position, refused to consider withdrawal to its old frontiers.

Meanwhile, using as a pretext the hi-jacking of several airliners to Jordan by Palestine commandos, in September 1970 King Hussein of Jordan launched a large scale offensive against the national liberation forces within Jordan; this offensive was resumed in July 1971, after which Hussein announced that the resistance forces within Jordan had been completely liquidated.

In April 1973 the government of Lebanon, using as pretext the Israeli commando raid against Palestinian guerillas near Beirut in February, launched an offensive against the Palestinian national liberation forces within Lebanon. The attack ended in May after the guerilla’s had suffered heavy casualties.

Meanwhile, the Egyptian government took action against the representatives of Soviet neo-imperialism, as described at the time in the MLOB’s journal RED FRONT:

“Since the death of Nasser, two conflicting trends have emerged within the Egyptian capitalist class – each standing for a different method of trying to solve the problem of the continuing occupation of Egyptian territory by the troops of their U,S. dominated neighbour, Israel.

One section, headed by former Vice-President Ali Sabry, favoured the adoption of a phoney programme of “socialism” as a pretext for completely subordinating Egypt to Soviet neo-imperialism in an alliance which would force Israel to retreat from her present positions.

The other section, headed by President Anwar Sadat himself, favoured confederating Egypt with Syria and Lybia, in order to offer to subordinate this confederation, to US imperialism in return for US pressure, on her Israeli puppets to withdraw their forces.

The US imperialists having indicated their interest in this second line of approach, the President dismissed Ali Sabry on the eve of the visit to Egypt by US Secretary of State William Rogers, at the beginning of May 1971.

Soon afterwards several hundred prominent persons associated with the pro-Soviet faction within the capitalist class – including Ali Sabry; the Secretary-General of the ruling “Arab Socialist Union”, Abdul Nur; six Cabinet Ministers, including the Minister of Defence, General Mohammed Fawzy, and the Minister of the Interior, Sharawy Gornaa – were arrested in the name of ‘preserving the independence of Egypt from a coup engineered by a foreign power.’

Apprehensive for the safety of their massive economic and military investments (more than half of Soviet “aid” has gone to Egypt), the Soviet neo-imperialists immediately despatched a high-level though “unofficial” delegation to Cairo headed by President Podgorny. The Egyptian government was pleased to sign a 15-year ‘Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation’ with the Soviet Union, and to use it as blackmail to further persuade the US imperialists to pressure their Israeli puppets into a peace settlement acceptable to the Egyptian capitalist class.”

(RED FRONT, July-August 1971; p.20).

In September 1973 the Syrian government imposed “strict restrictions” on the movements of Soviet personnel in the country. Meanwhile, in August, US Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco had made the position of the US imperialists only too clear when he said bluntly on Israeli TV:

“While our interests in many respects are parallel to the interests of Israel, they are not synonymous with those of the state of Israel. The interests of the United States go beyond any one nation in this area. … There is increasing concern in our country over the energy question and I think that it is foolhardy to think that this is not a factor in the situation.”

In September King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, whose country is a long-standing semi-colony of the USA to which it exports almost all its oil, declared (in support of the US plan) that continuing US support for Israel might be purchased “at the cost of Saudi oil.” President Nixon commented on this statement in a manner strikingly different from his earlier statements of full support for Israel, saying, “Both sides are at fault. Both sides need to start negotiating. That is our position.”

The Israeli leaders, becoming aware that they might be as expendable to the changing needs of US imperialism as the Chiang Kai-shek regime, made frantic approaches to the British and German imperialists. But Chancellor Willy Brandt invited to Israel for a state visit in June 1973, said only what British Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Hume had declared move bluntly in Cairo in September 1971, that Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories was “a vital requirement.”

When at the beginning of October 1973, the Austrian government closed down the transit camp for Jews from the Soviet Union (a capitalist government does not change its policy to save the lives of a few Jewish hostages), the relative isolation of the Israeli rulers from imperialism was finally clear.

A Just War of Liberation

The war of the Arab states for the liberation of the territories seized from them by Israel on behalf of United States imperialism is a just war, which will have the support of progressive people in every country. This just character is not altered by the fact that the US imperialists have, in a new world situation, given the green light to the Arab states.

But a war fought by Arab states with the tacit support of the US imperialists cannot solve the plight of the Palestine refugees. This requires the forcible destruction of the present Israeli racist state machine and the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state in which Arabs and Jews can have equal civil rights. This can be brought about not by the present war, but only by the armed struggle of a united Palestinian national liberation movement purged of illusions of the usefulness of acts of individual terrorism.

BUT THIS IS A QUESTION FOR THE FUTURE.

 

Source

On the 100th anniversary of World War I

YourCountryNeedsYou

The following entry is from the Great Soviet Encyclopedia.

 – E.S.

World War I (1914–18) 

an imperialist war between two coalitions of capitalist powers for a redivision of the already divided world (a repartition of colonies, spheres of influence, and spheres for the investment of capital) and for the enslavement of other peoples. At first, the war involved eight European states: Germany and Austria-Hungary against Great Britain, France, Russia, Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro. Later, most of the countries in the world entered the war (see Table 1). A total of four states fought on the side of the Austro-German bloc; 34 states, including four British dominions and the colony of India, all of which signed the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, took part on the side of the Entente. On both sides, the war was aggressive and unjust. Only in Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro did it include elements of a war of national liberation.

Although imperialists from all the principal belligerent powers were involved in unleashing the war, the party chiefly to blame was the German bourgeoisie, who began World War I at the “moment it thought most favorable for war, making useof its latest improvements in military matériel and forestalling the rearmament already planned and decided upon by Russia and France” (V. I. Lenin, Poln. sobr. soch., 5th ed., vol. 26, p. 16).

The immediate cause of World War I was the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, by Serbian nationalists on June 15 (28), 1914, in Sarajevo, Bosnia. German imperialists decided to take advantage of this favorable moment to unleash the war. Under German pressure, Austria-Hungary delivered an ultimatum to Serbia on July 10 (23). Although the Serbian government agreed to meet almost all of the demands in the ultimatum, Austria-Hungary broke diplomatic relations with Serbia on July 12 (25) and declared war on Serbia on July 15 (28). Belgrade, the Serbian capital, was shelled. On July 16 (29), Russia began mobilization in the military districts bordering on Austria-Hungary and on July 17 (30) proclaimed a general mobilization. On July 18 (31), Germany demanded that Russia halt its mobilization and, receiving no reply, declared war on Russia on July 19 (Aug. 1). Germany declared war on France and Belgium on July 21 (Aug. 3). On July 22 (Aug. 4), Great Britain declared war on Germany. The British dominions (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa) and Britain’s largest colony, India, entered the war on the same day. On Aug. 10 (23), Japan declared war on Germany. Italy formally remained a member of the Triple Alliance but declared its neutrality on July 20 (Aug. 2), 1914.

Causes of the war. At the turn of the 20th century capitalism was transformed into imperialism. The world had been almost completely divided up among the largest powers. The uneven-ness of the economic and political development of various countries became more marked. The states that had been late in embarking on the path of capitalist development (the USA, Germany, and Japan) advanced rapidly, competing successfully on the world market with the older capitalist countries (Great Britain and France) and persistently pressing for a repartition of the colonies. The most acute conflicts arose between Germany and Great Britain, whose interests clashed in many parts of the globe, especially in Africa, East Asia, and the Middle East, focal points of German imperialism’s trade and colonial expansion. The construction of the Baghdad Railroad aroused grave alarm in British ruling circles. The railroad would provide Germany with direct route through the Balkan Peninsula and Asia Minor to the Persian Gulf and guarantee Germany an important position in the Middle East, thus threatening British land and sea communications with India.

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France, rooted in the desire of German capitalists to secure permanent possession of Alsace and Lorraine, which had been taken from France as a result of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71, and in the determination of the French to regain these provinces. French and German interests also clashed on the colonial issue. French attempts to seize Morocco met with determined resistance from Germany, which also claimed this territory.

Contradictions between Russia and Germany began to increase in the late 19th century. The expansion of German imperialism in the Middle East and its attempts to establish control over Turkey infringed on Russian economic, political, and strategic interests. Germany used its customs policy to limit the importation of grain from Russia, imposing high duties while simultaneously making sure that German industrial goods could freely penetrate the Russian market.

In the Balkans, there were profound contradictions between Russia and Austria-Hungary, caused primarily by the expansion of the Hapsburg monarchy, with Germany’s support, into the neighboring South Slav lands (Bosnia, Hercegovina, and Serbia). Austria-Hungary intended to establish its superiority in the Balkans. Russia, which supported the struggle of the Balkan peoples for freedom and national independence, considered the Balkans its own sphere of influence. The tsarist regime and the Russian imperialist bourgeoisie wanted to take over the Bosporus and Dardanelles to strengthen their position in the Balkans.

There were many disputed issues between Great Britain and France, Great Britain and Russia, Austria-Hungary and Italy, and Turkey and Italy, but they were secondary to the principal contradictions, which existed between Germany and its rivals— Great Britain, France, and Russia. The aggravation and deepening of these contradictions impelled the imperialists toward a repartition of the world, but “under capitalism, the repartitioning of ‘world domination’ could only take place at the price of a world war” (Lenin, ibid., vol. 34, p. 370).

The class struggle and the national liberation movement grew stronger during the second decade of the 20th century. The Revolution of 1905–07 in Russia had an enormous influence on the upsurge in the struggle of the toiling people for their social and national liberation. There was considerable growth in the working-class movement in Germany, France, and Great Britain. The class struggle reached its highest level in Russia, where a new revolutionary upsurge began in 1910 and an acute political crisis ripened. National liberation movements grew broader in Ireland and Alsace (the Zabern affair, 1913), and the struggle of the enslaved peoples of Austria-Hungary became more extensive. The imperialists sought to use war to suppress the developing liberation movement of the working class and oppressed peoples in their own countries and to arrest the world revolutionary process.

For many years the imperialists prepared for a world war as a means of resolving foreign and domestic contradictions. The initial step was the formation of a system of military-political blocs, beginning with the Austro-German Agreement of 1879, under which the signatories promised to render assistance to each other in case of war with Russia. Seeking support in its struggle with France for possession of Tunisia, Italy joined Austria-Hungary and Germany in 1882. Thus, the Triple Alliance of 1882, or the alliance of the Central Powers, took shape in central Europe. Initially directed against Russia and France, it later included Great Britain among its main rivals.

To counterbalance the Triple Alliance, another coalition of European powers began to develop. The Franco-Russian Alliance of 1891–93 provided for joint actions by the two countries in case of aggression by Germany or by Italy and Austria-Hungary supported by Germany. The growth of German economic power in the early 20th century forced Great Britain to gradually renounce its traditional policy of splendid isolation and seek rapprochement with France and Russia. The Anglo-French agreement of 1904 settled various colonial disputes between Great Britain and France, and the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 reinforced the understanding between Russia and Great Britain regarding their policies in Tibet,Afghanistan, and Iran. These documents created the Triple Entente (or agreement), a bloc opposed to the Triple Alliance and made up of Great Britain, France, and Russia. In 1912, Anglo-French and Franco-Russian naval conventions were signed, and in 1913 negotiations were opened for an Anglo-Russian naval convention.

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The formation of military-political groupings in Europe, as well as the arms race, further aggravated imperialist contradictions and increased international tensions. A relatively tranquil period of world history was followed by an epoch that was“much more violent, spasmodic, disastrous, and conflicting” (ibid., vol. 27, p. 94). The worsening of imperialist contradictions was evident in the Moroccan crises of 1905–06 and 1911, the Bosnian crisis of 1908–09, the Italo-Turkish War of 1911–12, and the Balkan Wars of 1912–13. In December 1913, Germany provoked a major international conflict by sending a military mission under the command of General O. Liman von Sanders to Turkey to reorganize and train the Turkish Army.

In preparation for a world war the ruling circles of the imperialist states established powerful war industries, based on large state plants: armaments, explosives, and ammunition plants, as well as shipyards. Private enterprises were drawn into the production of military goods: Krupp in Germany, Skoda in Austria-Hungary, Schneider-Creusot and St. Chamond in France, Vickers and Armstrong-Whitworth in Great Britain, and the Putilov Works and other plants in Russia.

The imperialists of the two hostile coalitions put a great deal of effort into building up their armed forces. The achievements of science and technology were placed in the service of war. More sophisticated armaments were developed, including rapid-fire magazine rifles and machine guns, which greatly increased the firepower of the infantry. In the artillery the number of rifled guns of the latest design increased sharply. Of great strategic importance was the development of the railroads, which made it possible to significantly speed up the concentration and deployment of large masses of troops in the theaters of operations and to provide an uninterrupted supply of personnel replacements and matériel to the armies in the field. Motor vehicle transport began to play an increasingly important role, and military aviation began to develop. The use of new means of communication in military affairs, including the telegraph, the telephone, and the radio,facilitated the organization of troop control. The size of armies and trained reserves grew rapidly. (See Table 2 for the composition of the ground forces of the principal warring powers.)

Germany and Great Britain were engaged in a stiff competition in naval armaments. The dreadnought, a new type of ship, was first built in 1905. By 1914 the German Navy was firmly established as the world’s second most powerful navy(after the British). Other countries endeavored to strengthen their navies, but it was not financially and economically possible for them to carry out the shipbuilding programs they had adopted. (See Table 3 for the composition of the naval forces of the principal warring powers.) The costly arms race demanded enormous financial means and placed a heavy burden on the toiling people.

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There was extensive ideological preparation for war. The imperialists attempted to instill in the people the idea that armed conflicts are inevitable, and they tried their hardest to inculcate militarism in the people and incite chauvinism among them. To achieve these aims, all means of propaganda were used—the press, literature, the arts, and the church. Taking advantage of the patriotic feelings of the people, the bourgeoisie in every country justified the arms race and camouflaged aggressive objectives with false arguments on the need to defend the native land against foreign enemies.

The international working class (more than 150 million persons) was a real force capable of significantly restraining the imperialist governments. At the international level, the working-class movement was headed by the Second International,which united 41 Social Democratic parties from 27 countries, with 3.4 million members. However, the opportunist leaders of the European Social Democratic parties did nothing to implement the antiwar decisions of the prewar congresses of the Second International. When the war began, the leaders of the Social Democratic parties of the Western countries came to the support of their governments and voted for military credits in parliament. The socialist leaders of Great Britain (A. Henderson), France (J. Guesde, M. Sembat, and A. Thomas), and Belgium (E. Vandervelde) joined the bourgeois military governments. Ideologically and politically, the Second International collapsed and ceased to exist, breaking up into social chauvinist parties.

Only the left wing of the Second International, with the Bolshevik Party led by Lenin in the vanguard, continued to fight consistently against militarism, chauvinism, and war. The basic principles defining the attitude of revolutionary Marxists toward war were set forth by Lenin in the Manifesto of the Central Committee of the RSDLP, “War and Russian Social Democracy.” Firmly opposed to the war, the Bolsheviks explained its imperialist character to the popular masses. The Bolshevik faction of the Fourth State Duma refused to support the tsarist government and vote for war credits. The Bolshevik Party called on the toiling people of all countries to work for the defeat of their governments in the war, the transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war, and the revolutionary overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie and the landlords. A revolutionary, antiwar stance was adopted by the Bulgarian Workers’ Social Democratic Party (Narrow Socialists), headed by D. Blagoev, G. Dimitrov, and V. Kolarov, and by the Serbian and Rumanian Social Democratic parties. Active opposition to the imperialist war was also shown by a small group of left-wing Social Democrats in Germany, led by K. Liebknecht, R. Luxemburg, C. Zetkin, and F. Mehring; by a few socialists in France, led by J. Jaurès; and by some socialists in other countries.

War plans and strategic deployment. Long before the war began, the general staffs had worked out war plans. All strategic calculations were oriented toward a short, fast-moving war. The German strategic plan provided for rapid, decisive actions against France and Russia. It assumed that France would be crushed in six to eight weeks, after which all German forces would descend on Russia and bring the war to a victorious conclusion. The bulk of German troops (four-fifths) were deployed on the western border of Germany and were designated for the invasion of France. It was their mission to deliver the main attack with the right wing through Belgium and Luxembourg, turning the left flank of the French Army west of Paris and, throwing it back toward the German border, forcing it to surrender. A covering force (one army) was stationed in East Prussia to oppose Russia. The German military command figured that it would be able to crush France and transfer troops to the east before the Russian Army went over to the offensive. The main forces of the German Navy (the High Seas Fleet) were to be stationed at bases in the North Sea. Their mission was to weaken the British Navy with actions using light forces and submarines and then destroy the main British naval forces in a decisive battle. A few cruisers were detailed for operations in the British sea-lanes. In the Baltic Sea the German Navy’s mission was to prevent vigorous actions by the Russian Navy.

The Austro-Hungarian command planned military operations on two fronts: against Russia in Galicia and against Serbia and Montenegro in the Balkans. They did not exclude the possibility of forming a front against Italy, an unreliable member of the Triple Alliance that might go over to the Entente. Consequently, the Austro-Hungarian command drew up three variations of a war plan and divided their ground forces into three operational echelons (groups): group A (nine corps), which was designated for actions against Russia; the “minimum Balkan” group (three corps), which was directed against Serbia and Montenegro; and group B (four corps), the reserve of the supreme command, which could be used either to reinforce the other groups or to form a new front if Italy became an enemy.

The general staffs of Austria-Hungary and Germany maintained close contact with each other and coordinated their strategic plans. The Austro-Hungarian plan for the war against Russia provided for delivering the main attack from Galicia between the Vistula and Bug rivers and moving northeast to meet German forces, which were supposed to develop an offensive at the same time moving southeast from East Prussia toward Siedlce, with the objectives of surrounding and destroying the grouping of Russian troops in Poland. The mission of the Austro-Hungarian Navy, which was stationed in the Adriatic Sea, was to defend the coast.

The Russian General Staff worked out two variations of the war plan, both of which were offensive. Under Variation A, the main forces of the Russian Army would be deployed against Austria-Hungary. Variation G was directed against Germany, should it deliver the main attack on the Eastern Front. Variation A, which was actually carried out, planned converging attacks in Galicia and East Prussia, with the aim of destroying the enemy groupings. This phase of the plan would be followed by a general offensive into Germany and Austria-Hungary. Two detached armies were assigned to cover Petrograd and southern Russia. In addition, the Army of the Caucasus was formed in case Turkey entered the war on the side of the Central Powers. It was the mission of the Baltic Fleet to defend the sea approaches to Petrograd and prevent the German fleet from breaking through into the Gulf of Finland. The Black Sea Fleet did not have a ratified plan ofaction.

The French plan for the war against Germany (Plan XVII) envisioned going over to the offensive with the forces of the right wing of the armies in Lorraine and with the forces of the left wing against Metz. At first, the possibility of an invasion byGerman forces through Belgium was not taken into account, because Belgian neutrality had been guaranteed by the great powers, including Germany. However, a variation of Plan XVII ratified on Aug. 2, 1914, specified that in case of an offensive by German troops through Belgium, combat operations were to be developed on the left wing up to the line of the Meuse (Maas) River from Namur to Givet. The French plan reflected the lack of confidence of the French command,confronted with a struggle against a more powerful Germany. In fact, the plan made the actions of the French Army dependent on the actions of the German forces. The mission of the French fleet in the Mediterranean Sea was to ensure themovement of colonial troops from North Africa to France by blockading the Austro-Hungarian fleet in the Adriatic Sea. Part of the French fleet was assigned to defend the approaches to the English Channel.

Expecting that military operations on land would be waged by the armies of its allies, Russia and France, Great Britain did not draw up plans for operations by ground forces. It promised only to send an expeditionary corps to the continentto help the French. The navy was assigned active missions: to set up a long-range blockade of Germany on the North Sea, to ensure the security of sea-lanes, and to destroy the German fleet in a decisive battle.

The great powers carried out the strategic deployment of their armed forces in conformity with these plans. Germany moved seven armies (the First through Seventh, consisting of 86 infantry and ten cavalry divisions, with a total of about 1.6million men and about 5,000 guns) to the border with Belgium, Luxembourg, and France, along a 380-km front from Krefeld to Mulhouse. The main grouping of these forces (five armies) was located north of Metz on a 160-km front. The defense of the northern coast of Germany was assigned to the Northern Army (one reserve corps and four Landwehr brigades). The commander in chief was Kaiser Wilhelm II, and the chief of staff was General H. von Moltke the younger(from Sept. 14, 1914, E. Falkenhayn, and from Aug. 29, 1916, until the end of the war, Field Marshal General P. von Hindenburg).

The French armies (the First through Fifth, consisting of 76 infantry and ten cavalry divisions, with a total of about 1.73 million men and more than 4,000 guns), which were under the command of General J. J. C. Joffre, were deployed on front of approximately 345 km from Belfort to Hirson. (From December 1916, General R. Nivelle was commander in chief of the French armies, and from May 17, 1917, until the end of the war, General H. Pétain. On May 14, 1918, Marshal F. Foch became supreme commander of Allied forces.) The Belgian Army under the command of King Albert I (six infantry divisions and one cavalry division, with a total of 117,000 men and 312 guns) occupied a line east of Brussels. The British Expeditionary Force under the command of Field Marshal J. French (four infantry divisions and 1.5 cavalry divisions, with a total of 87,000 men and 328 guns) was concentrated in the Maubeuge region next to the left flank of the grouping of French armies. (From December 1915 until the end of the war, the British Expeditionary Force was under the command of General D. Haig.) The main grouping of Allied forces was northwest of Verdun.

Against Russia, Germany placed the Eighth Army (14.5 infantry divisions and one cavalry division, with a total of more than 200,000 men and 1,044 guns), under the command of General M. von Prittwitz und Gaffron, in East Prussia andGeneral R. von Woyrsch’s Landwehr corps in Silesia (two Landwehr divisions and 72 guns). Austria-Hungary had three armies (the First, Third, and Fourth) on a front from Czernowitz (now Chernovtsy) to Sandomierz. H. Kövess vonKövessháza’s army group (from August 23, the Second Army) was on the right flank, and Kummer’s army group was in the Kraków region (35.5 infantry divisions and 11 cavalry divisions, with about 850,000 men and 1,848 guns). Thesupreme commander in chief was Archduke Frederick. (Emperor Charles I became supreme commander in chief in November 1916.) The Austro-Hungarian chief of staff was Field Marshal General F. Conrad von Hötzendorf (from Feb. 28,1917, General Arz von Straussenburg).

Russia had six armies on its Western border (52 infantry divisions and 21 cavalry divisions, with a total of more than 1 million men and 3,203 guns). Two fronts were formed: the Northwestern Front (First and Second armies) and theSouthwestern Front (Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth armies). The Sixth Army was to defend the Baltic coast and cover Petrograd; the Seventh Army was to defend the northwest coast of the Black Sea and the boundary with Rumania. The divisions of the second strategic echelon and the Siberian divisions arrived at the front later, at the end of August and during September. On July 20 (August 2), Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich was appointed supreme commander in chief.(For a list of his successors, see SUPREME COMMANDER IN CHIEF.) The chiefs of staff of the supreme commander in chief were General N. N. Ianushkevich (July 19 [Aug. 1], 1914, to Aug. 18 [31], 1915) and General M. V. Alekseev (Aug. 18 [31],1915, to Nov. 10 [23], 1916; Feb. 17 [Mar. 2] to Mar. 11 [24], 1917; and Aug. 30 [Sept. 12] to Sept. 9 [22], 1917). At the end of 1916 and during 1917 the duties of chief of staff were temporarily carried out by Generals V. I. Romeiko-Gurko,V. N. Klembovskii, A. I. Denikin, A. S. Lukomskii, and N. N. Dukhonin. From Nov. 20 (Dec. 3), 1917, to Feb. 21, 1918, the chief of staff was M. D. Bonch-Bruevich, whose successors were S I. Kuleshin and M. M. Zagiu.

In the Balkans, Austria-Hungary set two armies against Serbia: the Fifth and Sixth armies, under the command of General O. Potiorek (13 infantry divisions and one cavalry division, with a total of 140,000 men and 546 guns). Serbiadeployed four armies under the command of Voevoda R. Putnik (the First, Second, Third, and Fourth armies, consisting of 11 infantry divisions and one cavalry division, with a total of 250,000 men and 550 guns). Montenegro had six infantrydivisions (35,000 men and 60 guns).

The strategic deployment of the armed forces of both sides was basically completed by August 4–6 (17–19). Military operations took place in Europe, Asia, and Africa, on all the oceans, and on many seas. The principal operations tookplace in five theaters of ground operations: Western Europe (from 1914), Eastern Europe (from 1914), Italy (from 1915), the Balkans (from 1914), and the Middle East (from 1914). In addition, military operations were carried out in East Asia (Tsingtao, 1914), on the Pacific islands (Oceania), and in the German colonies in Africa, including German East Africa (until the end of the war), German Southwest Africa (until 1915), Togo (1914), and the Cameroons (until 1916).Throughout the war the chief theaters of ground operations were the Western European (French) and the Eastern European (Russian). Particularly important theaters of naval operations were the North, Mediterranean, Baltic, and Black seas and the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian oceans.

Campaign of 1914. In the Western European theater, military operations began with the invasion by German troops of Luxembourg (August 2) and Belgium (August 4), the latter having rejected a German ultimatum regarding the passage of German troops through its territory. Relying on the fortified areas of Liège and Namur, the Belgian Army offered the enemy stubborn resistance on the Meuse River line. Abandoning Liège after bitter fighting (August 16), the Belgian Army retreated toward Antwerp. Dispatching about two corps (80,000 men and 300 guns) against the Belgian Army, the German command directed the main grouping of its armies to the southwest, toward the Franco-Belgian border. The French armies of the left flank (the Third, Fourth, and Fifth armies) and the British Army were moved forward to meet the German forces. The Battle of the Frontiers took place on Aug. 21–25, 1914.

In view of the danger of the enemy turning the left flank of the Allied forces, the French command withdrew its armies deeper into the country to gain time to regroup its forces and prepare a counteroffensive. From August 7 to 14 the Frencharmies of the right flank (the First and Second armies) conducted an offensive in Alsace and Lorraine. But with the invasion by German forces of France through Belgium, the French offensive was brought to a halt, and both armies were drawn back to their initial positions. The main grouping of German armies continued its offensive along a southwest axis of advance toward Paris and, winning a series of local victories over the Entente armies at Le Cateau (August 26),Nesle and Proyart (August 28–29), and St. Quentin and Guise (August 29–30), reached the Marne River between Paris and Verdun by September 5. The French command completed the regrouping of its forces and, having formed two newarmies (the Sixth and the Ninth) from reserves, created a superiority of forces in this axis. In the battle of the Marne (Sept. 5–12, 1914), the German troops were defeated and forced to withdraw to the Aisne and Oise rivers, where they dug in and stopped the allied counteroffensive by September 16.

From September 16 to October 15, three operations by maneuver known as the Race to the Sea developed out of the attempts of each side to seize the “free space” west of the Oise and extending to the Pas-de-Calais, by enveloping the enemy’s open flanks on the north. The forces of both sides reached the coast west of Ostend. The Belgian Army, which had been forced to withdraw from Antwerp on October 8, occupied a sector on the left flank of the Allied armies. The battle in Flanders on the Yser and Ypres river (October 15 to November 20) did not change the overall situation. Attempts by the Germans to break through the Allied defense and take the ports on the Pas-de-Calais were unsuccessful.Having suffered considerable losses, both sides stopped active combat actions and dug in on the established lines. A static front was established from the Swiss border to the North Sea. In December 1914 it was 720 km long, with 650 km assigned to the French Army, 50 km to the British, and 20 km to the Belgians.

Military operations in the Eastern European theater began on August 4–7 (17–20), with the invasion of East Prussia by the inadequately prepared troops of the Russian Northwestern Front (commanded by General la. G. Zhilinskii; chief ofstaff, General V. A. Oranovskii). During the East Prussian Operation of 1914 the First Russian Army (General P. K. Rennenkampf, commander), advancing from the east, smashed units of the German I Corps near Stallüponen on August 4(17) and inflicted a defeat on the main forces of the German Eighth Army on August 7 (20) in the battle of Gumbinnen-Goldap. On August 7 (20) the Russian Second Army (commanded by General A. V. Samsonov) invaded East Prussia, delivering an attack on the flank and rear of the German Eighth Army. The commander of the Eighth Army decided to begin a withdrawal of forces from East Prussia beyond the Vistula, but the German supreme command, dissatisfied with this decision, ordered a change in command on August 10 (23), appointing General P. von Hindenburg commander and General E. Ludendorff chief of staff.

The offensive by Russian troops in East Prussia forced the German command to take two corps and one cavalry division from the Western Front and send them to the Eastern Front on August 13 (26). This was one of the causes of the defeat of German forces in the battle of the Marne. Taking advantage of the lack of cooperation between the First and Second armies and the mistakes of the Russian command, the enemy was able to inflict a heavy defeat on the Russian Second Army and then on the First Army and drive them out of East Prussia.

In the battle of Galicia (1914), which took place at the same time as the East Prussian Operation, the troops of the Russian Southwestern Front (commander in chief, General N. I. Ivanov; chief of staff, General M. V. Alekseev) inflicted amajor defeat on the Austro-Hungarian forces. They took L’vov on August 21 (September 3), laid seige to the Przemyśl fortress on September 8 (21), and, pursuing the enemy, reached the Wisłoka River and the foothills of the Carpathians by September 13 (26). A danger arose that Russian forces would invade the German province of Silesia. The German supreme command hurriedly transferred major forces from East Prussia to the region of Częstochowa and Kraków and formed a new army (the Ninth). The objective was to deliver a counter strike against Ivangorod (Dęblin) in the flank and rear of the troops of the Southwestern Front and thus to thwart the attack on Silesia that the Russian forces were preparing. Owing to a timely regrouping of forces carried out by Russian General Headquarters, in the Warsaw-Ivangorod Operation of 1914 the Russian armies stopped the advance of the German Ninth Army and the Austro-Hungarian First Army on Ivangorod by September 26 (October 9) and then repulsed the German attack on Warsaw. On October 5 (18), Russian forces went over to the counteroffensive and threw the enemy back to the initial line.

The Russian armies resumed preparations for an invasion of Germany. The German command moved the Ninth Army from the Częstochowa region to the north, having decided to deliver a blow at the right flank and rear of the Russian offensive grouping. In the Łódź Operation of 1914, which began on October 29 (November 11), the enemy succeeded in thwarting the Russian plan, but an attempt to surround the Russian Second and Fifth armies in the Łódź region failed, and German troops were forced to withdraw, suffering heavy losses. At the same time, Russian troops of the Southwestern Front inflicted a defeat on Austro-Hungarian forces in the Częstochowa-Kraków Operation and reached the approaches to Kraków and Częstochowa. Having exhausted their capabilities, both sides went over to the defensive. The Russian armies, which had experienced a critical shortage of ammunition, dug in on the line of the Bzura, Rawka, and Nida rivers.

In the Balkan theater of operations, Austro-Hungarian forces invaded Serbia on August 12. Defeated in a meeting engagement that began on August 16 in the region of Cer Mountain, by August 24 the Austro-Hungarian forces had been thrown back to their initial position beyond the Drina and Sava rivers. On September 7 they renewed the offensive. A shortage of artillery and ammunition forced the Serbs to withdraw on November 7 to the east of the Kolubara River, but after receiving supplies from Russia and France, they went over to the counteroffensive on December 3. By mid-December they had liberated their country from enemy forces. The two sides took up defensive positions on the river boundary lines.

At the end of 1914 hostilities began in the Middle Eastern theater of operations. On July 21 (August 3), Turkey declared its neutrality, waiting and preparing for a convenient moment to come out on the side of the Central Powers. Encouraging Turkey’s aggressive aspirations in the Caucasus, Germany sent the battle cruiser Göben and the light cruiser Breslau to the Black Sea at the war’s beginning (August 10), to support the Turkish Navy. On October 16 (29),Turkish and German ships unexpectedly shelled Odessa, Sevastopol’, Feodosia, and Novorossiisk. On October 20 (November 2), Russia declared war on Turkey, followed by Great Britain (November 5) and France (November 6). Turkey declared a “holy war” against the Entente powers on November 12.

Turkish ground forces consisted of about 800,000 men. The Turkish First, Second, and Fifth armies were deployed in the Straits region; the Third Army, in Turkish Armenia; the Fourth Army, in Syria and Palestine; and the Sixth Army, in Mesopotamia. Sultan Mehmed V was nominally the supreme commander in chief, but in fact the duties of this position were carried out by Enver Pasha, the minister of war. The chief of staff was a German general, W. Bronsart von Schellendorf. Russia moved its Army of the Caucasus to the Turkish border (commander in chief, General I. I. Vorontsov-Dashkov; deputy commander in chief, General A. Z. Myshlaevskii; 170,000 men and 350 guns). In the second half of October (early November) clashes took place in the Erzurum axis. On October 25 (November 7) the Russians seized fortified positions near Köprüköy (50 km north of Erzurum). However, under pressure from the superior forces of the enemy, the Russians withdrew to their initial positions by November 26 (December 9). The Turkish Third Army went over to the offensive on December 9 (22), but during the Sankamuş Operation of 1914–15 it was routed. On November 10 British expeditionary corps landed at the mouth of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, forming the Mesopotamian Front. On November 22 the British took Basra, which had been abandoned by the Turks. The British captured al-Qurnah on December 9 and established a firm position in southern Mesopotamia.

Germany was unsuccessful in combat operations in Africa, the Far East, and the Pacific Ocean, losing most of its colonies during a single military campaign. In 1914, Japan seized the Caroline, Mariana, and Marshall islands in the Pacific Ocean as well as Tsingtao, a German naval base in China. The Australians seized the German part of New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, and New Zealand captured the Samoan Islands. Anglo-French forces occupied the German colonies in Africa: Togo in August 1914, the Cameroons in January 1916, Southwest Africa by July 1915, and East Africa by late 1917. (Until the end of the war, German forces continued to conduct partisan actions in the Portuguese colony of Mozambique and the British colony of Southern Rhodesia.)

Naval operations were of a limited character in 1914. On August 28 there was a battle between light forces of the British and German fleets in the North Sea near the island of Helgoland. On November 5 (18) a Russian squadron waged battle against the German ships Göben and Breslau near Cape Sarych in the Black Sea (50 km southeast of Sevastopol’). Damaged, the German ships retreated. The German command attempted to step up the actions of its fleet in British sea-lanes in the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific oceans. In the battle of Coronel (Nov. 1, 1914), Admiral M. von Spee’s German squadron (five cruisers) defeated Rear Admiral C. Cradock’s British squadron, but on December 8, Admiral von Spee’s squadron was destroyed by Admiral F. Sturdee’s British squadron near the Falkland Islands. By the beginning of November, three additional German cruisers operating in the Atlantic and Pacific had been sunk.

The campaign of 1914 did not produce decisive results for either side. In France both sides went over to a static defense. Elements of trench warfare also emerged in the Eastern European theater of operations. Military operations demonstrated that the general staffs had been mistaken in their prewar predictions that the war would be short. Stockpiles of armaments and ammunition were used up during the very first operations. At the same time, it became clear that the war would be long and that emergency measures must be taken to mobilize industry and to develop the production of arms and ammunition.

Campaign of 1915. The Anglo-French command decided to go over to a strategic defensive in the Western European theater of operations, in order to gain time to stockpile matériel and train reserves. In the campaign of 1915 the main burden of armed struggle was shifted onto Russia. At the demand of the Allies the Russian command planned simultaneous offensives against Germany (in East Prussia) and Austria-Hungary (in the Carpathians). The prospect of protracted war did not please the German high command, which knew that Germany and its allies could not withstand a lengthy struggle with the Entente powers, who possessed superiority in manpower reserves and material resources.Therefore, the German plan for the campaign of 1915 was an offensive plan that counted on rapidly achieving victory. Lacking sufficient forces to conduct offensives simultaneously in the East and the West, the German command decided to concentrate its main efforts on the Eastern Front, with the objectives of crushing Russia and forcing it to leave the war. A defensive posture was planned for the Western Front.

Russia had 104 divisions against the 74 divisions of the Central Powers (36 German and 38 Austro-Hungarian divisions). Attempting to forestall the offensive prepared by the Russians, between January 25 (February 7) and February 13 (26) the German command undertook the Augustów Operation of 1915 in East Prussia. However, they did not attain their objective of surrounding the Tenth Army of the Russian Northwestern Front. In February and March Russian command used the forces of the Tenth, Twelfth, and First armies to carry out the Przasnysz Operation, during which the enemy was thrown back to the borders of East Prussia. On the southern wing of the Eastern Front, the command of the Russian Southwestern Front carried out the Carpathian Operation of 1915. Beseiged by Russian troops, the 120,000-strong Przemyśl garrison surrendered on March 9 (22). Heavy but indecisive fighting continued in the Carpathians until April 20.Experiencing a critical shortage of weapons and ammunition, the Russian forces brought a halt to their active operations in April 1915.

By the summer of 1915 the German command had formed the Eleventh Army with troops transferred from the Western Front to Galicia. The German Eleventh Army and the Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army, under the overall command of the German general A. von Mackensen, went over to the offensive on April 19 (May 2). With an enormous superiority in forces and means (especially in artillery), the enemy broke through the defense of the Russian Third Army near Görlitz. The Görlitz breakthrough of 1915 led to a deep withdrawal of the forces of the Southwestern Front, which left Galicia in May and June.

At the same time, German troops were advancing in the Baltic region. On April 24 (May 7) they took Libau (Liepāja) and reached Shavli (Ŝiauliai) and Kovno (Kaunas). In July the German command attempted to break through the defense of the Russian First Army with an attack of the newly formed Twelfth Army in the Przasnysz region. The Twelfth Army, in cooperation with the Austro-Hungarian Fourth and German Eleventh armies, which were advancing from Galicia toward the northeast, was to surround the main groupings of the Russian forces, which were in Poland. The German plan was unsuccessful, but the Russian troops were forced to withdraw from Poland.

In the Vil’na Operation of August 1915 the Germans attempted to surround the Russian Tenth Army in the Vil’na (Vilnius) region. On August 27 (September 9) the enemy managed to break through the Russian defense and gain the rear of the Tenth Army. However, the Russian command stopped the enemy breakthrough. In October 1915 the front stabilized on the line of Riga, the Zapadnaia Dvina River, Dvinsk, Smorgon’, Baranovichi, Dubno, and the Strypa River. The German command had failed in its plan to force Russia to leave the war in 1915.

At the beginning of 1915 there were 75 French, 11 British, and six Belgian divisions opposing 82 German divisions in the Western European theater of operations. The number of British divisions increased to 31 in September and 37 in December. Planning no major operations, both sides conducted only local battles in this theater of military operations during the campaign of 1915. On April 22 at Ypres the German command became the first to use chemical weapons(chlorine gas) on the Western Front: 15,000 persons were poisoned. The German troops advanced 6 km. In May and June the Allies launched an offensive in Artois. Carried out with insufficient forces, it did not influence the course of combat operations on the Russian Front.

On July 7 the Interallied War Council was formed in Chantilly, to coordinate the strategic efforts of the Entente powers. To assist Russia, the council decided to undertake an offensive on the Western Front, with the objective of drawing considerable German forces away from the Eastern Front. However, offensive operations were carried out only from September 25 to October 6 in Champagne and Artois. At this time active military operations had in fact ceased on the Russian Front. Moreover, the Allied forces were unable to break through the strong enemy defense.

In the Middle Eastern theater of operations Russian forces conducted the most active military operations. In the Alashgerd Operation they cleared the enemy from the area around Lakes Van and Urmia. The increasing activity of German and Turkish agents in Iran forced the Russian command to send troops into the northern part of that country. General N. N. Baratov’s Caucasus Expeditionary Corps (about 8,000 men and 20 guns) was transferred from Tiflis to Baku and transported over the Caspian Sea to the Iranian port of Enzeli (Bandar-e Pahlavi), where it landed on October 17 (30). In November the corps occupied the city of Qazvin, and on December 3 (16) it took the city of Hamadan. Attempts by Germany and Turkey to strengthen their influence in Iran and draw it into the war against Russia were thwarted. The Caucasian Front (commander in chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich), which united all the Russian forces operating in the Middle Eastern theater, was formed in October 1915.

On the Mesopotamian Front, British troops under the command of General C. Townshend moved slowly toward Baghdad in September 1915, but on November 22 they were attacked and routed by the Turks, 35 km from the city, and on December 7 they were beseiged in Kut al-Amarah. The Russian command offered to organize coordinated actions between the British forces and the forces of the Caucasian Front, but the British command refused the offer, because it did not want Russian forces to enter the oil-rich Mosul region. At the end of 1915 the British corps in Mesopotamia was replenished and converted into an expeditionary army. On the Syrian Front the Turkish Fourth Army attempted to take the Suez Canal, by attacking Egypt from Palestine, but the Turks were driven back by two Anglo-Indian divisions. The Turks took up a defensive position in the al-Arish region.

In 1915 the Entente succeeded in drawing Italy into the war on its side. The vacillation of the Italian government was ended by the promises of the Entente powers to give greater satisfaction to Italy’s territorial claims than had been offered by Germany. On Apr. 26, 1915, the Treaty of London was signed. On May 23, 1915, Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary, but it did not declare war against Germany until Aug. 28, 1916. The Italian Army (commander in chief, King Victor Emmanuel III; chief of staff, General L. Cadorna) had 35 divisions, with a total of about 870,000 men and 1,700 guns. On May 24, Italian forces began military operations on two axes: against Trent and simultaneously toward the Isonzo River with the mission of reaching Trieste. The Italians failed on both axes. By June 1915 military operations in the Italian theater had already assumed a static character. Four attacks by Italian forces on the Isonzo River ended in collapse.

In the Balkan theater of operations the position of the Allies became more complicated in October 1915, when Bulgaria entered the war on the side of the Central Powers (the Bulgarian-German Treaty of 1915 and the Bulgarian-Turkish Treaty of 1915). On September 8 (21), Bulgaria proclaimed a mobilization of its army (12 divisions, about 500,000 men). In late September (early October), 14 German and Austro-Hungarian divisions and six Bulgarian divisions under the overall command of Field Marshal General von Mackensen were deployed against Serbia. The Serbs had 12 divisions. To assist Serbia, Great Britain and France, under an agreement with Greece, began on September 22 (October 5) to land an expeditionary corps at Salonika (Thessaloniki) and move it toward the border between Greece and Serbia. On September 24 (October 7) the Austro-German and Bulgarian forces launched a converging offensive against Serbia from the north, west, and east. For two months the Serbian Army courageously repulsed the onslaught of the superior forces of the enemy, but it was compelled to withdraw through the mountains to Albania. Approximately 140,000 men were transported by the Entente fleet from Durrës (Durazzo) to the Greek island of Corfu (Kerkira). The Anglo-French expeditionary corps retreated to the Salonika region, where the Salonika Front was formed in late 1915. The occupation of Serbia secured for the Central Powers the opportunity to establish direct rail communication with Turkey, making it possible to provide Turkey with military assistance.

During 1915 the German Navy continued its attempts to weaken the fleets of its enemies and to undermine the supply of Great Britain by sea. On January 24 a battle took place between British and German squadrons at Dogger Bank (North Sea). Neither side attained success. On Feb. 18, 1915, Germany declared that it was initiating “unrestricted submarine warfare.” The sinking of the passenger steamers Lusitania (May 7) and Arabic (August 19) evoked protests from the USA and other neutral countries, forcing the German government to limit its submarine warfare to actions against warships.

In February 1915 the Anglo-French command began to carry out a naval operation, the Gallipoli Expedition (the Dardanelles Operation of 1915), attempting to use naval forces to cross the Dardanelles, break through to Constantinople, and put Turkey out of the war. The breakthrough failed. In April 1915 a major landing party was set down on the Gallipoli Peninsula, but Turkish forces offered stiff resistance. In December 1915 and January 1916 the Allied command was forced to evacuate the landing forces, which were transferred to the Salonika Front. During the preparation for and execution of the Gallipoli Expedition, there was a bitter diplomatic struggle among the Allies. The expedition was undertaken under the pretext of assisting Russia. In March-April 1915, Great Britain and France had reached an agreement with Russia, under which Constantinople and the Straits would be handed over to Russia after the war, on the condition that the latter did not interfere in the partitioning of Asiatic Turkey. In reality, the Allies intended to capture the Straits and deny Russia access to them. Anglo-French talks on the partitioning of Asiatic Turkey concluded with the signing of the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. In August the German Navy undertook the Moonsund Operation of 1915, which was a failure. The Russian Black Sea Fleet continued to operate in Turkish sea-lanes. On April 21 (May 2), during the Gallipoli Expedition, it shelled the fortifications on the Bosporus.

The campaign of 1915 did not fulfill the hopes of either of the hostile coalitions, but its outcome was more favorable for the Entente. The German command, again failing to solve the problem of crushing its enemies one by one, faced the necessity of continuing a long war on two fronts. The chief burden of the struggle in 1915 was borne by Russia, giving France and Great Britain time to mobilize their economies to meet war needs. Russia also began to mobilize its industry. In 1915 the Russian Front grew more important: in the summer, 107 Austro-German divisions, or 54 percent of all the forces of the Central Powers, were stationed there, as compared to 52 divisions (33 percent) at the beginning of the war.

The war placed a heavy burden on the toiling people. Gradually freeing themselves of the chauvinistic attitudes that had been widespread at the beginning of the war, the popular masses became more and more resolutely opposed to the imperialist slaughter. Antiwar demonstrations took place in 1915, and the strike movement in the warring countries began to grow. This process developed with particular speed and violence in Russia, where conditions were greatly exacerbated by military defeats, and a revolutionary situation developed in the autumn of 1915. At the fronts, there were cases of fraternization among soldiers from hostile armies. The propaganda of the Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, and the left groups of European socialists and Social Democratic parties helped arouse the masses to revolutionary activity. In Germany the International Group was formed in the spring of 1915 under the leadership of K. Liebknecht and R. Luxemburg. (From 1916 the group was known as the Spartacus League.) The Zimmerwald Conference (Sept. 5–8, 1915), an international socialist conference of great importance for the consolidation of revolutionary antiwar forces, adopted a manifesto that signified “a step toward an ideological and practical break with opportunism and social chauvinism” (Lenin, Poln. sobr. soch., 5th ed., vol. 27, p. 38).

Campaign of 1916. By the beginning of 1916 the Central Powers, having expended enormous efforts in the first two campaigns, had considerably depleted their resources but had been unable to force France or Russia to leave the war. The Entente raised the number of its divisions to 365, as against the 286 divisions of the German bloc.

The 1916 operations by the armies of the Central Powers were based on General von Falkenhayn’s plan, according to which the main efforts were again to be directed against France. The main attack was to be delivered in the Verdun region, which was of great operational importance. A breakthrough on this axis would threaten the entire northern wing of the Allied armies. The German plan called for active operations at the same time in the Italian theater, using the forces of the Austro-Hungarian armies. In the Eastern European theater of operations, the Germans decided to limit operations to a strategic defensive. The fundamentals of the Entente’s plan for the 1916 campaign were adopted at a conference in Chantilly (France) on Dec. 6–9, 1915. Offensives were planned for the Eastern European, Western European, and Italian theaters of operations. The Russian Army was to be the first to launch offensive operations, followed by the Anglo-French and Italian forces. The Allies’ strategic plan was the first attempt to coordinate troop operations on different fronts.

The Entente plan did not provide for going over to a general offensive until the summer of 1916. This ensured that the German command would keep the strategic initiative, a factor which it decided to use to its advantage. The Germans had 105 divisions on a front 680 km long in the Western European theater of operations. They were opposed by 139 Allied divisions (95 French, 38 British, and six Belgian divisions). On February 21 the German command began the Verdun Operation of 1916, without an overall superiority in forces. Bitter combat, during which both sides suffered heavy losses, continued until December. The Germans expended enormous efforts but were unable to break through the defense.

In the Italian theater of operations the command of the Italian Army launched its fifth unsuccessful offensive on the Isonzo River in March 1916. On May 15, Austro-Hungarian forces (18 divisions and 2,000 guns) delivered a counter blow in the Trentino region. The Italian First Army (16 divisions and 623 guns), unable to hold back the enemy onslaught, began to withdraw to the south. Italy requested emergency assistance from its allies.

Operations in the Eastern European theater, where 128 Russian divisions were deployed against 87 Austro-German divisions along a front 1,200 km long, were particularly important in the campaign of 1916. The Naroch (Narocz) Operation,which was carried out on March 5–17 (18–30), forced the Germans temporarily to weaken their attacks on Verdun. The Russian offensive on the Southwestern Front (commander in chief, General A. A. Brusilov), which began on May 22 (June 4), was of great importance. The Russians broke through the defense of the Austro-German forces to a depth of 80–120 km. The enemy suffered heavy losses (more than 1 million killed and wounded and more than 400,000 taken prisoner). The command of the Central Powers were forced to move 11 German divisions from France and six Austro-Hungarian divisions from Italy to the Russian Front.

The Russian offensive saved the Italian Army from destruction, eased the situation of the French at Verdun, and hastened Rumania’s entry into the war on the side of the Entente. Rumania declared war on Austria-Hungary on August 14(27), on Germany on August 15 (28), on Turkey on August 17 (30), and on Bulgaria on August 19 (September 1). The Rumanian armed forces consisted of four armies (23 infantry and two cavalry divisions; 250,000 men). The Russian 47th Army Corps was moved across the Danube to the Dobruja region to assist the Rumanian forces. With Russian support, Rumanian forces launched an offensive in Transylvania on August 20 (September 2) and later in the Dobruja region, but they did not attain success. The Austro-German command concentrated General von Falkenhayn’s army group in Transylvania (the German Ninth Army and the Austro-Hungarian First Army, with a total of 26 infantry and seven cavalry divisions) and Field Marshal General von Mackensen’s German Danube Army in Bulgaria (nine infantry and two cavalry divisions). On September 13 (26) both groups, under the overall command of General von Falkenhayn, went over to the offensive at the same time. The Rumanian Army was routed.

On November 22 (December 6), German forces entered Bucharest, which the Rumanians abandoned without a fight. The Russian command moved in 35 infantry and 13 cavalry divisions to assist Rumania. Russia had to form a new Rumanian front. By the end of 1916, its forces had stopped the advance of the Austro-German armies on the line between Focşani and the mouth of the Danube. The formation of the Rumanian Front increased the total length of the front line by 500 km and diverted about a fourth of Russia’s armed forces, thereby worsening the strategic position of the Russian Army.

After lengthy preparation, Anglo-French forces opened a major offensive on the Somme River on July 1, but it developed very slowly. Tanks were used for the first time on September 15 by the British. The Allies continued the offensive until mid-November, but despite enormous losses, they advanced only 5–15 km and failed to break through the German static front.

In the Middle Eastern theater of operations the forces of the Russian Caucasian Front successfully carried out the Erzurum Operation of 1916, the Trabzon Operation of 1916, and the Erzincan and Oğnut operations, taking the cities ofErzurum, Trabzon, and Erzincan. General N. N. Baratov’s I Caucasus Cavalry Corps launched an offensive on the Mosul and Baghdad axes, with the objective of assisting the British, who were beseiged at Kut al-Amarah. In February the corps took Kermanshah, and in May it reached the Turkish-Iranian border. With the surrender of the garrison at Kut al-Amarah on Apr. 28, 1916, the Russian corps brought a halt to its advance and took up a defensive position east of Kermanshah.

In naval operations, the British fleet continued its long-range blockade of Germany. German submarines were active on the sea-lanes. The system of minefields was improved. The battle of Jutland (1916) was the war’s only major naval battle between the main forces of the British Navy (Admiral J. Jellicoe) and the German Navy (Admiral R. Scheer). The battle involved 250 surface ships, including 58 capital ships (battleships and battle cruisers). As a result of its superiority in forces, the British fleet was victorious, even though it suffered greater losses than the German fleet. The defeat shattered the German command’s belief that it was possible to break through the British blockade. The Russian Black Sea Fleet continued its actions on enemy sea-lanes, blockading the Bosporus from August 1916.

The campaign of 1916 did not result in the achievement of the objectives set at the beginning by either coalition, but the superiority of the Entente over the Central Powers became evident. The strategic initiative passed fully to the Entente, and Germany was forced to go over to the defensive on all fronts.

The bloody battles of 1916, which involved enormous human sacrifices and great expenditures of matériel, were depleting the resources of the belligerent powers. The situation of the working people continued to worsen, but the revolutionary movement also continued to grow stronger in 1916. The Kienthal Conference of internationalists (Apr. 24–30, 1916) played an important role in increasing solidarity among revolutionary forces. The revolutionary movement developed with particular speed and turbulence in Russia, where the war had finally revealed to the popular masses the complete decadence of tsarism. A powerful wave of strikes swept over the country, led by the Bolsheviks under the slogans of struggle against the war and the autocracy. The Middle Asian Uprising, a national liberation movement, took place from July to October 1916. In the autumn a revolutionary situation took shape in Russia. The inability of tsarism to win the war aroused discontent among the Russian imperialist bourgeoisie, who began to prepare a palace revolution. The revolutionary movement grew stronger in other countries. The Irish Rebellion, or Easter Rising (Apr. 24–30, 1916), was harshly suppressed by British troops. On May 1, K. Liebknecht led a massive antiwar demonstration in Berlin. The growing revolutionary crisis forced the imperialists to direct their efforts toward quickly ending the war. In 1916, Germany and tsarist Russia attempted to open separate peace negotiations.

Campaign of 1917. As the campaign of 1917 was prepared and carried out, the revolutionary movement grew considerably stronger in every country. Protest against the war with its enormous losses, against the sharp decline in the standard of living, and against the increasing exploitation of the working people became stronger among the popular masses at the front and in the rear. The revolutionary events in Russia had a tremendous effect on the subsequent course of the war.

By the beginning of the campaign of 1917, the Entente had 425 divisions (21 million men), and the Central Powers, 331 divisions (10 million men). In April 1917 the USA entered the war on the side of the Entente. The fundamental principles of the plan for the campaign of 1917 were adopted by the Allies at the third conference in Chantilly on Nov. 15–16, 1916, and were made more specific in February 1917 at a conference in Petrograd. The plan provided for limited operations on all fronts early in the year, to hold the strategic initiative. In the summer the Allies were to go over to a general offensive in the Western European and Eastern European theaters of operations, with the objective of finally crushing Germany and Austria-Hungary. The German command rejected offensive operations on land and decided to focus its attention on waging “unrestricted submarine warfare,” believing that it could disrupt the British economy in six months and force Great Britain out of the war. On Feb. 1, 1917, Germany declared “unrestricted submarine warfare” on Great Britain for the second time. Between February and April 1917, German submarines destroyed more than 1,000 merchant ships of the Allied and neutral countries (a total of 1,752,000 tons). By mid-1917, Great Britain, which had lost merchant ships amounting to approximately 3 million tons, found itself in a difficult situation. It could only make up for 15 percent of the losses, and this was not enough to sustain the export and import traffic essential to the country. By the end of 1917, however, after the organization of a reinforced defense of the sea-lanes and the development of various means of antisubmarine defense, the Entente managed to reduce its merchant ship losses. “Unrestricted submarine warfare” did not fulfill the hopes of the German command. Meanwhile, the continuing British blockade was starving Germany.

In executing the general plan for the campaign, the Russian command carried out the Mitau Operation on Dec. 23–29, 1916 (Jan. 5–11, 1917), with the objective of diverting part of the enemy forces from the Western European theater of operations. On February 27 (March 12) a bourgeois democratic revolution took place in Russia (the February Bourgeois Democratic Revolution of 1917). Under the leadership of the Bolsheviks, the proletariat, demanding peace, bread, and freedom, led the majority of the army, which was made up of workers and peasants, in the overthrow of the autocracy. However, the bourgeois Provisional Government came to power. Expressing the interests of Russian imperialism, it continued the war. Deceiving the masses of soldiers with false promises of peace, it opened an offensive operation with the troops of the Southwestern Front. The operation ended in failure (the June Operation of 1917).

By the summer of 1917 the combat capability of the Rumanian Army had been restored with Russian assistance, and in the battle of Mărăşeşti (July-August) Russian and Rumanian forces repulsed the German forces, which were attempting to break through to the Ukraine. On August 19–24 (September 1–6), during the Riga defensive operation, Russian troops surrendered Riga. The revolutionary sailors of the Baltic Fleet heroically defended the Moonsund Archipelago in the Moonsund Operation of Sept. 29 (Oct. 12)-Oct. 6 (19), 1917. These were the last operations on the Russian Front.

The Great October Socialist Revolution took place on Oct. 25 (Nov. 7), 1917. The proletariat, in alliance with the poorest peasants and under the leadership of the Communist Party, overthrew the power of the bourgeoisie and the landlords and opened the era of socialism. Carrying out the will of the people, the Soviet government addressed a proposal to all the warring powers, calling for the conclusion of a just democratic peace without annexations and reparations (the decree on peace). When the Entente powers and the USA refused to accept the proposal, the Soviet government was forced to conclude an armistice with the German coalition on December 2(15) and begin peace negotiations without the participation of Russia’s former allies. On November 26 (December 9), Rumania concluded the Focşani armistice with Germany and Austria-Hungary.

In the Italian theater of operations there were 57 Italian divisions opposing 27 Austro-Hungarian divisions in April 1917. Despite the numerical superiority of the Italian forces, the Italian command was unable to attain success. Three more offensives against the Isonzo River failed. On October 24, Austro-Hungarian troops went over to the offensive in the Caporetto region, broke through the Italians’ defense, and inflicted a major defeat on them. Without the assistance of 11 British and French divisions transferred to the Italian theater of operations, it would not have been possible to stop the advance of the Austro-Hungarian forces at the Piave River in late November. In the Middle Eastern theater of operations British troops advanced successfully in Mesopotamia and Syria. They took Baghdad on March 11 and Be’er Sheva’ (Beersheba), Gaza, Jaffa, and Jerusalem in late 1917.

The Entente plan of operations in France, which was developed by General Nivelle, called for delivering the main attack on the Aisne River between Reims and Soissons, in order to break through the enemy defense and surround the German forces in the Noyon salient. Learning of the French plan, by March 17 the German command withdrew its forces 30 km to a previously prepared line known as the Siegfried Line. Subsequently, the French command decided to begin the offensive on a broad front, committing to action major forces and means: six French and three British armies (90 infantry and ten cavalry divisions), more than 11,000 guns and mortars, 200 tanks, and about 1,000 airplanes.

The Allied offensive began on April 9 in the Arras region, on April 12 near St. Quentin, and on April 16 in the Reims region and continued until April 20–28 and May 5 on some axes. The April offensive (the “Nivelle slaughter”) ended incomplete failure. Although about 200,000 men had been lost, the Allied forces had not been able to break through the front. Mutinies broke out in the French Army, but they were cruelly suppressed. A Russian brigade that had been in France since 1916 took part in the offensive on the Aisne River. In the second half of 1917, Anglo-French forces carried out a number of local operations: Messines (June 7-August 30), Ypres (July 31-November 6), Verdun (August 20–27),and Malmaison (October 23–26). At Cambrai (November 20-December 6) massed tanks were used for the first time.

The campaign of 1917 did not produce the results anticipated by either side. The revolution in Russia and the lack of coordinated action by the Allies thwarted the Entente’s strategic plan, which had been intended to crush the Austro-Hungarian bloc. Germany succeeded in repulsing the enemy attacks, but its hope of attaining victory by means of “unrestricted submarine warfare” proved vain, and the troops of the coalition of Central Powers were forced to go over to the defensive.

Campaign of 1918. By early 1918 the military and political situation had changed fundamentally. After the October Revolution Soviet Russia quit the war. Under the influence of the Russian Revolution, a revolutionary crisis was ripening in the other warring powers. The Entente countries (excluding Russia) had 274 divisions at the beginning of 1918—that is, forces approximately equal to those of the German bloc, which had 275 divisions (not counting 86 divisions in the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and the Baltic region and nine divisions in the Caucasus). The military and economic situation of the Entente was stronger than that of the German bloc. However, the Allied command believed that even more powerful human and material resources would have to be prepared, with the assistance of the USA, in order to finally crush Germany.

Strategic defensives were planned for all theaters of military operations in the campaign of 1918. The decisive offensive against Germany was postponed until 1919. Their resources running out, the Central Powers were eager to end the war as quickly as possible. Having concluded the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Soviet Russia on Mar. 3, 1918, the German command decided in March to go over to the offensive on the Western Front to crush the Entente armies. At the same time, German and Austro-Hungarian forces, in violation of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, began occupying the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and the Baltic region. Rumania was drawn into the anti-Soviet intervention after May 7, when it signed the Bucharest Peace Treaty of 1918, the terms of which were dictated by the Central Powers.

On March 21 the German command began a major offensive operation on the Western Front (the March Offensive in Picardy). Their intention was to cut off the British forces from the French forces by means of an attack on Amiens, then crush them and reach the sea. The Germans made sure that they would have superiority in forces and means (62 divisions, 6,824 guns, and about 1,000 airplanes against 32 divisions, about 3,000 guns, and about 500 airplanes for the British). The German forces broke through the Allied defense to a depth of 60 km. The Allied command eliminated the breakthrough by bringing reserves into the battle. The German forces suffered heavy losses (about 230,000 men) but did not achieve their assigned objective. Going over to the offensive again on April 9 in Flanders on the Lys River, the German forces advanced 18 km, but by April 14 the Allies stopped them.

On May 27 the German armies delivered an attack north of Reims (the battle of the Chemin des Dames). They managed to cross the Aisne River and penetrate the Allied defense to a depth of about 60 km, reaching the Marne in the Château-Thierry region by May 30. Having arrived within 70 km of Paris, the German forces were unable to overcome French resistance, and on June 4 they went over to the defensive. The attempt of German troops from June 9 to 13 to advance between Montdidier and Noyon was equally unsuccessful.

On July 15 the German command made a final attempt to defeat the Allied armies by opening a major offensive on the Marne. The battle of the Marne of 1918 (the second battle of the Marne) did not fulfill the Germans’ hopes. After crossing the Marne, they were unable to advance more than 6 km. On July 18, Allied forces delivered a counterattack; by August 4 they had driven the enemy back to the Aisne and the Vesle. In four months of offensive operations the German command had completely exhausted its reserves but had been unable to crush the Entente armies.

The Allies took firm control of the strategic initiative. On August 8–13 the Anglo-French armies inflicted a major defeat on the German forces in the Amiens Operation of 1918, making them withdraw to the line from which their March offensive had begun. Ludendorff referred to August 8 as “the black day of the German Army.” On September 12–15 the American First Army, commanded by General J. Pershing, won a victory over German forces at St. Mihiel (the St. Mihiel Operation). On September 26, Allied forces (202 divisions against 187 weakened German divisions) began a general offensive along the entire 420-km front from Verdun to the sea and broke through the German defense.

In the other theaters of military operations the campaign of 1918 ended with the defeat of Germany’s allies. The Entente had 56 divisions, including 50 Italian divisions, in the Italian theater of operations, as well as more than 7,040 guns and more than 670 airplanes. Austria-Hungary had 60 divisions, 7,500 guns, and 580 airplanes. On June 15 the Austro-Hungarian forces, going over to the offensive south of Trent, broke through the enemy defense and advanced 3–4 km, but on June 20–26 they were thrown back to the starting line by counterattack by Allied forces. On October 24 the Italian Army went over to the offensive against the Piave River, but it made only an insignificant advance. On October 28 units of the Austro-Hungarian Fifth and Sixth armies, refusing to fight, began to abandon their positions. They were soon joined by troops of other armies, and a disorderly retreat of all the Austro-Hungarian forces began on November 2. On November 3,Austria-Hungary signed an armistice with the Entente at Villa Giusti (near Padua).

In the Balkan theater of operations, the Allied forces consisted of 29 infantry divisions (eight French, four British, six Serbian, one Italian, and ten Greek divisions and one French cavalry group, a total of about 670,000 men; and 2,070 guns).Facing them along a 350-km front from the Aegean to the Adriatic were the forces of the Central Powers—the German Eleventh Army; the Bulgarian First, Second, and Fourth armies; an Austro-Hungarian corps (a total of about 400,000 men); and 1,138 guns. On September 15 the Allies began an offensive; by September 29 they had advanced to a depth of 150 km along a front of 250 km. Surrounded, the German Eleventh Army surrendered on September 30. The Bulgarian armies were smashed. On September 29, Bulgaria signed an armistice with the Entente in Salonika.

The British army of General E. H. Allenby and the Arab army commanded by Emir Faisal and the British intelligence officer Colonel T. E. Lawrence (a total of 105,000 men and 546 guns) were operating on the Syrian Front, where Turkey had three armies—the Fourth, the Seventh, and the Eighth (a total of 34,000 men and about 330 guns). The Allied offensive began on September 19. Breaking through the enemy defense and pushing forward cavalry units to the enemy rear, Allied troops forced the Turkish Eighth and Seventh armies to surrender; the Turkish Fourth Army retreated. Between September 28 and October 27 the Allies captured Akko (Acre), Damascus, Tripoli, and Aleppo. A French landing party went ashore at Beirut on October 7.

On the Mesopotamian Front the British expeditionary army of General W. Marshall (five divisions) went on the offensive against the Turkish Sixth Army (four divisions). The British captured Kirkuk on October 24 and Mosul on October 31.The Entente powers and Turkey signed the Moudhros Armistice on Oct. 30, 1918, aboard the British battleship Agamemnon in Moudhros Bay (the island of Limnos).

In early October, Germany’s position became hopeless. On October 5 the German government asked the US government for an armistice. The Allies demanded the withdrawal of German forces from all occupied territory in the west. The military defeats and economic exhaustion of Germany had accelerated the development of a revolutionary crisis. The victory and progress of the October Revolution of 1917 in Russia strongly influenced the growth of the revolutionary movement of the German people. On Oct. 30, 1918, an uprising broke out among the sailors in Wilhelmshaven. The Kiel Mutiny of sailors in the German fleet took place on Nov. 3, 1918; on November 6 the uprising spread to Hamburg, Lübeck, and other cities. On November 9 the revolutionary German workers and soldiers overthrew the monarchy. Fearing further development of the revolution in Germany, the Entente hurried to conclude the Armistice of Compiègne with Germany on Nov. 11, 1918. Germany, admitting that it had been defeated, obligated itself to remove its forces immediately from all occupied territories and turn over to the Allies a large quantity of armaments and military equipment.

Results of the war. World War I ended in the defeat of Germany and its allies. After the conclusion of the Armistice of Compiègne the victorious powers began developing plans for a postwar “settlement.” Treaties with the defeated countries were prepared at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919–20. A number of separate treaties were signed: the Peace Treaty of Versailles with Germany (June 28, 1919), the Treaty of St.-Germain with Austria (Sept. 10, 1919), the Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria (Nov. 27, 1919), the Treaty of Trianon with Hungary (June 4, 1920), and the Treaty of Sèvres with Turkey (Aug. 10, 1920). The Paris Peace Conference also adopted a resolution regarding the establishment of the League of Nations and approved its Covenant, which became part of the peace treaties. Germany and its former allies were deprived of considerable territories and compelled to pay heavy reparations and greatly reduce their armed forces.

The postwar peace “settlement” in the interests of the victorious imperialist powers was completed by the Washington Conference on Naval Limitations (1921–22). The treaties with Germany and its former allies and the agreements signed at the Washington Conference constituted the Versailles-Washington system of peace. The result of compromises and deals, it failed to eliminate the contradictions among the imperialist powers and in fact considerably exacerbated them. Lenin wrote: “Today, after this ‘peaceful’ period, we see a monstrous intensification of oppression, the reversion to a colonial and military oppression that is far worse than before” (ibid., 5th ed., vol. 41, p. 217). The imperialist powers began to struggle for a repartition of the world, preparing for another world war.

In its scope and consequences World War I was unprecedented in the history of the human race. It lasted four years, three months, and ten days (from Aug. 1, 1914, to Nov. 11, 1918), engulfing 38 countries with a combined population of more than 1.5 billion. The Entente countries mobilized about 45 million men, and the coalition of the Central Powers, 25 million —a total of 70 million men. The most able-bodied men on both sides were removed from material production and sent to exterminate each other, fighting for the interests of the imperialists. By the end of the war, the ground forces exceeded their peacetime counterparts by a factor of 8.5 in Russia, five in France, nine in Germany, and eight in Austria-Hungary. As much as 50 and even 59.4 percent (in France) of the able-bodied male population was mobilized. The Central Powers mobilized almost twice the percentage of the total population as the Entente (19.1 percent, as compared to 10.3 percent). About 16 million men—more than one-third of all those mobilized by the Entente and its allies— were mobilized for the Russian armed forces. In June 1917, 288 (55.3 percent) of the Entente’s 521 divisions were Russian. In Germany, 13.25 million men were mobilized, or more than half of all the soldiers mobilized by the Central Powers. In June 1918, 236 (63.4 percent) of the Central Powers’ 361 divisions were German. The large size of the armies resulted in the formation of vast fronts up to 3,000–4,000 km long.

WWIGraph5

The war demanded the mobilization of all material resources, demonstrating the decisive role of the economy in an armed struggle. World War I was characterized by the massive use of many types of matériel. “It is the first time in history that the most powerful achievements of technology have been applied on such a scale, so destructively and with such energy, for the annihilation of millions of human lives” (Lenin, ibid., vol. 36, p. 396). Industry in the warring countries supplied the fronts with millions of rifles, more than 1 million light and heavy machine guns, more than 150,000 artillery pieces, 47.7 billion cartridges, more than 1 billion shells, 9,200 tanks, and about 182,000 airplanes (see Table 4). During the war the number of heavy artillery pieces increased by a factor of eight, the number of machine guns by a factor of 20, and the number of airplanes by a factor of 24. The war created a demand for large quantities of various materials, such as lumber and cement. About 4 million tons of barbed wire were used. Armies of millions of men demanded an uninterrupted supply of food, clothing, and forage. For example, from 1914 to 1917 the Russian Army consumed (in round figures) 9.64 million tons of flour, 1.4 million tons of cereal, 8.74 million tons of meat, 510,000 tons of fats, 11.27 million tons of forage oats and barley, and 19.6 million tons of hay, with a total value of 2,473,700,000 rubles (at 1913 prices). The front was supplied with 5 million sheepskin coats and pea jackets, 38.4 million sweaters and padded vests, more than 75 million pairs of underwear, 86.1 million pairs of high boots and shoes, 6.6 million pairs of felt boots, and other clothing.

Military enterprises alone could not produce such enormous quantities of armaments and other supplies. Industry was mobilized by means of a large-scale conversion of consumer-goods plants and factories to the production of war goods. In Russia in 1917, 76 percent of the workers were engaged in meeting war needs; in France, 57 percent; in Great Britain, 46 percent; in Italy, 64 percent; in the USA, 31.6 percent; and in Germany, 58 percent. In most of the warring countries, however, industry was unable to supply the needs of the armies for armaments and equipment. Russia, for example, was forced to order armaments, ammunition, clothing, industrial equipment, steam locomotives, coal, and certain other types of strategic raw materials from the USA, Great Britain, France, Sweden, Japan, and other countries. During the war, however, these countries provided the Russian Army with only a small proportion of its total requirements for armaments and ammunition: 30 percent of the rifles, less than 1 percent of the rifle cartridges, 23 percent of the guns of different calibers, and 20 percent of the shells for these guns.

In all the major countries special state bodies were established to manage the war economies: in Germany the Department of War Raw Materials, in Great Britain the Ministry of Munitions, and in Russia the Special Conferences (for state defense, fuel, shipping, and food). These state bodies planned war production; distributed orders, equipment, and raw and processed materials; rationed food and consumer goods; and exercised control over foreign trade. The capitalists formed their own representative organizations to assist the state bodies: in Germany the Central War Industries Council and war industries committees for each sector, in Great Britain the supervisory committees, and in Russia the war industries committees and the Zemstvo and Municipal unions. As a result, an interlocking relationship developed between the state administrative apparatus and the monopolies. “The imperialist war has immensely accelerated and intensified the process of transformation of monopoly capitalism into state-monopoly capitalism” (Lenin, ibid., vol. 33, p. 3). Although the state bodies managing the war economy had strong assistance from the representative organizations of the capitalists, the very nature of the capitalist economy prevented them from achieving complete success.

The war made intensive demands on all types of transportation. Up to half of all railroad rolling stock was loaded with military shipments. Most motor vehicles were used for military needs. A large number of the merchant vessels of the warring and neutral countries were engaged in shipping cargoes for war industries and armies. During the war 6,700 vessels (excluding sailing ships) were sunk (total displacement, about 15 million tons, or 28 percent of the prewar world tonnage).

The increase in military production, which was achieved primarily at the expense of nonmilitary sectors, placed excessive strains on the national economies, resulting in the disruption of the proportion between different sectors of production and, ultimately, in economic disorder. In Russia, for example, two-thirds of all industrial output went for war needs and only one-third for consumer needs, giving rise to a scarcity of goods, as well as to high prices and speculation. As early as 1915 there were shortages of many types of industrial raw materials and fuel, and by 1916 there was a severe raw materials and fuel crisis in Russia. As a result of the war, the production of many types of industrial output declined in other countries. There was a significant decline in the smelting of pig iron, steel, and nonferrous metals; the extraction of coal and petroleum; and output from all branches of light industry. The war damaged society’s productive forces and undermined the economic life of the people of the world.

In agriculture the effects of the war were especially grave. Mobilization deprived the countryside of its most productive workers and draft animals. Sown areas were cut back, yields dropped, and the number of livestock decreased and their productivity declined. Severe shortages of food developed in the cities of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia, which later experienced famine. The shortages spread to the army, resulting in cuts in food rations.

World War I demanded colossal financial expenditures, many times greater than the expenditures in all previous wars. There is no scientifically substantiated estimate of the total cost of World War I, but the one most commonly cited in the literature was calculated by the American economist E. Bogart, who set the total cost of the war at $359.9 billion in gold (699.4 billion rubles), including $208.3 billion (405 billion rubles) of direct (budgeted) expenditures and $151.6 billion (294.4 billion rubles) of indirect expenditures. Direct war expenditures included the cost of maintaining the army (40 percent) and the cost of the material and technological means for waging war (60 percent). The national income provided the economic base for covering war expenditures. Additional sources of financing the war were increases in existing (direct and indirect) taxes and the institution of new taxes, the sale of domestic and foreign bonds, and the issuing of paper money. The full weight of the financial burden of the war fell on the toiling classes of the population.

World War I was an important stage in the history of the art of war and in the building of armed forces. There were major changes in the organization and relationships of the various combat arms. The great length of the fronts and the deployment on them of vast armies of millions of soldiers led to the creation of new organizational units: fronts and army groups. The firepower of the infantry increased, but its proportionate role decreased somewhat as the result of the development of other combat arms: engineers, signal troops, and especially, the artillery. The number of artillery pieces rose sharply, technology improved, and new types of artillery were developed (antiaircraft, infantry support, and antitank artillery). The range of fire, destructive force of fire, and mobility of the artillery increased. The density of artillery reached 100 or more guns per kilometer of front. Infantry attacks were accompanied by rolling barrages.

Tanks, a powerful striking and mobile force, were used for the first time. Tank forces developed rapidly. By the war’s end there were 8,000 tanks in the Entente armies. In aviation, which also developed rapidly, several different branches emerged: fighter, reconnaissance, bombardment, and ground attack aviation. By the end of the war the belligerent powers had more than 10,000 combat aircraft. Antiaircraft defense developed in the air war. Chemical warfare troops appeared. The significance of the cavalry among the combat arms declined, and by the war’s end the number of cavalry troops had dropped sharply.

The war revealed the growing dependence of the art of war on economics and politics. The scale of operations, the extent of the front of attack, and the depth and rate of advance increased. With the establishment of continuous fronts,combat operations became static. The frontal blow, the success of which determined the outcome of an operation, became very important. During World War I the problem of the tactical breakthrough of a front was solved, but the problem of developing a breakthrough into an operational success remained unsolved. New means of fighting complicated the tactics of the combat arms. At the beginning of the war the infantry conducted offensives in skirmish lines and later, in waves of lines and combat teams (squads). Combined arms combat was based on cooperation between old and new combat arms—the infantry, the artillery, tanks, and aviation. Control of troops became more complex. The role of logistics and supplies increased significantly. Rail and motor-vehicle transport became very important.

The types and classes of naval ships were refined, and there was an increase in the proportion of light forces (cruisers, destroyers, patrol vessels and patrol boats, and submarines). Shipboard artillery, mines, torpedoes, and naval aviation were used extensively. The chief forms of military operations at sea were the blockade; cruiser, submarine, and mine warfare; landings and raids; and engagements and battles between line forces and light forces. The experience of World War I greatly influenced the development of military thinking and the organization and combat training of all combat arms (forces) until World War II (1939–45).

The war brought unprecedented deprivation and human suffering and widespread hunger and devastation. It brought mankind “to the brink of a precipice, to the brink of the destruction of civilization, of brutalization” (Lenin, ibid., vol. 31, p.182). Valuables worth 58 billion rubles were destroyed during the war. Entire regions, especially in northern France, were turned into wastelands.

Casualties amounted to 9.5 million killed and dead of wounds and 20 million wounded, of whom 3.5 million were permanently crippled. The heaviest losses (66.6 percent of the total) were suffered by Germany, Russia, France, and Austria-Hungary. The USA sustained only 1.2 percent of the total losses. Many civilians were killed by the various means of combat. (There are no overall figures for combat-related civilian casualties.) Hunger and other privations caused by the war led to a rise in the mortality rate and a drop in the birthrate. The population loss from these factors was more than 20 million in the 12 belligerent states alone, including 5 million in Russia, 4.4 million in Austria-Hungary, and 4.2 million in Germany. Unemployment, inflation, tax increases, and rising prices worsened the poverty and extreme deprivation of the large majority of the population of the capitalist countries.

Only the capitalists gained any advantages from the war. By the beginning of 1918, the war profits of the German monopolies totaled at least 10 billion gold marks. The capital of the German finance magnate Stinnes increased by a factor of ten, and the net profits of the “cannon king” Krupp, by a factor of almost six. Monopolies in France, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan made large profits, but the American monopolies made the most on the war—between 1914 and 1918, $3 billion in profits. “The American multimillionaires profited more than all the rest. They have converted all, even the richest, countries into their tributaries. And every dollar is stained with blood—from that ocean of blood that has been shed by the 10 million killed and 20 million maimed” (Lenin, ibid., vol. 37, p. 50). The profits of the monopolies continued to grow after the war.

The ruling classes placed the entire burden of the economic consequences of the war on the toiling people. World War I led to an aggravation of the class struggle and accelerated the ripening of the objective prerequisites for the Great October Socialist Revolution, which opened a new epoch in world history—the epoch of the transition from capitalism to socialism. The example of Russia’s toiling people, who threw off the oppression of the capitalists and landlords, showed other peoples the way to liberation. A wave of revolutionary actions swept over many countries, shaking the foundations of the world capitalist system. The national liberation movement became active in the colonial and dependent countries. “World War I and the October Revolution marked the beginning of the general crisis of capitalism” (Programma KPSS, 1974, p. 25). Politically, this was the chief result of the war.

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I. I. ROSTUNOV

The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 3rd Edition (1970-1979). © 2010 The Gale Group, Inc. All rights reserved.

ICMLPO (Unity and Struggle): Meeting of Marxist-Leninist Parties and Organisations of Europe

The crisis of the capitalist system on the world level is getting still worse, and in Europe it is taking the form of a recession. At the same time, the rejection of the austerity policy is stronger and more massive than ever before; tens of millions of workers, men and women, are taking to the streets in all the capitals of Europe.

The austerity policy imposed everywhere, instead of “solving the crisis,” as the neo-liberal and social liberal governments would have us believe, is deepening it. This policy is increasing the recession in the countries hardest hit by the crisis and is beginning to have consequences in which some have taken advantage of the crisis of others, as is the case of German imperialism. This policy is increasing the public debt and economic inequality, promoting unequal development as well as competition among the countries of the European Union (EU).

It is a vicious circle that the workers and peoples must break if they do not wish to be sucked into a spiral that will return them to conditions of the 19th century. The fiscal pact signed by Merkel and Sarkozy has been accepted as is by almost all the EU governments. It is a pact that combines the austerity policy and increases “competitiveness,” which clearly means greater flexibility, easier layoffs and brutal and massive falls in wages, which are presented as “costs”: we say that labour is not a “cost”, it is capital that is increasingly intolerable for the workers and peoples. The leaders of the major European imperialist powers, particularly Merkel and Hollande, are trying to impose a “European government,” a real General Staff of the financial oligarchy. In this way they are trying to strengthen the economic and political power of the oligarchy and to transform the elected institutions in the states – specifically parliaments as well as regional and local institutions – into simple transmission belts for their policies.

Taking advantage of the crisis that hit Cyprus, the European leaders have opened a new stage of trying to appraise the small savers and make them pay. It is a message, a threat to the peoples: tomorrow your savings will be confiscated by capital.

All this makes clear their true goal: super-exploit the working class, eliminate the mechanisms of social protection, weaken the fighting ability of the workers, transfer an ever greater share of the wealth created to the oligarchy, to the holders of capital who live at the expense of the workers and peoples. When poverty reaches unimaginable proportions, when hunger is a scourge that plagues millions of men, women and children, the oligarchy displays its wealth and luxury and its insulting lifestyle.

Austerity Goes Hand in Hand with Authoritarianism

Capital is carrying out its violent offensive with tremendous brutality and is trampling on democratic rights. The austerity goes hand in hand with the authoritarianism of the Troika imposed on States and supervised governments, as in Greece, which are required to submit their accounts regularly to committees of “experts” led by the Troika.

The workers and trade union movement is the main target of the attacks of capital. In several countries social protest is criminalized and limits are imposed on the exercise of trade union rights. The fighting sectors of the workers and the militants who are fighting against class collaboration are excluded from the unions by the leaders who practice such collaboration.

At the same time the governments and employers are carrying out an intensive campaign to discredit the unions. The government and employers are using the crisis, the large number of unemployed, etc., to pressure workers so that they do not join the unions, although this is a fundamental right enshrined in the constitution of all EU states. The migrant workers are particularly suffering from these repressive policies; they are being harassed and attacked by fascist and racist groups. They leave their countries fleeing war and poverty, for all of which the imperialist powers are responsible, particularly in Africa, and they suffer super-exploitation and racism.

In various countries the progressive, political and trade union movements are mobilizing and fighting so that these immigrant men and women have the same rights as their class brothers and sisters.

Also in many EU countries racist and fascist groups and parties are spreading their ideas which are repeated by the large media in order to influence broad sections of the popular masses. To the traditional discourse of the xenophobic and racist extreme right there is now added a dangerous populist discourse that mixes “social” formulations with rabid nationalism. They use the discontent of the masses and the rejection of the parties applying austerity policies, both those of the right and the left.

The Crisis Is Sharpening the Contradictions between the Imperialist Powers and Imperialist Blocs

The problem of control of energy resources, raw materials, strategic areas and markets is the main cause of wars of aggression and military intervention by the imperialist powers. After Libya, its oil and its riches, now it is Mali that is suffering the policy of war. French and British imperialism were the most involved in the war in Libya, French imperialism is the one that launched the war in Mali, but both have turned to their European and EU allies for help in these reactionary actions. At the same time they are maintaining troops in Afghanistan, and other countries are in the crosshairs of the imperialist powers, particularly Syria.

U.S. imperialism and its military arm, NATO, is pressing its European allies to take charge, particularly the “European” component of NATO, and they are committed even more financially and militarily. The fight within each country to leave NATO, as well as for its outright dissolution, is completely relevant today.

The peoples of Europe have nothing to gain from the war­mongering policy that only serves the interests of the oligarchy. The people are interested in increasing their ties of solidarity with those who are suffering from plunder and domination by the European imperialist powers, particularly the peoples of Africa, in order to fight united against the system of oppression and exploitation.

Our Camp Is That of the Workers and Peoples

The aspiration for united struggles against austerity, against the dictates of the Troika, is growing. Currently, more than ever, the problem is put forward of making these struggles converge and developing solidarity across borders.

In various countries the rejection of the austerity policy coincides with opposition to the Troika, the euro and the EU. The supporters of this Europe of reaction and capital are worried by this rejection and are trying to avoid it with the reactionary positions raised by the fascist and nationalist parties and organizations, which do not question the capitalist system but divide the peoples and pit them against each other.

The reformist forces are responding to these protests with a pathetic and deceptive call for a “social Europe” that in no way corresponds to reality.

We proclaim that the people have the right to decide to leave the euro and also the EU. We also know that not all the European countries belong to the Euro zone.

Along with the progressive forces who defend this position, we state that this is a problem linked to the issue of the defence of sovereignty; we support this fight as part of the struggle against the austerity policy imposed by the EU.

We state that if a people decides and brings about its withdrawal from the Euro, we stand in solidarity with the fight that will be waged against the offensive of the oligarchy, which will do everything possible to make them pay for that decision.

In any case, we defend the slogan of refusing to pay the debt, whether in euros or in any other currency.

The breadth of the workers and popular resistance, which must be developed, puts forward the problem of the political solution that we must give to this increase in the class struggle. The working class is in the vanguard of these battles and broad sections of the working masses of the cities and countryside are joining it on the streets and in demonstrations. The problem of the unity of the working class and the unity of all sections of the people are the basis for carrying out a policy of the united front, which has already taken concrete forms in different countries.

Our parties and organizations are calling for developing this policy everywhere, with the perspective of the revolutionary transformation of society and the development of international solidarity.

Germany,
25 June 2013

Communist Party of the Workers of DENMARK (APK)
Communist Party of the Workers of FRANCE (PCOF)
Organization for the Reconstruction of a Communist Party of GERMANY (Arbeit Zukunft)
Movement for the Reorganization of the KKE (1918-1955) GREECE
Communist Platform of ITALY
Communist Party of SPAIN (M-L)
Revolutionary Communist Party of TURKEY

Source

Communist Platform (Marxist-Leninist): NATO’s Favourite Social Democrat Dog of War

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Former Prime Minister and Labour Party leader Jens Stoltenberg has been appointed Secretary General of NATO.

The Norwegian right-wing Government of Erna Solberg, as well as the Labour party leadership itself, are bursting with pride on behalf of the Norwegian administration as well as that of the Labour Party. The neo- liberalist rightist government has been actively lobbying in order to ensure that Mr. Stoltenberg, supposedly a political opponent, would replace Danish Anders Fogh Rasmussen in Brussels.

But the Norwegian people have no reason to rejoice at Stoltenberg becoming the front-runner for NATO’s “Drang nach Osten.” His assignment is to spearhead an aggression eastwards, which in the worst case could end with another major European war. A Norwegian Secretary General of NATO will mean that Norway to an even greater extent than hitherto will spearhead this expansive alliance when it engages in new wars of aggression. It will bring about even more NATO-subservient media, more militarization and more looting of taxpayers’ money.

Being a tool of imperialism is an unbroken and shameful tradition of social democracy since the onset of the First imperialist world war one hundred years ago. 1914 was a watershed. Most of the old social democratic parties in Europe, but not in Russia, betrayed their roots and ideals by entering into the service of imperialism and their “own” bourgeoisie.

At first, they swore that they opposed imperialist war and would never raise arms against brothers in other countries, before they swung round and voted for war credits. After this class betrayal, it became impossible for revolutionary socialists to call themselves social democrats.

Today, the Social Democratic leaders are no longer merely lackeys of imperialism. They have themselves become spokesmen and the most prominent figures of modern imperialism.

It was Stoltenberg’s “red and green” government coalition project (2005-2013) that really transformed Norway into NATO’s most efficient bulldog. The appointment of Stoltenberg is a reward for obedience and ability to adapt to the agenda of greater imperialist powers in America and Europe. Stoltenberg has shown that he not only obeys the U.S. and UK, but that he also lends an ear to Germany and France. He is therefore acceptable for Merkel and Hollande, too. The imperialist unity around Stoltenberg is also a signal that NATO will further escalate the militarisation vis a vis Russia in the Arctic area, corresponding to the long-standing request from the Norwegian political elite and the oil monopolies.

It has been said that a secretary general of NATO is more secretary than general, and there is much to it. The task of a Fogh Rasmussen or a Stoltenberg is to smoothe tensions between the U.S. and European powers. Their obligation is to get this imperialist alliance to agree on a common strategy, which in practice coincides with the strategic interests of U.S. imperialism. An important part of this strategy is, of course, how to face main rival Russia, and to a certain extent China. But more important than anything, is how to quell the aspirations of freedom-loving peoples and rebellious workers at home and abroad.

It is no national honour, but the contrary, when Norway will spearhead the most aggressive military alliance in the world in the years to come. Labour Party leader and former Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg is objectively a war criminal, who is acquitted because those who retain the power, i.e. the USA and NATO, also have the power to define who should or should not be impeached.

In several New Year speeches Jens Stoltenberg told the Norwegian people that he was “filled with pride to see what Norwegian soldiers accomplish in a distant land.” In 2011 this “distant land” was Afghanistan. The following year, Stoltenberg boasted how Norwegian F-16 fighters had bombed Libya to the ground: “Our crews were among the most skilled in a broad coalition, and have since garnered deserved praise from our allies.” The sufferings which Norwegian attack forces have inflicted on civilians in Afghanistan and Libya, is inconceivable. But to the imperialists and monopolies, this is merely collateral damage.

President Obama is no doubt impressed by the vigour Stoltenberg demonstrated when he and his ministers from the Labour Party, The Socialist Left party (SV) and the Centre party swept international law and the Norwegian constitution aside, agreeing by means of text messages to declare war against Libya in March 2011.

A US President would hardly have dared anything of the kind, without first having secured the backing of Congress. This was one reason why Obama was compelled to back out from the planned attack on Syria in September 2013. Or when British Prime Minister David Cameron had to put up with a stinging defeat in the British Parliament. Jens Stoltenberg, however, has shown that he can go to war by phone if necessary. Reassuring? Hardly.

Stoltenberg has demonstrated that he will not allow popular protest or constitutional rules to curb the road to war if the U.S. of A. and NATO have given the word “Go”. Simultaneously, his rhetorical skills prod the media to exhibit him as a peace dove. A two-faced secretary general is to the liking of the major NATO powers.

Getting Norway out of NATO would be the greatest service the people of Norway can offer in favour of world peace and the oppressed peoples and nations on this planet.

Source

Communist Platform: The European People’s Democracies of the 20th Century: A Specific Form of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat

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From Unity & Struggle No. 25, Spring/Summer 2013

Italy

1. Between August 1944 and May 1945 the Red Army, in its unbeatable advance toward Berlin, freed Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and eastern Germany from Nazi rule, also aiding the liberation of Yugoslavia and Albania.

In those countries anti-fascist fronts were set up against the Nazi occupiers (for example, the Patriotic Front in Bulgaria, the Independence Front in Hungary, the National Democratic Front in Romania, the National Anti-Fascist Front in Czechoslovakia, the Anti-Fascist Front of National Liberation in Albania, and so on).

With the exception of Albania, where the Communist Party (later the Party of Labour) undertook by itself the leadership of the new people’s democratic State that arose from the war of liberation, in other countries coalition governments were formed with the participation of various political  parties, the expression of  different social classes.

In the beginning, the communists who took part in those coalition governments had the task of assuring the democratic development of those countries against the reactionary and fascist remnants, building inside the Front a bloc of left-wing forces, and preventing the right-wing forces from strengthening their traditional ties with the middle strata of the city and countryside. Profound agrarian reforms were carried out and some nationalisations were introduced; new organs of people’s power were established, such as the People’s Councils in Albania, the Committees of the Patriotic Front in Bulgaria, the Committees of the National Front in Czechoslovakia, and so on.

But from the theoretical and political point of view, for the communists this presented the problem of perspective. What was the class nature of these new systems of people’s democracy? And what “road” would they have to follow in their development towards socialism?

In this article we intend to examine – through the declarations of some leaders of the communist parties of those countries – the positions assumed by their parties in the first years of existence of the people’s democratic States, and how those positions were later modified through a process of profound Bolshevik criticism and self-criticism. (From here on the bold face is ours.)

2. “The struggle for socialism is different today from the struggle of 1917 and 1918 in tsarist Russia, at the time of the October Revolution. At that time it was essential to overthrow Russian tsarism, the dictatorship of the proletariat was essential in order to pass over to socialism. Since then, more than thirty years have elapsed, and the Soviet Union, as a socialist State, has become a great world power. […] There is no doubt that all counties, big and small, are destined to pass over to socialism, because that is historically inevitable for both big and small peoples. The crucial point of the question, and we Marxist-Leninists should know this well, is this: every nation will carry out the passage to socialism not through a road already drawn, not exactly as occurred in the Soviet Union, but proceeding along its own road, in accordance with its historic, national, social and cultural peculiarities” (G. Dimitrov, Report to the Congress of the Bulgarian Workers’ Party, February 1946).

Our people are for a parliamentary republic, which should not be a plutocratic republic. They are for a people’s republican system and not for a bourgeois republican system. What does this means? It means: 1) that Bulgaria will not be a Soviet republic, but a people’s republic in which the leading function will be performed by the great majority of the people – by the workers, peasants, artisans and intellectuals linked to the people. In this Republic there will not be any dictatorship, but the fundamental and decisive factor will be the labouring majority of the population” (G. Dimitrov, Speech of September 16, 1946).

Experience and the Marxist-Leninist teachings show that the dictatorship of the proletariat and the building of a Soviet system are not the only road leading to socialism. Under certain conditions, socialism can be achieved by other roads. The defeat of fascism and the suffering of the peoples in many countries have revealed the true face of the ruling class and have also increased the confidence of the people in themselves. In similar historical moments new roads and new possibilities appear. […] We are marching on our own road toward socialism” (K. Gottwald,Speech to the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, October 1946).

We must show what the relation is between the building of Hungarian people’s democracy and the road leading to socialism. The communist parties have learned, in this last quarter century, that there is no single road to socialism, but that the only road effectively leading to socialism is the road that takes into account the situation of each country. […] Only people’s democracy allows our country to march toward socialism through social evolution, without civil war (M. Rakosi, Speech to the 2nd Congress of the Hungarian Communist Party).

3. In this analysis and in these theoretical and political positions, the existence of indefiniteness, confusion and errors are evident, whether owing to an initial and not very mature experience of the “new roads”, or to a not clear relation between the immediate task (the consolidation of the new democratic systems emerging from the anti-Nazi and anti-fascist victory) and the long-term tasks of building socialism. There is also an excessive and one-sided emphasis on the national element, which is “isolated” and unlinked from its connections with proletarian internationalism.

These declarations correctly acknowledge and affirm that each nation will carry out the passage to socialism not “through a path already drawn”, but “according its own road, in conformity with its own historical, national, social and cultural peculiarities.

There were some important particularities in that historical situation: for example, the exclusion from power of the old ruling classes not as the result of a civil war, but on account of the armed presence of the Red Army on the territory; the survival of the parliamentary institution (an inheritance from the pre-war period) that coexisted with the new organs of people’s power. But these particularities were confused with the fundamental question of the class nature of the new power. The question of political leadership was not made clear. The leading role of the working class and its party – the communist party – in the power system of people’s democracy (a role that is decisive and irreplaceable in the dictatorship of the proletariat) is not asserted, or it is overshadowed.

In the following years those errors of analysis and perspective could be corrected self-critically, as we mentioned above. But we must not forget that, inside some of the communist parties, there were also right-opportunist tendencies, which led to the open theoretical revision of the foundations of Marxism-Leninism.

The most crude revisionist position was the one expressed in the Polish United Workers’ Party [PUWP] by the right-wing tendency represented in those years by its general secretary Wladislaw Gomulka. In his speech on November 30, 1946, to the assembly of Warsaw activists of the Polish Workers’ Party and the Polish Socialist Party [which later merged into the PUWP], Gomulka expressed his views in this way:

“The Polish Workers’ Party has based its conception of a Polish road to socialism that does not imply the necessity of violent revolutionary shocks in the evolution of Poland and eliminates the need of a dictatorship of the proletariat as the form of power in the most difficult moment of transition. On the basis of real elements, we have realized the possibility of an evolution toward socialism through a people’s democratic system, in which power is exercised by the bloc of democratic parties.”

He then explained “the three principal differences between the road of the evolution of the Soviet Union and our road”:

“The first difference is this: the social and political changes were accomplished through bloody revolutions, whereas in our country they are accomplished in a peaceful manner. The second difference consists in the fact that, whereas the Soviet Union had to pass through a period of dictatorship of the proletariat, in our country this period has not existed and can be avoided. The third difference that characterizes the roads of evolution between the two countries is that, whereas in the Soviet Union power is in the hands of the Council of Deputies, or Soviet, that unites in itself both legislative and executive functions, and that represents the form of socialist government, in our country the legislative functions and the executive ones are separate, and a parliamentary democracy is at the base of the national power.”

[…] “In Russia the dictatorship of the proletariat continues to be the form of government necessary after bringing down the counter-revolution. […] Today the dictatorship of the proletariat has changed its form and it can be said that it has died out with the disappearance of the class of exploiters and their ideology; its place has been occupied by Soviet democracy as the form of government of the country. The enemies of the Soviet Union, those who do not understand what the dictatorship of the proletariat means, continue to assert that this dictatorship still exists in Russia. This naturally does not make political sense.”

[…] “Thus we have chosen a Polish road of evolution, which we have called the line of people’s democracy. On this road and in these conditions, a dictatorship of the working class, let alone the dictatorship of one of the parties, is not necessary and is not our aim. We think that power should be exercised by the coalition of all the democratic parties. […] Polish democracy exercises power through a parliamentary system of different parties, whereas Soviet democracy realises the power of the people through the Councils. […] The Polish road to socialism is not the road that leads to the dictatorship of the working class, and the form of exercise of power by the working masses does not necessarily have to be represented by a system of Councils.”

Gomulka – who went so far as to even deny the existence of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Soviet Union – synthesized the essentials characteristics of Polish people’s democracy in this way:

“The elimination of reaction from power in a peaceful manner, and the accomplishment of great social reforms by democracy without bloodshed, without revolution and without civil war.”

These anti-Leninist positions (that, one should remember, never had any legitimacy in the Party of Labour of Albania under the firm political and ideological leadership of Enver Hoxha) were later defeated in Poland in consequence of the sharp class struggle developed inside the party. But they re-emerged with Khrushchev at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, giving rise to the principal trend of modern revisionism.

Just as full of errors, and particularly significant, is this definition of the countries of people’s democracy adopted in Hungary by Eugene Varga in the first years after the Second World War:

It is neither the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, nor the dictatorship of the proletariat. The old state apparatus was not destroyed, as in the Soviet Union, but it has been renewed through the continuous assimilation of the supporters of the new system. They are not capitalist States in the usual sense of the word, but they are also not socialist States. Their evolution toward socialism is based on the nationalisation of the principal means of production and on the actual character of these States. Even while the state power is maintained as it now exists, they can pass progressively to socialism by pushing forward the development of the socialist sector that already exists together with the simple-commodity sector (peasants and artisans), and the capitalist sector that is losing its dominant position.”

4. In the second half of 1947 the international situation went through profound changes, due to the passage of U.S. imperialism to an aggressive and expansionist policy (creation of military bases in the eastern part of the Mediterranean, military loans and aid to the reactionary regimes in Greece and Turkey, rearmament and support to all reactionary international forces), a policy that had its maximum expression in the “Truman Doctrine,” the “Marshall Plan” and the violent anti-communist ideological campaign unleashed by Yankee imperialism all over the world.

In his Report to the Information Conference of the representatives of nine communist parties (Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, France and Italy), held in Poland in September 1947, Andrei Zhdanov denounced the tendency of the United States of America to world domination, emphasised the formation at the international level of two camps – the imperialist anti-democratic camp and the anti-imperialist democratic camp – and criticized the tendency, present in some communist parties, to interpret the dissolution of the Communist International as if it “meant the liquidation of any ties, of any contact between the fraternal communist parties.

As the conclusion of that Conference, the “Information Bureau of Communist and Workers’ Parties” (Cominform) was set up, and inside the parties some important questions of a theoretical and political nature were re-examined, including those relating to the class content of the States of people’s democracy.

5. On December 19 1948, in his Report to the 5th Congress of the Bulgarian Workers’ Party (at that time again the Communist Party of Bulgaria), G. Dimitrov stated:

“In order to proceed with determination and firmness on the road toward socialism, it is necessary to completely clarify the ideas about the character, function and perspectives of people’s democracy and the people’s democratic State. In this respect, we must define more precisely some of the positions we have held until now, and rectify other positions, starting from the experience accumulated up to now, and from the more recent data on this new complex question. Briefly, in what does the question consist?

“First. The people’s democratic State is the State of a period of transition and has the task of assuring the development of the country toward socialism. This means that, although the power of the capitalists and large landowners has been demolished and the property of these classes has become property of the people, the economic roots of capitalism have not yet been extirpated, the capitalist elements aiming to restore capitalist slavery remain and are still developing. Therefore the march toward socialism is possible only by leading an implacable class struggle against the capitalist elements in order to completely liquidate them.

Second. In the conditions created by the military defeat of the fascist aggressor States, in the conditions of the rapid worsening of the general crisis of capitalism and of the huge increase in strength of the Soviet Union, our country, like the other countries of people’s democracy, once assured of the close collaboration with the USSR and the other people’s democracies, is seeing the possibility of accomplishing the passage to socialism without creating a Soviet system, through the system of people’s democracy, provided that this system is strengthened and developed with the aid of the Soviet Union and the countries of people’s democracy.

Third. The system of people’s democracy, representing in these particular historical conditions the power of the labouring people under the guidance of the working class, can and must – as experience has already shown – successfully exercise the functions of the dictatorship of the proletariat through the liquidation of the overthrown capitalist elements and landowners, in order to crush and liquidate their attempts to restore the power of capital.”

No less important and rich in lessons is the analysis in the Report to the First Congress of the Polish United Workers’ Party (December 1948), by the new secretary of the Party, Boleslaw Bierut, who denounced the positions of Gomulka as the result of a “nationalist limitation” and a “petty-bourgeois mentality”, as “a return to social-democratic opportunist conceptions that have not been completely defeated and are continually reborn; against them our party has conducted and must ceaselessly conduct  a fight to the finish.”

In that Report, Bierut pointed out the role and character of the State of people’s democracy in this manner:

“The Polish road to socialism, despite of its particular characters, is not something essentially different, but only a variant of the general road of development toward socialism, a variant which can exist only thanks to the earlier victory of socialism in the USSR, a variant based on the experiences of socialist construction in the USSR, with regard to the specific nature of the new historical period which determines the conditions of the historical development of Poland.

“What is a State of people’s democracy according to Marxist-Leninist theory? How can one define the essence, the class content and character of people’s democracy? Some people began to think that people’s democracy was a system qualitatively and fundamentally different from a system based on the dictatorship of the proletariat. Defining the system of people’s democracy in Poland as a specific Polish road toward the new system, its particularity was often understood in the sense that it was considered a special process of development whose point of arrival was impossible to establish previously, as was said.

“Some people imagined the result as a synthesis of its own kind of capitalism and socialism, as a particular socio-political system in which the socialist and capitalist elements coexisted on two parallel tracks and on the basis of a reciprocal recognition,. Other people, believing that the system of people’s democracy was a temporary effect of the specific situation determined by the post-war conditions, strived to temporarily stabilize this situation, in the hope that would be possible to return again to the situation existing before September [alluding to the Nazi invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939 – Editor’s note].

[…] “People’s democracy is not a type of synthesis or stable coexistence of two social systems of different natures, but the form through which the capitalist elements are undermined and progressively liquidated, and at the same time the form that allows the development and strengthening of the bases of the future socialist economy.

“People’s democracy is the particular form of revolutionary power that emerged in the new historical conditions of our epoch, it is the expression of the new array of class forces on the international level.

[…] “The development of our march toward socialism takes place through carrying out the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism in new conditions and in a new international situation.

“The principles are as follows:

  1. “The need for the working class, at the head of the popular masses, to seize political power;
  2. “The pre-eminent position of the working class in the worker-peasant alliance and in the national democratic front;
  3. “The leadership entrusted to the revolutionary party;
  4. “The merciless class struggle, the liquidation of big capital and the large landowners, the offensive against the capitalist elements.”

6. The historical experience of the international workers and communist movement is an extraordinary heritage of victories, elaborations and events, thanks to which fundamental pages on the road leading to communism have been written. The ability to verify the political theories and positions in practice, to admit and correct errors, to arrive at new formulations and conclusions, is a distinctive feature of Marxism-Leninism.

In the last century, the revolutionary creativity of the working class and peoples has produced different forms of the dictatorship of the proletariat, from the Soviets to the systems of people’s democracy, under specific historical conditions, which we communists must transform into the treasury for the development of our revolutionary theory and practice, as powerful tools for the transformation of the world.

The emergence of the people’s democracies as new State forms of the proletarian dictatorship, socialist states in the first phase of their development, that have run through various stages and applied different measures in order to destroy the bourgeois relations of production, has a great historical and present importance.

The study of the forms in which are embodied the historical necessity and inevitability of the political rule of proletariat, in alliance with and at the head of the labouring masses for the transition to classless society is essential for today’s communists. Our task is to win over the vanguard of the proletariat and to lead the masses to the seizure of power, applying the principles of Marxism-Leninism and finding the specific forms of approach to the proletarian revolution and socialism, in accordance with the historical conditions and characteristics of each country.

The idea of people’s democracy is still alive in the consciousness of the working class and the labouring masses, and it maintains its great force.

Will the Italy of the future be a people’s democracy? What is certain is that in the new century that has begun, in which we communists are continuing our battle, new proletarian revolutions will shake the world and new States will emerge from them: but each State will be a particular form of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

 “That all nations will arrive at socialism is absolutely certain, but all will arrive with some particularities, each nation will bring something particular to this or that form of democracy, to this or that variant of the dictatorship of the proletariat” (Lenin).

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Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Ecuador (PCMLE): Stalin

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Excerpts from a talk held in the Dominican Republic on the 50th anniversary of the death of Comrade Stalin, at the invitation of the Communist Party of Labour.

During his lifetime Comrade Stalin won the admiration and affection of the working class and all the peoples of the vast Soviet Union, as well as the respect and friendship of the workers of the five continents, the fervour and enthusiasm of the communists of all countries. Of course, he elicited the hatred of the reactionaries, imperialists and bourgeois who felt deeply hurt by the colossal achievements of the Soviet Union, by the great economic, cultural, technological and scientific feats of the workers and socialist intelligentsia, by the great and resounding triumphs of the revolution and socialism, of the communists.

In this plot against Stalin by which they fought communism, the Nazi propaganda stood out for its slander and persistence, which did not let one day pass without launching its dire diatribes.

Of course, this counter-revolutionary and anti-communist hatred also characterized Trotsky and his followers.

Shortly after Stalin’s death, the voices of the “communists” who had assumed the leadership of the Soviet Party and the State were added to the chorus of the reactionaries and anti-communists of all countries who had always reviled Stalin.

From then until our day, anti-Stalinism has been the recurring voice of all the reactionaries, of the ideologues of the bourgeoisie, of the Trotskyists, revisionists and opportunists of all shades.

By attacking Stalin, they are trying to tear down the extraordinary achievements of socialism in the Soviet Union and in what had been the socialist camp; they want to minimize and even ignore the great contributions of the Red Army and the Soviet peoples in the decisive struggle against Nazism, to denigrate the Communist Party and the socialist system as totalitarian, as the negation of freedom and democracy. By attacking Stalin they are aiming at Lenin, Marx and socialism. To denigrate Stalin as bloodthirsty and a bureaucrat means to attack the dictatorship of the proletariat and thereby deny the freedom of the workers and peoples, socialist democracy. To slander Stalin as being ignorant and mediocre is to refuse to recognize his great contributions to revolutionary theory, to Marxism-Leninism. To attack Stalin means to deny the necessity of the existence and struggle of the communist party, to transform it into a movement of free thinkers and anarcho-syndicalists, to remove its Leninist essence, democratic centralism.

The height of anti-Stalinism is to call Stalinists those who betrayed the revolution and socialism in the name of doing away with the “crimes of Stalin” and of making the Soviet Union a “democratic country”. The folly of the reactionaries and opportunists does not allow them to recognize that the confessed anti-Stalinists, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Gorbachev and Yeltsin, destroyed brick by brick the great work of the Soviet working class and peoples, of the communists, of Lenin and Stalin.

The attacks on Stalin are of such magnitude that even a significant number of social fighters, leftists and revolutionaries have fallen victim to these slanders. Basically, they are sincere people, interested in social and national liberation, who do not know the personality and work of Stalin and therefore join the chorus of these distortions. There are also some petty-bourgeois revolutionaries who attack Stalin from supposedly “humanist” positions.

It is up to us communists to defend the revolutionary truth about Stalin, and it is our responsibility because we are his comrades, the ones who are continuing his work.

The Great October Socialist Revolution was one of the great events of humanity. The workers and peoples of the world’s largest country stood up, undertook a long revolutionary process, led by the Bolshevik Party, which led them to victory in October of 1917. This great feat of the workers and peasants, the soldiers and the intelligentsia was a complex process, full of twists and turns and advances and retreats.

The proletarian revolution that smashed the tsarist empire to pieces was inconceivable without the guidance of Marxism, which established itself as the emancipatory doctrine of the working class; without the efforts of Russian communists, mainly of Lenin by his creative application in the social, economic, cultural, historical and political conditions of old Russia; without the building, existence and struggle of the Bolshevik Party; without the decisive participation of the working class and the millions of poor peasants; without the social and political mobilization of the broad masses; without the existence and fighting of the Red Army; and without the important contribution of the international working class.

Several decades of strikes and street battles; the utilization of parliamentary struggle and the participation of the communists in the Duma; the ideological and political struggle against the bourgeoisie and the tsarist autocracy; the organization of the Soviets of workers, peasants and soldiers; the great theoretical and political debate against opportunism within the party that led to the isolation of the Menshevik theses and proposals and to the formation of the Bolshevik Party governed by democratic centralism; the fierce battles against social chauvinism and social pacifism on an international scale; the profuse and fruitful propaganda activity of the communists; the fight to win ideological and political hegemony within the Soviets; the Revolution of 1905 and its lessons; the February Revolution of 1917, its results and consequences; the great armed insurrection of October; the Brest-Litovsk peace agreements; the revolutionary civil war; the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, these constitute the most salient features and characteristics of the struggle for power of the Russian communists, organized in the Bolshevik Party.

Stalin was born in Gori, a small town close to Tbilisi, in Georgia, on December 21, 1879. His father was a shoemaker, the son of serfs, and his mother, a servant, was also the daughter of serfs.

He joined into the ranks of the party in 1898, when he was 19 years old, and since that time his life, thoughts, dreams and his intellectual and physical effort were devoted to the cause of communism, to the fight for the revolution and socialism.

Until March of 1917 when he moved to Petrograd and joined the editorship of Pravda, Stalin had been and was a tireless organizer of trade unions and the party, of demonstrations and strikes, of newspapers and magazines, a student of Marxism and the author of various documents and proposals. He had been in prison and exile, at Party congresses and conferences. He was a fighter and leader of the revolution.

The revolutionary period that began with the February Revolution was the scene of great ideological and political confrontations against the bourgeoisie and the imperialists, but also against the Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries, and also within the Party. The whole process of winning the majority of the Soviets for the policy of the Bolsheviks had in Stalin a great leader and architect. The preparation of the insurrection, the technical and military contacts and preparations and also the debate within the leadership of the Bolshevik Party found in Stalin a protagonist of the highest order; he was a great comrade of Lenin in all aspects of political work.

Stalin was part of the first Soviet government as a People’s Commissar of Nationalities; he participated actively in the revolutionary civil war as a Commissar and Commander on various fronts and showed his military and political ability in forging and consolidating the young Soviet power and strengthening the Red Army. He was one of the most outstanding leaders of the party, the government and the army.

In 1921, by decision of the party and together with Lenin he participated actively in the foundation of the Third or Communist International, which would play a great role in the organization and leadership of the revolution on the international level.

A great task that the proletarian revolution took up was the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), which meant concretely the application of the line of the Party with regard to the nationalities and peoples. The “prison-house of nations” that was the tsarist empire became a community of nations, nationalities and peoples, governed by socialism, which put forward the defence and development of the national cultures and their inclusion in the building of the new society.

Having taken up these responsibilities, his dedication and selflessness in their fulfilment and his theoretical ability made Stalin the General Secretary of the Party in 1922. When Lenin died in 1924, the Political Bureau of the Party designated Stalin as the main leader of the party.

The Communist Party (Bolshevik), under the leadership of Stalin, faithful to the Leninist legacy, pushed through the New Economic Policy (NEP) during the 1920s. Amidst great difficulties, relying on the mobilization of the working class and peasantry, defeating the blockade, sabotage and resistance of the defeated reactionary classes and the force of individual capitalism that emerged in the peasant economy, it succeeded in overcoming the disastrous material, economic and social situation that Russia had been in after the Civil War, with production reduced to 14% of the pre-war period, and which was seen in widespread famine and the profusion of diseases.

In this period a bitter ideological and political battle was being waged within the party between the Bolsheviks and the so-called “‘Left’ communists,” who wanted to “export the revolution” and place the weight of the economy on the peasantry, liquidating it as an ally of the proletariat.

In 1929, the NEP was concluded and the accelerated collectivization of the countryside was begun, the great battle against the kulaks who wanted to reverse the revolutionary process in the countryside.

In 1930, the process of large-scale industrialization was pushed forward with great material efforts and supported by the mobilization of the working class. It was a great feat that required large investments and therefore limited the possibilities for the well-being of the great masses of workers and peasants. Despite this, the revolutionary fervour and enthusiasm allowed for the fulfilment and even over-fulfilment of its goals.

In the West, this was the time of the Great Depression; in the country of the Soviets it was the time of the victorious construction of socialism. The Soviet Union became the second greatest economic and commercial power in the world, after the United States. For eleven years, between 1930 and 1940, the USSR had an average growth of industrial production of 16.5%.

A good part of socialist accumulation had to be invested in the defence and security of the Soviet Union, which had to deal with the arms race to which all the capitalist countries of Europe, the USA and Japan were committed.

For 1938-39, the danger of imperialist war hung over Europe and the world. The German Nazis, the Italian fascists and the Japanese reactionaries were moving quickly to form the Axis. The Western powers headed by the Anglo-French alliance worked feverishly to conclude a pact with Germany in order to encourage it to direct its attacks against the Soviet Union, in order to liquidate the communists, wear down the Germans and enter the war under better conditions. It was a devious and cunning diplomatic game that handed over the Sudetenland and the rest of Czechoslovakia to the Germans.

The Soviet Union was a developing economic and military power, but its military capability was much weaker than that of Germany, France, England or the USA. It was surrounded by powerful enemies and needed material resources and time to prepare itself for the eventual war which was announced with cannons and aircraft.

The Soviet Union needed to combine international diplomacy and politics with its industrial development and military power. This circumstance forced the communists to devote a large quantity of material resources in this direction, but also to seek diplomatic alternatives that enabled its defence.

Several international meetings, endless proposals and projects were addressed to the chancelleries. The Soviet Union could not establish an alliance against Nazism since the main interest of the Western powers made the Soviet Union their target. In these circumstances and for its defence, in August 1939, the Molotov-Von Ribbentrop Pact of “non-aggression between Germany and the Soviet Union” was signed.

This international treaty gave the Soviet Union precious time to push forward its military industry. Utilizing large material resources and the will of the peoples, in a short time it was able to build planes, tanks, cannons, weapons and ammunition in large quantities and simultaneously it could relocate its key industries located in European Russia to the East, behind the Urals.

World War II broke out in 1939. The Germans invaded Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, the Balkans, France, Belgium and Netherlands and utilizing “blitzkrieg” tactics, the lightening war, in few weeks they destroyed the armies of those countries and imposed puppet governments.

When it came to the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, the Germans did not have the military capacity to carry out and win with the blitzkrieg; they ran into the resistance of the Red Army, the guerrillas and the great masses of workers and peasants who defended the socialist fatherland. The Red Army put up a fierce resistance and gave way to the Nazi troops, forcing them to penetrate into a vast territory, teeming with guerrillas who persistently harassed them. They could not take Leningrad much less Moscow. In Stalingrad a major battle was waged, street by street, house by house, man by man. The reds resisted and then took the initiative and defeated the German army. That was the beginning of the end of the fascist beast.

The Red Army launched the re-conquest of its territories occupied by the Nazis and advanced victoriously across the mountains and plains of Europe, contributing to the liberation of several of the countries of Eastern Europe, up to Berlin, which was taken on May 9, 1945.

This great victory of the Soviet Union was the fruit of the fortress of socialism, of the unity and will to action of the working class and peoples, of the valour of the Red Army, but it was also a consequence of the diplomatic, political and military genius of the General Staff and the leadership of the Soviet Party and Government, led by Stalin.

At the end of the war, the victory of the revolution took place in several countries of Europe, which established people’s democratic governments, and the victory of the revolution in other Asian countries. The Soviet Union emerged as a great economic and military power that won the affection and respect of workers and peoples of the world, of the patriots and democrats, of the revolutionaries and especially the communists. The Soviet Union, Stalin and the Communist Party were the great protagonists in the defeat of fascism.

The Great Patriotic War meant great human and material sacrifices for the Proletarian State. The victory achieved was built upon the great spiritual heritage of socialism that protected the workers and peoples of the USSR; it was made possible by the great patriotic sentiments with which the Communist Party was able to inspire the bodies and minds of the Soviet peoples, by the deep affection of the workers for Soviet power, by the brave and courageous contribution of the communists who put all their abilities and energy into the defence of socialism. The contribution of the Soviet Union in the Second World War was more than 20 million human beings, of which slightly more than 3 million were brave members of the Bolshevik Party. The Party gave over its best men to the war, it lost invaluable political and military cadres, but it also further tempered the Bolshevik steel, and at the end of the war it had gained more than 5 million new members.

At Yalta and Tehran, at the peace negotiations, the workers and peoples of the world had a great representative, Comrade Stalin, who knew, with wisdom, prudence and composure, how to restore the rights of the peoples and countries that had been victims of the war and fascism, how to contribute to the establishment of agreements and open the way to new levels of democracy and freedom in the world.

World War II was the prelude to the national liberation of dozens of countries on the five continents, who won their independence by breaking with the old colonial order. The Soviet Union led by Stalin was always the safe and reliable rear of this great liberation movement.

In the field of the revolution, the victories achieved in Albania and other countries of Eastern Europe, in China, Korea and Vietnam, gave rise to the formation of the powerful socialist camp. A quarter of the population living on a third of the Earth’s surface were building socialism and had in the Soviet Union, led by Stalin, an enlightening example and unreserved support. In the rest of the world, the working class, the peasantry, the youth and the progressive intelligentsia saw the socialist future of humanity with certainty and confidence.

On the other hand, the end of the Second World War established a new order within the capitalist sphere. The United States became the main world power and had hegemony over the capitalist countries.

There arose a new contradiction in the international sphere: one that opposed the old world of capital to the new world of socialism. The bourgeois ideologues and politicians called this the “cold war”, alluding to the antagonism of the dispute.

Once more the superiority of socialism became evident. In the Soviet Union, but also in the other countries of the socialist camp, the culture and well-being of the masses, science and technology, the social and material progress of the workers and peoples flourished. In 1949 the USSR was able to build the atomic bomb and in 1957 it launched the space race, taking the lead.

Neo-colonialism, a form of imperialist domination that emerged after the independence of the dependent nations and countries, always had a counterweight in the Soviet Union led by Stalin. The peoples of the former colonies always had a loyal friend.

Within a few years, from 1917 to the early years of the 1950s, the proletarians, led by the communists organized in the Bolshevik Party of Lenin and Stalin, built the dreams of a new world, the world of socialism. They built the essentials, many things were lacking, some failed, but humanity never knew a broader and truer democracy, never before were men in their multitudes able to have material and social well-being, equality among their peers. This was proletarian democracy.

It was an epic of the workers and peoples, the realization in life of the scientific theory of Marxism-Leninism, the gigantic effort of the communists, the serene and bold work of the leaders, Lenin and Stalin.

When we speak of Stalin we are referring to the leader, the organizer, the head, the comrade and friend, who was really one of the great builders of the new man, of the new humanity.

This understanding of Stalin cannot be conceived without discovering and learning about his extraordinary theoretical work.

From the beginning of his communist activity he correctly evaluated the role of theory in the process of organizing and making the revolution. He studied the Marxist materials that he had at hand, the Manifesto of the Communist Party, the works of Plekhanov, and soon he began to familiarize himself with Lenin, by his writings and directives, his valour as organizer and head of the communists, until he saw him in person at party events. From that time on they had a great friendship affirmed in militancy and the great commonality of opinions and concerns. Stalin was also a great reader of Russian literature. He was a man of vast culture, which grew daily throughout his life.

How can one not keep in mind in the training of communists in all countries his most outstanding works: Anarchism or Socialism?, Marxism and the National Question, On the Problem of Nationalities, The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists, The Foundations of Leninism, Concerning Questions of Leninism, Trotskyism or Leninism?, Dialectical and Historical Materialism, Marxism and Linguistics, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, the Reports to the Congresses of the Communist Party.

Stalin was a theoretician of the revolution, a Marxist who recreated and developed revolutionary theory in order to provide answers to the problems put forward by the revolution. He was not a theoretician who speculated with knowledge to try to generate ideas and proposals. No, his theoretical work addressed burning issues that had to do with the development of the class struggle, with the problems that the party, the trade unions, the state and the revolution were facing on an international scale.

The depth of his writings is not at odds with the simple form of making them understood. Stalin is rigorous in his theoretical analysis, his positions are valid; they provide a real guide to action, as he himself pointed out referring to Marxism, but also they are simple and easy to understand.

Stalin’s detractors insist on some issues that we should analyze. All of them: the confessed reactionaries of anti-communism, the Trotskyists, the revisionists and opportunists of all shades agree principally on the following charges: intellectual mediocrity, Lenin’s testament that supposedly condemned him, the building of socialism in a single country, forced collectivization, the bureaucratization of the party and state, the liquidation of the Bolshevik old guard, the great purges, his tyrannical and bloodthirsty character, forced industrialization, his incompetence in the war, the cult of personality.

With regard to Stalin’s intellectual mediocrity, the facts, history and its vicissitudes speak emphatically. The October Revolution, the building of socialism in a large country and for the first time in the history of mankind, his skill in leading the party, the working class and the peoples of the USSR in the great feat of building a new world would not have been possible with a mediocre leader who was poor intellectually. These diatribes fall under their own weight. Trotsky, who claimed to be a great theoretician and man of culture and was one of his detractors in this area, was defeated precisely, in theory and practice, by one who, according to him, was a mediocrity.

In regard to the so-called “Lenin Testament,” a lot of nonsense has been written, such as that Trotsky was the one anointed by Lenin to replace him as head of the Party, as if those notes of Lenin had been hidden by the Central Committee. We say that Lenin’s health was very shaky in those days in which he is supposed to have written the famous “testament”, his sensitivity was weakened by the complaints of his companion. However, Lenin had the revolutionary culture, the Bolshevik training to understand that he could not have written a testament, a last will; he also knew that one leader, whatever his rank, can only give his opinions, not orders, in the collective. For these reasons one must understand these notes of Lenin as opinions; moreover, they were out of the context of the everyday life of the leadership of the Party and State and in no way were they orders to be complied with without question. On the other hand, it is completely false that these notes were hidden from the Central Committee; the latter knew about and discussed them. The results were known; Stalin was chosen the Main Leader of the Bolshevik Party and that was a correct and wise decision. History has shown these facts irrefutably. The one supposedly anointed by Lenin as leader of the Party, Trotsky, was placed by life and the revolutionary struggle in the dustbin of the counter-revolution.

The Leninist thesis of the building of socialism in one country takes into account the uneven development of capitalism and as a consequence the various stages of the class struggle. That situation made it possible to break the chain of imperialism at its weakest link, old Russia. Stalin was the one who continued this line. Relying on the workers and peasants, on the great spiritual and materials reserves of the Soviet peoples he carried out the great feat, defended the revolution and defeated the detractors of this thesis. Those who raised the impossibility of building socialism in the Soviet Union as long as the revolution did not succeed in the capitalist countries of Europe and labelled the peasants as reactionaries and counter-revolutionaries were proven to be wrong. The USSR developed and so far there has been no revolution in any of the capitalist countries in Europe.

On the forced collectivization of the countryside, Stalin’s detractors claim that “he violated the will of the peasants, destroyed the agrarian economy and eliminated the social base of the revolution made up by the medium and rich peasants, the kulaks”. The facts are diametrically opposite. The necessary carrying out of the NEP in the countryside developed the rural bourgeoisie in a natural way and stripped millions of poor farmers of the land, depriving the population of cereals. Basing itself on Marxism-Leninism and taking social reality into account, the Party proposed to bring socialism to the countryside. Relying on the millions of poor peasants, it pushed forward a great social and political movement for the formation of cooperatives, the kolkhozes; this meant the expropriation of the kulaks, in some cases people’s tribunals and drastic sanctions. International reaction spoke of repression and massacres. In reality there was a socialist revolution in the countryside, the work of millions of poor peasants who assumed their role as the protagonists in the life of the country of the Soviets. And, as we know, a revolution unleashes the initiative and achievements of the masses, but also the anger of its enemies. As a result, agriculture and livestock flourished, the Soviet Union became the largest producer of wheat, the mechanization and the modernization of agriculture reached unprecedented levels, at the forefront on the international scale.

Stalin is continually blamed for the bureaucratization that was in reality growing in the party and State. Stalin was never in his life a bureaucrat. Quite the contrary, his dynamism was always expressed in direct contact with the base of the party and with the masses; he was one of the leaders of the Soviets before the revolution. His whole life was in action.

Bureaucracy is a social phenomenon, a degeneration that arises in the bourgeois administration (remember that a good part of the Bolshevik administration had to resort to old tsarist functionaries) that penetrated into the revolutionary ranks, into the party and State. Bureaucracy was really present in the life of the Socialist State; it affected many activists and leaders. In some cases the responsibilities of power were transformed into small or large privileges that were creating a caste of bureaucrats who undermined the functioning of the party and the state administration, which separated the party from the masses.

Stalin did not promote the bureaucracy, but in reality he did not have either the ability or the experience to eliminate it. Several offensives of an ideological character aimed at eliminating it took place, precisely under Stalin’s initiative. The political education, ideological struggle, the validity of democracy in the party, the party elections were expressions of the struggle of the communists against bureaucracy. They cannot be dismissed having been useless. They achieved results; among other things they allowed for the continuation of the social and material achievements of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the ideological, political and organizational cleansing of the party and State, the isolation and expulsion of several groups of opportunists and traitors. However, in fact, they were not able to eradicate the bureaucracy and opportunism. Various opportunists and traitors evaded the ideological struggle and hid. They would return later, after the death of Stalin.

It is clear that bureaucracy is an ideological illness which is persistently reborn and which must be fought relentlessly to the end. Stalin did not promote bureaucracy; rather he was one of its victims.

The accusation made against Stalin that he was a bloody dictator and despot and refers to the ideological cleansing, to the revolutionary repression of the counter-revolutionary outbreaks in the city and countryside, to the alleged liquidation of the Bolshevik old guard.

It is necessary to understand that the dictatorship of the proletariat is not a wedding party in which everything is rosy. No, quite the contrary. A whole armed, economic campaign, a trade boycott, an ideological and political penetration by imperialism and the international bourgeoisie was orchestrated against the dictatorship of the proletariat. In opposition to the new power of the workers, from within society, the old ruling classes, overthrown by the revolution but not physically eliminated, repeatedly carried out acts of sabotage; they tried many times to organize rebellions and uprisings, using mercenaries and men and women of the people who were deceived; they based themselves on religion and the priests, on feudal traditions, on liberal elements in the administration and on some occasions they infiltrated their agents into the party and the Soviet State. Within the party itself, in the new State and in the Red Army, there appeared over and over again degenerate elements who made attacks on the dictatorship of the proletariat in theory and practice, who tried to divert the party, to assume its leadership, to organize coups d’état. Some of these elements had been, in the past, outstanding members and leaders of the party and the revolution and they tried, therefore, to take advantage of their positions to change the course of socialism.

The fight to preserve and defend the line of the Party, its ideological, political and organizational unity was bitter and persistent, because again and again, the counter-revolution grew stronger in its attacks and, during Stalin’s life, it was again and again defeated by the force of reason, by the firmness of the Bolsheviks, by the support of the base of the party and the army, by the support of the masses of workers and peasants.

In reality the Bolshevik old guard, those comrades who dreamt of and organized the Great October Revolution, were falling behind. Some fell in combat for the revolution, others were assassinated by the counterrevolution. Others paid the physical tribute of their lives. Some survived Stalin.

The old Bolsheviks, the veteran communists knew how to face their responsibilities, they learned how to solve problems and unknown issues as they arose, they were put at the head of the great feat of building socialism, and were called “old Bolsheviks” not because they were old, but because of their qualities, for their militant and permanent adherence to the principles of Marxism-Leninism, for their quality as communist cadres and fighters.

The fight against the opportunist factions within the Party and State were real battles that mobilized the party, all its members, they were a demonstration of the proletarian firmness of Stalin and his comrades in arms; they constituted one victory after another, that guaranteed the life of the Soviet State, the building of socialism and the continuation of the revolution.

Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev and Bukharin were the main chieftains of the counter-revolution, who were confronted and defeated, in theory and practice, with the material and political achievements by the political correctness of the party leadership, headed by Stalin.

The dark legend of the work camps, of the confinement, of psychiatric hospitals, of prisons overcrowded with workers and communists, of the mass executions and mass graves are nothing more than the infamous slander of the reactionaries and imperialism, of the Nazis and social democracy, of the Trotskyists and revisionists, of the opportunists. They cannot be proved by any records much less by the existence of concentration camps and mass graves. They fall under their own weight.

Much has been said about Stalin’s incompetence in leading the war. Nothing could be further from the truth. In reality Stalin was not a soldier by training, he did not study in any academy nor could he claim mastery of the military arts, a thorough knowledge of weapons and military strategy and tactics. But it is clear that he was a proletarian revolutionary soldier who learned this art in the very course of the revolutionary civil war in the first years of Soviet power, that he was steeled as such in the difficult years of the building of socialism and that he played an outstanding role in the leadership of the Great Patriotic War, in the resistance against the Nazi invading hordes and in the great political and military offensive that drove the Red Army to take Berlin. No one has claimed that Stalin was a great Military Leader, all the revolutionaries recognize him as the leader of the Soviet proletariat and the peoples, as the political leader of the international proletariat, as a proletarian revolutionary, as a communist.

The accusations that Stalin promoted and used the whole gamut of praise and exaggerations that have been called the “cult of personality” for his prestige continue to be a part of the anti-communist arsenal.

In fact, Stalin daily received praise and recognition from his comrades and friends, from the workers and peasants who expressed them from their heart to express gratitude and recognition. There was also the praise of the opportunists who sought favours from him. The former demonstrations were sincere, a product of the generous spirit of the workers and people, the latter had a dual intention, based on facts; they tried to elevate Stalin above others, above the events and in this way to personally take advantage of this situation.

The cult of personality was in fact a defect of the first experience in the building of socialism. It began with good intentions, but finally it degenerated, it hurt Soviet power and Stalin himself. This is an incontestable fact. But to argue from there that Stalin himself encouraged these campaigns, that he became an egomaniac, a narcissist is a big lie.

Many pages and books can be written about Stalin. In fact there are thousands of publications about his life and work. There are those of his comrades and friends, but also those of his enemies and detractors. In fact the life of Stalin is the life of the first proletarian revolution itself. Stalin did not make the revolution to his measure; the revolution projected Stalin as one of its best sons and leaders.

Pablo Miranda
Ecuador, 2012

Source

Thoughts About the Class Roots of Counter-Revolution in the Territory of the Soviet Union

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Alexei Danko

I will not try to give a solid and complete answer to the question posed above given the shortness of this article and the lack of proper preparation. However, I feel obliged to at least draw the attention of revolutionary proletarians to the need to study this question deeply and scientifically for the benefit of the future class struggle of the Russian and international proletariat. Moreover, if we call ourselves Marxists we should not ‘close our eyes to reality’, regardless of how bitter and tough this truth may be for us. We need to clarify the truth and its fundamental essence among the proletarians so that the workers are not deceived by the tricks of the bourgeoisie. It is necessary to explain the essence scientifically from the point of view of dialectical and historical materialism so that the working class can see itself as the maker of historical progress and so that it does not leave all the class responsibility to the vanguard or its leaders.

In the conditions of the bourgeois system the working class is the progressive class, which develops the revolutionary class struggle against the reactionary class of capitalists. The Communist Party is essentially the political vanguard, the most advanced section of the working class. In the process of class struggle political leaders arise, i.e. the cadre who are best prepared and capable for revolutionary struggle, ‘the best of the best’ of a small group of professional revolutionaries.

In correspondence to the Marxist-Leninist teachings, the leading force of the revolution is the most advanced class in the concrete stage of historical development, which opposes the decadent system and the class that embodies it. The role of the individual in the process of revolutionary struggle (including any political leader) is undoubtedly great, but can become determining only in particularly tense moments of the struggle, i.e. temporarily.

Therefore it would be fundamentally wrong to state that the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Soviet Union depended mainly on the leadership and political activity of comrade Stalin, and that the counter-revolution in the country after the death of comrade Stalin was successful as a result of a conspiracy and the will of a bunch of Soviet revisionists who took over political power (the so-called ‘Khrushchevites’).

During the period of socialism, after the proletarian revolution and the suppression of the open class resistance of the bourgeoisie and the most obvious class enemies, for a long time there remain non-antagonistic, non-belligerent classes and social strata, as well as remnants of capitalism and certain social inequalities. As a result of this it is natural that under socialism the class struggle continues to exist in different manifestations and forms and, given certain negative class conditions, counter-revolution may become a real threat. The main revolutionary force capable of preventing counter-revolutionary threats or suppressing counter-revolutionary activities, as before, is the working class led by its political vanguard – the communist party. Therefore the most important task of the party is to establish a tight and relentless control over the purity of its members and to develop a continuous ideological struggle against anti-proletarian ideologies and political ‘teachings’ – a tenacious dictatorship against any counter-revolutionary expression and for a general political party line aimed at the liquidation of remnants of capitalism.

The essence of the existence of the party consists in that it becomes the brains of the working class and essentially becomes a monolithic organism together with the working class. If it is isolated from the working class, the Communist party ceases to be its political vanguard and necessarily degenerates from the class point of view; the party should be able to predict the social-class issues in society, to understand them in a timely manner and to recommend to the working class the most effective methods to ‘cure them’.

The petty-bourgeois ideology and its consolidation in society is particularly dangerous for the dictatorship of the proletariat. The intelligentsia (including officers of the army and whatever repressive organs) and the peasantry are objectively massive conductors of the petty-bourgeois psychology. The influence of petty-bourgeois ideology on the working class is also significant, since the working class to a sufficiently large degree includes recruits from the petty-bourgeoisie and it is not separated from it by a ‘Chinese Wall’. At the time of the Great Patriotic War (most commonly known as the Second World War, editor’s note) the working class suffered tremendous losses especially in terms of old party cadre who had experience in the class struggle and a stable class psychology. They were replaced by youths without sufficient class solidity.

The proletarian ideology and the petty-bourgeois ideology express different class interests. Therefore it is necessary to have a very clear conception about the differences between the interests of the petty-bourgeoisie and the interests of the working class

It is the petty-bourgeois masses who reproduce bourgeois aspirations in socialist society and who engender a new bourgeoisie. To neglect the struggle against the petty-bourgeois ideology and to lose revolutionary awareness of this cowardly enemy of the proletariat may become a mortal danger for the interests of the proletarian revolution and socialism.

Under capitalism a certain fraction of the petty-bourgeoisie becomes an active ally of the proletariat, especially when the contradictions between large capital and that of the petty owner deepen. Under socialism the petty-bourgeoisie, in conformity to its class essence and its class ambiguity, may become a dangerous counter-revolutionary force when the struggle against the petty-bourgeois ideology by the communist party and the working class loses momentum. The petty-bourgeoisie then goes on the offensive when opportunities for personal profiteering exist and when certain goods or services become scarce. The petty-bourgeois easily change their class attitude depending on the situation and due to the selfish class interests of the petty owners since they function only according to considerations of the individual or family, purely animal instincts and they cannot think about social life in perspective, in global terms. The attitude and political activity of the petty-bourgeoisie often even becomes irresponsible and rather aggressive.

The realisation of petty-bourgeois aspirations under socialism happens through the necessary preservation of certain elements of capitalism and the application of the ‘bourgeois right’, which it is impossible to liquidate in a short period of time. For instance, take the distribution according to labour, which necessarily results in income differentiation and the existence of significant differences between mental and manual labour and between the city and the countryside. A concrete expression and source of petty-bourgeois aspirations are the existence of private peasant plots, private real estate and dachas, goods of excessive luxury, the special status of managerial and intellectual labour, the existence of commodity-money relations in the sphere of distribution of products, commodities and services of broad demand and so forth. These elements can only be eliminated by means of gradual liquidation of ‘bourgeois right’ in the process of the progressive development of the material and technical basis of socialism. Only in this way can the conditions which reproduce the petty-bourgeois system with all its negative manifestations be liquidated.

The forms of class struggle are diverse: from the ideological struggle to armed struggle including civil war. Marxists acknowledge all forms of class struggle. In order to secure victory in the class struggle as a whole, Leninist Bolsheviks should first attain victory in the ideological struggle. At that time they became victorious. Nevertheless the ideological struggle continued. The ideological struggle between petty-bourgeois ideology, which has a multiplicity of forms, and proletarian ideology continued in different forms during the years of proletarian socialism: at times it weakened; at times it became more prominent. The thesis of comrade Stalin about the continuation of the class struggle in the process of construction of socialism is convincingly confirmed by real practice, by real life, since the only criterion of truth is practice.

Marxism-Leninism teaches that the pre-conditions for the change of one social system to another develop within society long before the revolutionary events. I am convinced that this fundamental thesis also applied to the case of counter-revolution in the socialist country.

Since we are dealing here with the victory of counter-revolution and the defeat of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the USSR, therefore in the Soviet Union during the post-war period decisive changes in the correlation of class forces took place, not in favor of the proletarian forces, especially within the Bolshevik party. As a result of the class struggle these anti-proletarian forces took over. No other interpretation here is possible if we are to stick to the science of classes and class struggle.

The invasion by fascist Germany of the socialist Soviet Union should not be considered in a primitive fashion, from the point of view of a regular aggression of one country against another. In this deadly conflict two irreconcilable class forces faced each other: the most reactionary forces of capitalism siding with fascist Germany and the progressive communist forces represented by the Soviet Union, which made a breakthrough in the future of world civilisation and was dangerous for capitalism as a whole. While paying the price of countless victims and sacrifices, the Soviet people led by the Bolshevik party defended the independence of the proletarian state, expelled the aggressor from the territory of its socialist country and crushed the fascist beast in its own lair. The working class of the Soviet Union ferociously defended its revolutionary conquests against the same reactionary forces of world capital. However, at the same time the class enemy managed to inflict a mortal wound on the Bolshevik party and the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Soviet Union from which later the power of the working class and proletarian socialism died in the USSR.

The Bolshevik party was the vanguard of the working class of the Soviet Union not only as a result of its specific political position. The Bolshevik party continuously directed its best party cadre to the most difficult and responsible sections of practical work, where they outstandingly demonstrated the high level of authority and respect enjoyed by party members among non-party comrades due to success in concrete practical deeds. In the years of the Great Patriotic War the Bolshevik party directed its best party cadre and the best representatives of the working class to the hardest sections of the front and the rear. The communists were the first to enter battle and the first to die. Therefore the losses among party cadre were extremely severe, especially during the first years of the war. However, the party membership grew, its ranks filled to a great degree by heroes of the front since heroism in the front was not only a mass phenomenon but an obvious one and the communists were the best of those heroes. Therefore the title of communist became a special distinction.

The fact that the overwhelming majority of new party cadre did not have party and political experience helped to dilute the class content of its ranks. As a result of this development especially during the years of the war, the party suffered a significant qualitative damage in the political sense of the word. Nevertheless, this should not be considered an error or lack of political foresight by the Bolshevik party. During the war the fate of the proletarian state was being decided at the front. Therefore the most important political goal, slogan and task at the time was: EVERYTHING FOR VICTORY. All the politics and life of the Bolsheviks were devoted to the latter. Therefore, by virtue of this the heroes of the front were not only heroes but were the political vanguard in the most advanced aspect of the practice of the class struggle, i.e. they essentially made up the base of the party under those conditions. This completely conformed to the politics of the party and the class demands of the war period, but it had within itself the threat of petty-bourgeois degeneration of the party ranks especially due to peasants and intellectuals.

During wartime the consciousness of the peasant masses was dominated by the psychology of the peasant-labourer. Why? The proletarian revolution and the success of socialism greatly improved the standards of living of the peasantry. The proletarian power provided the peasants with land and the necessary means, modern agricultural technique under preferential conditions through the creation of the machine-tractor stations (MTS), support in case of poor crops, many social-cultural benefits, it liberated the peasantry from the dangers of chaotic market relations when realising their production, etc. Under the tsars, the peasants could not even dream about such things. Therefore soldiers from peasant background displayed great heroism in the front lines, defending their class interests, and through this, the defence of the proletarian revolution and the proletarian state from the belligerence of the fascist invaders. Because of this the communist psychology dominated in the consciousness of the peasant-labourer during the years of the war, compelling many peasants to join the Bolshevik party, which defended the interests of the peasantry at the cost of many lives of the best children of the party.

In the post-war period the situation fundamentally changed. Having returned from the front, the peasantry faced significant material difficulties. The kolkhozes, many of which were destroyed during the war, could barely fulfill the state contracts. Industry faced the need to accommodate to the requirements of peaceful times and could not provide the peasants with the necessary industrial goods and technique rapidly enough, while at the same it justly demanded that the peasants increase the production of food and agricultural products. The private plots of peasants were not productive enough; food, clothing and many other necessary means for a modest family life were scarce. Those who fought in the front had already suffered severe scarcity, enjoyed war glory and many dreamed of a better life. This impelled the peasantry to focus on its own material interests,and that included taking advantage of the glory earned in the war and the party membership. These factors encouraged the peasantry to develop strong elements of private thinking in their consciousness. However, as a result of the duality of the peasants’ psychology, the psychology of the petty owner and the psychology of the labourer, most of the peasant masses trusted the Bolshevik party with regard to the construction of communism since they were already convinced of the economic benefits brought by socialism. On the other hand, with regard to questions of everyday life and activity, the peasants as a rule gave priority to their private interests over the interests of society.

Such is the dialectics of the psychology of the peasant, a petty owner and a labourer at the same time. This psychology was inherited and further propagated even more aggressively by city inhabitants originally coming from the peasantry.

To defend the party ranks from the dangerous contaminations from elements with the psychology of the petty owner was already a very complicated task. Firstly, such elements already had become a large section of the party. Secondly, these elements had war achievements in serving the socialist Fatherland and this prevented other comrades from exposing them.

The intellectuals, by virtue of their social position, always serve the dominating class regardless of the social system.

Under capitalism the intellectuals, on the one hand also relate to the exploited class. On the other hand, the intellectuals, as a result of their social functions, participate in the accomplishment of the exploitation of the workers and peasants, since it is though the intellectuals that the capitalist class exerts and regulates its direct domination, i.e. the intellectuals are used as tools for the exploitation of the workers and peasants.

Under socialism the intellectuals are bound to execute the will of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Many intellectuals see themselves unwillingly forced to offer such a ‘service’, since they have to serve the interests of the workers and peasants whom the intellectuals had traditionally considered as lower classes. The standard of living of the intellectuals depends on their social position in society. This explains the tendency of the intellectuals to indulge in such social illnesses as careerism, bureaucratism, idealism, overestimation of their social role and the will to have a special position in society. To a great degree this explains the tendency of the intellectuals to join the Bolshevik party. As a result of their social-class specifics, the duality of their class position, the intellectuals are easy targets for petty-bourgeois influence and decomposition.

It is common to the intellectuals and peasants, who are influenced by individualism, to make the country’s leadership responsible for the organization of social life and the party.

In the post-war period the Bolshevik party was dangerously infiltrated by such petty-bourgeois elements.

It is necessary to note that ‘if we do not close our eyes to reality we must admit that at the present time the proletarian policy of the Party is not determined by the character of its membership, but by the enormous undivided prestige enjoyed by the small group which might be called the Old Guard of the Party. A slight conflict within this group will be enough, if not to destroy this prestige, at all events to weaken the group to such a degree as to rob it of its power to determine policy’ (V.I. Lenin Collected Works, 4th English Edition, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1966, volume 33, page 257).

As a result of the class struggle during the war and in the post-war period this ‘small group … of the Old Guard of the Party’ also suffered great losses and became even smaller and after the death of Stalin ‘slight conflicts within this group’ weakened it to the extent that it did not have the ‘power to determine policy.’

The war and the severe military consequences inflicted tremendous losses on the Soviet Union not only from the class, material point of view and in terms of population, but also strengthened a number of dangerous tendencies for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The war period demanded that the economy re-direct the focus of the development of the forces of production and the efforts of all of society on the needs of the struggle against the fascist aggression. In the course of accomplishing this goal the production relations also suffered changes toward a strictly top-down structure. This shift took place not only in the organisation of the economy but in all fields of social life including politics. The need to liquidate the most severe consequences of the war also required a speedy economic restoration and the development of the forces of production under a regime of general mobilisation.

The development of production relations seriously lagged behind the development of the forces of production as a result of these extreme measures and conditions, and not only as a result of the inertia so characteristic of production relations in general.

Under the pressure and the disguise of these and other adverse conditions the functions of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the development of proletarian democracy were significantly hampered. The dictatorship of the proletariat was then applied from top to bottom, mostly as a result of the activity and authority of the leading organs of the Bolshevik party, and the development of proletarian democracy in society was basically reduced to endorsing the government and party decisions produced at the top.

The strictly top-down character of the management of economic and social life seriously weakened the class control from below of the activity of the apparatus and the intellectual elite. This lack of control from below led to the social alienation and petty-bourgeois decomposition of the apparatus. As a result, the petty-bourgeois interests and actions of the managers and intellectual elites began to diverge from the class interests of the proletariat.

The situation worsened from the class-political point of view due to the replacement of managerial cadre as the result of personnel losses during the war. The replacements came mostly from demobilised army cadre and specialists of war industry who traditionally, in virtue of the organisational specifics of their previous activity, resisted the development of proletarian democracy in production and social relations, and even most probably did not understand the danger to the dictatorship of the proletariat and socialism concealed in their actions.

The class and social-economic phenomena described above represented a substantial danger for the dictatorship of the proletariat, but while Stalin was alive the proletarian forces within the party managed to maintain the political situation under control in the party and in society. How can this be explained?

The most honest and deepest trust of the Soviet people towards the Bolshevik party and the proletarian power was engendered by real life and was tested to death during the years of the war. It was specifically the monolithic class unity of the Bolshevik party and the working class in alliance with the labouring masses (non-party members) of the Soviet Union that was one of the most determining factors that made possible the successful and rapid development of practical life of the socialist society. Therefore it is disturbing and laughable when today bourgeois ideologists claim that the Bolsheviks and their leadership allegedly usurped power and remained in power with the help of mass violence and terror. Such ignorant garbage and irreverent slanders would be denied by even the most vicious enemy of the Bolsheviks and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

When we say Lenin we mean the party. By analogy, the name of Stalin incorporated the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Soviet Union during the so-called Stalinist period. This was related not only to Stalin’s greatest contributions to the Bolshevik party and the working class. This phenomenon also has a social-class explanation. The victory of the proletarian revolution and the tremendous success of socialism during the dictatorship of the proletariat under the leadership of the Bolshevik party created a strong morale among the masses and their hopes for a bright future. The dreams of a better life turned into reality in a planned and rapid fashion. The petty-bourgeois consciousness, first of all of the peasants and the intellectuals, was used to link the good and the bad in their lives, victory or defeat, with the name of a given leader and not with the politics of the leading class; in the concrete historical case we are dealing with the dictatorship of the proletariat led by the Bolshevik party. This way it was easier for the petty-bourgeois consciousness to understand, and the successes of the country were indeed legendary. Therefore while Stalin was alive, through such manifestations, the influence of the proletarian nucleus in the party was further strengthened by the authority of the party attained during the epoch of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Marxist-Leninist line of the party did not suffer changes and the party formally displayed class unity among its members; this all corresponded to the post-war period while comrade Stalin was still alive.

After the death of comrade Stalin the petty-bourgeois forces within the party (the Soviet revisionists, the so-called ‘Khrushchevites’) worked hard to seize the key party positions, since to achieve control in the party structures gave them the chance to take over political power and ideological control. However, in order to change the politics of the CPSU towards the opposite class direction, i.e. to bring it in correspondence with the real power, it was necessary to discredit the Stalinist dictatorship of the proletariat and to isolate it from the Leninist party of the Bolsheviks,even though the Stalinist dictatorship of the proletariat solidly followed the Leninist party of the Bolsheviks.

It was because of this that the 20th Congress of the CPSU had to replace the class dictatorship of the proletariat and the vanguard role of the Bolshevik party with the ‘cult of personality of Stalin’, it had to replace the class struggle with the unilateral dictate of the leader and to slander his name after his death. This completely contradicts Marxism-Leninism as a science of classes and class struggle and the whole world practice of class struggle, but it is easily comprehended by primitive petty-bourgeois consciousness.

The 20th Congress of the CPSU should be considered as the date that formally marks the defeat of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the USSR and the execution of a counter-revolutionary coup.

The counterrevolution did not hesitate to resort to slanders, intrigues, terror and threats to use the armed forces directly in order to attain power.

It is true that not all the party leaders agreed with the concrete actions of the class enemy. In particular Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov, Shepilov and other party members tried to remove Khrushchev after a while. But their actions were not reflected in the class struggle and were more like a struggle for power among the high party echelons, as if their actions had nothing to do with the class struggle and the class enemy and were a result of private organisational inner-party discussions. It is due to this that their ‘struggle’ did not become an example of revolutionary class struggle. Khrushchev and his supporters declared this group ‘anti-party’ and expelled them from the party leadership in their entirety.

Power in the territory of the Soviet Union fell completely into the hands of the new class forces forged in the petty-bourgeois medium who defeated the dictatorship of the proletariat in the class struggle.

These were communists only in words, but capitalists in practice. The new party leadership was obliged, above all, to transform the party documents according to the new essence of power and the real situation in society. Fundamental class concepts such as the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’, ‘class struggle’, the ‘political vanguard of the working class’ and other concepts which make up the basics of the Marxist-Leninist teachings simply disappeared. At the same time theses about the ‘complete and final victory of socialism in the USSR’ were introduced, which pointed without proof to the impossibility of restoring capitalism and excluded the possibility of class struggle, about the ‘party of the whole people’, etc. In other words, Marxism-Leninism was subject to open and conscientious petty-bourgeois revision. However, the external attributes of the CPSU remained untouched; the party preserved its communist name; the state was still called socialist and the party propaganda still called for loyalty to Marxism-Leninism. This was also consistent with the psychology of the rank-and-file Soviet petty-bourgeois of that time. The revision of Marxism-Leninism also had another hidden aspect: the revisionists concealed their true (bourgeois) selves using Lenin.

Lenin was transformed by them into an icon for mass oration, which was harmless for the new power, and Marxism-Leninism was transformed into a petty-bourgeois pseudo-science under the excuse of ‘creative development’ and ceased to inspire revolutionary action among the working class and the communists.

The representatives of the petty-bourgeois forces, who seized power and destroyed the dictatorship of the proletariat, took over all the socialised means of production; therefore de facto they became corporate owners, i.e. capitalists. From this point on we are dealing here with a bourgeois state and the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.