Category Archives: Joseph Stalin

Che Guevara and the Political Economy of Socialism

Ernesto Che Guevara visiting the tractor factory in Brno, Czechoslovakia, October 27, 1960.

Rafael Martinez

Che Guevara is widely known to the world as the romantic-idealist revolutionary. The economic thought of Che Guevara has not really been widely publicised as the Argentinean born revolutionary is commonly known for his works on the guerrilla warfare, whose underlying idealist and voluntarist approaches to the struggle of the oppressed masses against capitalism and imperialism have been exposed and rejected altogether by the Marxist-Leninists. It is most appropriate, however, to pay special attention to Guevara’s economic works, as his contribution to the economic transformation of Cuba during the early stages of the revolutionary process was central and was highly criticised by the ideologists of modern revisionism, both within and outside the country.

Che participated in making up the agrarian reform law in 1959. In October 1959 he was appointed director of the Department of Industrialisation, which was created by INRA (Instituto Nacional de la Reforma Agraria or National Institute of the Agrarian Reform). At that time most of the industry was still in the hands of private owners. Guevara undertook the task of studying the economy of the island and establishing the guidelines of building up Cuban industry. According to Orlando Borrego, author of ‘Che el camino del fuego’ (Imagen Contemporanea, Havana 2001), the department started off without a single industry under its jurisdiction nor a ‘budget of its own to finance supplies, investments and other expenses’ to manage the few companies that passed to its jurisdiction later in the year. In November 1959 Guevara was appointed head of the National Bank, although he never stopped overseeing the work of the department of industrialisation to where he returned within the next year.

It is not till October 1960, when the Cuban Government decrees the immediate nationalisation of commercial and industrial enterprises including the sugar cane industry, that the Department of Industrialisation becomes a full-fledged body for the organisation of industrial production on a massive scale. His leadership in the Department of Industrialisation led Guevara to become the Cuban minister of industry in February 1961, which had the task to organise state industry following massive nationalisation.

At this point Guevara faces the challenging task to organise most of the country’s industrial production on the basis of an ill-defined (from the point of view of socialist construction) revolutionary process. Despite the success of the anti-imperialist struggle undertaken by the Cuban Revolution, its leadership lacked knowledge of the political economy of Marxism-Leninism. Che Guevara, without any doubt, is the member of the Cuban leadership who takes most seriously the study of political economy, which he did in parallel to all the administrative and organisational tasks that he was assigned by the Cuban Revolution. The study of Marxist political economy and the economic discussions that were triggered during the process of organisation of the Cuban industry become the central topic in Guevara’s life during the first half of the ‘60s. This period of exploration and creativity comes for the most part to an end when, in 1965 Che renounces his responsibilities as the Minister of Industry, following a heated economic debate, referred to by many as the ‘Great Debate’, which reached its climax in 1963-1964.

Strong divergences between the pro-Soviet economic line and Guevara’s plan of industrialisation brought to an end the participation of the Argentinean revolutionary in the internal affairs of the Cuban revolution. Guevara embarks on a ‘quixotic’ military campaign to aid and create revolutionary processes in Africa and Latin America, which concludes with his assassination in Bolivia, in 1967.

Castro remembers Che in a well-known speech given in 1987, in the midst of the so-called process of rectification, by denouncing a number of gross deformations in the economic life of the island and corruption of moral standards. Castro calls upon the population with an appeal of the highest moral standards embodied by the life of the great revolutionary, and admits to the negative consequences of departing from Che’s economic thought:

‘Che was radically opposed to using and developing capitalist economic laws and categories in building socialism. He advocated something that I have often insisted on: Building socialism and communism is not just a matter of producing and distributing wealth but is also a matter of education and consciousness’ (Fidel Castro in ‘Che Guevara, Economics and politics in the transition to socialism’, Pathfinder, New York, 2003, p. 39).

In the midst of open appeals to revive what many in Cuba call the ‘Che’s dream’ a lot of confusion is fostered about the interpretation and originality of Guevara’s economic thought. Twenty years after his assassination, Cuban scholars Fernando Martinez Heredia, and specially, Carlos Tablada, revived the discussions concerning Guevara’s contribution to the practice of socialist construction in Cuba and to the economic theory of the transitional epoch in general. Unfortunately, most scholars in Cuba consider Guevara’s economic thought in isolation from the theory of political economy of socialism developed before the revisionist political economy became widely accepted in the Soviet Union and the former People’s Democracies of Eastern Europe in the 1960s.

Outside the country, efforts have been made to reconcile Guevara’s economic thought with Trotskyism and neo-Trotskyite tendencies. Neo-Trotskyite elements around the world, not without encouragement from within Cuba, try to portray Guevara’s economic thought as a reaction to the economic line imposed by the bureaucratic castes in the Soviet Union, by completely ignoring, more correctly suppressing, Guevara’s open support to Stalin in questions of the construction of socialism. It is silenced that Guevara quoted Stalin on multiple occasions in his economic works published in Cuba and the fact that the core of his economic theory, the budgetary finance system, bears strong similarities to the economic ‘model’ of development, which had become ‘standard’ in the former People’s Democracies of Eastern Europe during the post-war period up until Stalin’s death. Trotskyism, neo-Trotskyism and many in Cuba exacerbate Guevara’s idealist mistakes present in both his political and economic thoughts and turn Che into some sort of humanist socialist, who de facto suppressed the weight of the objective character of the economic laws of socialism in favour of a leading role of socialist education and consciousness (which, unfortunately, is true to a considerable degree).

Discussions about the controversial role of Che Guevara in the Cuban revolution during the early stages of the construction of the new economy have been revived in recent years. More and more unpublished documents are slowly coming to light. One of the most significant efforts developed in this direction is led by the Centro de Estudios Che Guevara, based in Havana and located in the house where Guevara and his family used to reside during the first half of the sixties. This association possesses direct access to Guevara’s personal library, which contains numerous volumes in which he used to make annotations. Ambitious plans have been revealed to publish nine volumes with materials covering numerous aspects of the political life of Che Guevara, which hopefully will throw important light on the evolution of Guevara’s thought as a Marxist.

One of the most enlightening documents published in recent years corresponds to a letter sent by Che, while based in Tanzania, to Armando Hart Dávalos on the need to publish in Cuba works on philosophy. The authenticity of this letter does not seem to be controversial as it was published in a Cuban journal and made available to the public. In this letter Guevara outlines a basic plan for the publication of texts in philosophy, subdivided into 8 groups:

In Cuba there is nothing published, if one excludes the Soviet bricks, which bring the inconvenience that they do not let you think; the party did it for you and you should digest it.

It would be necessary to publish the complete works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin [underlined by Che in the original] and other great Marxists.

Here would come to the great revisionists (if you want you can add here Khrushchev), well analyzed, more profoundly than any others and also your friend Trotsky, who existed and apparently wrote something (Che Guevara, Letter to Armando Hart Dávalos published in Contracorriente, Havana, September 1997, No. 9).

In the present article we will try to briefly cover the main elements of Guevara’s economic thought by means of establishing analogies with the Marxist-Leninist economic theory of the transitional society. Further, we will discuss the absurd allegations of Trotskyism that the Soviet revisionist leadership inflicted on Guevara. We will conclude with a brief exposition of what are, in our opinion the two major mistakes committed by Guevara in his economic works: idealism and mechanicism.

Budgetary System versus Financial Self-Management

At the centre of Guevara’s economic thought stands the budgetary system, which Che implemented in the enterprises organised by the ministry of industry between 1961 and 1964. The budgetary system is formulated by Guevara as a reaction against what had been established in the Soviet Union and the former People’s Democracies of Eastern Europe under the system of economic accounting (usually referred by us as market-like economic accounting, in order to distinguish it from the more generic concept of economic accounting), which the followers of post-Stalin Soviet revisionism posed as a model of development in Cuba. It is within the context of the revision of the Marxist-Leninist principles of the political economy of socialism by the Soviet revisionist leadership that the study of Guevara’s budgetary system needs to be analysed and appreciated.

Despite strong elements of mechanicism and schematism inherent to Guevara’s presentation for a case in favour of the centralisation of industrial production and the establishment of forms of management and interrelations between individual producing subjects and the state, the budgetary system embodies the means, however primitive, which served the purpose for the application and success of the centralised planned principle of the economic development in a backward country. This is the rationale behind Guevara’s formulations, which represents in the main the basic prerequisite for a more or less rapid industrialisation of the island, which he considered to be the highest priority within the process of socialist construction.

Many in Cuba portray Guevara’s budgetary system elaborated for the specific conditions of Cuba, which in a sense Che ‘invents’ a particular model that suits his more or less utopian view of the transition to the socialist society. Thus Guevara’s thinking is studied in isolation from the historical epoch, which corresponds to the epoch of the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union and the former People’s Democracies. At most, Guevara’s economic thinking is viewed as an alternative to the ‘neo-Stalinist’ command-administrative system undertaken by the Soviet leadership. This view was revitalised in Cuba towards the end of the 1980s when the Soviet economy and the whole so-called ‘socialist’ system showed clear signs of decomposition. It is enlightening, however, to see that some leading economists in the island do admit that Guevara’s economic thought did not come out of the blue:

‘In retrospective, the budgetary system is a contribution of great value. We would not say – and you know it well – that Che invented the budgetary system. It already came from the socialist countries; in the Soviet Union for a period of time the budgetary system ruled many aspects of the economy’. (Carlos Rafael Rodriguez in ‘Che Guevara, Cuba and the Road to Socialism’, New York, 1991, pp. 39-30. Translated from Spanish.)

Needless to say Rodriguez refers to the socialist economic model developed under Stalin. Rodriguez, however, wrongly attributes to Guevara the view that in the transition to higher forms of socialism, or full socialism, the budgetary system could be applied to the entire economy; the entire economy could allegedly function as one big enterprise, with one social fund to meet the needs of production and distribution. Much to the contrary, Guevara formulates the budgetary system as a means to meet the immediate needs posed by the organisation of the State industry and, as will be seen in the next section, admits to the existence of commodity-money relations between the state and other production objects, hence he admits the existence of forms of production other than state owned.

The budgetary system is conceived by Che as an opposite of the model established in the Soviet Union and the former People’s Democracies of Eastern Europe after Stalin’s death. Guevara exposes the basic differences between the budgetary system and the market-type of economic accounting or so-called financial self-management, as early as in 1961, i.e. the very early stages of the socialisation of industry in the country. Guevara’s thinking in favour of the centralisation of the State industry predates the ‘Great Economic debate’, and it is clear to us that Che had conceived the budgetary system long before he sees himself engulfed in a heated discussion with the numerous supporters of financial self-management in the island. We have every reason to believe that he was in some more or less systematic way acquainted with the history of the Soviet economy and the general elements of the socialist economy during Stalin’s times.

Guevara rejects from the very beginning the concept of free enterprise within the socialist sector, which is embodied by the ability of the individual economic subject to act as a more or less independent producer, since

‘…in the socialist countries, the enterprise possesses a bank credit, acquires money, produces with the money that it receives, sells its production, and then grants to the State part of the profit and part of this profit is preserved for internal needs. The difference is that our company does not sell, but delivers products and workers are awarded through the State’ (Che Guevara, Conference ‘Economy and Plan’ of the People’s University, 1961. Translated from Spanish.)

In Guevara’s system the enterprise does not sell, as the commodity-money becomes effective both in form and content only when the product is alienated by an independent producer or the individual consumer. Guevara understands the retribution of the worker in the socialist enterprise as an operation, in which in essence the socialist toiler establishes an employer-employee relationship with the socialist state, bypassing the enterprise. We believe he considers this relationship from the point of view of the essence of the labour relationship, as in reality this relationship has unavoidably to take the form of employment via the individual enterprise.

As opposed to the revisionist system of financial self-management, labour circulates among the individual enterprises of the state sector and between the enterprises and the State via the form of allocation or assignments according to contracts stipulated by the socialist plan:

‘To elaborate a budget through which the enterprise will be assigned necessary funds by the state to make effective contracts…; and also to transfer to public accounts the revenue from sales.’ (Che Guevara, op. cit. in ‘Collective Discussion: Unique Decision and Responsibility’, p. 3. Translated from Spanish.)

In Guevara’s system the enterprise functions as an aggregate of a larger enterprise, which does not possess financial resources with which to make its own decisions in terms of production and reproduction. Since the socialist enterprise:

‘The company does not have resources of its own; therefore its income is transferred to the national budget’ (Che Guevara, op. cit. in ‘Considerations on Expenses’, p. 46. Translated from Spanish.)

Guevara is adamantly opposed to any form of exchange among socialist enterprises in the socialist sector other than allocation of resources. The circulation of labour within the socialised sector is viewed by Guevara as an aggregation of labour in a complex productive chain. In this system the enterprises are not able to establish labour exchange independently from the plan, since the entire productive activity of the enterprise is dictated by it. The state, in the form of the State Bank is the beginning and the end of labour flow concerning the productive activity of the socialist enterprise: it acquires the necessary financial means to acquire the means of production and it deposits the revenue in the Central Bank. These resources are then utilised by the socialist planning system to provide for extended reproduction of the individual productive unit, for capital investment or non-productive social needs. In this sense the enterprise does not extract profit per se; it transfers a positive balance between the production cost and the income and it is the socialist state which makes the final decision according to the plan as to the fate of this positive balance.

The concept of socialist planning in Guevara’s system is closely linked to the concept of profitability of the whole productive system. The effectiveness of the socialist economy is not the results of the mechanical summation of individual enterprises. A positive balance in the arithmetic sum of individual profits is possible in the capitalist system during times of expansion, although it becomes negative in times of recession. Regardless of the fact that the socialist productive system does not know recession or crises, the socialist productive system displays the greatest rates of growth not just because the arithmetic aggregation of individual profitability amounts to a positive balance. The advantage of the socialist mode of production over capitalism lies in the planned character of the economy, that the socialist state is in a position to decide at the scale of the whole productive system, not the coordination of individual producers but the regulation of labour flow among socialist enterprises. While it is of paramount importance that the productive unit be most profitable by means of maximum reduction of production costs, the efficiency of the economy needs to be assessed as a whole.

‘Since this system is based on the central control of the economy, the relative efficiency of an enterprise would become just an index; what really matters is the total profitability of the entire productive system’ (Che Guevara, op. cit. in ‘Considerations on Expenses’, p. 48. Translated from Spanish.)

This concept, which is a more complex concept with respect to the profitability of the individual enterprise, had been stated explicitly by Stalin in Economic Problems. In arguing against the right-wing deviationists, the only way to understand that certain sectors of the economy may function without profit or even producing losses over a certain period of time is to introduce a more complex concept of profitability of the whole socialist economy:

‘If profitableness is considered not from the standpoint of individual plants or industries, and not over a period of one year, but from the standpoint of the entire national economy and over a period of, say, ten or fifteen years,… then the temporary and unstable profitableness of some plants and industries is beneath all comparisons with that higher form of stable and permanent profitableness which we get from the operation of the law of balanced development of the national economy and from economic planning…’ (J.V. Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR,Foreign Language Publishing House, Moscow 1952, pp. 28-29.)

Many have been led to believe that the establishment of socialised planning in certain areas of the State-owned sector during the transitional economy is a dangerous utopia. The transition to NEP is commonly used as a historical example, which allegedly illustrates that socialised forms of organisation do not correspond to the economic conditions given in a backward, agricultural country. Much to the contrary, not only the implementation of market-like economic accounting in the State industry is a relatively short-lived phenomenon in the economic history of the Soviet Union, it was soon realised that the NEP-style approach could lead to catastrophic consequences if the market-like economic accounting were to be imposed on all the areas of the State sector. Since the first stages of the transition from the economy of War Communism to the liberalisation of the Soviet economy, the Soviet leadership expressed worries that Lenin’s plans for the industrialisation of the country would be jeopardised if market relations were to be made effective in all the State-owned sectors. Already in 1923, the XII Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) expressed ample concerns:

‘On the other hand, heavy industry, which has barely entered in contact with the market and which depends completely on State contracts, needs for its reconstruction large and well-calculated financial resources from the State. This also applies to a great degree to railway and sea transport.’ (Decisions of the Soviet Government on Economic Questions, Moscow 1957, Volume 1, p. 380. Translated from Russian.)

Despite what right-wing revisionism led many to believe, the Soviet government since the early stages of the NEP established a line of demarcation within the sectors I and II of the economy. While light industry displayed significant growth during the early stages of the liberalisation of the economy, mostly due to the revival of market relations, heavy industry showed little or no signs of flourishing under the conditions of market-style economic accounting. If the market-type economic accounting were to be imposed on heavy industry, if the Soviet plan, regardless of the level of development of the forces of production and the correlation of forces within the various sectors of the economy and the weight of non-socialist forms of production, were to deny heavy industry large long-term financial assistance for a sustained process of re-production, this sector would be forced into recession. The plans for the speedy industrialisation of a vast and backward (both technically and culturally) country would be doomed and with it collectivisation and socialist construction.

‘The interrelations between light and heavy industries cannot be resolved by means of the market, as this would threaten to liquidate heavy industry in the next few years; heavy industry could recover, but this time as a result of the anarchic development of the market and on the basis of private property. (Ibid. p. 382. Translated from Russian.)

The socialist law of development, according to which the industry of means of production should develop faster than light industry and agriculture, necessarily leads a more or less significant fraction of the forces of production owned by the socialist state to operate according to laws of labour distribution and organisation different from those inherited from the capitalist form of production. While market relations to a considerable degree were temporarily allowed by the NEP to regulate production and labour distribution among more or less disseminated and independent economic units in the State industry, the Soviet State was forced since the beginning to define the concretisation of this law of socialist production, in a sense breaking with NEP itself. The establishment of socialist planning on the basis of the socialised mode of production in certain sectors of the economy holds absolute character. This principle holds regardless of the level of development of the forces of production in the economy of the country in transition to socialism as a whole. The level of socialisation of the State sector does strongly depend upon the concrete-historical conditions of the country in transition. However, the State is bound since the very beginning to establish a socialist planned principle to operate in a direct, socialised way (not by means of the market) on certain sectors of the economy, primarily on the sector I. This is the basic principle of the transitional economy that Guevara tried his best to uphold by advocating the budgetary system, as a system opposed to the system of market-type economic accounting proposed by the followers of Soviet revisionism in the island.

As will be touched upon in more detail, Guevara’s economic thought, the budgetary system that he advocated is completely opposed to Trotsky’s concealed right-wing economic theories. Trotsky opposed since the early stages of NEP, all the way till the end of his political career the establishment of a genuine planned principle in certain sectors of the State sector, by advocating the absolute and universal character of NEP:

But the New Economic Policy does not flow solely from the interrelations between the city and the village. This policy is a necessary stage in the growth of state-owned industry. Between capitalism, under which the means of production are owned by private individuals and all economic relations are regulated by the market –I say, between capitalism and complete socialism, with its socially planned economy, there are a number of transitional stages; and the NEP is essentially one of these stages.

Let us analyze this question, taking the railways as a case in point. It is precisely railway transportation that provides a field which is prepared in the maximum degree for socialist economy… The railway lines, not only those privately owned, but also the state-owned lines, settled their accounts with all the other economic enterprises through the medium of the market. Under the particular system this was economically unavoidable and necessary because the equipment and development of a particular line depends upon how far it justifies itself economically. Whether a particular railway is beneficial to the economy can be ascertained only through the medium of the market.’ (L.D. Trotsky, ‘The First Five Years of the Communist International’, Volume 2, New Park Publications, London, 1953, pp. 233-4.)

Guevara’s budgetary system is the means for the industrialisation of Cuba. One of the fundamental principles of the socialist economy is based on the development of industrial production, mainly heavy industry, as the basis and engine of the development of the socialist economy. Imperialist domination is based upon the concentration of industry and technology in the hands of imperialist corporations. Exploited countries are deprived of the means and necessary knowledge to secure the development of labour productivity, a key element to sustained development of the forces of production.

In order to overcome economic backwardness and the relations of dependence on the imperialist countries, i.e. the ultimate goal of a genuine process of national-liberation, it is imperative to turn around the character of economic relations with the outside world. This implies a deep re-structuring of the economies, which for long years have been geared towards fitting the economic needs of the imperialist countries, and to turn these countries into self-sufficient and prosperous socialist industrial ones. Genuine independence, true anti-imperialism is no more than rhetorical statements without massive policies of socialist industrialisation, which is the material basis for long-term and sustained independence.

Over a hundred years of national liberation movements have taught us that the socialisation of the means of production, as opposed to half-measures disguised by pseudo-socialist phraseology, is the only way towards national independence. Here lies the essence of the internationalist policies of the Soviet State during the post-war period.

The economies of dependent countries, such as Cuba back in the 1950s, are based upon the extraction and the early stages of manufacturing of raw materials. The main source of revenue of Batista’s Cuba was the export of sugar, whose price in the international market was out of the control of the country and, as repeatedly pointed out by the leaders of the Cuban revolution, undershot the actual value.

The only possible way that economically and culturally backward countries can attain economic and sustained political independence, lies in the development of heavy industry, which is the only possible way to lay the foundations for sustained economic growth. This fundamental point of the socialist construction lies at the centre of attention of Guevara’s economic thought and to it he devoted most of his practical and theoretical efforts while remaining in office.

Commodity-Money Relations and the Law of Value

In this section we will briefly cover Guevara’s understanding of the role of commodity-money relations and the law of value in the socialist industry. At this point we lack written materials to throw light on his attitude towards the agrarian reform performed during the early stages of the Cuban revolution. His understanding of the collectivisation of the large mass of petty producers is also unknown to us, although we hope that in the near future archival materials may be made available to the public in Cuba.

As illustrated in the previous section, at the centre of Guevara’s economic thought stands the model of budgetary system. This system is intimately related to Guevara’s understanding of the role of plan, which, as discussed, fundamentally differs from that envisioned by right-wing revisionism in the Soviet Union and the former People’s Democracies in Eastern Europe. Much to the contrary, it bears close resemblance to the conception of economic planning, which prevailed in the Soviet Union before Stalin’s death and stands in line with the economic policies that had become ‘standard’ in the former People’s Democracies in Eastern Europe in the period of 1948-1953.

Guevara’s attitude to the role of market categories and relations are consistent with his understanding of plan and are very close to Stalin’s formulations in Economic Problems. Guevara explicitly denies the need for commodity exchange between socialist enterprises and categorically denies the commodity character of the means of production. He supports the correct view that commodity exchange involves change of ownership. Commodity exchange between state enterprises is viewed by the Argentinean as a contradiction per se, since in the budgetary system the socialist enterprise is an organic element of a bigger enterprise, the State. Within this system the labour among enterprises does not adopt the form of commodity exchange. Means of production, financial resources are not owned by the socialist enterprise, as the latter lacks its own account and revenue is automatically deposited in a socialised account. In this system, the means of production are allocated to a given production unit according to the needs and future perspective of economic development and dictated by a centralised plan.

Guevara does not deny the existence of commodity production and the coexistence of different modes of production. He supports Stalin’s views that commodity relations are not inherent to the socialist sector but that their existence is due to the presence of different forms of property within the Cuban economy. As opposed to the Soviet Economy in Stalin’s time, the Cuban countryside had not undergone the process of collectivisation of the petty producer. In the concrete-historical situation of Cuba, the incipient socialist industrial sector had to coexist with a large mass of independent producers. However, this concrete-historical circumstance does not prevent the socialist sector, however small and poorly organized, to operate under a different regulator of production than that operating in the countryside. Guevara writes:

‘We believe that the partial existence of the law of value is due to the remnants of the market economy, which also manifests itself in the type of exchange between the State and the private consumer’ (Che Guevara, op. cit. in ‘On the Budgetary System’, p. 95. Translated from Spanish).

This statement is very close to Stalin’s well-known statement given in Economic Problems:

‘But the collective farms are unwilling to alienate their products except in the form of commodities, in exchange for which they desire to receive the commodities they need… Because of this, commodity production and trade are as much a necessity with us today as they were thirty years ago…’(J.V. Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1952, p. 19-20.)

In addition, as pointed out by Guevara, there remains the need for commodity-money bonds between the State and the private producer, as the worker in socialism still receives a significant fraction of the social fund for the satisfaction of individual needs in money terms. The exchange between the state and the individual producer is performed under the form of a commodity exchange, as

‘…this transfer occurs when the product leaves the state sector and it becomes property of an individual consumer’ (Che Guevara, op. cit. in ‘Considerations on Expenses’, p. 46. Translated from Spanish.)

With the socialisation of all the means of production and the liquidation of individual and collective forms of production, there would be no need for commodity-money exchange in socialism. As a matter of fact, the realisation of the socialist principle of distribution does not necessarily imply the existence of commodity-money relations, as a category of production. These views were ‘exposed’ and refuted by Soviet economists, who after a series of discussions re-wrote chapters in the Manual of Political Economy regarding the political economy of socialism.

Naturally, these views were also not shared by many economists in Cuba, as manifested in a more or less full-fledged controversial discussion during 1963-1964. For instance, Alberto Mora (Minister of Foreign Trade during that time) in 1963 openly attacked Guevara’s views, by comparing them with Stalin’s, which were published in Economic Problems. He rejected Guevara’s theses on the grounds that the most serious ‘scientific’ discussions held in the Soviet Union during the second half of the 1950s and early sixties indicated that Stalin’s views were wrong, that the law of value operates in socialism as a regulator of production, as the products in the socialist economy remain and will remain commodities all the way till communism:

‘When some comrades deny that the law of value operates in the relations among enterprises within the State sector, they argue that the entire State sector is under single ownership, that the enterprises are the property of the society. This, of course, is true. But as an economic criterion it is inaccurate. State property is not yet fully developed social property that will be achieved only under communism.’ (A. Mora, in ‘On the operation of the law of value in the Cuban Economy’, published in Man and Socialism in Cuba, Atheneum, New York, 1973, p. 227).

The well-known Trotskyite economist, Ernest Mandel, who was very active during what he called the ‘Great Debate’ in Cuba, enters into a long-standing controversy with Charles Bettelheim, a French right-wing revisionist scholar. The latter also became active during the economic debate, this time as a fervent supporter of the ‘socialist-market’ conception advocated by the pro-Soviet economists in the island. Despite Mandel’s views that means of production in the socialist economy do not circulate as commodities, he is very keen on exposing Stalin’s views advocated by Guevara with regard to the causes of the law of value in the socialist sector. In the section of the ‘Historical conditions leading to the extinction of mercantile categories’ of a well-publicised article in Cuba, he states:

‘Although we have criticized several of comrade Bettelheim’s positions, we agree with him completely in rejecting Stalin’s theory that the basic reason for the mercantile categories in the Soviet economy is the existence of two forms of socialist property: ownership by the people (that is, the State) and ownership by more limited social groups (essentially the Kolkhozy)’. (E. Mandel, in ‘On the operation of the law of value in the Cuban Economy’, published in Man and Socialism in Cuba, Atheneum, New York, 1973, p. 70.)

Mandel has an opinion of his own and does not need to refer to the Soviet pseudo-science to ‘expose’ Guevara’s ‘primitivism’. The author advocates that only the abundance of consumer goods, which are closely linked to the development of forces of production, will create the objective conditions for the abolition of commodity-money relations in the sphere of private consumption. Moreover, he seems to be proud that

‘The new program of the CPSU, approved by the XXII congress, incorporated this idea as set forth in our Traite d’Economie Marxiste’ (E. Mandel, in ‘On the operation of the law of value in the Cuban Economy’, published in Man and Socialism in Cuba, Atheneum, New York, 1973, p. 71).

Guevara advocated the correct view that the law of value does not operate within the socialist sector as a regulator of production. He is able to grasp, unlike his detractors, a crucial element in the political economy of socialism:

‘We insist on the analysis of the cost, since part of our conception refers to the fact that it is not strictly necessary that cost of production and price coincide in the socialist sector’. (Che Guevara, op. cit. in ‘Considerations on Expenses’, p. 47. Translated from Spanish.)

Guevara understood that the price setting in the socialist sector, as a quantifier of the flow of labour circulating among different subjects of the state industry, does not necessarily have to coincide with the cost of production. If the labour exchange between different sectors of the socialist economy were to be governed by the exchange according to equal value, less profitable or even not profitable enterprises would not be able to survive and the process of extended reproduction of the socialist economy would be brought to its knees. If the law of value is forced to operate as a regulator of the proportions of labour exchanged between enterprises in the socialist sector it would not be possible to overcome the disproportions between sectors of the economy, which are inherited from capitalism, let alone colonialism and neo-colonialism. This consequently leads to a more complex concept of profitability of the socialist economy, which was touched upon in the previous section, which Stalin formulated in Economic Problems and which Guevara embraces wholeheartedly.

It is true that the abstract formulation that prices in the socialist sector do not necessarily correspond to the cost of production contains within itself a strong potential and it represents a serious step forward in the evolution of the understanding of political economy of socialism. This statement represents a tremendous step forward with respect to the theories of right-wing revisionism, which does not conceive labour exchange outside the boundaries of commodity-money relations. However, this statement does solve right away the most intricate problem of the political economy of socialism, which is to concretise what are the actual proportions of labour that correspond to the historical-concrete situation and the development of the forces of production and forms of management of a given country. This is a titanic task that needs to be resolved by the revolutionaries of a given country, which Guevara genuinely and with the best of his abilities tried to solve for the concrete conditions of Cuba.

Guevara is an advocate of the strictest economic accounting, for the same reasons that Stalin criticised many Soviet managers and plan making for neglecting the operation of the law of value as a strong instrument for economic accounting in socialism. Indeed, accounting in value terms proves a powerful tool to evaluate the effectiveness of the socialist enterprise, and this is most appreciated by Guevara:

‘The cost would yield an index of the management of the enterprise; it is irrelevant that these prices are higher or lower than the prices in the socialist sector, or even, in some isolated cases, than those prices used to sell the product to the people; what matters is the sustained analysis of the management of the enterprise…, which is determined by its success or failure to reduce costs’ (Che Guevara, op. cit. in ‘Considerations on Expenses’, p. 49. Translated from Spanish.)

At the end of the day, one of the fundamental goals of the enterprise in socialism as well as in communism

‘…reduces to a common denominator…: the increase of labour productivity as the fundamental basis for the construction of socialism and indispensable premise for communism.’ (Che Guevara, op. cit. in ‘Considerations on Expenses’, p. 51. Translated from Spanish.)

In Guevara’s budgetary finance system, money within the socialist enterprise is used primarily as means of calculation, as a strong algebraic tool for determining the effectiveness of the enterprise, the correctness of the use of the resources granted by the State to the enterprise, a means to determine if the enterprise is doing enough to reduce costs, etc… In his very important article, ‘About the Budgetary System’ he exposes one of the most prominent differences between his conception and the role given to money by the pro-Soviet economists in Cuba within the so called ‘Economic Accounting’ system:

‘Another difference is the way money is used; in our system money operates as arithmetic money, as a reflection, in prices, of the management of the enterprise, which the central organs will analyze in order to control the functioning of the latter.’ (Che Guevara, op. cit. in ‘About the Budgetary System’, p. 80 Translated from Spanish.)

Guevara’s views are consistent with the well-known exposure of Notkin’s ‘marketist’ views by Stalin:

Why, in that case, do we speak of the value of means of production, their cost of production, their price, etc.?

Firstly, this is needed for purposes of calculation and settlement, for determining that the enterprises are paying or running at a loss, for checking and controlling the enterprises. …’ (J.V. Stalin, op. cit, p. 58-59.)

As the economic discussion in Cuba progresses and the contradictions between Guevara’s line and the pro-Soviet economists (including Charles Bettelheim) on the one hand, and the Trotskyite elements in Cuba (Cuban nationals as well as foreigners) on the other, Che has unavoidably to clash with the economic conception advocated by the Soviet revisionists. Towards the end of this discussion, in 1964 Guevara expresses himself in a more and more explicit and eloquent way regarding the differences between his model and the ‘market-socialist’ type of development advocated by the revisionists. The exposition of the differences, which at first, in 1961 Guevara had put in rather mild, almost academic terms, turns controversial and bitter in 1964, leaving no doubt that the contradictions had become irreconcilable and that the Cuban leadership would have to take a stand sooner rather than later. Whether the Soviet revisionist leadership demanded Guevara’s removal from his posts in the economy of the island, as a pre-requisite to sustained economic aid, or whether his detractors in Cuba played a leading role in the events that followed the economic discussions, remains a matter of speculation. Regardless, it is clear to us that Guevara engages in an important theoretical debate till the very end and was never curbed by the overwhelming wave of criticism triggered by his writings, which he faced almost alone. In addition, we can only imagine how upsetting to pro-Soviet and Trotskyite elements in the island it would be to accept that the leading economist, a holder of a key command position in the Cuban economy, dares, not once, not twice, but at least three times that we are aware of, to cite and defend Stalin’s works as an authoritative reference against his opponents.

Che openly and in print criticises the revisionist manual of political economy published in the Soviet Union in the early sixties, with regards to the insistence of the Soviet revisionists on developing commodity-money relations in socialism, let alone the transition to socialism. After a series of gradual changes operated in the economic literature of the 1950s followed by crucial economic discussions held towards the end of that decade, the Soviet economists published a new manual of political economy under the editorship of a leading economist, Ostrovitianov. In this important document all the products in socialism are proclaimed to be commodities, including the means of production (with the utterly inconsistent exemption of labour force), and the law of value, which is used in a conscious way by the socialist plan, operates as the regulator of proportions of labour among enterprises, whether state owned or cooperatives.

As opposed to Stalin’s plans for the gradual shrinkage of the sphere of operation of the commodity-money relations and categories, the Soviet revisionists envisioned a plan to further enhance the role of these in the economy and to provide the enterprises with more independence. The operation of the law of value will disappear only when the highest stage of communism is accomplished in a more or less distant future. Guevara rebels against the new theses advocated by the Soviet revisionist economists by rejecting altogether the plans for developing commodity-money relations in socialism, which are treated by us as a departure from the political economy of socialism developed by Lenin and Stalin:

‘Why develop? We understand that the capitalist categories are retained for a time and that the length of this period cannot be predetermined, but the characteristics of the period of transition are those of a society that is throwing off its old bonds in order to move quickly into the new stage.

The tendency should be, in our opinion, to eliminate as fast as possible the old categories, including the market, and, therefore, material interest – or better, to eliminate the conditions of their existence’ (Che Guevara, in Man and Socialism in Cuba, Atheneum, New York, 1973, p. 142).

It is unfortunate, however, that Che’s reasoning is plagued with idealist assertions, according to which commodity-money relations allegedly embody within themselves the ideological burden of the capitalist society. As will be touched upon the next section, Guevara equates to a great extent commodity-money relations and categories with the concept of material incentive, which he understands as a mechanism aimed at motivating and enhancing labour productivity by the same means as used in capitalism. Material incentive and consciousness appear in Guevara’s thought as two poles of one of the main (if not the most relevant) contradiction in the process of socialist construction.

Guevara should not be accused of a left-wing attitude with regard to the role of commodity-money relations in socialism. Nowhere in Che’s writings can one find appeals to implement the policies of war communism in the Cuban economy. Much to the contrary, he is aware of the need to retain commodity-money relations for an undetermined period, as a result of the presence of a large mass of individual producers. Despite glaring idealist elements in Guevara’s thought we need to give him credit for identifying correctly the sphere of application of commodity-money relations and the fundamental reasons leading to the inevitability of the latter in the socialist transition in general and in the Cuban revolutionary process, in particular. In summarising the increasing contradictions between the line of thought and the economic reforms accomplished under his office, and the push for market relations advocated by the ‘marketists’ in Cuba Guevara states:

‘We deny the possibility of consciously using the law of value, in the conditions that a free market does not exist, which expresses directly the contradiction between producers and consumers; we deny the existence of the commodity category in the relation among state enterprises and we regard them as part of one big enterprise, the State (although in practice it does not happen yet in our country).’ (Che Guevara, op. cit. in ‘On the Budgetary System’, p. 96. Translated from Spanish.)

When Guevara admits to the fact that the state sector in Cuba does not function as a ‘one big enterprise’ he is most likely referring to the coexistence of the Ministry of Industry, the INRA and the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the latter two lead by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and Alberto Mora, respectively, both rabid ‘market-socialists’. The latter had expressed their disagreement with Guevara’s plans for industrialisation of the island based on the argumentation that Cuba was not prepared for forms of economic relations consistent with developed stages of socialisation of the labour process. Rodriguez states as late as in 1988:

‘The budgetary system is closer to the future society… this system requires conditions that we will not be able to achieve in a long time’ (Carlos Rafael Rodriguez in Che Guevara, Cuba y el camino al socialismo, New International, New York, 2000, p. 42. Translated from Spanish.)

By arguing that Cuba was never (not even after 30 years of revolution) ready for higher forms of exchange between state enterprises, Rodriguez openly polemicises in 1988, as he used to do 25 years before, with Che’s assertion that products exchanged between state enterprises do not adopt the form of commodities.

Guevara to the very end sticks to his conception that the commodity-money relations are not inherent to the socialist economy, and especially to the socialised sector, which he tried so hard to build up since the very early stages of the Cuban revolution. Market relations come about as a result of the presence of important remnants of private producers and they are bound to disappear with them (both in form and content). Even though, Guevara refrains (to the best of our rather sketchy and fragmental knowledge of the evolution of Guevara’s thinking) from referring openly to his opinion with regards to the plans of collectivising the private producer, we believe that he would have advocated for a ‘Soviet-style’ type of bond between the socialised sector and the collective farms. As an advocate of retaining the main means of production outside the operation of commodity-money relations (i.e. means of production are not treated as commodities in content, regardless of the need to use value categories to assess the amount of labour involved in them), it seems natural that Guevara would have envisioned a concept pretty much like the machine tractor stations, as a main factor for the increase of labour productivity. We believe this statement is substantiated since the rational core of Guevara’s economic thought, despite strong elements of idealism and mechanicism, remains very close to the economic forms adopted in the Soviet Union under Stalin, which had become standard and were successfully applied with whatever modifications in the countries of People’s Democracies in Eastern Europe between the end of the 1940s and Stalin’s death. We have every reason to believe that Guevara was to a certain extent acquainted with Stalin’s Economic Problems and the basic differences of principle between the so-called Stalin model and the model of ‘market-socialism’ advocated by Rodriguez, Mora et al. in Cuba.

In probably his last article ‘Man and Socialism in Cuba’ a letter addressed to Carlos Quijano, editor-publisher of the Uruguayan weekly Marcha, written in early 1965, Guevara reiterates his position once more, leaving us no doubt that he stood for his principles till the very end.

‘Pursuing the chimera of achieving socialism with the aid of blunted weapons left to us by capitalism (the commodity as the economic cell, profitability, and individual material interests as levers, etc.) it is possible to come to a blind alley’ (Che Guevara, in Man and Socialism in Cuba,Atheneum, New York, 1973, p. 342).

Unfortunately, Guevara does not give up certain elements of idealism that make his economic thought so distinct as well as vulnerable and inconsistent. This side of Guevara’s economic thought has been publicised the most both in Cuba by his detractors and outside Cuba by Trotskyism and neo-Trotskyism. The clear connection between a significant number of Guevara’s statements on political economy and the so-called ‘Stalinist’ model of socialist construction is very much silenced. Che’s writing are twisted by picturing his economic thought as a continuation of his idealist and voluntarist stand in questions regarding the interrelation between the masses, the party and the guerrilla warfare, for which he is most commonly known.

On Guevara’s Alleged Trotskyism

Guevara soon entered into conflict with the Soviet revisionist leadership. As we have seen above, Che acknowledges differences of principle, as early as 1961, between the economic model established in what he used to call socialist countries, and the plans for industrialisation he was advocating. Guevara’s economic reforms were bound to clash with the character of the agrarian reform and the plans suggested by the Soviet Union that Cuba was to remain primarily a sugar cane producer for longer than anticipated by Che. As the character of the Cuban revolution consolidated and the Cuban leadership accommodated to the economic relations between the island and the Soviet Union, it was necessary that Cuban economists align with the new political economy created by the revisionists.

Guevara’s plans soon met glaring resistance within Cuba. Due to the worsening of Guevara’s relations with the Soviet leadership, many in Cuba felt a great deal of embarrassment. According to several of Guevara’s biographers, the Soviets accused Che’s economic views of Trotskyism. It was just a matter of time before Che is to leave his post of Minister of Industry and that his plans for industrialisation of the island are to be revised in favour development based on the sugar cane industry.

Trotsky is usually portrayed as a ‘radical left-wing’, as an advocate of extreme measures with regard to resolution of contradictions both in politics and economics. Trotsky’s alleged push for the militarisation of the economy has led many to believe that Trotskyite economic theories are opposed to the politics of the New Economic Policy (NEP) with regard not only to the relations between the individual producer and the state sector but also with regard to the liberalisation of the state sector. In this section we will try to substantiate the fact, that Trotsky’s economic theory cannot be classified as left-wing; much to the contrary, it does not deviate significantly from the right-wing revisionism in questions of socialist construction and the role of commodity-money relations during that period.

The myth about Trotsky’s alleged leftist stand in resolving contradictions in the transitional period, conceals the true essence of Trotskyism in economic questions. Guevara’s economic thought has nothing to with Trotsky’s attitude to commodity-money relations and categories in the transitional period; their views are completely opposed to each other. Such allegations with regards to Guevara’s economic thought are unfounded and preposterous, to say the very least. As covered above, Guevara’s economic thought does suffer from serious elements of mechanicism, which does not make him a Trotskyite, as such mistakes were common to many economists in the Soviet Union during the Stalin period.

It is very interesting to observe how the Russian bourgeoisie is willing to appreciate in Trotsky the ‘virtues’ of a ‘market-socialist’, which many in the left movement do not seem to be able to grasp. To commemorate the 125th anniversary of Trotsky’s birth, a leading economic journal, Voprosi ekonomiki (‘Questions of Economy’) published an article under the title ‘Economic views of L.D. Trotsky’. In this article the authors attribute Trotsky’s heavy-handedness during the revolution and the civil war to the historical circumstances of that time, that in fact Trotsky had become one of the first to push for the liquidation of the policies of war communism and the liberalisation of the economy by allowing several forms of property to coexist for an indefinite period of time. The authors draw the bourgeois reader’s attention to Trotsky’s true and poorly publicised merit as being one of the first to advocate a mixed economic model for the transition to socialism:

‘The transition to NEP significantly changed Trotsky’s economic views. In a number of his works during that time he agitates in favour of the development of market relations, material stimulation, the understanding of the plan, as rigorous management in the sense of foreseeing and synchronising various sectors of social production. During the period of NEP Trotsky formulated a number of very important, even original ideas, namely: about the incompatibility of the methods of war communism in the conditions of NEP, about the need for each enterprise to have its own accounting balance, about the objective limitations to transferring resources from the agrarian sector to industry…’ (M. Voeikov and S. Dzarasov, ‘Economic Views of L.D. Trotsky’ in Voprosi Ekonomiki No. 11, 2004, p. 152).

Trotskyite economic doctrine seriously overlaps with Bogdanovism/Bukharinism in the understanding of the essence of the plan. Trotsky, in his renowned work ‘The Soviet Economy in Danger’, written in late 1932, starts off by equating one of the economic laws of the socialist economy and the transition to socialism, the planning principle with preconceived harmony of economic proportions:

‘However, light-minded assertions to the effect that the USSR has already entered into socialism are criminal. The achievements are great. But there still remains a very long and arduous road to actual victory over economic anarchy, to the surmounting of disproportions, to the guarantee of the harmonious character of economic life.’ (The Soviet Economy in Danger, in ’Writings of Leon Trotsky 1932’, Pathfinder Press, New York, 1973, p. 260. Our emphasis.)

The famous and infamous principle of equilibrium and harmony of the proportions of labour in the socialist economy is advocated by Trotsky in a rather unambiguous way. Within the eclectic framework of Trotskyism, centralisation of the economic policy alters the abstract principle of harmony of the economic processes. Trotsky, in his attempt to oppose the transition of the Soviet economy towards higher forms of economic organisation, comes around as a full-fledged right-wing revisionist, adding no more substance to the right wing opposition led by Bukharin/Rykov.

‘It is impossible to create a priori a complete system of economic harmony. The planning hypothesis could not but include old disproportions and the inevitability of the development of new ones. Centralized management implies not only great advantages but also the danger of centralizing mistakes, that is, of elevating them to an excessively high degree. Only continuous regulation of the plan in the process of its fulfillment, its reconstruction in part and as a whole, can guarantee its economic effectiveness’ (loc. cit.).

Trotsky’s ‘continuous regulation’ is the back door to substantiating his rebuff of the party’s line to shrink the operation of the commodity-money relations in the economy, which leads to the liquidation of capitalist exploitation in the country and the consolidation of the socialist economic laws. Once opponents, Bukharin and Trotsky converged into Bogdanovism as the construction of socialism progressed in the Soviet Union.

When Trotsky appeals to the impossibility ‘to create a priori a complete system of economic harmony’ it is implied that the central economic organs, are not in a position to undertake the tasks of centralised economic management, regardless of the development of the forces of production and the socialisation of the means of production. Deformations of the socialist economy inevitably take place as centralised decision-making overpowers workers’ democracy and a caste of administrators takes over as a ‘communist bureaucracy’. Once more, the objective character of the economic laws in general and the economic laws of socialism in particular, is overruled and loses its raison d’etre in the economic thinking of right-wing revisionism. Instead, Trotsky, as a poorly concealed right-wing revisionist, appeals on and on to the need for establishing harmony between the different branches of the socialist economy, which lies at the basis of his political economy.

Trotsky’s Bogdanovism is not a phenomenon of the 1930s; much to the contrary, it is inherent to his economic thinking from the very early stages of economic reforms in Soviet Russia. In summarising the developments in Soviet Russia since the victory of the October revolution, Trotsky states that the period of war communism had to end in order to restore equilibrium in labour exchange between the peasantry and the working class and between branches of the state sector, as:

‘Every economy can exist and grow only provided certain proportionality exists between its various sectors. Different branches of industry enter into specific quantitative and qualitative relations with one another. There must be a certain proportion between those branches which produce consumer goods and those which produce the means of production. Proper proportions must likewise be preserved within each of these branches. In other words, the material means and living labor power of a nation and of all mankind must be apportioned in accordance with a certain correlation of agriculture and industry and of the various branches of industry so as to enable mankind to exist and progress.’ (L.D. Trotsky, ‘The First Five Years of the Communist International’, Volume 2, New Park Publications, London, 1953, pp. 228.)

The postulate about proportionality of portions of labour among branches of the economy was conceived as a general, non-historic law that would apply to all economic systems. Marx’s considerations about the need for the establishment of certain proportions in which labour is exchanged in every economic system, and revised in a mechanical fashion by Bogdanov/Bukharin had a simple consequence in practice: the application of the law of value as a regulator of production was to be perpetuated in the socialist economy under the abstract consideration about the need for proportionality. This abstract concept is shared by Bukharin and Trotsky:

‘The problem of the proportionality of the elements of production and the branches of the economy constitutes the very heart of socialist economy’. (The Soviet Economy in Danger, p. 265.)

The ultimate goal of right-wing revisionism in questions concerning the transition to socialism is to provide every possible ideological means to perpetuate the economic relations of capitalism and to undermine the process of socialisation of the relations of production. In doing so, right-wing revisionism creates eclectic forms, Trojan horses in political economy. The postulate about the need of proportionality proved a euphemistic attack against the party line to curtail the operation of the law of value in the socialist sector and capitalist exploitation in the Soviet economy. By appealing to an abstract concept of proportionality without, leaving its concretisation as a loose end in the economic thinking, naturally leads to the perpetuation of relations of production existing hitherto. Abstract formulations in general, and in political economy in particular, without a concretisation within the concrete-historical framework inevitably render hollow abstractions, double-edged swords in the hands of revisionism.

Certainly, Trotsky casts out his disguise of a left-wing revisionist by bluntly stating:

‘The innumerable living participants in the economy, state and private, collective and individual, must serve notice of their needs and of their relative strength not only through the statistical determinations of plan commissions but by the direct pressure of supply and demand. The plan is checked and, to a considerable degree, realized through the market.’ (The Soviet Economy in Danger, p. 275. Our emphasis.)

Here, Trotsky makes an open appeal to the implementation of market relations as the ‘judge’ of the correctness or effectiveness of the economic policies developed by the plan makers. In other words, in the transitional economy the market is the beginning and the end of the economic system, the medium in which the struggle between the planned and market principles evolves into higher forms of development. It is within the market and according to the rules of the market that the superiority of the socialisation of the means of production is supposed to be put to the test. At some point in time the capitalist and petty bourgeois forms of productions will collapse under the inevitable overwhelming economic pressure of the socialised sector, at the time when it is able to develop higher forms of labour productivity. Trotsky, as a vulgar right-wing economist, therefore stands against what had been usually referred to by them as extra-economic measures to suppress the market principle in the economy, advocating instead a gradualist approach to the resolution of the contradictions between the socialist and other economic forms.

Trotsky’s economic thought is plagued with metaphysics; the metaphysical division of the economic system of the transitional society into the planned system and the market system holds a prominent place in the economic works of Trotskyism. This anti-dialectical approach to the economic processes had been already exposed in the mid 1920s in the Soviet Union by the majority of the party, including Bukharin/Rykov. But despite these differences, the left-wing and right-wing opposition agreed on the main proposition: let the market be the regulator of the labour exchange not only between industry and the countryside, but within the economic subjects of the socialist sector.

The idealist, metaphysical and non-historic postulate of proportionality of the elements of production is at the basis of the right-wing theories of Trotsky/Bukharin and gives them a certain semblance of self-consistency. The market represents the realm where the law of value, which is the concretisation of the postulate of proportionality, regulates the flow of labour among economic subjects, whether socialised or not. Needless to say, Trotsky is not the first to concretise the postulate of proportionality, which he had recently embraced, nor he was the first to establish such a line of thought. The appeal to preserve the commodity-money relations in the form that existed during NEP clearly predates Trotsky’s assertions about the need for proportionality. While we have to give credit to Bogdanov/Bukharin for their pioneering work in the descending line of modern revisionism, Trotsky does not deserve such an honour, as his contribution does not go beyond popularising the vulgar political economy of right-wing revisionism.

Apart from the metaphysical as well as mechanical idiosyncrasy of Trotskyite thought, which does not deserve to be the main topic of the present discussion, it is useful to bring out quotations like the following:

‘In this connection three systems must be subjected to a brief analysis: (1) special state departments, that is, the hierarchical system of plan commissions, in the center and locally; (2) trade, as a system of market regulation; (3) Soviet democracy, as a system for the living regulation by the masses of the structure of the economy.(The Soviet Economy in Danger, p. 273. Our emphasis.)

Far from sticking to left-wing orthodoxy, Trotsky sounds more like a Yugoslav Titoite, more like a pro-Western market liberal than anything else.

Trotsky takes a right-wing stand with regard to the role of NEP in the transition to socialism. Despite earlier attacks on the party to strengthen and develop further the economic and political link between the working class and the peasantry, Trotsky turns into a fervent advocate of the early forms of the transition to socialism adopted by the party. Moreover, he accuses the latter of liquidating the union between the working class and the peasantry. As a vulgar ‘market-socialist’, Trotsky considers the NEP as an inevitable step due to the significant weight of petty private production in the countryside, regardless of the concrete-historical conditions of revolutionary Russia:

‘The need to introduce the NEP, to restore market relationships, was determined first of all by the existence of 25 million independent peasant proprietors. This does not mean, however, that collectivization even in its first stage leads to the liquidation of the market.’ (The Soviet Economy in Danger, p. 275.)

The need for a transition to market relations between industry and the peasantry holds absolute character. According to Trotsky, due to the backwardness of the Russian peasantry and the level of mechanisation of labour in the countryside, the only possible form of peasant production with other producers is inevitably commodity-money relations. Trotsky’s mechanical and metaphysical thinking does not conceive of the socialist state and the individual peasant engaging in other forms of exchange, as well. Trotsky views the process of collectivisation as a forced administrative measure to unnaturally suppress the commodity-money bond between the city and the countryside. It is only through the evolution of the market, that certain conditions are created that the peasant feels it is more profitable to produce as a member of a larger production unit rather than remaining an individual producer. Hence it is believed that collectivisation should be performed by the forces of the market, that the market will suppress itself in a natural way.

Trotsky’s inevitability of market relations as the dominating bond between production agents during the transition to socialism does not reduce only to the interrelations between industry and the peasantry, much to the contrary:

‘This policy [NEP, our note] is a necessary stage in the growth of state-owned industry. Between capitalism, under which the means of production are owned by private individuals and all economic relations are regulated by the market – I say, between capitalism and complete socialism, with its socially planned economy, there are a number of transitional stages; and the NEP is essentially one of these stages’ (L.D. Trotsky, ‘The First Five Years of the Communist International’, Volume 2, New Park Publications, London, 1953, pp. 233).

NEP involved far more than the realisation of peasant production in a free market and the establishment of economic ties between the countryside and industry based on supply-demand. Never mind the cohabitation of the socialist sector with state capitalism and petty capitalist exploitation in both the countryside and the city; NEP introduced broad pro-market reforms within the socialist sector based on commercial accounting. It is true, however, that the expansion of commodity-money relations was seriously curtailed in the socialist sector in the second half of the twenties, which Trotsky viewed as a bureaucratic-administrative attack on the principles upon which Lenin allegedly conceived the path to socialist construction. It is here, where Guevara rebels against right-wing revisionism by advocating the right of the socialist state to determine the character of the relations of production and to regulate the proportions of labour exchange between branches of the state sector according to the global needs of the socialist state rather than the profitability of individual enterprises.

Much against Guevara’s views, Trotsky during the very early stages of NEP, during the transition from ‘war communism’ advocated the de-centralisation of the state sector:

‘The policy of a centralized bureaucratic management of industry excluded the possibility of a genuine centralized management, of fully utilizing technical equipment along with the available labor force.’ (L.D. Trotsky, ‘The First Five Years of the Communist International’, Volume 2, New Park Publications, London, 1953, pp. 230.)

As a result of the efforts to de-centralise state industry in 1921, especially light industry, as advocated by Trotsky, negative effects were felt soon, such as:

‘…violation of plan discipline, separatism; some state officials tried to replace the state plan organisation – VSNKh – by some ‘social organization of industry’’ (P.I. Lyashchenko, History of the People’s Economy of the USSR, Moscow 1956, Volume III, p. 153. Translated from Russian.)

Guevara supported the correct view that economic calculation does not necessarily imply market relations as factors determining production in the state sector, that economic accounting is not necessarily tied to commodity-money relations, as advocated by the supporters of the Soviet-style model in Cuba. Trotsky takes sides with Soviet revisionism:

After the administrative suppression of the NEP, the celebrated ‘six conditions of Stalin’ – economic accounting, piecework wages, etc. – became transformed into an empty collection of words. Economic accounting is unthinkable without market relations.” (The Soviet Economy in Danger,p. 276. Our emphasis.)

The history of the political economy of socialism has exposed the intimate link between the postulate of proportionality in the exchange of labour among different branches of the economy and the mechanical transportation of market relations to socialism. Metaphysics and mechanicism, common to the economic thought of right-wing revisionism, are closely interrelated with vulgar and superficial understanding of economic categories, which impels the ideologists of right-wing revisionism to equate exchange to commodity exchange and economic equilibrium to the operation of the law of value. The vulgar economic thought advocated by Trotsky and the right-wing opposition does not conceive another form of economic exchange other than commodity-money relations. It is not conceivable that the socialist state could establish a different content in the economic ties among objects of the socialist economy, which may violate the rigid principle of profitability of the individual enterprise. The ability of the planning bodies to establish labour exchange among socialist enterprises, which violates that principle, is viewed as a deformation, as a disproportion. Right-wing revisionism is unable to grasp and appreciate the great power in the hands of socialist planning to establish certain proportions of labour exchange that fit the needs and growth perspectives of the socialist economy, regardless of the overall level of socialisation of economy. In this sense, right-wing economists conceive the plan as a corollary of subjective (aprioristic, according to Trotsky) measures to organise, rationalise the labour exchange among profit-making individual enterprises. Guevara wholeheartedly rejects such a vulgar view of the plan, by advocating the right of the socialist planning to establish a different character of economic relations among the state enterprises, which does not necessarily follow the principle of profitability of the individual enterprise as the leading criterion for economic effectiveness.

Guevara openly exposed the view advocated by Trotsky and the ideologists of modern revisionism that economic accounting ‘is unthinkable’ without commodity money relations. Much to the contrary, Che advocated strict accounting, based on centralised responsibility and accountability of the management of the socialist enterprise, as a key element of the budgetary finance system, which lies at the centre of this economic thought. In his economic system economic accounting in the socialist sector is dissociated from the essence carried by commodity-money relations. Even though Guevara does not seem to grasp the dialectical evolution of market categories in socialism, his thought contains the basic elements to arrive at this understanding. Guevara’s accepts the correct view that the price, despite being a category inherited from the market economy, may be used within the socialist sector for calculation purposes. Hence, he does not reject the use of the form of market categories, which brings him closer to the Marxist-Leninist understanding developed by Lenin-Stalin. On the other hand, it is not clear to us that Guevara understood the evolution of the principle of economic accounting, which was introduced in 1921, through the NEP all the way to the massive collectivisation and the consolidation of the economic basis of socialism in the 1930s, all the way to the publication of Stalin’s Economic Problems. An analysis of the category of economic accounting shows that a deep change in the content had taken place which, despite the fact that the term was in use in the 1930-50s, reflected a different type of management to which Guevara’s budgetary system bears strong resemblance.

According to Tablada and Borrego, Che Guevara paid special attention to the analysis of the causes which led to the abolition of the war economy and the establishment of NEP. This issue is covered on multiple occasions in their books and has been the topic of a great deal of speculation, including allegations that Guevara accused Lenin of going too far in the development of market relations during the early stages of the NEP. Regardless of speculations, Che makes a strong case out of Lenin’s statements, in which NEP is considered as a retreat in the practice of the revolutionary process like the peace of Brest-Litovsk. It is evident, despite the wealth of confusion fostered by Guevara’s bourgeois, Trotskyite and neo-Trotskyite biographers, that Guevara does not consider NEP as an inevitable step in the transition to socialism, as a general and universal statement, but rather, a product of the historical-concrete conditions of revolutionary Russia. After quoting Marx, Lenin and Stalin (this article was written in 1964, when anti-Stalinism was already solidly established in the Soviet Union and the former People’s Democracies in Eastern Europe, with the exception of Albania), Guevara concludes:

‘As we see, the retreat that Lenin mentioned was due to the economic and political situation of the Soviet Union. These policies may be characterised as a practice, which is closely linked to the historical situation of the country, and, therefore, they do not hold universal character.’ (Che Guevara, ‘Che y la Economia’, Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, Habana, Cuba 1993, p. 74. Translated from Spanish.)

The argumentation in favour of NEP-type of economic reforms as an unavoidable step in the transition process between capitalism and socialism is a fundamental element of the economic theory of right-wing revisionism, including Trotskyism, which Guevara rejected altogether. A historical example, which refutes NEP as a compulsory stage for new revolutionary states, is served by the first steps adopted by the People’s Democracies in Eastern Europe between 1948 and 1953. The governments of the People’s Democracies set an economic course based on the priority of heavy industry over other sectors of the economy. The policies of what bourgeois ideologists called the Stalinist economic model resulted in a spectacular growth of the socialist industry, a conditio sine qua non for a massive process of socialisation of means of production both in the city and the countryside. Even a vicious anti-communist publicist, such as F. Fejto, a Hungarian-born journalist based for a long time in France, admits:

‘Between 1949 and 1953, the industrial production of the six Comecon countries rose by 114 per cent, and in certain countries, like Hungary, where the ambitious planners knew no limits the results had been even more spectacular. Heavy industrial production increased fivefold; the engineering industry was seven times more productive in 1953 than in 1938. (F. Fejto, A History of the People’s Democracies, Penguin Books, 1977, p. 362.)

Further, Fejto elaborates on the very interesting case of the transition to socialism in Hungary, especially the events that followed the abrupt change of ‘gears’ imposed by the Soviet leadership weeks after the death of Stalin. In 1949 Hungary’s party, led by Matyas Rakosi, one of the most fervent supporters of Stalin’s policies, launched a campaign of collectivisation, which, although far from finalised, was well underway towards 1953. With Stalin’s death a swift change in the character of the Soviet leadership took place. The new Soviet leadership, at first initiated most likely by Beria, imposed on the leaders of the fraternal parties in Eastern Europe a line of forcible de-Stalinisation. The revisionist leadership ordered Eastern European leaders to slow down the tempo of industrialisation and to basically liquidate the process of ‘forcible’ collectivisation. In a number of countries, peasants were allowed to desert the collective farms (‘de-collectivisation’) if they wished to; private exploitation of land together with the restoration of the artisan class and private business. It was argued that the ‘Stalinist’ economic reforms had gone too far, that allegedly broad masses of the peasantry and the working class in those countries were frustrated at seeing that the unquestionable economic growth did not result in meaningful enhancement of the standards of living of the population, including that of the working class. There is no question that the ideological and organisational chaos induced by the policies of forcible ‘de-Stalinisation’ encouraged anti-communist elements within the middle classes, petty bourgeoisie and workers aristocracy to demonstrate compulsively, while entire party organisations proved hopeless, in disarray.

The Hungarian leader, Matyas Rakosi, did his best to stand up against Soviet revisionism and its supporters in the country; he succeeded in remaining in office till July 1956, when he was basically forced into exile by the Soviet leadership. Following orders from the Soviet revisionist leadership, in July 1953 Rakosi was forced to give up the post of Prime Minister, which passed to Imre Nagy, who even in the words of Fejto:

‘…revived Bukharinist ideas that had gone underground in Stalin’s lifetime’ (F. Fejto, A History of the People’s Democracies, Penguin Books, 1977, p. 363).

Certainly, Nagy was a fervent advocate of NEP-style treatment of the economic contradictions between the socialist sector, the peasantry and other petty producers. Soon after he gains office in July 1953, he launches a set of ‘liberalising’ measures, which became known as the ‘New Course’. In his last work, written in 1955, he states:

‘In a socialist society, when determining the tempo of economic development and the ratio between the various economic branches, the proportion between production and consumption and between consumption and stockpiling must be in harmony with the requirements of the basic economic law of socialism, guaranteeing a gradual advance of society’ (I. Nagy, ‘On Communism’, Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, New York, 1957, p. 98).

Nagy advocated ad nauseam the need for harmonic balance between the resources spent on sector A and sector B of the economy. The well-known concept of certain harmonic proportions invented by Bogdanov/Bukharin and plagiarised by Trotsky comes out again and again, as the back door to the development of commodity-money relations both in the socialist and non-socialist sectors, as a regulator of production. It is interesting, that unlike Bukharin/Trotsky, he uses Stalin’s citations of the mid twenties to substantiate the need to have NEP-style relations in the transitional economic system. In fact, by ‘basic economic law of socialism’ Nagy implies the well-known formulation given by Stalin in Economic Problems. This, however, does not prevent Nagy from remaining a vulgar right-wing economist, which Guevara’s economic thought has nothing to do with.

According to Nagy, the only bond that the socialist sector and the private producer can have in the early stages of the transition from capitalism to socialism is the market. It is only through the market that the process of socialisation of production can prove its advantages over capitalist forms of management and production. Nagy is explicit:

‘‘The NEP policy must be carried out unconditionally, as it means the establishment of increasingly closer relations in the exchange of goods between the city and the village, between the socialist industry and the system of small holdings producing for the market, facilitating the switch to a socialist system of agricultural farms on a large scale.’ (I. Nagy, op. cit., p. 82. Our emphasis.)

Nagy on and on bitterly complains about the staggering disproportions and ‘distortions’ inflicted on the Hungarian economy by Rakosi’s ‘clique’, referring to the fast development of heavy industry with respect to light industry, and especially the countryside. Nagy’s attack on Rakosi’s ‘clique’ becomes even more acute when touching upon the treatment of individual peasants and the collectivisation. He initially refers to Rakosi’s ‘clique’ as adventurous, later on as open left-wing ‘fanatics’ and deviationists. Finally, while quoting Lenin and Stalin’s works in the 1920s, taking their writings out of context, Nagy establishes a parallel between Rakosi’s struggle to uphold the principles of Marxism-Leninism, regardless of whatever mistakes in its implementation, and the Trotskyite left-wing opposition in the Soviet Union in the 1920s by appealing to:

‘The resolutions of the Bolshevik Party in the Fifteenth Congress, which were forged in the battle against the extreme ‘left-wing’ Trotskyist opposition…’ (I. Nagy, op. cit., p. 82.)

It is not the first time that right-wing opportunism portrays the struggle for the basic principle of centralisation of means of production in the construction of socialism as a left-wing, Trotskyite deviation. These allegations of Trotskyism that were thrown at Guevara are to be understood in the historical context, which corresponds to the time when right-wing revisionism, led by the revisionist leadership of in the Soviet Union, disbanded the ‘Stalinist’ plans for the socialisation of the means of production in industry and the countryside. Modern revisionism turned the state sector in the People’s Democracies into an aggregation of independently producing enterprises, which engage in labour exchange with other enterprises and the state via commodity-money relations; in the countryside the process of collectivisation was halted and reversed, and in some countries farm cooperatives were turned into independently producing enterprises, following the model imposed by the revisionists in the Soviet Union. It is in this context, that Guevara’s fight against followers of the Soviet economic model in Cuba, despite his mechanical and idealist mistakes, renders a substantiated critique against right-wing revisionist theories for the construction of socialism.

Guevara’s plans for the industrialisation of the Caribbean island need to be understood within the historical-concrete situation corresponding to the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union and the People’s Democracies in Eastern Europe. Despite elements of idealism and mechanicism, Guevara’s model of budgetary finance system and his refusal to implement commodity-money relations and the law of value as the regulator of proportions among state enterprises bears strong resemblances with the economic system existent in the Soviet Union during the 1930-50s. Hence, it was natural that Guevara’s plans for industrialisation faced fierce resistance by Soviet revisionism and its followers in the island. It is evident to us, that allegations of Trotskyism or left-wing deviationism thrown by right-wing revisionists are utterly unfounded. Nevertheless, more investigation is needed to throw light on Guevara’s ideological evolution in the 1950s and early 1960s and on how he came to propose the budgetary finance system, as the fundamental pillar for the industrialisation in Cuba.

Idealism and Mechanicism in Che’s Economic Thought

Despite the progressive character of Guevara’s economic thought, and its invaluable positive impact on the economic discussion held in Cuba during the first half of the 1960s, which represents a courageous and more or less consistent and substantiated struggle against modern revisionism, Che’s thinking needs to be considered critically. Notwithstanding the substantiated struggle against the right-wing theories of socialist construction, which makes Guevara’s works most relevant materials for the study of questions related to socialist transformation, he is plagued with serious mistakes. Guevara’s eclecticism is inherent to his thought in general, and cannot be neglected when evaluating Guevara’s role in the Cuban revolution and the theory of socialist transformation.

Guevara’s mistakes in political economy can be classified into two groups: idealism and mechanicism. Idealist mistakes were committed by Guevara when evaluating the role of consciousness in political economy. When we refer to mechanicism in Guevara’s economic thought we mainly imply his failure to grasp the dialectical evolution of economic categories involved in commodity-money relations during the transitional epoch. Needless to say, Guevara’s mistakes have been extensively used by the bourgeoisie and the representatives of revisionist tendencies, such as Trotskyism and neo-Trotskyism to mystify the revolutionary and rip his contribution to the political science and political economy from its Marxist logical core and divorce it from a number of Marxist-Leninist principles, which Guevara tried to uphold in a more or less consistent manner.

Guevara’s mistakes in political economy have been used inside and outside the island to consider Guevara’s contribution to the economic transformations in the early stages of the Cuban revolution in isolation from the principles of socialist transformation adopted by the People’s Democracies during the post-war period, so demonised by modern revisionism. Guevara’s thought is portrayed by many as a specific phenomenon of the Cuban revolution, thus completely ignoring its strong links with the so called ‘Stalinist’ economic theories and modus operandi during the transitional period. Although we do not wish to portray Guevara’s economic thought as a faithful concretisation of the principles of Marxism-Leninism in the conditions of revolutionary Cuba in the 1960s, we feel it would be a serious mistake not to evaluate Guevara’s thought within the concrete-historical epoch corresponding to systematic violation of the principles of Marxism-Leninism, which led to the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union and the liquidation of socialist construction in Eastern Europe. While evaluating critically Guevara’s economic thought and identifying areas of inconsistency, we feel compelled to appreciate and value the positive and progressive that Che upheld under very difficult conditions of struggle against imperialism and revisionism.

Idealism is present throughout Guevara’s works all the way till his last published work, ‘Man and Socialism in Cuba’. It leads Guevara to proclaim consciousness and education as primary with respect to the study of relations of production in the transitional economy, including the construction of communism. Impressed by the early philosophical works of young Marx, Guevara states:

‘The word conscious is emphasized because Marx considered it basic in stating the problem. He thought about man’s liberation and saw communism as the solution to the contradictions that brought alienation – but as a conscious act. That is to say, communism cannot be seen merely as the result of class contradictions in a highly developed society, contradiction that would be resolved during a transitional stage before reaching the crest. Man is a conscious actor in history. Without this consciousness, which embraces its awareness as a social being, there can be no communism.’ (Che Guevara, in ‘On the budgetary finance system’, published in Man and Socialism in Cuba, Atheneum, New York, 1973, p. 124. Our emphasis.)

The role of consciousness and education is ubiquitously stressed by Guevara in his economic works as the leading factor in the transition to higher forms of economic organisation. In Guevara’s system political economy ceases to be an independent discipline, the objective character of the economic laws of the transitional society is secondary to the cultural formation of the new man. The economic laws of socialism, like those of capitalism, exist and evolve with the development of the forces of production and the historical conditions at times independently from the level of consciousness of the masses. In fact, in certain historical situations, the masses as a whole remain unaware of the economic essence of both revolution and counter-revolution.

The role of consciousness and education undoubtedly play a fundamental role in the construction of the new society. However, political economy remains an independent discipline and the study of the objective laws that govern it remains a titanic effort. Only scientific analysis and synthesis of the relations of production can make possible the sustained economic development necessary for the construction of the socialist and communist societies. As opposed to capitalism, during the course of the transition to socialism, objective and subjective conditions are given for the masses to participate consciously in the construction and scientific analysis and synthesis of the socialist construction. It is clear that the more conscious and active participation of the working class in the socialist construction, the more solid are the foundations of the socialist formation. It is clear too, that the more conscious the working class is about the essence of the economic transformation, the more robust is the economic development and the less influential are the forces of counter-revolution.

Economic development under socialism and the development of consciousness and socialist culture – two phenomena which go hand in hand. Generalisation on the basis of the history of the Soviet Union indicates that consciousness and socialist culture require a material basis, without which further economic development and further development of consciousness. However, according to Guevara consciousness and socialist education are supposed to be the primary engines of economic development in socialism:

‘The hopes in our system [budgetary finance system – our note] point to the future, towards a more rapid development of consciousness, and through consciousness, to the development of the productive forces’. (Che Guevara, op. cit. in ‘Socialist plan: its meaning’, p. 147. Translated from Spanish.)

In Guevara’s system, socialist economic development is not really the engine of consciousness, but the other way around, consciousness is the source of socialist economic development. Guevara’s idealism turns voluntarist. In this respect, Che’s idealism may be compared to Mao’s idealist views in political economy, despite the fact that Guevara displays a significantly more progressive stand with respect to commodity-money relations than the latter. Mao, in his critique of Stalin’s Economic Problems, bitterly complains about the fact that the latter does not include the study of the superstructure in the analysis of the socialist economy:

Stalin’s book from first to last says nothing about the superstructure. It is not concerned with people; it considers things not people…

They speak only of the production relations, not the superstructure nor politics, nor the role of the people. Communism cannot be reached unless there is a communist movement’. (Mao Tsetung, A Critique of Soviet Economics, Monthly Review Press, New York and London, 1977, pp. 135-136.)

Guevara supports the wrong idealistic view that commodity-money relations per se and in general are a manifestation of the alienation of the human being in the process of production. Guevara interprets mechanistically and metaphysically the role and place of economic forms inherited from capitalism in the socialist economy:

‘The alienated human individual is bound to society as a whole by an invisible umbilical cord: the law of value. It acts upon all facets of his life, shaping his road and his destiny. (Che Guevara in ‘Man and Socialism in Cuba’, Atheneum, New York, 1973, p. 340.)

One of the major and profound mistakes displayed by Guevara’s economic thought, a mistake common to many others who have genuinely claimed allegiance to Marxism-Leninism, is his failing to grasp Lenin’s and Stalin’s teachings with regards to the dying off of economic categories inherited from capitalism. These teachings may be succinctly expressed in Stalin’s well-known assertion in Economic Problems. In his answer to A. Notkin, Stalin stresses:

‘The fact of the matter is that in our socialist conditions economic development proceeds not by way of upheavals, but by way of gradual changes, the old not simply being abolished out of hand, but changing its nature in adaptation to the new, and retaining only its form; while the new does not simply destroy the old, but infiltrates into it, changes its nature and its functions, without smashing its form, but utilizing it for the development of the new. This, in our economic circulation, is true not only of commodities, but also of money, as well as of banks, which, while they lose their old functions and acquire new ones, preserve their old form, which is utilized by the socialist system.’ (J.V. Stalin ‘Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR’, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1952, p. 59.)

Guevara commits the colossal mistake, which has been more or less successfully exploited by neo-Trotskyism and other bourgeois ideologies, of mechanically and metaphysically extrapolating the character of the economic categories implemented during the NEP to later stages of the socialist construction in the Soviet Union. Guevara, de facto blames the adoption of such economic forms as economic accounting, profit, credit, etc. implemented in the 1920s for the right-wing deviationist economic theories that he was fighting in the 1960s, without appreciating the profound changes that operated in the content of those categories during the 1930-50s:

In the Soviet Union, the first country to build socialism, and those who followed its example, determined to develop a planning process that could measure broad economic results by financial means. Relations among enterprises were left in a state of more or less free play. This is the origin of what is now called economic calculus (a poor translation of the Russian term, that might better be expressed as auto-financing, or, more precisely, financial self-management).

Roughly speaking, then, financial self-management is based on establishing broad financial control over the enterprise activities, banks being the principal agencies of control. Suitably designed and regimented material incentives are used to promote independent initiative toward maximum utilization of productive capacity, which translates into greater benefits for the individual worker or the factory collective. Under this system, loans granted to socialist enterprises are repaid with interests in order to accelerate product turnover’. (Che Guevara, in ‘On Production Costs and the Budgetary System’, published in Man and Socialism in Cuba, Atheneum, New York, 1973, p. 114.)

It is clear that, the transition to socialism in the Soviet Union, which followed the implementation of market-type economic relations in most of the economy, had to carry within itself certain economic forms, which are inevitably inherited from capitalism. However, Guevara apparently fails to grasp the fact that the concept of economic accounting evolved dramatically over the years, as the character of the economic relations evolved. The concept of economic accounting never disappeared from the Soviet economic literature; however, its content evolved in time in order to accommodate the planned principle of the economy on the basis of socialised property and the liquidation of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois forms of production. The economic accounting of the more or less disseminated production subjects confined to the Soviet artels in the 1920s bears little resemblance with the economic accounting of highly concentrated Soviet industry in the 1930-50s. The character of the labour exchange among the different production subjects during the 1930-50s bear close resemblance to that of the budgetary finance system advocated by Guevara in the 1960s.

It is not clear to us, to what extent Guevara is able to appreciate the qualitative changes that operated in the interpretation of the content of economic categories over the history of the political economy of the Soviet Union. It is unclear whether Guevara sees the preservation in the Soviet Union of economic forms such us, economic accounting, profit, credit, banks, etc… as a sign of economic backwardness, or rather as a sign of the concrete historical conditions under which the transition to socialism took place in the Soviet Union. For instance, Guevara advocated the liquidation of the concept of credit in socialism, even though the form of credit was never liquidated in the Soviet Union:

‘In our system [the budgetary system – our note.] the Bank supplies a certain amount of resources to the enterprises according to the budget; here the interest rate is not present’. (Che Guevara, op. cit. in ‘Considerations on Expenses’, pp. 45-46. Translated from Spanish.)

The same applies to the economic category of profit, which was never liquidated in the Soviet Union but was categorically denied by Guevara within the context of the budgetary finance system in Cuba. Guevara seems to understand mechanically the economic relation of the State with socialised production subjects:

‘…because the State Enterprise in the conditions of Cuba, is just a centre for production. It has a budget, a budget for production; it should meet the goals of production and deliver its product to the Ministry of Domestic Commerce, or to other state industries. Thus, the enterprise does not have profit, does not have money; all the profit, all the difference between what was sold and the cost belongs to the Cuban state. The enterprise is reduced to production.’ (Che Guevara, Conference ‘Economy and Plan’ of the People’s University, 1961. Translated from Spanish.)

As a matter of fact, the history of the political economy of the Soviet Union has demonstrated that the principle of socialist planning on the basis of socialised forms of production does not contradict the implementation of such economic forms as profit, as long as the latter do not express the relationship between independent producers, but on the contrary is used as one of the indexes of economic effectiveness, etc… To state that profit is not the leading economic criterion in socialist industry is generally speaking correct. However to interpret the sole presence of the concept of profit, regardless of its relative weight in the definition of economic effectiveness, as a sign of economic backwardness is strictly speaking incorrect.

In his article ‘Bank, Credit and Socialism’ Guevara brilliantly exposes the vulgar and fetishist economic views of those in Cuba who did not understand the need to re-define the role of banks in a socialist economy and that the economic functions of the banks in capitalism cannot be mechanically transported to socialism. His conclusions are generally speaking correct, correct in the sense of abstract formulations. So are his conclusions with regard to commodity-money relations and the role of the law of value in the transitional economy. However, they are correct in the abstract and may turn dangerous if applied mechanically to concrete-historical conditions.

Unfortunately, the evaluation of Guevara’s economic thought is confusing and inconclusive since the budgetary finance system is conceived as a result of the struggle with right-wing economic theories, which absolutise the role of commodity-money relations. The budgetary finance system is without a doubt a reaction against right-wing economic theories and needs to be appreciated as such. Further investigations, possibly on the basis of archival materials, will hopefully throw valuable light on the role of mechanicism and metaphysics in Guevara’s economic thought.

Source

Reactionary anti-communist bourgeois theories that conceal the restoration of capitalism in Soviet Union (1953-1990) Part B

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Reactionary anti-communist bourgeois theories that conceal the restoration of capitalism in Soviet Union (1953-1990) Part B

B. The reactionary anticommunist bourgeois theory of “developed socialism” of the Khrushchevit social-democracy

After the violent overthrow of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the victory-triumph of the Khrushchevian revisionist counter-revolution in the Soviet Union in 1952, while pursuing the scheduled and systematic policy of gradual restoration of capitalism facilitated by the implementation of capitalist economic reforms, the leading anti-communist group of Khrushchev-Brezhnev of, what is by now, the bourgeois social-democratic Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), sought to formulate a suitable theory to conceal this reactionary process from socialism-communism to capitalism.

In their attempt to formulate a new and suitable “theory” concealing this reactionary process and the emerging society of restored capitalism euphemistically called “developed socialism” (!), the Khrushchevian-Brezhnevite revisionists came up with the well-known theory of “advanced socialism”

Both the theory of “developed socialism” promoted by the Khrushchevian traitors and the theory of“convergence” promoted by the western bourgeois reaction are anti-communist reactionary bourgeois theories because during the period of their dominance (1955-1990) were directed against the communist perspective of the Proletariat, obscured the Proletariat’s communist prospect presenting the restored capitalism of the Soviet Union as “the communist” future while, at the same time, they were in total breach with the objective historic progress of society toward socialism-communism. The class character and content of the two theories was based on the defence of capitalism: the theory of “convergence” defended was traditional capitalism of the Western countries, while the theory of “developed socialism” defended the restored capitalism of the Soviet Union and the other revisionist countries (Details can be found at “Anasintaxi”, no. 373, August 2012, p. 3).

Since the treacherous, renegade Khrushchev-Brezhnev group “managed”, in the 20th Congress of CPSPU in 1956, to present arbitrarily and provocatively the capitalist-fascist Yugoslavia of Tito as “socialist”(!) – a view imposed on the international communist movement (N.S. Khrushchev: “Report in 20th Party Congress, 1956:“Yugoslavia has not small successes in the socialist construction”, a clear proof that the Khrushchevian clicque had decided to follow Tito’s counter-revolutionary, capitalist path – and promoted a kind of “socialism”(!) that would result “peacefully” without the need of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, this group officially confessed and publicly admitted, during the 22nd of Congress of CPSU (1961), that there was neither Dictatorship of the Proletariat nor revolutionary communist party in the Soviet Union of that period and that these had been replaced by the “state of all people” and “party of all people” and mentioned, for the first time, the “transition period from capitalism to socialism” to which the Dictatorship of the Proletariat “corresponded”. At the same time, they formulated the theory of “developed socialism” without using yet the terms that became well known later: “developed socialism” and “advanced socialist society”.

The theory of “developed socialism” promoted by the Khrushchevian renegades constitutes, as it will be shown below, a complete revision and a blatant, crude rejection of revolutionary Marxism.

As a theory, the so-called “developed socialism” has nothing in common with the revolutionary theory of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin, it amounts to its negation and it is an anti-communist bourgeois theory. The so much advertised, but non-existent “advanced socialist society” was nothing more than the restored capitalism of the Khrushchevian-Brezhnevite period as shown in previous articles. According to the anti-communist Brezhnev, this type of society had already been in November of 1967, that is to say, when capitalism had been fully restored (on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution, he had declared that “In the USSR a developed socialist society has been built).

The theory of “developed socialism” dominated later the new bourgeois constitution (i.e. the constitution of the restored capitalism) of the Brezhnevite period while the euphemistically called “advanced socialist society” found its full expression in this – a constitution which, for the first time, officially legalized and confirmed not only the state-capitalist (articles 10-11) and collective-capitalist ownership (article 12) but also the individual capitalist ownership (articles 13-17) in the Soviet Union’s society of that time. It also legalized the capitalist competition between the autonomous enterprises, the “socialist commodity producers”, and the capitalist profit (article 16). In this constitution, the content of the “advanced socialist society”, that is, of the Soviet Union’s restored capitalism is generally described.

The elements-views from which the theory of “developed socialism” was made are the following: “the party of all people”, “the state of all people”, “transition period from capitalism to socialism”, “three phases of the communist society”, “socialism: a new autonomous mode of production”. Concerning the theory of “advanced socialism” and the euphemistically called “advanced socialist society” there is a vast literature of many articles and books. However, we will make a limited use of them and cite only those extracts that highlight the counter-revolutionary essence of this bourgeois reactionary theory.

1. “Party of all people” or revolutionary communist party?

In the 22nd Congress of CPSU (1961) it is mentioned: “our Marxist-Leninist Party that was born as a party of the working class, has become the party of all people”, an anti-Marxist view which later passed to the new Brezhnevite bourgeois constitution (1977) where it was formulated as: “CPSU exists for the people and to serve the people”. (Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution, 1977)

Some quick comments on the anti-Marxist view “party of all people”:

1. The adoption of this view meant the abandonment of the Marxist theory not only about the revolutionary, new type of party but also about all political parties considered as separate organisations that defend the different interests of particular classes.

2. The Khrushchevian social democrats promoted the well known bourgeois view according to which parties stand above classes and they are, therefore, defenders of the interests of “most” or “all classes”.

3. As known, according to revolutionary Marxism there are no organisations and parties that belong to “all people”, that is parties of all classes. Since, the Khrushchevian revisionists themselves admitted that there was not any more a revolutionary communist party in the Soviet Union of that period, because, according to them, the Marxist-Leninist party had been replaced with the party of “all people”, then the new CPSU, that is the so-called party of “all people” could not be nothing else but a bourgeois, social-democratic party. Consequently, the revolutionary, until the beginning of the 1950’s, CPSU changed its class character: from a Marxist-Leninist party of the working class, it became a bourgeois party: a defender of the class interests of the emerging soviet bourgeoisie.

The character of a party, according to Marxism, is determined first of all by the its ideology and, among others by its programme. The new CPSU, that is, the so-called “party of all people”, was not guided any more by the ideology of the revolutionary Marxism, that is, Leninism-Stalinism, but by the counter-revolutionary ideology of Khrushchevian revisionism (which is a version of bourgeois ideology).

The new CPSU of Khrushchev-Brezhnev as well as the Khrushchevian parties of all countries in the following decades were (and still are) bourgeois, social-democratic parties because: a) they were not guided revolutionary Marxism, b) they had reformist programmes that cannot lead to the overthrow of capitalism, c) they adopted a anti-Marxist view of socialism-communism since they advertised the restored capitalism of the Khrushchev-Brezhnev-Gorbachev period as “socialism”(!), in other words they claimed that there was allegedly “socialism” in the Soviet Union during 1953-1991.

4. Neither socialism can exist nor the construction of socialism can continue without a revolutionary communist party of a new type, that is, of Leninist-Stalinist type. Therefore, after 1953, it was inevitable that the construction of socialism in the Soviet Union finally stopped and the new CPSU, that is, the “party of all people”, was at the forefront of the capitalism economic reforms that completely eliminated socialism and resulted in the full restoration of capitalism by the mid 1960’s.

5. Socialism-communism cannot to constructed without a marxist-leninst-stalinist party, precisely because this party “has always as a primary task the class, political organisation of the proletariat as an autonomous political party and sets the next goal to be the struggle for the Dictatorship of the Proletariat” (MARX-ENGELS: Bd.18, pp.267-268, Berlin 1969) and also it is the party that : first, is the organiser and the leader of the giant work of socialist-communist construction and second, without this party the Dictatorship of the Proletariat possible cannot exist. That’s why Stalin is very right to point out that “the dictatorship of the proletariat is exercised through the Party, that without a united and cohesive party the Dictatorship of the Proletariat cannot exist”, that “the Dictatorship of the Proletariat is possible only through the party that is its guiding force” and that “the Dictatorship of the Proletariat is complete only if it is led by one party, the Communist Party, which does not and cannot share power with other parties” (Stalin, Collected Works vol. 10)

2. “State of all people” or Dictatorship of the Proletariat

In relation to the state of the Soviet Union of that period, it is mentioned in the 22nd Congress that the state of the working class had been transformed to the “all people’s state”: “The state of all people is the new state in the development of the socialist state, the most important landmark in the path of development of the socialist state to a communist self-governing society” (22nd Congress of CPSU, p. 205, Athens 1961) and that “the dictatorship of the proletariat was not any more necessary …” (ibid, p. 208) for the construction of socialism in the Soviet Union. Later, this anti-Marxist view passed to the new Constitution (1977) – from which the term Dictatorship of the Proletariat had been deleted (justifiably so since it had been already been overthrown in 1953) – and which confirms that the Soviet Union was not any more the state of Dictatorship of the Proletariat as it was in the era of Lenin-Stalin but the “state of all people” (“Constitution 1977”, p. 42: The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a socialist state of the whole people).

The anti-marxist view of the Khrushchevian about the “state of all people” is raising some important questions worth of special consideration:

First, by denying the necessity of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat during an important phase of development of socialism-communism, the soviet revisionists-social democrats and in such an important and central question the reformist Khrushchevian parties abandoned Marxism and it known that nobody can be regarded as Marxist without the recognition of the dictatorship of the proletariat as Lenin noted: Only he is a Marxist who extends the recognition of the class struggle to the recognition of the dictatorship of the proletariat. That is what constitutes the most profound distinction between the Marxist and the ordinary petty (as well as big) bourgeois. This is the touchstone on which the real understanding and recognition of Marxism should be tested” (Lenin, “State and revolution”)

Second, it is important to note the open confession and the official admission made by the Khrushchevians that there was no Dictatorship of the Proletariat in the Soviet Union of that period and, it was exactly for this reason why there was no socialism any more. Moreover, the construction of socialism had stopped in 1953 after the death-murder of Joseph Stalin. The continuation of socialist construction in a country without the Dictatorship of the Proletariat is totally impossible and inconceivable. Also, the maintenance of socialism is unimaginable without the Dictatorship of the Proletariat since, for Marx, the concepts of socialism and Dictatorship of the Proletariat are inseparable. As early as 1850, Marx noted that socialism: the class dictatorship of the proletariat as the necessary transit point to the abolition of class distinctions generally, to the abolition of all the relations of production on which they rest, to the abolition of all the social relations that correspond to these relations of production, to the revolutionizing of all the ideas that result from these social relations” (MARX-ENGELS: vol.7, p. 89-90, Berlin 1969).

Third, the Khrushchevian concept of the “state of all people” not only meant a rejection of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat but it constituted a complete revision of the Marxist theory on the state of Dictatorship of the Proletariat, and the state in general, and this is why Lenin emphasized that “the essence of Marx’s theory of the state has been mastered only by those who realize that the dictatorship of a single class is necessary not only for every class society in general, not only for the proletariat which has overthrown the bourgeoisie, but also for the entire historical period which separates capitalism from “classless society”, from communism” (Lenin, State and Revolution.”)

Fourth, the Khrushchevian concept of the “state of all people” bears no relation to Marxism. It is alien to Marxism because according to the Marxist theory there is no state standing above classes, that is to say, “state of all classes” of a society; this is a bourgeois view. On the contrary, the state has always a class character: either it is the state of the bourgeoisie or it is the state of the proletariat. In the period of transition from capitalism to socialism-communism, there can be either the dictatorship of the proletariat or the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. This is why the famous English Marxist George Thomson, in 1971, very rightly emphasized that the “state of all people” declared by the treacherous Khrushchevian clique was in reality “a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie”, or to be more exact, a dictatorship of the new soviet bourgeoisie.

Fifth, the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, according to the teaching of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin, is established right after the victory of the armed Proletarian Revolution and the complete annihilation of the state machinery, is preserved and strengthened and it is absolutely necessary for the whole transitional period from capitalism to socialism. The state of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat is never transformed to the “state of all people” (it is also known that Max and Engels rejected with irony the so-called “free state” in the Critique of the Gotha Program. The Dictatorship of the Proletariat exists until it withers away in the higher stage of communist, in the communist classless society: For the state to wither away completely, complete communism is necessary” and that The state will be able to wither away completely when society adopts the rule: “From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs”. (Lenin, “State and Revolution”)

Source

Are Popular Fronts Necessary Today?

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Raul Marcos
Member of the Communist Party of Spain ML
August 2014

The answer is a resounding YES. They are necessary and indispensable given the condition of oppression and exploitation that are worsening, and from which the people are suffering. The proletariat, with its party at the forefront, should be at the head of the popular masses, to organize and lead their struggles. It is not an easy task, but all difficulties can be overcome. For that to happen, it is necessary to work to link up in a broad manner with the advanced masses, to win their recognition.

The Congress of the Communist International (1921) stated that “The United Front [of the proletariat] is the unity […] of the workers who are decisive in the fight against capitalism”. Dimitrov insisted that the Popular Front, given the circumstances that existed in the world, was an urgent necessity and that its essential basis must be the United Front of the Proletariat.

The fundamental contradictions of the period in which we live and struggle, are perfectly defined: The contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie; the contradiction between capitalism and socialism; the contradiction between oppressed peoples and nations on the one hand and imperialism on the other; the contradiction among imperialist and financial powers. The last contradiction manifests itself in the local wars, the aggressions against the peoples, the contention for geostrategic zones and the exploitation of the neo-colonies, the manipulation of the democratic and patriotic sentiments of the peoples. It is a rapidly growing contradiction.

We live in the period which Lenin defined, but with new characteristics and forms. Presently, we see the expression of a tendency towards fascism as organized groups of neo-Nazis carry out actions in various countries, and this should concern us. In many cases they are protected by the governments (such is the case in Greece, Hungary, Spain, etc.). Power and state apparatus, with some exceptions, are in the hands of parties and governments which are reactionary and anti-popular. The big powers and their puppet governments speak of democracy, of human rights, of peace among the people… while they are savagely subjugating and exploiting the people, who are oppressed, in many cases through force of arms.

This is a general situation, not in this or that country: in different degrees and different forms and intensity; it is a general tendency. The communist parties must daily confront situations of repression, of struggles for social conquests, against laws which encroach upon and suppress labor and social rights which had been achieved through many decades of struggle.

In his report to the VII Congress of the Communist International (1935), and with a similar situation at hand, Dimitrov focused on the importance of creating popular fronts against the conditions which arose with the growth of Nazi-fascism (Italy, Germany, Portugal, Japan, etc.). Despite the years which have passed and the events that have taken place, the report is still very relevant and can serve as a general orientation to the parties. It is evident that the present circumstances are not the same as the 1930s. The context in which we live is very different from that period, and it is enough to recall the dismemberment of the Soviet Union, the opportunist degeneration of many of the parties at that time, and that today, with some rare exceptions, the Marxist-Leninist parties are very weak, without much influence upon the broad masses.

The importance of Dimitrov’s writing is undeniable, yet we should keep in mind that the international situation is not the same, although there are problems of a similar nature (which are reflected in the fundamental contradictions), and it is also necessary to act according to the particular circumstances of each country and party. The work of a front cannot be carried out in the same manner in every country, since we have to take into consideration the inevitable unequal development, of the political forces as well as the Party and of society itself. Its undeniable that we cannot compare the situation which Ecuador is living under (in all of the aspects pointed out), with that of Germany, for example, in Spain, Denmark, Turkey, Morocco, France, Venezuela, etc. etc., there are different conditions and therefore, tactically there will be differences, secondary differences, but in the end differences.

Defending the importance and the present aspects of Dimitrov’s speech should not lead us to apply every detail, each and every aspect which his text deals with. To study, analyze and discuss the writings of great communist leaders, and Dimitrov is one of them, should not lead us to convert them into catechism, infallible doctrines, something which is opposed to the Marxist Leninist dialectic.

Each of our parties should consider these questions. There are no prefabricated answers. Only the dialectic examination, that is of the moment which can change from one day to the other, without separating ourselves from tomorrow’s strategy, whose course cannot be predicted or defined, will allow us to take up tactical positions and measures to confront and attempt to solve the problems.

The important thing is to keep in mind at all times the reality in which our parties live and evolve, work and struggle. Therefore, we must keep in mind a decisive fact: In almost all countries, with different levels of development, the working class is the most revolutionary and its advanced members are at the head of the struggles for justice. But the working class is not the only class exploited by capitalism. There are sectors of the small and middle bourgeoisie which also suffer oppression. And although their mentality is not that of the conscious proletariat, we should take those sectors into consideration and try to get closer to them. We should keep in mind that if the working class and its party do not try to unite the other working classes, including certain patriotic and democratic sectors of the middle classes, these could be manipulated by some faction of the bourgeoisie. Undoubtedly, the working class must win over, in the ideological and political combat, the role of vanguard of all those exploited and oppressed sectors and defend their demands.

This could be the basis for forging tactical, momentary alliances. But we should not confuse or counterpoise those tactical alliances of a given moment, to the strategic alliances. That is, we do not subordinate strategic alliances to questions of the moment, circumstantial ones, but neither do we subordinate tactical alliances to the establishment of possible strategic alliances, so long as this does not imply abandoning essential questions. To be clearer: we should be vigilant so as not to confuse with the Popular Front tactical, partial, or momentary alliances, in many cases local ones or of a city, region or province, including agreements with special sectors, but which cannot include the  most advanced general sectors.

The Popular Front should respond to the general needs of the struggle, to political questions which are proposed, and above all, to mobilize the advanced masses to incorporate them into action.

The working class, theoretically the proletariat, should be the principal force of the Popular Front. This means that in practice it should also be the leading force. We should keep in mind that theory without practice is just empty words, and that practice without theory is like blindly striking out blows.

Given the broad political nature of the forces which could become part of the Front, the Party should strive to be at the head, be the leader (in relative terms depending on the circumstances) so that the proletariat can exercise its influence as the main force. That leading role is not achieved by force of will, or by a decree; it must be won in daily practice, by the clarity of our political proposals, with the respectful and faithful application of agreements.

If the party does not fulfill that role, in the long run it will tail behind the petit bourgeoisie and that would be a grave error. Here we should keep in mind the “Law of the unity and struggle of opposites”.

This leads us to the question of the ideological independence of the Party. A Popular Front, built upon minimum agreements (depending on the circumstances), cannot take up all our proposals. But that should not lead us to renounce our political and ideological positions. Within the framework of the tasks of the Front, communists are, and will be, very careful at the time of fulfilling our agreements even if these are not exactly what we would have preferred.

The policy of unity in any alliance, and also in the Popular Front, should not lead us to forget the class struggle. In fact, the alliances, agreements or tactical compromises with other political forces should help us to reinforce the strength of the Party and not the other way around. That is not always understood, so that if the Party, communists, become diluted as a result of such an alliance, that would result in a grave weakening or possibly the disappearance of the Party.

With much ability and tact, and without high-handedness or strange maneuvers, the Party should, as Lenin stated, lead everything. This forces us to carry out a clear and sincere work with the forces which make up the Front, to respect and fulfill the agreed-upon commitments and programs, but without forgetting that:

”…only the political party of the working class, i.e., the Communist Party, is capable of uniting, training and organizing a vanguard of the proletariat and of the whole mass of the working people that alone will be capable of withstanding the inevitable petty-bourgeois vacillations of this mass (Lenin, Preliminary Draft Resolution of the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P. on the Syndicalist and Anarchist Deviation in Our Party. Our emphasis.)

We should be with the advanced masses, becoming more and better, to mobilize within the Popular Front and in all the fronts created which include the masses. That requires defeating the relative weakness of the parties, (without forgetting the inevitability of unequal development), since without a strong party we can do very little; and it is also necessary to be conscious of the fact that regardless how big and powerful a Party may be, we will always be a minority in society:

“…We communists are but a drop in the ocean, a drop in the ocean of the people”, but “without a party of the proletariat we cannot even consider the defeat of imperialism, the conquest of the dictatorship of proletariat…” and also the Party “is the vanguard of a class and its duty is to guide the masses, and not to reflect the average mental state of the masses,” Lenin sharply stated.

For communists it is of prime importance to carry out a constant work face-to-face with the masses. But this must be well planned and we should not speak of the masses in a superficial way, without being precise: we should lead the advanced masses and keep in mind that there are various levels of understanding among them regarding the struggle. Dimitrov said that Sectarianism finds expression particularly in overestimating the revolutionization of the masses…” and he quoted Lenin, “…we must not regard that which is obsolete for us, as obsolete for the class, as obsolete for the masses.”

Lenin, like Stalin, Dimitrov, the great leaders, were constantly concerned about the work towards the masses. Lenin specified and warned:

There is nothing more warranted than the urging of attention to the constant, imperative necessity of deepening and broadening, broadening and deepening, our influence on the masses, our strictly Marxist propaganda and agitation, our ever-closer connection with the economic struggle of the working class, etc. Yet, because such urging is at all times warranted, under all conditions and in all situations, it must not be turned into special slogans, nor should it justify attempts to build upon it a special trend in Social- Democracy. A border-line exists here; to exceed the bounds is to turn this indisputably legitimate urging into a narrowing of the aims and the scope of the movement, into a doctrinaire blindness to the vital and cardinal political tasks of the moment.

But for the very reason that the work of intensifying and broadening our influence on the masses is always necessary, after each victory as after each defeat, in times of political quiescence as in the stormiest periods of revolution, we should  not turn the emphasis upon this work into a special slogan or build upon it any special trend if we do not wish to court the risk of descending to demagogy and degrading the aims of the advanced and only truly revolutionary class. (On Confounding Politics with Pedagogics, 1905)

To overestimate the role of the masses is as dangerous as to underestimate it, since both errors distort the role of the Communist Party. This also has to do with the Popular Front since its work is oriented precisely towards the popular masses. One of the conditions for considering an alliance as a Popular Front is that it include, as a minimum, sectors of the exploited and oppressed classes whether they are organized or unorganized.

It is necessary to pay attention, in all our activity, the Leninist Communist Party, leader of the proletariat, of the advanced sectors of the working class, so as not to confuse it with the “mass party” which is amorphous and includes the revisionists and right-wingers of every type. There exists a line of demarcation which must not be underestimated. For communists, what we define as “mass line” is to implement our politics and proposals in a decisive and capable manner outside of the Party. We should not limit ourselves just to our own members and intimate friends.

It is important to have a clear understanding of the lines of demarcation between Marxist-Leninists and opportunists, Khrushchevites, Maoists, including those who preach socialism of the 21st century. Does this mean that we should not have agreements, compromises, and unity pacts with all those who do not share our principles? Clearly not! If we only unite with those who share our ideas and principles, we would not be talking about alliances, popular fronts, etc.; we would only be talking about unity with communists. And that is a different problem.

Presently, many of our parties have a problem which is a history of weak organizing, which is trying to fulfill the role of leaders. This is not achieved through decrees; there are no magic formulas. It will be achieved, depending upon the circumstances, through our work and dedication. Alliances tactical agreements, etc. with other political forces or groups are proposed to us. We are not in a situation in which we can impose our positions. However, we should not refuse the offer because of that. On the contrary, we should participate loyally and in the discussions present our political proposals; we should discuss and confront opinions and little by little go about winning political and ideological ground.

A very simple question, but one which we do not always keep in mind, is that alliances of broad fronts are not meant to last forever. They must be seen as developing; they are not static alliances; what we propose and approve today as just and valid, can stop being so at another time.

The Popular Front is created depending upon the circumstances and we do not create circumstances; we find ourselves in them and we must take them up, always having in mind the evolution of these circumstances. As Dimitrov warns with a great deal of reason: “…it is particularly dangerous to confuse the wish with fact. We must base ourselves on the facts, on the actual concrete situation.”

The Popular Front is an important task which must be dealt with under all circumstances in which the political struggle is developing; it is not an option, it is a necessary task. To promote it and to advance in completing that task, the revolutionary party of the proletariat must draw up a correct revolutionary policy which takes into consideration the concrete conditions, always keeping in mind the strategic objectives. The application of that policy depends not only on its correctness, but also on the potential of the Party, of its forces. A just and correct revolutionary policy can remain as a proposal if there is not a firm decision to carry it out with the advanced sectors of the masses.

The experience of the international communist movement leads us to seriously consider the danger of deviations which can occur. Generally, the existing opportunism has been, and is, of the right. But we cannot forget that there is also left opportunism; both are particularly harmful to the work of a broad front. It is convenient to remember Marx’s warning in his Critique of the Gotha Program: “no bargaining about principles.”

Right-wing opportunism tends to appear with the following expressions or characteristics: to make concessions of principles in order to make allies; to reduce the level of the struggle for fear of the enemy; to lag behind the level of consciousness of the masses instead of going in front of them; to exaggerate the importance of national or regional particularities without taking into account the general principles; and liberalism in matters of organization, of which the most dangerous is to hide the Party as if it did not exist. We should always keep Lenin in mind: Eenter into agreements to satisfy the practical aims of the movement, but do not allow any bargaining over principle.” (What Is To Be Done?)

Opportunism of the left has the following main characteristics: the false criteria of all or nothing; not knowing how to make the needed concessions and compromises useful for the development of this work; not knowing how to adapt Marxism-Leninism to the particular conditions of the reality in which we live, allowing us to be influenced by the experiences of others, which leads to not know how to adapt or to make mistakes about the level and forms of the struggle and the objective conditions of the masses; in adopting rigid criteria in matters of organizing.

In his Poverty of Philosophy, Marx criticized opportunism. Quoting Juvenal: “Et propter vitam vivendi perdere causas”, in other words, “And for the sake of life to lose the reasons for living!” Let us not forget this old lesson.

Source

Marx, Lenin and Stalin on Zionism: Conclusion & References

This article was published by Alliance (Marxist-Leninist) as part of the publication Alliance, issue #30, “Marx, Lenin and Stalin on Zionism.”

CONCLUSION:

1) The Marxist-Leninists have always stood against both anti-Semitism and Zionism.
To be anti-Zionist is not equivalent to being an anti-Semite or anti-Jewish.
It is the Zionists – both in the past and in their current manifestations as the supporters of Israel in its present imperialist puppet state from – that confuse progressives by insisting that they are the same.

2) Revisionists used the tactic of confusing anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism
The distortion of anti-Zionism into anti-Semitism formed part of the revisionist underground campaign to subvert the USSR from socialism.
It reached a peak under the so called “Doctor’s Plot.”

That more will be learnt about all of the episodes discussed in this report, is certain. Until further data becomes clear to Marxists-Leninists however, the role of Stalin in supporting the establishment of a partitioned Palestine for a Zionist Israel – is extremely unlikely.

This was a policy foisted upon the USSR by the revisionists led by Gromyko, Ponomorev and Manuilsky.

LISTING OF THE FULL REFERENCES

Journals

Alliance Marxist-Leninist (Available from address cited page 3 of this report or contact via <hari.kumar@sympatico.ca>;
Compass (Available from: <hari.kumar@sympatico.ca>
Science cited re Sudoplatov’s allegations;
Several Soviet journals have been cited; but were not read by Alliance; & so these are also cited by the authors used by Alliance to compile the information in this report;

World Wide Web Sites Used In This Report:

1) For several citations on the positions of Jews in Europe especially pre-revolutionary Russia: See “Beyond The Pale”; found at the site:
<http://www.friends-partners.org/partners/beyond-the-pale/english/32.html> ;
2) For citations from Lenni Brenner’s book: See: Web site of International Secretariat of the War & Holocaust Tales Ancient Amateurs’ Association; (WHOTAAAN) in 1996; E-Mail: <aaargh@abbc.com>; the book itself is referenced also below;
3) For some citations on cold war and world war II policy of West to USSR; see “A Decade of American Foreign Policy : Basic Documents, 1941-49″; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC: 1950. Found on the WWW: World War II Page WW II Conferences Page; Avalon Home Page: William C. Fray & Lisa A. Spar.
4) For some citations upon the USSR efforts for a bomb; Cold War International History Project; Web Site: “Research Notes: the Russian Nuclear Declassification Project: Setting Up the A-bomb Effort, 1946″; by G. A. Goncharov, N. I. Komov, A. S. Stepanov;
5) For various documents from the USSR archives; here we cite: From A Document On The Web: The Jewish Anti-fascist Committee Jewish in the USSR 21 June 1946: To Comrade M. A. Suslov, Director Section for Foreign Policy Central >Committee of the Communist Party; Site is at: <http://lcweb.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/jewi.html>
6) For the quotations from Marx on The Jewish Question – analysed in detail in the Appendix; See: <http://www.marx.org/Archive/arch-z.gif>

Books:

Axell, Albert: “Stalin’s War Through the Eyes of His Commanders”; New York; 1997;
Arch Getty J & Roberta T. Manning Eds: “Stalinist Terror, New Perspectives.” Cambridge, 1993.
Bland W.B.: “The Doctors Case & The Death Of Stalin”; Stalin Society; London nd ca 1992;
Bland W.B.; “Restoration of Capitalism In the USSR”; London; 1981; also at home pages of Alliance.
Bland W.B. for ML Research Bureau; Report No.2; London; nd circa 1992;
Brenner, Lenni: Zionism in the Age of Dictators; 1983, Kent;
Chaney, Preston: “Zhukov”; 1976; Norman Oklahoma=
Dallin D.J. “Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin”; Philadelphia 1961
Degras J (Ed); “The Communist International 1919-1943; Documents” Vol 1; London; 1971;
Deriabin Peter: “Watchdogs of Terror: Russian bodyguards from the Tsars to the Commissars”; USA; 1984;
Etinger Iakov; “The Doctors’ Plot: Stalin’s Solution to the Jewish Question”; in Editor: Yaacov Ro’i: “Jews & Jewish Life in Russia & the Soviet Union”; London; 1995;
Elon Amos; “Rothschild”; London;
Gromyko A. “Memoirs”; New York; 1989;
Gromyko A.A. & Ponomorev B.N. Edited: “Soviet Foreign Policy; 1945-1980″; Volume II; Moscow; 1980;
Grey I: “Stalin: Man of History”; London; 1979;
Holloway, David: “Stalin and the Bomb”; New Haven, 1994;
Knight, Amy: “Beria-Stalin’s First Lieutenant”; Princeton New Jersey 1993;
Khruschev N.S.: Secret Speech to 20th party Congress; CPSU, In: “The anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism: A Selection of Documents”; New York; 1956;
Laquer Walter; “A History of Zionism”; New York; 1976;
Levytsky B: “The Uses Of Terror: The Soviet State Security: 1917-1970″; London; 1971;
Leon Abraham; “The Jewish Question-A Marxist Interpretation”; New York; 1970;
Lenin V.I;: “The Position of Bund In The Party”; 1903; Works; vol 7; Moscow 1986;
Lenin “Critical Remarks National Question” In “Lenin On USA”; p. 87; or From Vols 20; Works;
Lenin; “Right Of Nations to Self Determination”; Sel Wks; Vol 1; Moscow; 1977; or Works vol 20;
Lenin V.I: “Does the Jewish proletariat need an independent political party”; Iskra 1903; Works; Mos; 1985; Vol 6
Marx; Letter to Ruge A; March 13th 1843;
Marx., “British Rule in India”: the collection: “Marx & Engels On Britain.” Moscow; 1971;
Marx: “On the Jewish Question” – >Deutsch-Franzosische Jahrbucher=- Vol 3 Marx and Engels Collected Works;
Marx; “The Holy Family”; The Jewish Question. Volume 4; CW; Moscow; 1975;
Marx K; “Capital” Volume 1; Chapter 1; Section 4;
Padover Saul K.; “Introduction” In Volume 5, “On Religion”; The Karl Marx Library; New York; 1974
Pinkus Benjamin: “The Jews of the Soviet Union”; Cambridge; 1988;
Ro’i, Yaacov (ed) “Jews & Jewish Life in Russia & The Soviet Union”; London 1995;
Rapoport Y: “‘The Doctor’s Plot’, Stalin’s Last Crime”: London; 1991;
Resis Albert: “Stalin, the Politburo & the Onset of the Cold War. 1945-1946″, no.701, CB Papers; Pittsburgh 1988;
Reale Eugenio: “The Founding of the Cominform,” In M. M.Drachkovitch and Branko Lazitch (Eds): “The Comintern: Historical Highlights: Essays Recollection &Documents”; Stanford (USA); 1966;
Redlich, Shimon: “Propaganda and Nationalism in Wartime Russia-The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee in the USSR, 1941-1948″; 1982; USA;
Sudoplatov Pavel &; with JL &LP Schecter: “Special Tasks”; Boston; 1995;
Stalin J.: “Works” Moscow; 1956; Vol 2; “Marxism and the National Question”;
Strizhov Iurii: “The Soviet Position on the Establishment of the State of Israel”; London; 1995;
Tawney R.H. “Religion & The Rise of Capitalism”; London; 1975;
Teller, Judd T: “The Kremlin, The Jews and the Middle East”; p.106.New York; 1957;
Vaksberg Arkady; “Stalin Against the Jews”; New York; 1994;
Wilson E.M.: “Decision On Palestine – How the US Came to Recognise Israel”; Stanford; 1979;
Weinberg Robert; “Stalin’s Forgotten Zion – Birobidzhan & the Making of A Soviet Jewish Homeland, An Illustrated History 1928-1996.” Berkeley 1998;
Wolin S & Slusser R: “The Soviet Secret Police”; London; 1957;
Zubok, Vladislav & Pleshakov, Constantine “Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War – From Stalin to Khrushchev”; Cambridge Mass; 1996.

Source

The Doctor’s Plot

Vrachi-timashuk

This article was published by Alliance (Marxist-Leninist) as part of the publication Alliance, issue #30, “Marx, Lenin and Stalin on Zionism.”

Over this entire period another phenomena was taking place, the distortion of a legitimate anti-cosmopolitanism campaign into an illegitimate anti-Semitic campaign. An increasing number of articles in the press accused persons of “Cosmopolitanism,” but:

“More and more the attacks take an anti-Jewish character, as most of the attacked bear distinctly Jewish names, often given in brackets next to their Russified names. From November 1948 onward, the Soviet authorities start a deliberate campaign to liquidate what is left of Jewish culture. The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee is dissolved, its members arrested. Jewish literature is removed from bookshops and libraries, and the last two Jewish schools are closed. Jewish theatres, choirs and drama groups, amateur as well as professional, are dissolved. Hundreds of Jewish authors, artists, actors and journalists are arrested. During the same period, Jews are systematically dismissed from leading positions in many sectors of society, from the administration, the army, the press, the universities and the legal system. Twenty-five of the leading Jewish writers arrested in 1948 are secretly executed in Lubianka prison in August 1952. The anti-Jewish campaign culminates in the arrest, announced on January 13, 1953, of a group of ‘Saboteurs-Doctors’ accused of being paid agents of Jewish-Zionists organizations and of planning to poison Soviet leaders. Fears spread in the Jewish community that these arrests and the show trial that is bound to follow serve as a pretext for the deportation of Jews to Siberia. But on March 5, 1953, Stalin unexpectedly dies. The ‘Doctor”s Plot’ was exposed as a fraud, the accused are released, and deportation plans, already discussed in the Politburo, are dropped.”

Web site Beyond The Pale; Op Cit:
http://www.friends-partners.org/partners/beyond-the-pale/english/62.html

The class struggle in the USSR was culminating in a frenzied atmosphere, where one strand that was being used by the revisionists was a mounting awareness of an anti-Semitic campaign. This melded the closing of the JAFC into the new plot – the so called “Doctor’s Plot”:

“On 12 August 1952, a group of former JAFC members, convicted by the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court, were put before a firing squad. Many other people of Jewish nationality – 110 in all -were arrested in connection with the JAG case on charges of ‘espionage’ and “anti-Soviet Jewish nationalist activity.” At the time of the trial of the JAG members, preparation of the Doctors’ Plot reached its final stage.”

Iakov Etinger; “The Doctors’ Plot,” Ibid; p. 104.

The Doctor’s Plot was according to the Khruschevite revisionists, entirely the fabrication of Stalin, and they claim credit as the ones who exonerated the Doctors named:

“Stalin… issued orders to arrest a group of eminent Soviet medical specialists.. When we examined this “case” after Stalin’s death, we found it to be fabricated from beginning to end.”

N.S.Khruschev: Secret Speech to 20th party Congress; CPSU, In: “The anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism: A Selection of Documents”; New York; 1956; p.64.

However it is known that Stalin was dubious about the whole notion of the “Doctors’ Plot.”

When he was first informed his reaction was characteristically blunt.
When Stalin first heard about the alleged “Doctors’s Plot” he dismissed it.
It should also be noted that Stalin’s death was certainly not caused by inappropriate medical attention – but in sharp contrast – by the very deliberate lack or withholding of medical attention. (See Bland’s chronology of events in “Death Of Stalin”; Ibid.)

In 1948, an allegation was made by a Dr Lydia Timashuk, described as a “rank-and-file” doctor, against medical experts. She alleged there had been:

“intentional distortions in medical conclusions made by major medical experts who served as consultants in the hospital. She exposed their criminal designs and thus opened the eyes of security bodies to the existence of the infamous conspiracy.”

Rapoport Y: “Doctors’s Plot: Stalin’s Last Crime”: London; 1991; p.77.

Although Khrushchev alleged that Stalin was behind “this ignominious case,” (Khrushchev secret speech op cit; p. 65) other commentators tell us that:

“Stalin had strong doubts about Timashuk’s allegations.”

Grey I: “Stalin: Man of History”; London; 1979; p.461.

And Stalin’s daughter Svetlana Alliluyeva wrote:

“My father’s housekeeper told me not long ago that my father was extremely distressed at the turn events took… She was waiting on table as usual, when my father remarked that he did not believe the doctors were ‘dishonest’ and that the only evidence against them, after all were the ‘reports’ of Dr. Timashuk.”

Alliyeuva S; ibid; p.215.

Again it is only Khrushchev or Sudoplatov, who can confirm that Stalin supposedly “changed his mind” after a full investigation. (Khrushchev N: “Khrushchev Remembers”; London; 1971; p.283).

Victor Abakumov, was placed in charge of the investigation of Dr Timashuk’s allegations. It was in 1950 that the first arrest took place, with that of Dr Yakov Ettinger at the First Ggradeskaya Hospital of Moscow. (Rappoport Op Cit; p. 24).

However in 1951, Victor Abakumov was then himself arrested, on the charge of “lack of vigilance in connection with the “Leningrad Affair”:

“In.. 1951.. Abakumov was arrested.. He was taken to the Lyubanka and put in solitary confinement. Several of his deputies and several dozen state security officers were arrested along with him… The charges brought against Abakumov at that time were that he had not recognised the enemy of the people during his handling of the ‘Leningrad Affair’.. In September 1951 none other than Khrushchev .. Echoed Stalin’s charge that Abakumov and his officers had failed to recognise the enemy of the people in the northern city’s Party apparatus.”

P.Deriabin: “Watchdogs of Terror:Russian bodyguards from Tsars to Commissars”; USA; 1984; p.316-317.

How did the whole matter get started, and who were the players behind it?

As stated above, the accusations were a matter of four years old. They had been put aside as an un-proven allegation. It is speculative, but they might be seen as having been sent by a potentially disgruntled employee.

The allegations were put aside until, the accusation became expedient to serve as a further means of sabotage. In other words to disrupt the faithful Marxist-Leninist ring around Stalin; and to inflame the population with a divisive anti-Semitism.

Dr Lydia Timashuk had been the original complainer, and she received the Order of Lenin for her work, in 1953:

“On 21 January 1953, the newspapers published the Decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium awarding Doctor L. F Timashuk the Order of Lenin ‘for assistance rendered to the government in exposing the murderous doctors.'”

Iakov Etinger: “The Doctors’ Plot”; Ibid; p. 115-7

But the letter “warning of the “Doctor’s Plot” itself had been submitted in 1948.
Timashuk had written to Vlasik, of the MGB Security and a key pro-Stalin figure.
Neither Vlasik, Stalin nor those of the MGB responsible for Zhdanov took action.

The letter warned that during the conduct of medical tests on Zhdanov, there had been a deliberate mis-diagnosis. Dr Timashuk was the head of the Electrocardiography laboratory at the Kremlin Hospital. Not only did she allege that Professors Egorov and Vasilenko (of the Kremlin’s Special Medical Department) insist that Dr Timashuk alter a diagnosis of “coronary thrombosis” to “sclerosis and hypertension,” but that they also falsified a diagnosis on a form previously reported by a “physician in charge” – Dr Maiorov:

“It is now known from recently discovered classified KGB and CPSU Central Committee documents that on 29 August 1948, Timashuk, head of the electrocardiography laboratory at the Kremlin Hospital, sent a confidential letter to General N. S. VIasik, chief of MGB security. It was a political denunciation asserting that on 28 August 1948, the head of the Kremlin’s special medical department, Professor P. I. Egorov, summoned her to take an ECG of Politburo Member A. A. Zhdanov. On that same day she and Professor Egorov, Academician Vinogradov and Professor V. Kh. Vasilenko flew from Moscow to Valdai where Zhdanov was at the time. She took his electrocardiogram and diagnosed coronary thrombosis. She immediately told the professors who had come with her about it. But, she went on, Professor Egorov and the physician in charge, Dr. Maiorov, said that the diagnosis was incorrect, that this was not a case of coronary thrombosis but of functional disorders caused by sclerosis and hypertension. They proposed that she, ‘alter’ the diagnosis and write ‘caution’ without mentioning coronary thrombosis as Dr. Karpai had done on the previous electrocardiograms. Further on Timashuk said in her letter to VIasik that on 29 August 1948 Zhdanov had had another acute heart attack and she was summoned from Moscow for the second time. However, on orders from Vinogradov and Egorov the electrocardiogram was not taken on 29 August but postponed until the following day. ‘It was again proposed in a categorical fashion that I alter the diagnosis, and that myocardial infarction should not be mentioned. I notified Comrade A. M. Belov about it.’ Belov was an MGB official responsible for Zhdanov’s safety .. Timashuk pointed out that the consultants and the doctor in charge of the case “clearly underestimated Zhdanov’s grave condition, for they allowed him to get up and take a walk in the park.’ In her opinion ‘in future that could lead to fatal consequences.'”

We will leave aside the vexed issue of inter-physician agreements at the best of times! Those unfortunate enough to end up in the hands of physicians will know how they frequently disagree! However, to stay with the facts –
the letter was, by the 30th August, with Abakumov – who responded to Stalin in a memorandum:

“On the desk of the State Security Minister V. S. Abakumov.
On that same day he sent a top-secret memorandum to Stalin: To Comrade Stalin, 1. V., I am sending you a statement by Dr. L. F.Timashuk, head of the electrocardiography laboratory, about the condition of Comrade Zhdanov. As is evident from Dr. Timashuk’s statement, she insists that Comrade Zhdanov had a myocardial infarction in the area of the anterior wall of the left ventricle and of the intra ventricular septum. Head of the Kremlin medical department Egorov and Academician Vinogradov suggested that she alter the diagnosis omitting any mention of myocardial infarction.
Enclosed: Statement by Comrade Timashuk and the ECG of Comrade Zhdanov.”

Iakov Etinger, “The Doctors’ Plot”; p. 115-7

Since no action was still taken, despite the subsequent death of Zhdanov, Timashuk continued to send more letters – apparently it is true they were at least in some cases, addressed to a known revisionist Kuznetsov. Conceivably it is true then that a revisionist would have delayed the “truth” (if there were any – in Timashuk’s allegations from emerging.
But it was not till 1952, when the case was re-opened. It was re-opened – it is alleged by Professor Iakov Etinger (Younger) – by Stalin himself:

“Zhdanov died on 30 August 1948. After his death Timashuk sent several letters to the Central Committee, setting forth her opinion about Zhdanov’s diagnosis and treatment. At that point the case was shelved. But Stalin returned to it in the summer of 1952, when preparations for the Doctors’ Plot were in full swing.”

Iakov Etinger, “The Doctors’ Plot”; p. 115-7

But the re-opening of the case by Stalin would mean that he would have in the interim changed his mind. We have no direct evidence for this.
We have only the assertions from various interested parties like Professor Etinger, and Khruschev, that Stalin now “wanted to launch a case against the Jews.” Other than this incantation, we have not yet heard any concrete evidence that indicates Stalin had changed his mind.

The re-opening of the case has been described by Timashuk herself, in a letter found in the Central Committee Archives.

In her letter she describes being received by Malenkov and being informed of her “service” having been rewarded with the Order of Lenin. But she herself records that she had not believed that the doctors were saboteurs. The inference is that she believed they had been simply “mistaken.” She also describes the revoking of the Order and assurances that she was still considered competent:

“A letter Timashuk sent to the Presidium of the 23rd Congress of the CPSU in 1966 has recently been discovered in the Central Committee archives. It said:
“In the summer of 1952 I was suddenly summoned to investigator Novikov in the MGB investigation department on matters of highest importance and after some time to investigator Eliseev in connection with the case of the late A. A. Zhdanov. I again confirmed everything I had written to A. A. Kuznetsov, in the Central Committee. Six months later, on 20 January 1953, A. N. Postrebyshev (Head of the Central Committee’s Special Sector, Stalin’s personal secretariat) summoned me by phone and I was invited to the Kremlin. There G. M. Malenkov told me that a Council of Ministers meeting and Comrade Stalin personally had just thanked me for my personal courage displayed (that is, four and a half years ago) when I adhered to my professional opinion in the dispute with a prominent professor, and officially commended me and decorated me with the Order of Lenin. I was dumbfounded, for I could not believe that the doctors treating Zhdanov would turn out to be saboteurs. .. On the following day, 21 January 1953, the Order of Lenin was awarded to me and on 4 April 1953, The day the doctors were rehabilitated] the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium repealed the decision on my decoration as erroneous. When I returned the Order of Lenin to the Supreme Soviet, A. F. Gorkin and N.M. Pegov (prominent party and Soviet functionaries) were present. They assured me that the government considered me an honest Soviet doctor and the repeal of the decree on my decoration would not affect my professional prestige or position. I continued working in the Kremlin Hospital as head of the functional diagnosis department. Three years later, in 1956, N. S. Khrushchev sent a secret letter dealing with Stalin’s personality cult to the CPSU Central Committee and mentioned my name there in connection with the Doctor Plots.”

Iakov Etinger, “The Doctors’ Plot”; p. 115-7

The work of the previously quoted Iakov Etinger becomes of significant interest, not the least because he was the son of the first imprisoned doctor.

Dr Etinger the elder, was the first implicated doctor in the “Plot,” and he was accused of the murders of Alexsandr Shcherbakov and Andrei Zhdanov.

Dr Etinger was a competent physician who had often been consulted by and on behalf of leading party and Comintern officials. His degrees and competency were never questioned. What was questioned was his motives, and whether he used his knowledge to deliberately mis-treat and kill prominent patients:

“On 13 January 1953, all leading Soviet newspapers carried the notorious TASS communique entitled ‘The Arrest of a Group of Saboteur Doctors’ which accused a number of Jewish doctors of plotting to murder leading Soviet figures using harmful methods of medical treatment. These doctors had allegedly caused the death of Central Committee Secretaries Aleksandr Shcherbakov and Andrei Zhdanov. The provocation was part of a far-reaching plan to link the JAG case with the doctors ‘crimes.’ This was alluded to in the following phrase from the TASS statement:

‘Vovsi (one of the accused physicians) told the investigation that he had gotten orders to kill leading cadres in the USSR from the US-based Joint (the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee) via a Moscow doctor, one Shimeliovich, and the prominent Jewish bourgeois-nationalist Mikhoels.”‘

Iakov Etinger: “The Doctors’ Plot”; p. 115-7

Etinger the Younger’s interpretation of events was that there was a link between the “Anti-Zionist Plot,” and the current plot – designed to provoke suspicions of the Jews:

“The investigation committee wanted Shimeliovich, who had been a member of the JAG Presidium and had already been shot, and Professor Vovsi, Mikhoels’s cousin, to play the role of the connecting link between the JAG and the arrested Jewish doctors In other words, the upcoming trial was meant to ‘demonstrate’ that the JAG were the ideologues of a ramified and deeply entrenched ‘Jewish plot’ that was to be carried out by Jewish ‘doctor killers.'”

Iakov Etinger: “The Doctors’ Plot”; p. 104-105.

In fact it was Riumin who had provoked further investigations into the case.

It was this same Riumin who was anxious to implicate Abakumov as having been “negligent” in his prior investigations.
Riumin also claimed that Abakumov was trying to obstruct the renewed investigation of Riumin.
Riumin’s actions included personal letters to Stalin.

From a point in June of 1951, Abakumov was first expelled from the party, and then in July he was arrested. These details have been written about by a writer in the former USSR named Kirill Stoliarov:

“Kirill Stoliarov summed up the results of his painstaking and profound study of the materials in the case of State Security Minister Abakumov in his book ‘Golgofa’ (Calvary). He writes there:
‘Riumin investigated the Ia. G. Etinger case. He claimed that Abakumov, first, did not permit him to interrogate Etinger as a participant in the heinous murder of A. Shcherbakov.. and, secondly, ordered Etinger… transferred from the inner prison (of the Lubianka) to the Lefortovo Prison, where he suddenly died and thus priceless information on an extensive terrorist plot was buried. This calls for some explanation. In June 1951 (Abakumov) was expelled from the party, relieved from his post on 4 July and arrested on 12 July. A large group of high-ranking State Security Ministry officials were also arrested. All of them were detained on the strength of the information submitted to the party Central Committee.”

Iakov Etinger: “The Doctors’ Plot”; p. 104-105.

Thus Riumin wrote to Stalin that Abakumov was “glossing over” the Etinger affair:

“M. D. Riumin informed the Central Committee that his superiors were ‘glossing over’ the terrorist plans of Etinger and ‘enemy agents’ spearheaded against Politburo members and Stalin personally; they deliberately neglected to record Etinger’s interrogations which made it possible adroitly to conceal from Stalin, mistakes ‘in the struggle against the schemes of international imperialism.'”

Iakov Etinger: “The Doctors’ Plot”; p. 104-105.

Etinger attributes the subsequent arrest of Abakumov to the actions of Stalin. It is unknown however whether this was so, or whether there was little choice in this circumstance but to bide time and order a full enquiry.
In any case Riumin did obtain his goals: both the arrest of Abakumov and the control over the Etinger case:

“Sending such a letter to Stalin was doubtless a risky undertaking. The chances that it would reach him were very slim.
‘But the miracle did occur,’ Stoliarov writes, ‘and in defiance of common sense and chance. .. Stalin got the signal and after carefully thinking the matter over ordered that Abakumov be arrested.’ The Abakumov case was investigated by K. Mokichev, First Deputy Prosecutor-General. Stoliarov notes that Mokichev began the interrogations ‘with facts’ cited by Riumin, namely, that the terrorist aims of the Jewish nationalist Etinger were being ‘glossed over.'”

Iakov Etinger: “The Doctors’ Plot”; p. 107-8.

Abakumov’s testimony showed that he did in fact conduct an investigation and had come to the conclusion that the whole matter was NOT a question of physician sabotage.

In Abakumov’s words “In the course of the interrogation it had become clear to me that all of this had nothing to do with terrorism, absolutely nothing:

“Stoliarov goes on to say: This is what Abakumov testified about Etinger:

Question: Why did you delay Etinger’s arrest and subsequently forbid interrogating him about terrorism, telling Riumin that Etinger would get him ‘bogged down?’

Answer: The leadership of the Second Directorate reported to me that Etinger was hostile. I told them to prepare a memorandum for the Central Committee. The memorandum cited facts proving that Etinger was a dirty swine. (Abakumov was referring to the anti-Stalin views Professor Etinger expressed when speaking to his son, which constituted a counter-revolutionary crime punishable under Art. 58-10 of the RSFSR Criminal Code. Father and son were having a private conversation, which was tape-recorded – K. Stoliarov).

That was in the first half of 1950, I do not remember in which month. However, at that juncture we had no orders to arrest him. After the order from the higher authorities came, I had him brought to me because I knew that he was an active Jewish nationalist and vehemently anti-Soviet.

“You better tell the whole truth, without beating about the bush,” I said to Etinger.

In reply to my questions he promptly answered that there were no grounds for his arrest and the truth was that Jews were being suppressed in this country. When I pressed further, he said he was an honest man, he was treating high-ranking people and mentioned my deputy, Selivanovskii, and then Shcherbakov. At this moment I said he would have to describe what exactly he had done to cause his death. He began speaking in great detail about Shcherhakov’s serious condition and said he had been doomed. In the course of the interrogation it had become clear to me that all of this had nothing to do with terrorism, absolutely nothing. Later it was reported to me that nothing new or interesting had been gotten out of Etinger.”

Iakov Etinger: “The Doctors’ Plot”; p. 108-109.

Etinger then summarises that Abakumov had concluded that Etinger was not a “criminal” but was merely a Jewish nationalist:

“According to declassified documents of the CPSU Central Committee and the KGB, after another regular interrogation of Etinger in December 1950, Abakumov ‘came to the conclusion’ that there were no facts pointing to ‘criminal medical treatment.’ On 28-29 January 1951, Abakumov issued instructions ‘to discontinue working with Etinger,’ that is, to stop trying to make him confess to ‘criminal treatment’ and only stick to the charges of anti-Soviet activity and Jewish nationalism.”

The excerpts from the interrogation corroborate the view that Abakumov did not try to deny – that even physical beating – had failed to produce any evidence that the physician Etinger had been a criminal. But let us return to the verbatim records of Abakumov’s interrogation.

Question: Are you aware that Etinger was transferred to the Lefortovo prison and that conditions there were new to him?

Answer: This is not correct. The inner [Lubianka] and Lefortovo prisons do not differ from one another.

Question: Did you issue orders that Etinger be kept in special conditions, jeopardizing his health?

Answer: What do you mean by special?

Question: Harder than for the other inmates. Etinger was placed in a damp and cold cell.

Answer: There is nothing extraordinary about that because he was the enemy. We are allowed to beat the inmates – I and my first deputy Ogol’tsov were repeatedly reminded at the RGPtb) Central Committee that whenever necessary our chektsty should not be afraid to use physical force against spies and other people who had committed crimes against the state. An inmate is an inmate, and prison is prison. There are no such things as warm and cold cells there. There was talk about a stone floor, but as far as I know all cells have stone floors. I told the investigating officer that we must get the truth from the inmate and I may have said that I did not want him to get us bogged down.”

Iakov Etinger: “The Doctors’ Plot”; p. 109.

It is known that Abakumov wrote to Stalin, protesting his loyalty and that it was at that point, that Stalin had asked to see the records of testimonies for himself:

“From the ‘Matrosskaia tishina’ Prison, Abakumov wrote a letter to Stalin, trying to prove that he was innocent and infinitely loyal to him. The letter said:

‘Riumin’s statement about my alleged hint to Etinger that he should refuse to testify regarding terrorism (the reference is to charges of causing Shcherbakov”s death) is all wrong. There was nothing of the kind and could never be. Had we had any concrete facts to act upon we would have skinned him alive in order not to miss a case like that.’

Abakumov’s letter reached Stalin and he kept it. Three weeks later, the following note came to the USSR Prosecutor”s Office:

‘Comrade Mokichev, at 3 a.m. there was a phone call from Malenkov. He has gotten instructions to send the records of Abakumov’s interrogation to Comrade Stalin tomorrow. The note was dated 19 August 1951, 3:10 a.m. and signed by S. Ignat’ev, the new Minister of State Security.'”

Iakov Etinger: “The Doctors’ Plot”; p. 109-110.

But it was precisely this step that needed to be somehow either blocked – or check-mated – by the revisionists.
Otherwise, Stalin would have been in a position to both free Abakumov, un-ravel the Doctor’s Plot as a fraud, and in the process further reveal the hidden revisionist plots.

The check-mate came in the form of a highly convenient “confession,” but one that was “made” to another trusted revisionist.
The latter was necessary, so that there could be no more possible re-appraisals, until the revisionist coup was carried through.
It was ensured that there would be no opportunity to attempt any further cross-examination of Etinger – for Etinger was now conveniently dead.

At this juncture the short term aim of the revisionists was to be put in charge of the investigation of Abakumov; and to roll out the “Doctors Case.”

The “confession” of Etinger was achieved at this very juncture. This also automatically implicated Stalin”s own personal physician Vinogradov – since the two must have been working in tandem, if one was a criminal:

“At that time Riumin was doing his best to be put in charge of investigating the Abakumov case. According to Stoliarov, Riumin succeeded in getting what he wanted when Col. M. Likhachev, former deputy head of the USSR State Security Ministry investigating high priority cases, arrested shortly after Abakumov, obediently confirmed that before his death Professor Etinger had confessed to causing Shcherhakov’s death. It was a stroke of unbelievably good luck opening vast prospects to Riumin:

the late Etinger had been just a consultant, while Professor Vinogradov, Stalin’s personal physician of long standing, had been treating Shcherbakov.

Etinger could not have worked to kill Shcherbakov without Vinogradov’s consent. Hence, it had been a joint operation.”

Iakov Etinger: “The Doctors’ Plot”; p. 109-110.

Riumin succeeded in taking over the investigation of Abakumov:

“On 22 February 1952 State Security bodies were put in charge of the investigation of the case of Abakumov and his subordinates and the suspects were transferred from the ‘Matrosskaia tishina’ Prison to Lefortovo. As noted above, by that time Professor Etinger was already dead.”

Iakov Etinger: “The Doctors’ Plot”; p. 110.

The question then as to whether Abamumov, was a genuine Marxist-Leninist or not, seems to be answered in the affirmative.
It seems quite clear that the revisionists needed him out of the way.

In that light we believe that he had taken the correct Marxist-Leninist route.
We will come to Beria’s view of him later.

But it is interesting, that the very same revisionist who was so virulently against Abakumov – Riumin – had been especially hostile to the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee:

“In 1951, Riumin had written a report on the hostile intentions of S. A. Lozovskii, I.S. Fefer, L. S. Shtern, B. A. Shimeliovich – 14 people in all. The report said that ‘the evidence has established that during their visit to America in 1943, former JAFC leaders Mikhoels and Fefer were given an assignment by Jewish reactionaries to get the Crimea settled by Jews and have an independent republic established there to be used by the Americans as a bridgehead against the USSR at an opportune moment.’ In late 1951 Colonel Riumin was appointed Deputy Minister of State Security and was made responsible for the ministry’s investigation.”

Iakov Etinger: “The Doctors’ Plot”; p. 109-110.

Etinger’s son, notes that the timing of the “Doctors’ Plot,” was coincident with various similar events throughout the countries developing towards socialism in Eastern Europe:

“The main participants in the Doctors’ Plot were arrested in November 1952. Simultaneously the anti-Semitic drive in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe was being stepped up. The trial of the ‘anti-government conspirators’ took place in Czechoslovakia in late November 1952. The crusade against ‘Jewish bourgeois nationalism’ was gaining momentum and an unprecedented anti-Jewish purge was being prepared throughout the socialist camp with the main developments unfolding in Moscow. In December; subsequent to the CPSU Central Committee Presidium decree of 4 December 1952 ‘On the Situation in the Ministry of State Security and on Subversive Activities in Medical Treatment,’ the Central Committee issued instructions to party organizations concerning organs of the MGB. N. A. Bulganin, then a member of the Presidium, told me that the instructions contained a passage about ‘established facts regarding subversive activities in medicine’ and the comments to the instructions stressed the ‘key role’ of Jewish professors “closely linked with international Zionism and American intelligence.”

Iakov Etinger: “The Doctors’ Plot”; p. 113.

The announcement of the Plot was associated with an attempt to light up an anti-Semitic campaign, by linking it with the use of terms such as “fifth column,” and by publishing lists of names that were apparently of Jewish origin:

“The preparatory phase in the Doctor’s Plot was completed by late 1952. On 13 January 1953, the TASS statement announced the arrest of ‘saboteur doctors.’ On the same day Pravda carried a front-page editorial under the heading ‘Despicable Spies and Murderers Disguised as Professors of Medicine’… the article said:
‘US tycoons and their British ‘junior partners’ know that it is impossible to impose their domination on other nations by peaceful means. Their frenzied preparations for a new world war include planting spies in the Soviet rear and the People’s Democracies in an attempt to succeed where the Hitlerites failed: to create their subversive ‘fifth column’ in the USSR. In other words, a clear hint was being made, that the ‘Jewish bourgeois nationalists’ were this ‘fifth column.’ Unbridled anti-Semitic propaganda was unleashed in the country. The press was rife with Jewish names.”

Iakov Etinger: “The Doctors’ Plot”; p. 114.

At about this time a letter was devised that was to be signed by prominent Soviet Jews.

This would call for the deportation of Jews to resettle them in outlying areas.
A “theoretical foundation” was given by the Philosopher Dmitrii Chesnokov of the Party presidium from the 19th Party Congress. This stated that:

“The Jews had proved to be ‘unreceptive to socialism.’ He wrote a book which was .. (widely) circulated.”

Iakov Etinger: “The Doctors’ Plot”; p. 118-119.

This letter called for punishment against the accused doctors, and to resettle many Jews. It provoked unrest amongst the intelligentsia. It was promoted by another known revisionist – Mark Borisovich Mitin who had supported the anti-scientific campaign of Trofim Lysenko. (See “Lysenko, Views of Nature, Society”; 1990; available, from Alliance p.285).

Nonetheless despite the evident pressure, some notable figures refused to sign:

A. N. Iakovlev, former Central Committee Secretary, who at one time,” headed the Politburo commission for rehabilitation and was well acquainted with many major political “cases” of the postwar years, said that the letter was devised and put into circulation by Chesnokov. Iakovlev recalls that another “philosopher,” Mark Mitin, and “historian”, Isak Mints, collected the required signatures of Jewish scientists and cultural figures. We know that several people to whom the trio turned refused to sign – Ilya Erenburg, People”s Artist of the USSR, Mark Reizen, Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel-General Ia. G. Kreizer, and composer I. 0. Dunaevskii. Among those who did sign was M. I. Blanter, the author of the famous song “Katiusha”. The full list of those who signed this document is unknown.”

Iakov Etinger: “The Doctors’ Plot”; p. 118-119.

The timing of these events is highly significant. As all this de-stabilisation of the USSR state was taking place, Stalin was both ill and most probably – dying. In some way, all commentators are agreed, the “Doctors’ Plot” was a key hinge around which took place, all the events of the last few days and weeks of Stalin’s life were. We here will only cite Etinger:

“On 5 March, if we are to believe the official version of events, Stalin died. It later came to light that in the last days of the dictator”s life, the CPSU leadership was in session around the clock. On that same day, a joint session of the Central Committee Plenum, the Council of Ministers and the Supreme Soviet Presidium was held. The session adopted a resolution on the reorganization of the country’s party and state leadership. A major decision adopted there was the merger of the Ministry of State Security (MGB) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) into a single Ministry of the Interior headed by Beria, who was also appointed first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.”

Iakov Etinger: “The Doctors’ Plot”; p. 118-119.

It is at this point that again we have to re-discuss whether or not Beria was a Marxist-Leninist? For Etinger states that he began an ‘extremely ingenious game’ and started calling ‘Stalin a tyrant':

“Having taken over the state security bodies, Beria began an extremely ingenious political game. He began calling Stalin a tyrant and suggested that Central Committee members get acquainted with numerous facts showing his cruelty, abuse of power and political terrorism. The country’s new leadership was extremely worried by the fact that Beria had attained full control of the state security organs and could make use of their archives to suit his own purposes – primarily to expose the entire group of Stalin’s successors as accomplices and perpetrators of the massive repressions in the 1930’s. Therefore, the elimination of Beria was a matter of vital importance for the new Kremlin leaders. With his penchant for adventurism, Beria was increasingly becoming the main contender in the struggle for power.”

Iakov Etinger: “The Doctors’ Plot”; p. 119.

However, it emerges that Etinger is using his own personal interviews and friendships with both Bulganin and Khrushchev to substantiate his viewpoint.
This is clearly inadequate!

As stated above, Beria now moved to discredit and stop the fear-mongering and de-stabilisation associated with the alleged “Doctors’ Plot.”
Even so Etinger asserts that Kaganovich attacked Beria”s “sensationalising” of the “Doctor’s Plot” and taking all credit for freeing the doctors:

“Beria used the Doctors’ Plot as his trump card in this struggle for power and demanded that the doctors be immediately released. It is worth recalling Kaganovich’s statement at the July 1953 Central Committee plenum in which he went out of his way to deny that the Doctors’ Plot had any anti-Semitic overtones. He also stressed that Beria used the Doctors’ Plot in order to consolidate his position in the country and to curry favour with world public opinion as the man who denounced the provocation and had the framed victims released. Kaganovich stated: Let us, for example, take the Doctors’ Plot, which some elements have erroneously linked with Jewry as a whole. The party was right in releasing the doctors, but Beria sensationalised it out of all proportion, resorted to his usual method of patting himself on the back and alleging that it was he who had done it and not the Central Committee, that it was he who had set things right and not the government.”

Iakov Etinger: “The Doctors’ Plot”; p. 120.

But undoubtedly it was Beria and his investigations into the events that had led to the pressure for the release of the physicians.

This came after Beria had forced some rather startling revelations into the hands of the Presidium of the Party. We have already discussed this, the murder of Mikhoels and Abakumov’s allegations:

“On 2 April 1953 Beria sent a letter to the party presidium addressed to Malenkov stating:
‘An examination of the materials in the Mikhoels case has revealed that in February 1948, in Minsk, former USSR MGB Deputy Minister Ogol’tsov and former Belorussian MGB Minister Tsanava illegally…. liquidated Mikhoels on orders from USSR MGB Minister Abakumov… In this connection Abakumov .. Gave the evidence… ‘:

‘As far as I can remember in 1948 the head of the Soviet Government I.V.Stalin gave me an urgent assignment – to promptly organise the liquidation of Mikhoels by MGB personnel..'”

Iakov Etinger: “The Doctors’ Plot”; p. 121.

Again we must discuss Abakumov’s testimony. Until further evidence comes to light, we argue that Abakumov was an honest Marxist-Leninist misled into “believing” that an order had come from Stalin. This is the most likely interpretation of the turn of events.

As discussed above, the role of Suslov and Ponomoraev make the murder of Mikhoels a suspiciously pro-Revisionist event.

What was Beria’s attitude to Abakumov?

Again – some might argue here that Beria was not a Marxist-Leninist. But in the light of the other events of his life, we argue that far more evidence is needed to discredit Beria’s Marxist-Leninist credentials. It seems that Beria either could not attempt a “rescue” of Abakumov from jail, or he might have believed that Abakumov was a revisionist or revisionist misled force.

The revisionists who had benefited from Stalin’s death, were anxious about Beria.

Given the revelations, and Beria’s potential for completely un-ravelling the entire revisionist conspiracy, for the moment his insistence upon releasing the doctors was heeded.

It was Beria who ended the episode of the “Doctor’s Plot”

Despite Professor Etinger’s annoyance, it is hardly surprising that in this context, Beria ensured that it was his name – and not that of Khrushchev’s – that would be associated with the ending of the plot and the restoration of order:

“Beria insisted on the immediate release of the arrested physicians. Finally, on 3 April 1953 at 12 noon, the CPSU Presidium adopted a decision to set free 37 doctors and the members of their families being held for investigation in the Lubianka and Lefortovo prisons. The decision was to be published in the central press and broadcast over the radio on 4 April. At this juncture Beria made a brilliant political move. During the night he called the Pravda editorial offices and demanded that the title of the communique on setting the doctors free be altered. The heading now read ‘Communique of the USSR MVD’ instead of ‘Decree of the CPSU Central Committee Presidium.’ Naturally, people reading this communique on the physicians’ rehabilitation got the impression that Beria’s rise to power in the MVD led to his investigation of the Doctors’ Plot and the release of the innocent victims. Beria was scoring points in the struggle for power not only within the country but also abroad, for world public opinion was greatly concerned about the outburst of anti-Semitism in the USSR.”

Iakov Etinger: “The Doctors’ Plot”; p. 122.

The immediate consequences of this were that the revisionists Riumin and Ignate’ev were arrested:

“Two days after the publication of the MVD communique, a Pravda article revealed that the doctors’ investigation had been headed by Riumin, who was ‘now under arrest.’ More than 15 months later, from 2-7 July 1954, the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court heard the case of Riumin, who was accused of crimes specified in Articles 5-7 of the RSFSR Criminal Code. It is noteworthy that in the announcement of the USSR Supreme Court there was no mention whatsoever that the Doctors’ Plot had any Jewish aspect.”

Iakov Etinger: “The Doctors’ Plot”; p. 119-122.

The revisionists later managed to effect the release of their most important ally Ignat”ev.

They did not exert themselves for Riumin.

Both Riumin and Abakumov were shot.

Of course these temporary set-backs showed the dangers to the revisionists of leaving Beria at the top.
He was swiftly toppled by a plot in which Malenkov and Molotov and Zhukov were persuaded to participate.

These final events – sealing the revisionist victory and successful take over of the socialist state of the USSR – have been best dealt with by Bland in the already referenced booklet: “The Doctors’ Case & The Death Of Stalin”; and the Book “Restoration of Capitalism In The Soviet Union.”

Source

The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee and the Anti-Jewish Plot

Solomon Mikhoels, chairman of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, at the grave of Sholem Aleichem in New York in 1943.

Solomon Mikhoels, chairman of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, at the grave of Sholem Aleichem in New York in 1943.

This article was published by Alliance (Marxist-Leninist) as part of the publication Alliance, issue #30, “Marx, Lenin and Stalin on Zionism.”

The Effects of The War Upon the Jews of the Soviet Union

As the Nazis entered the USSR in their war of aggression, they organised killing squads against the Jews of the former Pale of Settlement, within the USSR:

“The former ‘Pale of Settlement’ – fell under German occupation. In the territories annexed by the Soviet Union after September 1939 – the Baltic, eastern Poland, Bessarabia and the Bukovina – live 1,910,000 Jews; in the Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Crimea and other areas of the RSFSR overrun by the German forces are 2,160,000 Jews. Of these, 1.5 million manage to flee before the German troops arrive. More than 2.5 million are trapped, 90 percent of which live concentrated in less than 50 towns. In the months before the attack, the Nazi leadership has designed a method for these particular circumstances: the mobile killing units.. “Einsatzgruppen,”..of SS men, German police and local helpers… Outside cities with large Jewish populations, mass killings of unprecedented scope and speed take place – in Babi Yar outside Kiev, in Ponar outside Vilna, in the VII.Fort outside Kaunas. In the first five months of operation, the “Einsatzgruppen” shoot 100,000 Jews per month… about 2 million Jews are still alive after the first sweep in November 1941.. Jews are forced into “ghettos” and the population Aselected” for immediate killing, deportation or for forced labor. From 1942 onward, these ghettos are Aliquidated” and the remaining population shot. By the end of 1943, another 900,000 Jews are killed.”

WWW Site: “Beyond the Pale”; Op Cit; at:
http://www.friends-partners.org/partners/beyond-the-pale/english/53.html

During the war anti-Semitic chauvinism continued to be expressed against the Jews despite high involvement of the Soviet Jews in the resistance:

“The Jews of the Soviet Union took an active part in the fight against Nazi Germany. About half a million served in the Red Army, and many volunteered for service at the front. Jewish soldiers ran an extra risk: when taken prisoner, they were bound to be shot immediately. An estimated 200,000 Soviet Jews died on the battlefield. During the war, the old anti-Semitic stereotype of Jews as cowardly soldiers was resurrected. Rumours circulated that Jews are “draft dodgers..” http://www.friends-partners.org/partners/beyond-the-pale/english/53.html

The Soviet state took action to organise the Jewish partisans and fighters, and to publicise their actions in the West. This took the concrete from within the Soviet Union of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee (JAFC). Its’ organisation was approved of, and supported by both Stalin and Beria.

“The Soviet authorities in April 1942 allow the establishment of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee. Its aim is to organize political and material support for the Soviet struggle against Nazi Germany from the Jewish communities in the West.”

(See Web site at “Beyond the Pale”; Op Cit p.61: http://www.friends-partners.org/partners/beyond-the-pale/english/61.html).

“One should bear in mind that attempts to organise an international Jewish committee in the Soviet Union during the first months of the War were sponsored by Beria, head of the Soviet Security Police. Individuals connected with the security apparatus also preformed a significant role within the Soviet Antifascist Committee which emerged in Spring 1942.”

Redlich Shimon:”Propaganda and Nationalism in Wartime Russia-The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee in the USSR, 1941-1948″; 1982; USA; p.11.

There is some dispute as to the origin of the idea of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee.

Two members of the “Bund,” from Poland, were imprisoned by the Soviets after the annexation of Eastern Poland under the terms of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, in 1939. These two men were Henrych Erlich and Wiktor Alter.

They proposed to set up an international Jewish Committee in the USSR. Upon the arrest of the two, international pressure mounted to release them. This included Polish socialists such as Wanda Wasilwska and the American Federation of Labor, and the British government. As a letter written from the Foreign Office explained, this would strengthen the hand of the “moderate Poles” led by General Sikorski:

“A letter from the British Foreign Office to the British Embassy in Moscow listed Erlich and Alter among eight outstanding Polish specialists whose release was sought by the British ‘to strengthen General Sikorski’s hand with his people,’ ie to bolster the moderate Poles.”

Redlich Shimon: “Propaganda and Nationalism in Wartime Russia-The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee in the USSR, 1941-1948″; 1982; USA; p.14.

But when Beria became involved in their case, the previously announced death sentences were lifted and they were released. They were then allowed to assist in the formation of the Committee. As Redlich points out, the Soviet Government was actively thinking about such steps, and a parallel Slav Committee, had already been created “within a few weeks after Hitler’s attack”. (Redlich Ibid; p. 11.)

Claims that Alter and Erlych were primarily responsible for a similar idea in respect of the Jews, are impossible to verify. It is however, certainly the case that both were then later executed.

Who would gain from their executions?

Although both of them were Bundists, and thus anti-Bolshevik, both were working towards the ridding of Poland from Nazi rule and the establishment of a democratic and social-democratic state in Poland. Their contacts with the Polish ambassador in Moscow, Professor Stanlsilaw Kot had assured their allegiance to:

“The New Plan.. Which will shape the fate of the future Europe in the spirit of political freedom social justice and national equality… Kot subsequently reported to his superiors in London that the “Bund delegates told me that the Soviet Government (NKVD) asked their assistance in spreading propaganda especially in America. They promised their help on condition that they would conduct the propaganda themselves, not as figure heads, and that it would be under the control of the (Polish) ambassador.”

Redlich Ibid; p. 24,

Despite evidence that is acknowledged, that they had established links with visiting social democrats such as Water Citrine of the British Trades Union Congress and members of the Soviet – British Trade Union Committee, it appears that Alter and Erlych were genuinely interested in the liberation of Poland.

They therefore objectively assisted the Soviet struggle.

It is clear then, that their murder did not objectively help the USSR.
Yet they were suddenly re-arrested on December 4th 1941.

Even Shimon Redlich, the anti-Marxist-Leninist historian of the JAFC, finds the arrests inexplicable, from the point of view of both Stalin and the desperate struggle of the USSR state against Hitlerism.

In the absence of further data, Alliance is forced to interpret this as another attempted sabotage (See above for other documented war time sabotage).

However the decision had been taken, somehow the fact of their executions; had subsequently to be explained to the world. Vyshinsky accused them of: “working on behalf of Germany.” Redlich Ibid; p. 30. This seemed to many to be a rather un-convincing allegation. There was considerable negative international response to their re-arrest. Workers circles in the USA especially, were split by the news of these two executions. However, the executions were indeed confirmed by Litvinov in early 1943, who stated that both of them had argued for a Peace with Germany. (Redlich Ibid; p. 33).

Further documentary data on this matter is still awaited.

However by the time the arrests of the Bund-ists, had occurred, a Jewish Anti-fascist Committee had been established.

Information provided in an internal party document, “Pursuant to the inquiry of Comrade Shumeiko” upon the JAFC, confirms that the Jewish Anti-fascist Committee in the USSR (JAFC) was formed soon after a rally organised in Moscow of the representatives of Athe Jewish people” Vaksberg A, Ibid, p. 107. It occurred after the:

“First antifascist radio broadcast political rally of representatives of the Jewish people, which was held in Moscow in August 1941. The Committee consists of 70 members … and its executive committee has 19 members.”

From Library of Congress site WWW: “The Jewish Antifascist Committee Jewish in the USSR”; Find at: http://lcweb.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/jewi.html

In a memo of 21 June 1946: “To Comrade M.A.Suslov”; the members were itemised. The leading elements were in the main, long standing party members:

“1. Secretary of the Committee, whose duties (following the death of Comrade Shakhno Epshtein) are carried out by the writer I. Fefer, member of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) [VKP(b)] since 1919.
2. Deputy Secretary of the Committee, Comrade S.M. Shpige’glias, VKP(b) member since 1919 and formerly a party worker.”

Memorandum of JAFC ; 21 June 1946; To “Comrade M. A. SUSLOV, Director Section For Foreign Policy of the Central Committee Of the Communist Party”; At Library of Congress site on web: http://lcweb.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/m2antfac.html

But, as a leading representative of the politburo, Solomon Lozovsky was the political representative. He was then Deputy Commissar of Political Affairs, and deputy chief of Sovinformburo. It was he who officially announced the formation of the committee, talking to foreign correspondents in Kuibyshev in April 1942:

“All the anti-fascist committees arose in connection with Hitler’s treacherous attack on the USSR.. The Jews have created an anti-fascist committee to help the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the USA.”

Redlich Op Cit; p. 40.

The JAFC published a paper- “Eynikayt“, from the summer of 1942, until late 1948. The key members of the JAFC included, Solomon Mikhoels (the Jewish actor, and Director of the Moscow Jewish State Art Theatre), Shakhne Epstein, the executive secretary, and Itzik Feffer was a poet as well as a Red Army Colonel; Ilya Ehrenburg the noted writer; David Bergelson the writer; Perets Markish the Soviet-Yiddish poet.

Of all these, undoubtedly the most popular figure in the JAFC was Solomon Mikhoels, famous for his stage roles and this Theatre. It is said that Stalin had nick-named him as “The Wise Solomon”, (Teller, Judd L: “The Kremlin, The Jews & The Middle East”; New York; 1957; p.41.”) though this is specifically repudiated by other sources. Rapport; Ibid).

After the victory of Stalingrad, in 1943, a tension erupted over a dual potential role for the JAFC:

Firstly, to defend Jewish refugees and provide assistance and rehabilitation to Jewish expatriates; and
Secondly to “activate” foreign Jewry for the defence of the USSR. (Redlich Ibid; p. 43-44).

The latter view predominated, and Mikhoels and Feffer were sent on a speaking tour of the West. They succeeded in convincing Jewish people in the West to support and donate to the Russian anti-war efforts:

“The Jewish Anti-fascist Committee in the USSR has sent during its entire existence one delegation, composed of Comrades Mikhoels and Fefer, to the United States, England, Canada, and Mexico. This delegations’s trip report has been published in the book: “The Jewish People against Fascism.”
Memorandum to Comrade Suslov; Ibid; AT:
http://lcweb.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/m2antfac.html

The leading lights of the Western Jewish intelligentsia met them such as those of the American Committee of Jewish Writers & Scientists, with Albert Einstein, Sholom Asch, Lion Feuchtwangler, Howard Fast, Lilian Hellmann and others. The trip succeeded in raising funds for at Aleast one thousand aeroplanes and five hundred tanks and uniforms and food etc. Vaksberg Ibid; p.118

There is little doubt that Mikhoels and Feffer made a significant impact upon world Jewry, and garnered respect and enthusiasm for the USSR.

“In 1943 Solomon Mikhoels and the writer Itzik Feffer embark on a seven-month official tour to the USA, Mexico, Canada and Great Britain. They are received everywhere with great enthusiasm: for a long time, no official contact with one of the largest Jewish communities of the world had been possible. Especially in the United States, where many Jews have not forgotten their ties with Russia, the tour is a great success, and many millions of dollars are raised for the Russian war effort. The JAFC becomes the focal point of a national awakening for Soviet Jewry at a time when its very survival is in danger. Many Jews turn to the JAFC with requests for help, among them survivors from the Nazi camps who find their houses occupied upon their return.” WWW Site Beyond the pale:
http://www.friends-partners.org/partners/beyond-the-pale/english/61.html

One important achievement of the JAFC was that several prominent Jews from all over the world came to the USSR as guests of the committee:

“Over two years, representatives of a series of foreign Jewish antifascist organizations have visited the Committee: Deputy Chairman of the Jewish Antifascist Committee of Bulgaria, Mr. Zhak Vradzhali; one of the leaders of the Union of Jews of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Rozenberg; representatives of Jewish organizations of France, Poland, et al. Recently Mr. Ben Zion Goldberg (Waife), the son-in-law of Sholem Aleichem, visited the Soviet Union. He is a prominent public figure in the United States, a member of the executive committee of the Soviet-American Friendship Society (headed by Lamont), chairman of the Committee of Jewish Scientists, Writers, and Artists of the United States (Albert Einstein is president of the Committee), vice-president of Ambidjan, the All-American Society for Aid to Birobidzhan (president of Ambidzhan– Steffenson). Mr. Goldberg is also a major American journalist.. Mr. Goldberg was received in Moscow by M. I. Kalinin and S. A. Lozovskii.. Met Soviet writers .. representatives of the Soviet Jewish community (at the Jewish Antifascist Committee in the USSR headquarters), with leaders of the State Jewish Theatre, with the chief rabbi of the Moscow Jewish congregation, Shliffer, and with leaders of the Red Cross, among others… During his stay in the Soviet Union, Mr. Goldberg dispatched via the Soviet Information Bureau 33 articles to the American, Canadian, English, Palestinian, Polish, and Yiddish press. The articles were extremely friendly toward the Soviet Union. Before his departure, Mr. Goldberg began to write a book in English entitled England, the Opponent of Peace, and a book in Yiddish entitled Jewish Culture in the Soviet Union.”

Memorandum to Comrade Suslov; Ibid; AT:
http://lcweb.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/m2antfac.html

Further requests were being received by the USSR from prominent Jews in “several countries”:

“Such requests were received from: N. Goldman, the chairman of the executive committee of the World Jewish Congress; Dr. Stephen Wise, chairman of the American Jewish Congress; Louis Levine, chairman of the Jewish Union for Soviet Aid under Russian War Relief; Mr. Raiskii, the editor-in-chief of the newspaper Presse Nouvelle in Paris; et al.”

Memorandum to Comrade Suslov; Ibid; AT:
http://lcweb.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/m2antfac.html

At this stage, the Jewish AFC proposed a detailed plan to make the Crimea the site of a Homeland for oppressed Jewish people from all over the world, including all the refugees from the war.

This was proposed by the JAFC in a letter to Stalin dated February 15, 1944.

It seems that only part of this letter has been made public to date. That fragment reads:

“The creation of a Jewish Soviet Republic will once and forever, in a Bolshevik manner, within the spirit of Leninist -Stalinists national policy, settle the problem of the state legal position of the Jewish people and further development of their multi century culture. This is a problem that no one has been capable of settling in the course of many centuries. It can be solved only in our great socialist country.”

Cited From Literatunaya Gazeta July 7th; 1933.; By Sudoplatov Ibid; p. 286.

As mentioned above, Stalin had approved the formation of the committee. Even the virulently anti-Stalin figure Vaksberg notes that Stalin had written to the JAFC the following note:

“Please convey to the working Jews of the Soviet Union who collected an additional 33,294,823 rubles for the construction of air force squadron Stalin’s Friendship of the Peoples and tank column Soviet Birobidzhan my fraternal greetings and the gratitude of the Red Army J.Stalin”.

Vaksberg A; AStalin Against the Jews”; New York; 1994; p. 116.

Why therefore, as various Zionists state, should Stalin have turned against the JAFC? They allege “anti-Semitism.”

Was Stalin himself known to hold anti-Semitic views?

The major allegations made on a personal level about this charge are frankly ludicrous. Thus for instance, reliance upon Khrushchev and moreover upon an unclear source reveals this:

“The first symptoms of Stalin’s anti-Semitic policy are rooted in his personality and may be traced to the pre-revolutionary period. Many people who knew him well, such as Khrushchev, suggested that his Judaeophobia was pathological. Stalin’s struggle against Trotsky and his numerous Jewish supporters fuelled the anti-Semitic trends in the Kremlin dictator’s policy. ‘Anti-Semitism and anti-Trotskyism reared their heads simultaneously’, Trotsky wrote.”

Iakov Etinger, “The Doctors’ Plot: Stalin’s Solution to the Jewish Question”; in Editor: Yaacov Ro’i:”Jews & Jewish Life in Russia & the Soviet Union”; Ibid; p.103.

It is remarkable that Trotsky then, himself a Jew never commented that this was the reason for his “persecutions” in a more visible and public forum. Nor indeed do Trotsky’s followers including Isaac Deutscher his primary biographer use this charge. What else does Professor I. Etinger have for us?

“Stalin’s secretary, Boris Bazhanov, recollects that Stalin made crude anti-Semitic outbursts even when Lenin was still alive. In 1907 Stalin wrote a letter in which he referred to the Mensheviks as a ‘Jewish faction’ and to the Bolsheviks as a ‘truly Russian’ one.’ It would do no harm to us Bolsheviks if we staged a pogrom inside the party’, he suggested.”

Etinger, “The Doctors’ Plot,” Ibid; p. 104; citing V.Solov’ev, E. Klepikov, op cit p.216.

Other comments from Vaksberg, indicate the same source for other various anecdotes. But interestingly, the most virulent anti-Stalin Vaksberg records other facts that show Stalin was not anti-Semitic. So Vaksberg, although interspersed with sly digs and innuendoes throughout, must note that Stalin was vociferous against anti-semitism:

“The composer Dmitri Rogal-Levitsky… was in 1944 commissioned to orchestrate the new state anthem.. His notebooks .. Record the conversation (of a banquet)…

“Stalin asked how many conductors there were at the Bolshoi Theatre. They told him seven of whom three were Jews…

‘Do you have Nikolai Golovanov there?’ Stalin asked…
‘We were planning to entrust two or three productions to him’ began Tsazoksky… ‘And?’ Interrupted Stalin.
‘He refused.’
‘Good thing!’ Stalin said, striking a match.
‘I don’t like him… He’s an anti-Semite. Yes a real anti-Semite. A crude anti-Semite. He should not be allowed into the Bolshoi Theatre.. It’s like letting a goat into the cabbage patch,’ he said laughing.

Then the conversation turned. But a while later without any obvious connection, Stalin returned to the first theme:

‘But that Golovanov is an anti-Semite.’
‘I’ve not dealt with him in that sense.’
‘Don’t worry you will, if you let him into the Bolshoi Theatre… Golovanov is a real anti-Semite, a dangerous, principled anti-Semite.. You cannot let Golovanov into the Bolshoi Theatre. That anti-Semite will turn everything upside down.'”

Vaksberg A; “Stalin Against the Jews”; New York; 1994; p. 29-30.

Yet ultimately, Vasberg dismisses this all, as an elaborate facade behind which Stalin’s own “anti-Semitism” could be hidden. Vaksberg refers to Stalin’s daughter having “destroyed” Svetlana Alliluyeva’s first marriage because it had been to a Jew – Grigory Morozov (Moroz). Such personal testimony is liable to selective “filtering.” But even Svetlana’s own words are somewhat self-contradictory. She states that Stalin did not stand in her way regarding her marriage, but he refused to allow her husband to visit him. Perhaps the real reason that Stalin disliked him, was not that he was a Jew, but lies in what he told her:

“He’s too calculating, that young man of yours.. Just think it’s terrible at the front. People are getting shot. And look at him. He’s sitting it out at home.”

Alliluyeva, Svetlana, “Twenty Letters to a Friend”; New York; 1967; p.187.

It is true that Svetlana says later on, that Stalin told her that the “Zionists had thrown the first husband” into her way. (Alliluyeva, Svetlana, “Twenty Letters to a Friend”; Ibid; p.196). However the marriage appears to have failed of its’ own accord, Svetlana is quite clear on this.

The net definite “evidence” to prove the racism of Stalin must be in doubt by an open mind.

The real “proof” for the accusers, who convict Stalin of “anti-Semitism”- appears to lie in the matter of the so called “Zionists’ Plot” and the “Doctor’s Plot.”

Was Beria Personally an anti-Semite?

The same general problem is faced by Zionists, who although they accuse Beria of being an anti-Semite, confront and cannot explain data that in reality shows the opposite:

“There is also the mystery of Beria’s comportment towards Jews in Georgia. The New York Times correspondent Salisbury discovered in Tiflis Georgia in 1951, a Jewish ethnological Museum which featured painting depicting Jewish religious rites reconstructions of early Georgian synagogues, and a record of Jewish Soviet heroes in World War II. That the museum should have survived the liquidation of Jewish culture everywhere else in the USSR was curious; the information that Beria had inspired it was even more curious”. He had also sponsored in the 1920’s an occupational rehabilitation programme for Georgian Jewry. This programme included Jewish trade schools and farms.”

Teller Ibid; p. 91-92.

“There is also reason to believe that (Beria) was helpful to Jews in Georgia. The American journalist Harrison Salisbury who visited Georgia after the war, discovered that Beria as Georgian party leader, had instigated the establishment of a program for rehabilitating Georgian Jews. The program included a Jewish charitable society and a Jewish ethnological museum in Tbilisi. It might be added that Beria’s sisters’ husband was a Jew and that Beria had several Jews in his retinue: Mil’stein, Raikhmna, Mamulov, Sumbatov-Topuridze and N.I.Eitington to name a few. Although many Jews lost their jobs in the late 1940’s as a result of the anti-Semitic campaign, these men survived.”

Knight A; Ibid; p.147

Furthermore, it must be noted firstly that it was Beria, who after Stalin’s death – first repudiated the “Doctor’s Plot”, as being a sham:

“Beria’s position as chief of the security services and the police place him in an invidious position as the likeliest candidate for indictment and castigation for all persecutions that has taken place .. Stalin’s successors have fingered him as the author of the so-called Doctor’s Plot… Yet after Stalin’s death it was Beria who exposed the indictment which in itself, disputes his executioners’ contention that he was its author. The Minister of State Security the real boss of the secret police at the time that this evidence was manufactured, was Semyon D.Ignatiev, Beria’s political enemy. Although publicly pilloried for his central role in concocting the indictment, Ignatiev was restored to favour at the Kremlin immediately after Beri had been purged. The post-Beria Kremlin significantly had maintained that there was not anti-Semitic intent behind the doctor’s indictment.. Which in turn invites speculation that the charge might not have been dismissed had not Beria exposed them in his life time.”

Teller Ibid; p. 90-91.

“Not only did Beria denounce the Doctor’s Plot was a hoax after Stalin’s death, he also took it upon himself to attempt a revival of Jewish culture immediately after Stalin died.”

Knight A; Ibid; p.148.

Following this Pravda ran an editorial that stated:

“Every Soviet worker kolkhoz members and intellectual is under the protection of Soviet law. The citizens of the great Soviet state may be certain that all the rights guaranteed them by the Soviet Constitution are sacred and will be guarded by the Soviet Government…. Careful investigation had ascertained the fact that members of Riumin’s clique (responsible for the doctors libel -ed) had slandered the People’s Artist Mikhoels who was an upright communal worker.”

Teller Ibid; p. 125-126.

To Summarise:
Data does not support that the Marxist-Leninists Stalin and Beria were personally anti-Semitic. What of the revisionist politicans?

Khrushchev’s Attitude to the Jews

Khrushchev by several accounts, was well known to be an anti-Semite. Amy Knight puts it as follows:

“Khrushchev… first secretary in the Ukraine, favoured the dissolution of the Union of Jewish Writers Kiev, and the closure of Jewish literary journal.”

Knight M; Ibid; p.148.

That Stalin ensured that Khrushchev was in effect repudiated upon the issue of anti-Semitic pogromists was clear, when Malenkov was sent to the Ukraine to correct the “blindness” of Khrushchev to anti-Semitic abuses:

“Khrushchev’s case is different. Even before his name was generally known outside the USSR, he had acquired notoriety in the Jewish press… for an episode in Kiev when the war ended. He was then boss of the Ukraine. Jewish wartime refugees, braving the local populations; anti-Jewish animus and the Kremlin’s bruited displeasure, trickled back to their devastated homes in the Ukraine. One day in a scuffle over an anti-Semitic remark, two Red Army officers one Jewish and the other Ukrainian, fired their guns at each other. The Ukrainian died, and the result was a pogrom in Kiev. The Ukrainian was buried with military honours and Khrushchev marched in the funeral procession. The pogromists went unpunished until Malenkov arrived to restore order.”

Teller Ibid; p. 92.

This view is substantiated more recently by Knight’s biography of Beria:

“In May 1944 Mikhoels wrote a letter to Molotov complaining about discrimination against Jews in liberated Ukraine. On receiving a copy of the letter, Beria issued instructions to Ukrainian Party Chief Khrushchev to “take the necessary measures to improve the living and working conditions of Jews in the newly liberated areas.”

Knight M; Ibid; p.147

Mikhoels would pay a price for his request for intervention, addressed to the Marxist-Leninist Molotov. But who was it that wrote his bill?

The Murder of Solomon Mikhoels

As discussed above, Stalin had supported the JAFC and sent it congratulatory telegrams.

It seems though, that the general attitude inside the USSR to the JAFC changed after the war.

One of the signs of this change was that the previous plan to publish a book – the so called “Black Book” – cataloguing the Nazi genocide of the Jews, and the Jewish partisan struggles, was only brought to fruition in the USA but not in Russia:

“The contacts with American-Jewish organizations result in the plan to publish a Black Book simultaneously in the USA and the Soviet Union, documenting the anti-Jewish crimes of the Nazis and the Jewish part in the fighting and resistance. In 1944, the writer Ilya Ehrenburg sends a collection of letters, diaries, photos and witness accounts to the USA to be used in the book. The Black Book is published in New York in 1946. But no Russian edition appears. The typefaces are finally broken up in the printing press in 1948, a year in which the situation of Soviet Jews has once more deteriorated sharply.”

See WWW site: “Beyond the Pale”; page 61 at:
http://www.friends-partners.org/partners/beyond-the-pale/english/61.html

But the death of Mikhoels – allegedly in a murder committed at the direct order of Stalin, is the event that is usually cited as the beginning of the alleged anti-Semitic campaigns of the Soviet USSR.

It is alleged by many, including Sudoplatov, that Stalin feared the potential power that Mikhoels would have, and had him assassinated in January 1948:

“Mikhoels .. had been at the heart of the discussions to establish a Jewish Crimean republic. Stalin feared that Mikhoels would unleash forces that could not be controlled and would lead to unpredictable political consequences. Stalin feared a truly independent Jewish homeland. Mikhoels had the stature of a leader with world recognition, and Stalin could not risk his developing his own power base. Mikhoels was murdered in January 1948, under the direct order of Stalin.”

Pavel & A Sudoplatov; with JL &LP Schecter:”Special Tasks”; Boston; 1995; p. 296.

But as noted in the foreword, Sudoplatov’s memoirs have been seriously discredited.

It is true that other sources also refer to the death of Mikhoels and all assume that Stalin “ordered the murder of Mikhoels.”

In fact, the mysterious death of Solomon Mikhoels in Minsk on January 13, 1948, served to rob the USSR of a valuable and respected figure. For all these other sources, this contradiction, is not apparently a difficult issue – since they all pre-judge Stalin as variously, mad, irrational, capricious.. etc.

However this line of reasoning is countered by the facts previously adduced.
(See Previous issues of Alliance on Personality Cult :(1) The Cult of
Personality (Talk at The Stalin Society (UK) May 1991) AT: http://ml-review.ca/aml/STALIN-TXT/WBBPERSONALITY1991.html2) Stalin – Myths and Reality: Talk intended for the Third ISML Conference Paris October 1999: http://ml-review.ca/aml/STALIN-TXT/WBBSTALINMYTHSPARIS1999.html

The most detailed source, of the actual last days of Mikhoels life, is found in Arkady Vaksberg. (ibid pp159-170). As Amy Knight points out, the assumption is usually made that Beria performed the killing:

“Many had assumed that Beria as responsible for the murder, since he oversaw the police apparatus.”

Knight A; Ibid; p.147.

However it seems that Beria related the facts of the case, in a letter to Malenkov, after the death of Stalin.

According to this letter, Beria questioned Abakumov in prison, where Abakumov had remained following Stalin’s death. Beria learnt that the key players were Ogol’tsev and Tsanava. Knight insists that Stalin “ordered” the killing:

“Stalin had ordered Abakumov to have Mikhoels killed, a task carried out by Deputy Minister of State Security S.I.Ogol’tsev and Belorussian MGB chief Tsanava. Mikhoels and his companion were lured into a car and taken to Tsanava’s dacha outside Minsk, where they were murdered. Their bodies were then dumped on the side of the road. When Beria learned of Tsanava’s complicity, he ordered his arrest along with that of Ogol’tsev.”

Knight A; Ibid; p.147.

In fact Knight reminds us that Beria had:

“Supported the idea in 1942 of creating the Jewish Anti-fascist Committee in order to harness the war efforts of Soviet Jews at home and abroad and had maintained direct contacts with JAFC leaders after that. Indeed he seems to be have been sympathetic to their cause.”

Knight A; Ibid; p.147.

But, she fails to remind us that Stalin had also supported Mikhoels and the JAFC.

So was ultimately responsible for the murder of Mikhoels?

It seems that the revisionist S.D.Ignat’ev (or Ignatiev) was heavily involved:

“It may not be a coincidence that in addition to First Secretary Gusarov… who was in the Belorussian CC Secretariat at the time of the Mikhoels murder: S.D.Ignatiev, who was to replace Abakumov as USSR MBG chief in mid-1951. Ignatiev later helped to fabricate the case against the doctors.”

Knight A; Ibid; p.148.

Who was pushing for action on the “anti-Zionist plot?”

Vaksberg claims that Abakumov was supported by Malenkov and Mikhail Suslov. We would argue that of these, Suslov was an out and out revisionist and at best, Malenkov was a vacillator.

On October 12, 1946 Abakumov (after having taken over from Vsevolod Merkulov, the Ministry of State Security) wrote a memorandum entitled: “On Nationalistic Manifestations of Some Workers of the Jewish Anti-fascist Committee”, accusing them of:

“Forgetting the class approach which has been replaced by an approach on national lines,” and of “establishing foreign contacts on the same national principles”. Also in foreign editions about the life of the Soviet Jews, it “exaggerated their contribution to the achievements of the Soviet Union in science, technology, and culture.” And finally a special section of the memo.. Noted that the committee “has taken on the function of the chief representative of the affairs of the Jewish population and intermediary between that populations and the Party-Soviet organs. The summary conclusion to the memo was that the Afurther activity of this committee is politically harmful and intolerable”.. The Minister was supported by one of the new members of the hierarchy.. Mikhail Suslov. In his appeal to Stalin on November 26th 1946, he also called for liquidation of the committee.”

Vaksberg; Op Cit; p.195

It was finally on March 1948 that Abakumov forwarded a report to the Central Committee arguing that JAFC leaders and Mikhoels had:

“conducted anti-Soviet nationalist activities.”

Knight A; Ibid; p.148.

This report went to the Central Committee and was copied to Stalin, Molotov, Zhdanov, and Kuznetsov.

By 20 November 1948, the Politburo adopted the resolution approving a decision of the Council Of Ministers to disband the JAFC.

This resolution was adopted after the sudden death of Zhdanov in August 1948, and thereafter the correct anti-cosmopolitanism campaign, was crudely transformed into the incorrect anti-Semitic campaign.
(For Bland’s article on the anti-cosmopolitanism article see: http://ml-review.ca/aml/CommunistLeague/COSMOPOLITANISM-COMPASS131-1998.HTM

Abakumov continued to send memos to Stalin over this issue, calling the JAFC a “hot-bed of Zionism” in a memo of the March 1, 1948. (Vaksberg; Op Cit; p.196. )

It was after September 3rd, 1948 that action was finally taken against the JAFC. On that date, it is alleged by Vaksberg and other bourgeois commentators that the “mass rallies” greeting Golda Myerson (later to be known as Golda Meir) in her post as the first Israeli ambassador, “frightened” Stalin.

Yet as Vaksberg himself states, in the spring of 1945 Stalin had allowed open and massive Jewish rallies to commemorate the Jewish dead of the war:

“On the recommendation of the World Council of Rabbis meeting in Jerusalem, Stalin permitted Moscow Jews to organise a memorial service for the six million Jewish victims of the Nazis…. Major governmental figures marshals, and generals and celebrated artists attended – over 20,000 people.. Raising over half a million rubles for the postwar restoration of the country. The solemn Kadish was repeated in 1946. In 1947 it was banned.”

Vaksberg; Op Cit; p.185.

By March 26th 1948, Abakumov had sent a memo to Stalin, Molotov and CC Secretaries Zhdanov and Kuznetsov entitled “On the Espionage and Nationalistic Activity of the Jewish Anti-fascist Committee”, stating that Mikhoels was:

“Known long before the war as an active nationalist, he was a kind of banner for nationalistic Jewish circles.”

Vaksberg; Op Cit; p.197-198.

On November 20th 1948, item no.81 on the agenda of the Politburo of the CC stated:

“On the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee: Confirm the following resolution of the Bureau of the Council of Ministers of the SSR: “The Bureau of the Council of ministers of the USSR instructs the MGB USSR to disband the JAFC immediately, because as the facts show, this Committee is the center of anti-Soviet propaganda and regularly provides anti-Soviet information to organs of foreign intelligence. In conjunction with this, the publishing organs of the Committee are to be shut down and the Committee’s files confiscated. For the time being no one is to be arrested.”

Vaksberg; Op Cit; p.198-199.

Thus far at any rate, the “facts” are not quite so obvious as made out by the Zionists who attack Stalin as anti-Semitic. There is a clear implication from Vaksberg, that a compromise decision had been made, with the final statement just cited, regarding an explicit counter-manding of further arrests.

Nonetheless, David Goldstein had already been arrested in September, and on December 24th Fefer was arrested. Vaksberg; Op Cit; p.200-201. Lozovsky was arrested on January 16th. Vaksberg; Op Cit; p.202.

A little complicating, but true, is that Salmon Lozovsky was also a hidden revisionist (partially discussed previously by Alliance – See Alliance issue Number 15); who had subverted correct trade union tactics in the Comintern and the trade union international Profintern (led by Lozovsky).

However, Alliance argues, until further evidence can be adduced, that the net effect of these arrests, was once more to alienate the Marxist-Leninist wing of the Bolsheviks Party from a section of the working class.

Moreover it served to strengthen the hand of international support for Israel, and to serve as an instrument of propaganda against the USSR.

It was the Writers Union under Alexander Fadeyev who pushed for a resolution that called for closing associations of Jewish writers and closing Yiddish almanacs. That the hand of the revisionists was heavy in making these decisions is made clear by Shimon Redlich in his history of the JAFC. He points out that another key revisionist involved was Boris Ponomorarev:

“Sources suggest that Boris N. Ponomorarev was personally active in the liquidation of the Committee. Ponomorarev, an ex-functionary of the Comintern, and Deputy Director of the prestigious Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute after the War, was appointed Deputy Director of the Sovinformuro in late 1948 or early 19489. When Lozovskii was arrested in late 1948 to early 1949, Ponomorarev became Head of the Bureau for a short while.”

Redlich Shimon: “Propaganda and Nationalism in Wartime Russia-The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee in the USSR, 1941-1948″; 1982; USA; p.167-8.

As Redlich points out, various hypotheses linking the affair with an alleged Malenkov-Zhdanov hostility; or to an attempt to discredit Beria; simply do not make any sense.

He is left only to explain it as Stalin’s fear of the international contacts that Soviet Jewry had built with overseas Jews. He himself acknowledges Stalin’s previous support of these contacts:

“Although encouraged and supported by Stalin at the time, these contacts were regarded in retrospect as dangerous and treacherous.”

Redlich S; Ibid; p.169.

Another potential “reason” leading Stalin to take this step, is cited by Redlich as the following:

“It is well known to Soviet official circles and to Stalin himself that the Committee had attempted to perform functions and took upon itself responsibilities far beyond the initial purpose of its establishment. Mikhoels and other top personalities of the JAFC approached various Soviet authorities both on matters concerning individual Jews and on Jewish cultural and national issues…. The JAFC was apparently regarded by Stalin as a structure which organised and expressed Jewish national interests and since he viewed such interests as a security risk to the regime, and to himself it seemed to him a matter of prime importance to wipe out this potentially dangerous organisation.”

Redlich S; Ibid; p.169-70.

Alliance finds that the evidence to date, suggests that Mikhoels was murdered, and was not the victim of an accident.

This is dealt with directly below, in a citation from Beria.

As to who was responsible, there continues to be disagreement.

Only one piece of evidence links Stalin to this directly.
That is evidence provided by the cross examination of Abakumov while he was imprisoned.

This was referred to above, from the biography of Beria by Knight (see page above). The full cited is the following, and is drawn from a document upon Abakumov, available in Russian only. Significant sections are cited from the English text of a piece by Iakov Ettinger, based on reports in Russian cited by Stoliarov:

“Col.-Gen. V. S. Abakumov, Minister of State Security from 1945-1…Russian researcher Kirill Stoliarov summed up the results of his painstaking and profound study of the materials in the case of State Security Minister Abakumov in his book “Golgofa” (Calvary).”

Iakov Etinger:”The Doctors’ Plot: Stalin’s Solution to the Jewish Question”; in Editor: Yaacov Ro’i: “Jews & Jewish Life in Russia & the Soviet Union”; citing Storilaov; Ibid.

After Stalin’s death, Beria investigated the Mikhoels events further. It emerged again from Abakumov’s testimony, still being in jail, that Abakumov had asserted not only that Mikhoels had been killed, but that Stalin had ordered him to perform this murder:

“Meanwhile Beria made another move. On 2 April 1953 he sent a letter to the party Presidium addressed to Malenkov stating:

“An examination of the materials in the Mikhoels case has revealed that in February 1948, in Minsk, former USSR MGB Deputy Minister Ogol’tsov and former Belorussian MGB Minister Tsanava carried out an illegal operation to liquidate Mikhoels on orders from USSR MGB Minister Abakumov.. In this connection Abakumov has been interrogated at the MVD and explanations have been received from Ogol’tsov and Tsanava. Abakumov gave the following evidence…
“As far as I can remember, in 1948, the head of the Soviet government I. V. Stalin gave me an urgent assignment – to promptly organize the liquidation of Mikhoels by MGB personnel and charge specially selected people with the task. Then it came to our knowledge that Mikhoels and his friend, whose name I do not remember, had gone to Minsk. When this was reported to Stalin he immediately ordered us to carry out the liquidation in Minsk…After Mikhoels was liquidated Stalin highly praised the operation and ordered that the people who had performed it be decorated, which was carried out.”

Etinger I: Ibid; p. 120-121; Citing :’Argumenty i Fakty 2′; 1992.

Beria’s letter then outlines that the murder of Mikhoels was disguised by crudely staging a motor vehicle accident:

“The letter goes on to describe in detail how Mikhoels was “liquidated”. There were several options for eliminating Mikhoels: a) a car accident, b) running him over with a lorry in a deserted street. Since neither gave a 100 per cent guarantee the following course was decided upon: to invite Mikhoels, through one of our agents, to visit an acquaintance of his late at night, provide a car from the hotel he was staying in, allegedly to drive him there, take him to Tsanava’s dacha and liquidate him. Then the body was to be put in an out-of-the-way deserted street and run over by a lorry. And that is how it was done. To keep the matter secret, agent Golubov, who accompanied Mikhoels on this fatal visit, was also done away with (they were run over by a lorry near the dacha). At the end of the letter Beria declared:

The MVD deems it necessary:
a) to arrest and initiate proceedings against former USSR Deputy MGB Minister S. I. Ogol’’tsov and former State Security Minister of Belorussia L. F. Tsanava,
b) to repeal the Supreme Soviet decree conferring honours on the participants in the murder of Mikhoels and Golubov.”

Etinger I: Ibid; p. 120-121; Citing: ‘Argumenty i Fakty 2′; 1992.

In Conclusion: Alliance argues the following:

1. If it is agreed that Beria was a Marxist-Leninist, his letter indicates the primary responsibility for the attacks on the JAFC are laid on the door of low level operatives S. I. Ogol’tsov and L. F. Tsanava.

2. Backing up these individuals but at a higher level were the revisionists Malenkov and Suslov and Ponomoranev. Of these the first, was possibly a “vacillator” but the other two were definitely revisionists.

3. There remains the matter of Stalin. We argue that Stalin had nothing to gain by the murder of Mikhoels, that his “ego” definitely did not require this as bourgeois sources claim; and that it was not in his interests. However Abakumov’s testimony “fingers” Stalin. What then? Barring a “mistake” upon Stalin’s part, we suggest the following two possibilities:

i) Abakumov’s testimony cannot be simply discounted. We argue, that his testimony on the so called “Doctor’s Plots” shows him to be a basically honest individual (see below);
We further argue that if this is the case, then on the earlier issue of the JAFC, he was mis-led on the matter of Stalin’s orders;
Beria’s ‘testimony’ was ‘extracted’ by Khrushchev who of course went on to kill Beria.

OR:

ii) Another possibility exists: That Beria for some reason lied about Abakumov’s testimony. If so two possible reasons for this can be adduced:
Either Beria was NOT a Marxist-Leninist;
OR Beria decided that as a Marxist-Leninist – what was critical was that as far as possible the security apparatus be purged of revisionists in order to fight on for Marxism-Leninism. He may have reasoned that Stalin was dead and Abakumov was virtually dead anyway.

We believe the data thus far shows that Beria was a consistent Marxist-Leninist.
We believe therefore that the most likely conclusion is that Abakhumov was tricked by the revisionists into effecting Mikhoels murder.

It is very remarkable that the newer generation of revisionist leaders of the USSR – those who actually dissolved the state- held a Politburo Commission and declared the direct responsibility to lie with Malenkov.

It is pretty inconceivable that these individuals who hated Stalin, would not publicise evidence linking Stalin with this issue if it in truth existed:

“A Politburo Commission created by Mikhail Gorbachev and chaired by Alexander Yakovlev came to the conclusion on late 1988 that the “direct responsibility for the illegal repression of people arrested in the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee case was borne by G.M.Malenkov, who was directly involved in the investigation and trial.” Vaksberg; Op Cit; p.202-3.

The Case of Polinya

The wife of Molotov – Polina Zhemchuzhina – was Jewish. She had held high ranking posts for the Bolsheviks such as People’s Commissar of the Fish Industry, head of the State Perfume Trust, as well as being on the Bolshevik Central Committee. It is alleged that she incurred Stalin’s’ wrath as she had been the last person to see Nadezdha Allilueva alive before she committed suicide. This according to Vaksberg was the reason for her removal from the Central Committee for “failure in work.” Previously she had received a reprimand for neglect and, for allowing in 1939, some German spies to penetrate her area. According to Golda Meir’s testimony, Polinya “wished the Zionists in Palestine well” saying:

“If things go well for you, then things will be good for the Jews the whole world over.”

Vaksberg; Op Cit; p.188.

This conversation was monitored and the Central Committee was informed. According to Vaksberg, Stalin reportedly told Molotov:

“It is time for you to divorce your wife.”

Vaksberg; Op Cit; p.189.

It is important to recognise that as so often, the primary source for this conversational tit-bit of information is the revisionist Khrushchev.

In late 1948 the Molotovs were divorced, and in February 1949 Zhemchuzhina was arrested.

Prior to this, some bizzare personal charges including one of an extraordinary adultery involving a juniro employee, and espionage were laid at a meeting of the Politburo.

However even Vaksberg, is in agreement that various documents were indeed missing, from the Ministry of Light Industry textile branch, then being run by Zhemchuzhina.

Nonetheless the various charges against Zhemchuzhina also included:

“Being present at the memorial service at the synagogue on March 14th, 1945; enjoying the nationalistic play Freileks produced by the Jewish bourgeois nationalists Mikhoels at the Jewish Theatre; and of attending the funeral of Mikhoels.”

Vaksberg; Op Cit; p.192.

It is likely that some of these latter minor charges are true. Whether that made her an enemy of the state is debateable in the view of Alliance currently. But it is notable that Zhemchuzhina never repudiated Stalin, even after years in prison (Vaksberg; Op Cit; p.192).

It seems most likely that both she and Molotov were aware that there were inner-party battles going on that explained the turn of events.
In fact although Stalin is blamed for these events, it is most unclear why Molotov should have been targeted. For not only did his wife suffer imprisonment, but observers agree that he himself was demoted in rank although he remained within the Politburo. (Knight M; Ibid; p.147).

Alliance argues then, that the general aim of the revisionists to take over leading positions of state power was assisted by the direct and in-direct attack upon Molotov – as far as we know a reliable Marxist-Leninist, while Stalin was alive.

Source

The Changing Leadership of the Secret Service

Nikolai_Yezhov_conferring_with_Stalin

This article was published by Alliance (Marxist-Leninist) as part of the publication Alliance, issue #30, “Marx, Lenin and Stalin on Zionism.”

THE CHANGING LEADERSHIP OF THE SECRET SERVICE

It is accepted by most if not all Marxist-Leninists, that at various times, revisionists within the USSR Bolshevik party took control of the secret services.

Since that is the case, determining whether particular campaigns undertaken by the secret services – were really in the interests of the Marxist-Leninists, or the interests of the revisionists – needs to take into account several specific facts of the campaign as well as the personality of the chiefs of the secret service at the particular time in question.

In assessing the evidence regarding the alleged Zionist Plot, it is therefore necessary to understand those who made the allegations and effected the arrests.

The Case of Ezhov And the Appointment of Beria To The Secret Services

Stalin’s attempts at creating a trusted and close network of Marxist-Leninists around him in foreign policy (See Part Two of this article), matched a similar strategy in the secret service. In previous Alliance issues, we have discussed how, Stalin attempted to either root out, or at worst, to contain the counter-revolutionary terror, that was striking at the best of the Bolsheviks, as intended and organised by the hidden revisionists.

Firstly Yagoda was removed from heading the secret service after his Trotskyite affiliations became clear. His substitute was Nikolai Ivanovich Ezhov, who became the head of the Secret Police the NKVD. But again it appears that this office had been infiltrated by hidden revisionists.

For example, Arch Getty has shown how Stalin obstructed Ezhov in his “mass” arrests and expulsions from the party. For example, this exchange shows the antagonism between the two:

Ezhov: Comrades as a result of the verification of party documents we expelled more than 200,000 members of the party.
Stalin: [Interrupts] Very many.
Ezhov: Yes very many. I will speak about this..
Stalin: [Interrupts] If we explained 30,000..(inaudible remark) and 600 former Trotskyites and Zinoviev-ists it would be a bigger victory.
Ezhov: More than 200,000 members were expelled. Part of this number.. were arrested.”

Cited from Stenographic Records. Cited In AStalinist Terror, New Perspectives.”Ed. J.Arch Getty & Roberta T. Manning. Cambridge University Press, 1993. p.51).

Zhdanov (a close comrade-in-arms of Stalin) tried to place further brakes upon Ezhov, as shown when:

“In a highly publicized attack Zhdanov accused the Saratov kraikom (party leadership-Ed) of “dictatorship” and “repression”.. At the Feb 1937 Central Committee Plenum, Zhdanov gave the keynote speech on democratizing party organisations, ending bureaucratic repression of “little people,” and replacing the co-option of party leaders with grass roots elections. Indeed under pressure of this line, contested secret ballot party elections were held in 1937.”

Cited from Stenographic Records. Cited In AStalinist Terror, New Perspectives.”Ed. J.Arch Getty & Roberta T. Manning. Cambridge University Press, 1993. p.51).

In the case of Avel Enukidze, then Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of Soviets, Ezhov had wanted to expel him. But Stalin and Molotov defended Enukidze.

After further pressure from Ezhov, he was expelled.

But then Molotov and Stalin moved for him to be re-admitted. Though the plenum agreed with Stalin and Molotov, this re-admission never happened – having been arrested, he was shot in 1937. The record shows a clear pattern here – where Stalin was set versus Ezhov. (Arch Getty & Manning; Ibid; p.54).

Even in the case of the arch-Right revisionist Bukharin, (a leading ex-Bolshevik whose prominence and past service made him especially controversial – yet especially important to deal with. Precisely just in case he did become the focus of further organised opposition) – even his execution was controversial. Stalin wanted him expelled, and not even put on trial, let alone executed.

The opposition to Stalin on this matter were: Ezhov, Budennyi, Manuilskii, Shvernik, Kosarev and Iakir (who voted to shoot Bukharin without trial); and Litvinov, Postyshev, Shiriatov, and Petrovskii (Who voted to send Bukharin to an open trial).

The Plenum voted for Stalin’s line by a majority. But the documents of agreement were altered (in Mikoian’s handwriting) and Stalin’s advice was simply ignored. (Arch Getty & Manning; Ibid; p.58).

Even a very hostile Sudoplatov, records that Stalin’s attitude was surprisingly the opposite of the conventional portrait painted of a vindictive dictatorial individual. According to Sudoplatov, Stalin preferred private rebukes rather than prosecution, for example when dealing with instances of “corruption“:

“I learnt from Malenkov’s deputy- Anna Tsukanova.. That the Central Committee did not always prosecute corruption reported by the Party Control Commission and security organs. Stalin & Malenkov preferred to reproach an errant high-ranking official rather than to prosecute him, but if the man landed in the wrong power group, then the incriminating evidence was used to demote or purge him.”

Sudoplatov; Ibid; p. 319

It can only be reasonably concluded, that Stalin was trying hard to limit the damage being done by a revisionist taking cover behind a Left-ist and zealot position.

In this situation, Lavrentii Beria was put in this sensitive and critical job. Stalin himself put Beria into this job, after Ezhov had tried to prepare a case against Beria. Beria appealed to Stalin, who appointed Beria initially as Ezhov’s Aassistant”. Beria became first deputy chairman of the USSR NKVD at the end of August 1938, having been relieved of his prior position as first secretary of the Georgian party organisation. (Amy Knight: “Beria-Stalin’s First Lieutenant”; Princeton New Jersey 1993; p. 87-88). On 17 November 1938, Sovnarkom and the Central Committee adopted a report issued by Beria’s investigation entitled: “On Arrests – Supervision By the Procuracy And the Conduct of Investigations”, which passed a resolution. This was a:

“Strongly worded, lengthy resolution.. (it) Completely renounced the purges. Directed at party, Procuracy and NKVD officials in the republic it was highly critical of the “gross violations of legal norms” that had been committed during arrests and investigations in particular the reliance on confessions extracted from the accused and the failure to keep records. Furthermore the resolutions stated,
‘The NKVD has gone so far in distorting the norms of the judicial process that very recently questions have arisen about giving it so called limits on the process of mass arrests”. According to the resolution, Aenemies of the people” who had penetrated the NKVD and the Procuracy were falsifying documents and arresting innocent people”. The resolution forbade these organs from continuing their policy of mass arrests and exile. Henceforth arrests were to be made only with the consent of the court or the Procurator; the noxious NKVD troikas which decided cases of the spot were to be abolished.'”

Amy Knight: “Beria-Stalin’s First Lieutenant”; Princeton New Jersey 1993; p. 89.

Immediately after, in the words of Amy Knight, his biographer, Beria “cleansed” the NKVD. As far as he could, he tried to only place trusted Bolsheviks in the key positions. As he had personal knowledge from Georgia of who was reliable or not, many of the appointees were from Georgia. This has been labelled as a “Georgian mafia” controlled by Beria. But since the objective was to place trusted comrades in key positions, and Beria knew these people best – this derogatory term is un-justified. As Knight puts it, Beria:

“Set about “cleansing” the NKVD of undesirable elements, in other words he initiated a full-scale purge of the Ezhovites, executing or imprisoning hundreds of officials…. By early 1939 Beria had succeeded in arresting most of the top and middle level hierarchy of Ezhov’s apparatus, replacing these men with members of his Georgian group. It is possible to identify at least 12 Beria men…. appointed to key NKVD posts… Vsevold Merkulov.., Vladimir Dekanozov,… Bogdan Kobulov… Solomon Mil’shtein… Iuvelian Sumbatov-Topuridze.. Sardeon Nadaraia.”

Amy Knight: “Beria-Stalin’s First Lieutenant”; Princeton New Jersey 1993; p. 90-91

It is accepted by even hostile and anti-Marxist-Leninist writers, that following Beria’s changes, thousands of prisoners in the camps were released:

“There was a general feeling that the NKVD would eschew the excesses of the Ezhov period and people began to talk about a ‘Beria thaw’.”

Amy Knight: “Beria-Stalin’s First Lieutenant”; Princeton New Jersey 1993; p. 92

Many bourgeois reports and Khruschevite revisionists have labelled Beria as a man who was both a political evil and a sexual debauchee given to raping young girls. But these are dubious, as Knight herself acknowledges:

“It should be noted that the stories have been disputed by some who knew Beria. One former NKVD employee expressed strong doubts that Beria was raping young girls, noting that he was known in police circles as a man with exceptional self-control who worked extremely hard.”

Amy Knight: “Beria-Stalin’s First Lieutenant”; Princeton New Jersey 1993; p. 97.

As an enemy of both bourgeois and Khruschevite revisionists, Beria is bound to attract negative and libellous comments. But Marxist-Leninists are aware that Beria effectively cleared the NKVD of revisionist practices and revisionist personnel. His later treatment at the hands of the revisionists led by Khrushchev, who were now in power, after the death of Stalin – lends credence to the view that Beria was a Marxist-Leninist. That case has been well summarised by W.B. Bland in an article published by the Stalin Society of London UK.” (Bland: “The Doctors Case & The Death Of Stalin”; Stalin Society; London nd ca 1992. NB: soon to be placed on the web site of Alliance).

The Post-War Reshuffle That Removed Beria From Sole Control of the Secret Services – The Atomic Threat

Beria had proven himself capable of running the necessarily vigilant, but controlled secret service that a socialist state must have, faced by an imperialist combination.

However after the war, a new danger arose – the atomic bomb monopoly by the USA. It was essential to have in charge of the Russian Atomic Bomb project, someone who was an utterly reliable Bolshevik. Stalin ensured that Lavrentii Beria was given this mandate. This very serious and onerous task could not be done well with divided attention.

The future safety of the USSR critically depended upon its success. Therefore, Beria was duly relieved of his post as the sole Commissar of Internal Affairs which he had held from 1938 to December 1945. He ceased to be solely in charge of security and intelligence in the USSR and overseas – excepting for all security problems directly connected with his job as manager of the Special State Committee on Problem Number One – the creation of the atomic bomb. (Sudoplatov P, Ibid; p.315)

The secret services had already been divided into three arms in April 1943.

Probably this was likely to be because the work load was already too great to enable only one agency to entirely cover the work. Thus the former People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) was split into three arms:

1) The NKVD – still under Beria but who was now no longer responsible for state security but only for economic security:

“The NKVD under the leadership of Beria, was thereby relieved of the heavy problems of state security and became more and more an “economic’ organisation.”

B.Levytsky: “The Uses Of Terror: The Soviet State Security: 1917-1970″; London; 1971; p.160.

2) The Peoples Commissariat of State Security (NKGB) headed by Vsevolod Merkulov. He was known to be a close ally of Beria’s:

“He was one of Beria’s closest and trusted collaborators.”

B.Levytsky: “The Uses Of Terror: The Soviet State Security: 1917-1970″; London; 1971; p.141.

3) The Counter-Espionage Department of the People’s Commissariat for Defence (SMERSH) headed by Victor Abakumov.

After the war in 1946, SMERSH was abolished, and the NKVD was re-named the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and was headed by Sergey Kruglov who was later openly revisionist. The NKGB was renamed the Ministry of State Security (MGB) and remained under Abakumov.

Today most Marxist-Leninists are in agreement on the class affiliations of Beria, Kruglov, and Merkulov.

It is true that some Indian Marxist-Leninists (of Revolutionary Democracy) have recently raised questions about Beria, but these have not been to date, substantiated in print. We therefore will not deal with these purely verbal allegations.

But there still remains some significant queries about whether Abakumov was a Marxist-Leninist, or whether he was a revisionist.

We are forced to consider this matter for the correct interpretation of several later events – including the matter of Stalin’s death. Also, at least in part, the correct interpretation of the alleged Zionist Plot – hinges on this matter. We msut examine the question:

Was Victor Abakumov A Marxist-Leninist?

The Case for Abakumov Being a Marxist-Leninist:

Essentially as far as Alliance can discern, the case on behalf of Abakumov rests on two matters as follows:

i) An Alleged Friendship with Beria:

As the British Marxist-Leninist W.B. Bland views it, Beria and Abakumov were associated as close comrades. By this reasoning, Abakumov must have been a Marxist-Leninist. Bland cites the following views of historians of the Soviet secret services- Levytsky and Wolin & Slusser:

“Beria’s adversaries in the Party (i.e. the opponents of M-L-ism-Ed).. Achieved a notable victory in late 1951, with the replacement of V.S.Abakumov, an associate of Beria’s by S.P.Ignatiev a Party official, as head of the MVD”

S.Wolin & R.Slusser :”The Soviet Secret Police”; London; 1957; p.20.

“Abakumov, Beria’s intimate friend was removed from his post and replaced by S.D.Ignatiev.”

Levytsky op cit p.204

In corroboration of Bland’s point of view, it is also alleged by Sudoplatov that Abakumov was an ally of Beria (Sudoplatov; Ibid; p.324). However this view is contested by Amy Knight- who is undoubtedly the most extensive biographer of Beria (albeit a bourgeois historian), available in the English language. Knight claims that:

“Beria’s loyal deputy Merkulov was replaced by Victor Abakumov as head of the MGB late in the summer of 1946. This change was not instigated by Beria who was distressed to lose Merkulov.”

Knight Ibid; p.141.

Knight maintains that Stalin placed Abakumov in charge of the MGB. This is very possible as the pressures on Beria had to be relieved somehow. But it is most unlikely that it was done for the purpose, as Knight maintains, that Stalin wanted to:

“Limit Beria’s pervasive influence on the security organs.”

(Knight Ibid; p.141).

The pressures dictating that Beria should be freed for the work on the nuclear bomb, meant that several loop-holes had opened, for the revisionists to squeeze themselves back into the security apparatus with a view to renewing disruption. As the changes took place, several opportunities arose:

“The following months witnessed numerous changes in both the MVD and MGB as several new deputies arrived, apparently under the auspices of Abakumov and Kruglov. These changes may also have been influenced by the arrival of a new CC secretary A.A.Kuznetsov, who took over party supervision of the police. With the exception of Stepan Mamulov, a longtime Beria crony who became a deputy minister in the MVD, none of the new men were part of Beria’s “Georgian Mafia”, although most had been in the security or internal affairs organs for a long time.”

(Knight Ibid; p.141).

ii) Khrushchev ordered the execution of Abakumov

Abakumov was arrested while Stalin was still alive.

It is thus highly plausible that the arrest itself, coming under Stalin’s life time, might have been a part of the revisionist strategy or the Marxist-Leninist strategy.

However, there is no doubt that Abakumov was tried, after Stalin’s death, in Leningrad before the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court presided over by Lieutenant-Colonel E.L. Zeidin. He was charged with “committing the same crimes as Beria”, and also with having:

“Fabricated the so-called Leningrad Case’, in which many Party and Soviet officials were arrested without grounds and falsely accused of very grave state crimes”.

In Bland: “The Doctors Case & The Death Of Stalin”; Stalin Society; London nd ca 1992; p.66.

Thus Abakumov was then sentenced to death by shooting, by the revisionists. This pro-Abakumov evidence seems to Alliance fragmentary at best.

If Stalin was still alive while Abakumov was imprisoned, it suggests that Stalin did not try to obtain his release. One suspects that were Beria to be imprisoned, Stalin would have moved heaven and earth to get him out.

What evidence is there against Abakumov?

The Case Against Abakumov

i) Abakumov’s other Allegiances

In 1947, Abakumov revealed the responsibility of Malenkov for some defects in aviation production that were apparently concealed from the state. (Sudoplatov; Ibid; p.315).

Malenkov was given a party reprimand, demotion & a temporary exile to Kazakhstan and removed from the CC secretariat. However Malenkov’s duties were then taken by Aleksei A. Kuznetsov. Sudoplatov claims that: “Kuznetsov & Abakumov soon became friends.”

But if this is truly so, this must shed some doubt and suspicion upon Abakumov’s identity as a Marxist-Leninist, since Kuznetsov was well known to be a close ally of the revisionists Vosnosenky and Khrushchev. As Bland has pointed out in the Marxist-Leninist Research Bureau Report no 2 (reprinted as Alliance Number 17) the Politburo of the CC of the CPSU(B):

“adopted a resolution “On the Anti-Party Actions of the Comrades Aleksey A. Kuznetsov, Mikhail I Rodionov and Pyotr S Popkov.”

Bland ML Research Bureau; Report No.2; London; nd circa 1992; p. 25

Also, as W.B.Bland had previously made clear in the now classic “Restoration of Capitalism in the USSR,” Kuznetsov was an ally of the arch-revisionists Vosnosenky and Khrushchev:

“Party leaders confide that … Vosnosensky and Kuznetsov … (were) in 1949… trying to establish a separate Communist organisation in the Russian Soviet Republic .. With headquarters in Leningrad instead of Moscow.”

C.L. Sulzberger:”The Big Thaw”; New York; 1956;

Also See Bland In “Restoration”; Wembley 1988; reprinted Alliance Number 14; p.342.

Also find Appendix 3 “The Leningrad Plot” at: http://www.virtue.nu/allianceml/

But Stalin is said to have fought for Malenkov’s reinstatement from Sudoplatov’s testimony:

“Stalin however allowed Malenkov to return to Moscow after two months & appointed him deputy prime minster. Beria in this period strongly supported Malenkov.” (Ibid).

Malenkov was a later vacillator and not a firm Marxist-Leninist. But Stalin had clearly recognised the anti-Marxist-Leninist behaviurs of Kuznetsov.

(ii) The General Zhukov Affair

Abakumov was apparently behind various attempts to destroy the career of General Zhukov, and his efforts resulted in the dismissal of Zhukov from the Bolshevik party CC. Using evidence from the imprisoned General Nivikov, Zhukov was charged with conspiracy. In these charges, Novikov had described Zhukov as being of a man of:

“Exceptional ambition” and… A man “namoured with himself”, who loved glory and honour. He was officious and would not tolerate opposition.”

Chaney, Preston: “Zhukov”; 1976; Norman Oklahoma; p. 371.

But as Zhukov’s biographer makes clear, Stalin only reluctantly agreed to an enforced and temporary retreat for Zhukov, pending full investigation saying:

“Nonetheless Comrade Zhukov, you will have to leave Moscow for a while.”

Chaney Ibid; p. 373.

Zhukov was sent to Odessa to run the Military District from June 13th to December 1947.

He was reprimanded in June 1947 for the only single objective negative fact that had emerged on him. What was this? Zhukov had in peacetime awarded an actress with a medal. He was therefore reprimanded then for:

“Improperly rewarding artists in his district. The right to reward reverted in peacetime to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.”

Chaney Ibid; p. 374.

In December 1947 Zhukov was summoned to the Central committee Plenum where he heard his charges read out. Upon hearing that no new facts were stated he refused to argue, and when he saw that the ensuing vote had expelled him from the Central Committee, he simply marched out. All other allegations, against Zhukov remained un-proven. But as Chaney says, Stalin remained unconvinced of Zhukov’s “error”:

“Despite their relentless effort to have Zhukov arrested, Beria and Abakumov failed to convince Stalin of the Marshall’s guilt. As Khrushchev told Zhukov later, Stalin said to Beria:
“I don’t believe anyone that Zhukov would agree to this. I know him well. He is a straightforward person; he is sharp and can say unpleasant things to anyone bluntly, but he will never be against the Central Committee.”
Another version was that Stalin said:
“No, I won’t arrest Zhukov. I know him well. For four years of war, I knew him better that my own self.”

Chaney Ibid; p. 375.

Thus it was Stalin who resisted the attacks on Zhukov, in which to a large extent Abakumov was involved. Naturally, others were also involved in the complex battles, and the inter-relationships become important, to attempt to systematically work out.

From 1947 General Rukhadze was placed in the Ministership of state security of Georgia, having been in the war years, the head of SMERSH in the Caucasus. According to Sudoplatov his anti-Beria inclinations were well known. (Sudoplatov; Ibid; p.321.)

He was assisted by Ryumin, who later becomes a key figure in the subsequent anti-Marxist-Leninist plots, that became known to the world at large as the “Anti-Zionist Plot” and the “Doctors’ Plot.”

We will return to Abakumov below, when we examine his testimony on the murder of Mikhoels and the Doctor’s Plot (See below).

But at least some evidence cited to this point in this report, continues to identify Abakumov as an honest Marxist-Leninist.

Given the obvious truth that the revisionists were responsible for his death, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that as Bland has it, Abakumov was an honest Marxist-Leninist.

Source

“Legalizing” the Formation of the State of Israel by the United Nations Partition & the USSR Recognition – 1947

israel-palestinian-loss-of-land

This article was published by Alliance (Marxist-Leninist) as part of the publication Alliance, issue #30, “Marx, Lenin and Stalin on Zionism.”

At the early stages of the Comintern, the views of Lenin were still unchallenged by the later revisionist opposition, who would finally succeed in hi-jacking the Comintern, only by 1928.

Even when Stalin took over the leadership of the CPSU(B), until 1925 his views were not easily ignored. Matters within the Comintern, were however dominated by the succeeding revisionist factions – first of Zinoviev, and then those of Bukharin, and then by that of Dimitrov-Kuussinen-Manuilsky.

At the early stages then, policies were in general correctly Marxist-Leninist. For instance, article (11f), was passed at the Second Congress of Comintern (still attended by Lenin), that condemned the attempts of foreign imperialism to establish the divisive “Jewish” state of Israel; in Arab Palestine.

“(11 f) It is essential constantly to expose and to explain to the widest masses of the working people everywhere, and particularly in the backward countries, the deception practiced by the imperialist Powers with the help of the privileged classes in the oppressed countries in creating ostensibly politically independent States which are in reality completely dependent on them economically, financially, and militarily. A glaring example of the deception practiced on the working classes of an oppressed nation by the combined efforts of Entente imperialism and the bourgeoisie of that same nations is offered by the Zionists’ venture (And by Zionism as a whole, which under the pretense of creating a Jewish state in Palestine in fact surrenders the Arab working people of Palestine, where the Jewish workers form only a small minority to exploitation by England). In present international circumstances there is no salvation for dependent and weak nations except as an alliance of Soviet republics.”

Theses 2nd Comintern Congress: AThe National & Colonial Question A; Ed J.Degras; Vol 1; p.144.

It must be asked then, why Andrey A. Gromyko, the UN representative of the USSR, and the Soviet ambassador to the USA, voted at the United Nations, to recognise the formation of the state of Israel in 1947? While the European Communist Parties were being ideologically re-educated by the Cominform, in the weakened state of the USSR it turned out that Andrei Gromyko was appointed to the United Nations. Gromyko’s later overt revisionism was clear. But at that time, he was not revealed as a revisionist.

The Palestine Communist Party had been agitating very publicly that there should be no division of the territory of Palestine between Jewish immigrants and the local indigenous Palestinians Arab population. However at the very first session of the UN in San Francisco, Gromyko voted for the division of Palestine and the establishment of the state of Israel. This policy went against the long history of Marxist-Leninists, who had argued that Jews should be assimilated in the country they lived, and should join the class struggle there.

The result was a temporary victory for the revisionist faction inside the leading echelons of the CPSU(B), led by Khrushchev.

As Walter Laquer, one of the most well known historians of the Zionist movement puts it, Gromyko was very much in the vanguard of the push for an independent Israel. Even propelling the hesitant President Truman and the USA into his wake:

“President Truman and his advisers were firmly resolved not to give any lead to the United Nations but to wait for the emergence of a consensus. Much to the surprise of the Zionists the Soviet attitude was much more positive. This first became evident when the Jewish Agency asked to be permitted (as a matter of simple justice’) to appear at the UN on behalf of the Jewish people since the Arabs were already represented there. They had the immediate support of the Soviet delegation, and on May 15 Gromyko spoke not without sympathy about the aspirations towards Palestine of a considerable part of the Jewish people, of the calamities and sufferings they had undergone throughout the last war, (which defy description’) and the grave conditions in which the masses of the Jewish population found themselves after the war. He mentioned partition as one of several possible solutions. This unexpected support continued throughout 1947 and led later that year to the Soviet decision to vote for partition. Traditionally the Soviet attitude to Zionism had been extremely hostile, and since Moscow reverted to is earlier position not long after the state of Israel came into being once can only conclude that the short-lived rapprochement came exactly at the right moment for the Zionists. Without it they would not have stood a chance… On 15 may 1947 the General Assembly approved the establishment of a committee of eleven to investigate the Palestine question to make proposals for a settlement…The UNSCOP committee (United Nations Special Committee on Palestine) majority came out in favour of partition.. And were published on 31 August 1947. Both the majority and the minority reports were drafted by the same man – Dr Ralphe Bunche…. a hesitating President Truman gave his assent to the partition scheme on 9 October 1947… The vote was taken on 29 November and the motion carried by 33 to 13…. The state of Israel came into being at a meeting of the National Council at 4 pm on Friday 14 May 1948.. The first country to recognise the new state was the USA.. Within the next few days the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala Uruguay and other countries followed.”

Laquer W; AA History of Zionism”; New York; 1976; p. 578; 582; 586.

It is clear that Gromyko was also fighting a propaganda war for an independent state of Israel based in Palestine, inside the USSR. Clearly even members of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee (see below) such as Solomon (or Shlomo) Mikhoels were influenced by this, as related by Teller:

“In a small and select group the conversation turned to Gromyko’s speech on the Palestine question. Actor-director Shlomo Mikhoels alluded to a passage in one of the Yiddish classics by Mendel Mocher Sefarim in which a Jew ask a Russian peasant to point him the way to the Land of Israel. “Gromyko”, said Mikhoels in exaltation, “is that good Gentile who shows us the way to the Land of Israel.”

Teller, Judd T: “The Kremlin, The Jews and the Middle East”; p.106; New York; 1957;

What seems to have happened is apparent from recent detailed memorandums that reveal that the USSR first did take a principled Marxist-Leninist line which was then subverted.

In order to be clear, we show this process below, citing both the primary and the secondary source.

The tremendous refugee problem after the war, obviously consisted of a huge Jewish population. The USSR government was already aware of proposals that this should be remedied by the formation of a state inside Germany:

“20 February 1945, the Third European Division of the USSR People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (NKID) sent a memorandum (from the Jewish Committee – dated 11.11.1944 – ed) to Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs V. G. Dekanozov. It informed him that the Soviet Embassy in Italy had forwarded two letters to the NKJD, one addressed to I. V. Stalin, the other to V. M. Molotov, from the Rome-based Jewish Committee of the International Union of Emigrants and Refugees. Enclosed with the letters was a proposal for creating an independent Jewish state on German territory and a map of Germany where the prospective state was delineated.”

Strizhov I;:” The Soviet Position on the Establishment of the State of Israel”; Op Cit; p.303

As will be discussed later, proposals were also made by the progressive Soviet Jews for the resolution of the problem in the Crimean republic of the USSR. However by now, the Zionists had already made Palestine their goal.

Initially the objective reality of a larger settler population – whether illegally arrived or not – inside Palestine was to be confronted by the remaining Marxist-Leninists within the CPSU(B), by the correct insistence that the mandate of Britain over Palestine should be lifted; and possibly replaced by a Mandate responsible to the entire UN.

It was rightly pointed out, by the CPSU(B) Marxist-Leninists, that the British had “failed” to peacefully resolve the situation.

This was articulated on 27 July 1945 in a memo signed by M.M.Litvinov in his post as, Chairman of the “Committee on Preparing Peace Treaties and the Postwar Order.” Although Litvinov was at best a vacillating Marxist-Leninist, and at worst a concious enemy of the USSR state [as several sources can attest to] – nonetheless the key memo itself had been set up by the diplomats within the USSR People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (NKID), who:

“Sent a memorandum entitled ‘The Palestine Question'” to Stalin, Molotov and the Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Its conclusion read:

1. No matter how hard the British may try to prove that their present policy in Palestine conforms to the Balfour Declaration, it is obvious that they have failed to live up to the mandate entrusted to them. This was admitted in the.. statements by high-ranking British statesmen. This is sufficient justification for taking the Palestine mandate away from the British.

2.The Palestine question cannot be duly settled without impinging upon the wishes and rights of Jews or Arabs, or perhaps both. The British government is in equal measure subject to the influence of the Arab states and world Jewry. Hence its difficulties in choosing the correct means to settle the Palestine problem.

3. The US government is subject to the same influences. While British Palestine policy is necessarily affected mainly by orientation towards Arab interests, the American government is subject in the first place to the influence of the powerful US Jewry. It should be recalled that at the latest presidential elections both the Democratic and the Republican parties felt compelled to issue declarations on their attitude to Palestine, demanding unrestricted immigration of Jews and unrestricted rights for Jews to their own land. At the same time, the US government would hardly choose to quarrel with the Arabs, in view of the fact that the oil pipeline from Saudi Arabia in which they have a stake will run through hundreds of kilometres of Arab territory. That would put the US government in as difficult a position regarding Palestine as the British government.

4. The USSR, free from either Arab or Jewish influence, would be in a better position to tackle the Palestine issue. This at least entitles it to request a temporary trusteeship over Palestine until a more radical solution is found.

5. The British attach to Palestine, which guards the approaches to the Suez Canal and has an outlet for Iraqi oil on its territory, too much importance for us to expect them to consent even to a temporary transfer of Palestine to the hands of another state, particularly, the USSR.

6. In the event that the Soviet request is rejected the following solution suggests itself: transfer of Palestine to the collective trusteeship of three states – the USSR, USA and Britain. These three powers will be able to take the requisite decisions collectively, paying less tribute to the opinion of the Arab or the Jewish population than either the American or British government acting on its own would feel obliged to do.

7.The provisions of collective trusteeship shall be bound neither by the Balfour Declaration nor by any promises Britain has earlier given as the mandatary power, so that the new collective administration could tackle the Palestine problem in all fairness, in accordance with the interests of the entire population and the new imperatives of political realities and general security.”

Strizhov I;:” The Soviet Position on the Establishment of the State of Israel”; Op Cit; p.304-305; Citing 5.Arkhiv vneshnei politiki MID SSSR (AVP),fond (f.) . 07,opis’ (op.) 12a, papka (pk.) 42, delo (d.) 6, pp. 36-8

This generally correct line, given the new circumstances, continued to hold until May 1946.

By then the British and the USA imperialists had continued the general policy of divide and rule. They had established the Anglo-American Committee, which had alienated both Jews and Arabs:

“In December 1945 an Anglo-American Committee was set up to investigate the situation in Palestine. It was entrusted with a wide range of tasks connected with the Palestine problem as a whole. The Committee’s report was made public in April 1946 and was met with an outburst of violent recriminations throughout the Arab states and with bitter disappointment on the part of the Jews.”

Strizhov I;:” The Soviet Position on the Establishment of the State of Israel”; Op Cit; p.305

The previous line of the USSR was brought up to date, in order to acknowledge that the Anglo-American Committee had attempted to continue the British imperialist mandate “jointly.”

In the circumstances, the correct Marxist-Leninist line was taken – to use the UN to “reveal the aspirations” of the imperialists to “prevent the interference of other countries” in settling the issue.

It was correctly stated (and consistent with previous Marxist-Leninist views) that anti-racism and anti-Semitism was a reflection of larger forces and could not be dealt with simply by creating a state – that anyway could not “house” every one subject to racism.

Moreover it correctly noted that in the current situation unless the issue was brought up, the British and USA would succeed in enforcing their will – “our silence on the Palestine issue.”

The correct approach however was to allow the Arabs to raise the question at the UN. This was put in an up-dated memo to Dekanozov, Molotov’s Deputy:

“A memorandum entitled ‘The Palestine Question’, based on the results of the Litvinov Committee, was compiled by the Middle East Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry and on 15 May 1946 was sent to Dekanozov. It read: ‘Attempts by Britain and the US jointly to continue the British mandate outside the framework of the UN reveal their aspiration to prevent the interference of other countries in the settlement of the Palestine question until Palestine is fully under the control of the US and Britain. Our silence on the Palestine issue might be interpreted by the US, Britain, Arabs and Jews as the Soviet Union’s partial approval of the proposals put forth by the committee. Bearing this in mind and in view of the fact that official and unofficial representatives of both Arab states and Jewish organizations are running to the Soviet Union in order to have the Palestine problem settled it would be expedient to set forth the Soviet point of view on the Palestine problem in two or three articles to be published in the press. Later our diplomatic representatives may refer to these articles in private conversations if they are approached by Arab or Jewish representatives in connection with the Palestine question.”

Strizhov I;; Op Cit; p.305 citing: AVP, f. 06, op. 08, pk. 42, d. 694, pp. 2-4

After this preamble, the most likely Marxist-Leninist position advisable, was crystallised as being to reject the Anglo-American Committee’s position as “incompetent” and to insist upon abrogation of the British mandate in Palestine:

“Presumably, our position on the Palestine question should be as follows:

1.The Anglo-American committee set up to study the Palestine question without the participation of the UN was not competent to discuss. ..and tackle the Palestine problem without the participation of the parties directly concerned.

2.The Jewish question in Europe cannot be solved through Jewish immigration to Palestine, inasmuch as only complete eradication of racism and the democratization of European countries can create normal conditions for the existence of the Jewish masses.

3.The British mandate in Palestine should be abrogated since it is impeding a radical solution of the Palestine question and jeopardizing security in the Middle East. All foreign troops should be withdrawn from Palestine.

4. Palestine should be placed under the trusteeship of the UN which within a certain period of time will lay the groundwork for a sovereign and democratic Palestine. We must not submit the Palestine question for consideration by the UN. It should be raised by the Arab UN members themselves. We should only voice our opinion and uphold it. It would be expedient to postpone the publication of articles on the Palestine question until the session of the Council of Foreign Ministers has completed its deliberations.”

Strizhov I; Op Cit; p.305 citing: AVP, f. 06, op. 08, pk. 42, d. 694, pp. 2-4

The best elements of the Jewish immigrants into the Palestine lands, were the left wing Poalei-Tsion (led by L. Levite and M. Erem) and the Hashomer-Hatsair Workers Party (led by Y.Barzilai), had participated in the Palestine-USSR Friendship League. They were already in contact with the Soviet Ambassador to Poland V.Z. Lebedev.

As he wrote to Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister A.Ia Vyshinskii, the Hasomer-Hatsair were in agreement with the principle of a federation of an Arab-Jewish state with two national chambers. This differed from the Poalei-Tsion. (Strizhov I; Op Cit; p.306).

The US Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles now showed the USA policy response, which was to accept the challenge of ensuring an imperialist led take-over of the United Nations.

Accordingly the British were persuaded to agree publicly to their failure:

“In mid-February 1947 the British government officially admitted that since it was unable to find a solution to the Palestine problem, it was going to ask the United Nations to recommend one.”

Strizhov Op Cit; p.307; citing Sumner Welles, We Need Not Fail (Boston:1948), p.41.

Even as late as 5 March 1947, the Middle East Department of The USSR Foreign Ministry were pursuing a correct Marxist-Leninist line.

They sent Vyshinskii a memo entitled “The Palestine Problem” (October 1946-February 1947), which based itself upon the previously cited points 2 and 3 of the May memo.

But more public stands were shortly to be needed by the Soviet hidden revisionist representatives to the UN. By 6 March the UN Soviet delegate Boris Shtein had noted that although until then, the UN had “refrained from formulating its stand on the Palestine question,” the fact that the discussion was now tabled would force a public stand by the USSR.

This was an ideal opportunity for the Soviets take the principled Marxist-Leninist line: to demand the withdrawal of British troops, the full independence for Palestine, and a full democratic statute.

But since Arab-Jewish “contradictions” would still exist, the resolution could only be exercised via a United Nations “collective trusteeship” – specifically thereby rejecting a British “trusteeship” only.

At least this would ensure the possibility of real Soviet brakes upon the Zionist settlers and their wars against the Arabs for land.

This line was indeed put, or outlined, in the following internal memo to Vyshinsky:

“Up until now the USSR has refrained from formulating its stand on the Palestine question. However, the upcoming discussion of the issue by the UN impels us to formulate our position. First of all, the USSR must come out resolutely for the abrogation of Britain’s Palestine mandate. Britain has not coped with its responsibilities as the mandatary power. Throughout the duration of the mandate… Britain has not succeeded in establishing order in the country and preventing almost un-intermittent bloodshed. Substituting British trusteeship for the mandate is also out of the question. The change of signboard will not change anything. What could be considered is collective trusteeship over Palestine by the UN as an organization or by several nations (in effect, permanent Security Council members). However, this possibility is excluded by the fact that the population of the country, both Arabs and Jews, are mature enough for independence. Neither Arabs nor Jews would agree to any trusteeship whatsoever and want complete independence. The Soviet Union cannot but support the demand for full independence for Palestine.. The withdrawal of British troops from the country should be the first and obligatory precondition for the independence of Palestine. Still, granting independence to Palestine would not take the edge off Arab-Jewish contradictions in the country. The Soviet Union cannot see any way of settling them other than by democratic means. Thus, alongside independence, Palestine should obtain a democratic statute ensuring full and genuine equality (civil, political and national) for the population of Palestine as a whole. The statute is to be worked out by the UN Organization, which is subsequently to become a guarantor of its implementation. The fact that Britain has relegated the Palestine question to the United Nations for discussion, enables the USSR for the first time not only to voice its views on the issue but also to take an active part in Palestine’s fate.”

Strizhov I; Op Cit; Citing p.308; AVP, f. 07, op. 12, pk. 42, d. 6, pp. 140-1.

In Gromyko’s speech of 17 May 1947, made to the UN, he correctly pointed out, in accordance with the general USSR line, that:

“The mandate administration established in Palestine in 1922 has not proved itself.”

Strizhov I; OP Cit; p.308.

He even went on to note, that no single West European state had protected the “elementary rights” of the Jewish people, and that “vast numbers” were homeless and without subsistence. Again this was consistent with the line evolved previously.

But then he radically departed from the previously agreed line – of setting up a democratic Palestine with “full and genuine equality for all the population of Palestine as a whole.”

Instead Gromyko proposed a Partition of Palestine, seemingly as a fall-back position, if a democratic Palestine was not agreeable.

In reality this unacceptable and revisionist line was designed to open the door on an imperialist settlement of the Palestine question:

“Gromyko pointed out that neither past history’ nor the conditions now obtaining in Palestine’ justified a one-sided settlement of the Palestine question’ that ignored the legitimate rights’ of both the Arab and Jewish populations. The Soviet delegation had come to the conclusion that the legitimate interests of both the Jewish and the Arab peoples of Palestine could be safeguarded only if an integral Arab Jewish democratic state’ were established. If this variant proved unattainable’ due to the deterioration of Arab-Jewish relations, then it would be necessary to consider the second variant, which had gained currency in Palestine: the partition of Palestine into two independent sovereign states – one Jewish and one Arab.”

Strizhov I;:Op Cit; p.309; 1zvestiia, 16 May 1947.

It is not surprising, that some Zionist observers were surprised by this line from someone claiming to be the representative of the USSR, as the line was quite in “contradiction to the explicitly anti-Zionist attitude”:

“Gromyko’s speech, an Israeli diplomat commented many years later, ‘was in complete contradiction to the explicitly anti-Zionist attitude which both communist ideologists and practical politicians had expressed repeatedly and consistently over several decades.. therefore came as a great surprise.”

Strizhov I;:Op Cit; p.309; Avigdor Dagan, Moscow and Jerusalem” (London, 1970), pp. 19-20.

On the 15 May 1947, UNSCOP (United Nations Special Committee On Palestine) was established and it reported to the General Assembly on 13 October 1947. Speaking in support of partition, the Soviet representative Tsarapkin:

“Pointed out that the Jews’ desire to create their own state was understandable, and it would be unjust to deny the Jewish people the right to realize these aspirations. The creation of a Jewish State has become a ripe and urgent issue’.Having supported in principle the recommendations submitted by a majority in the special committee’ for the partition of Palestine, he declared: If this session of the General Assembly decides to establish a Jewish and an Arab state, it would be a big stride forward in the settlement of the Palestine question as a whole.”

Strizhov I;:” ASoviet Position”; Op Cit; p. 309-310; Pravda, 16th October 1947.

The final proposals were put to the General Assembly after having been agreed to by the ad hoc committee including the Soviet Ukrainian and Belorussian delegates:

“On 25 November 1947 the ad hoc committee adopted the proposal for the partition of Palestine into two states, one Arab and one Jewish. The Soviet, Ukrainian and Belorussian delegates all voted for the proposal. The Partition Plan was considered and put to the vote at the General Assembly plenary sessions held between 26-29 November 1947. The session’s proceedings were marked by heated debate.”

Strizhov I; “Soviet Position”; Ibid; p. 310.

When on 26 November 1947, Gromyko addressed the plenary session, he defended Partition on the grounds that it met the demands of the Jewish people, and he insisted that the Soviet delegation had been insistent and quite un-ambiguous upon this matter:

“The resolution of the question of Palestine on the basis of its partition into two independent states will have great historic significance inasmuch as it meets the legitimate demands of the Jewish people…In the opinion of the Soviet delegation, the plan for the settlement in Palestine submitted by the committee and stipulating that the Security Council is to be entrusted with its practical implementation, fully coincides with the interests of maintaining and strengthening international peace and the promotion of inter-state cooperation. Therefore the Soviet delegation supports the recommendation for the partition of Palestine. Unlike some other delegations, the Soviet delegation has from the very outset taken a clear-cut and unambiguous stand upon this question and is consistently upholding it. It will not engage in manoeuvring or manipulations with votes as is regrettably the case at the Assembly, in particular in connection with the debates on the Palestine issue.”

Strizhov I; Ibid; p. 310; vnethnaiapohuha Soretskogo Sniuza (Moscow, 1948), pp. 244-2, 244-5.

On 29 November 1947 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 181(11) on the partition of Palestine into two states. This decision, endorsed the establishment of the State of Israel.

Resolution 181(11) established in January 1948, a special UN commission to “supervise” preparations for the creation of the Arab and the Jewish states.

While this objectively supported the long term imperialist plans for the Middle East, a certain myopia on the part of the imperialists prevented their seeing immediately that they should be pleased.

Initially therefore, it encountered opposition from the British who obstructed its’ work. On the floor of the UN, the US supported the British and argued that it was not possible to perform the task of partition peacefully. But the USA in turn was heatedly opposed by Gromyko who insisted that there should be no such problem:

“The work of the commission generated acrimonious debate and differences in the UN Security Council which was to ensure the implementation of the resolution. At the Security Council meeting on 19 March 1948 the United States representative Warren Austin submitted a proposal for convening the 2nd Special Session of the General Assembly ‘to establish UN trustee-ship over Palestine’, claiming that ‘it is allegedly impossible to carry out the Palestine partition program.. .by peaceful means’. In reply, Soviet representative Gromyko declared that the US stand had nothing in common with the General Assembly resolution and that the Soviet Union could not agree with that position.”

Strizhov I; “Soviet Position”; Ibid; p.310; Pravda, 21 March 1948.

Because of the impasse, it was sponsored that the UN establish a trusteeship plan. This had been the original Soviet intention as shown by the above memos put to the Foreign Ministry.

Now however, Gromyko expressly argued against these plans, and in effect, Gromyko ensured that partition would occur with very likely, a quick Israeli take-over of the whole of Palestine:

“On 30 March 1948 when two US resolutions providing for an immediate truce between the Arabs and the Jews and the convocation of a special General Assembly session to reconsider the earlier decision on partition were submitted to the Security Council, Gromyko criticized the US trusteeship plan, characterizing the partition of Palestine as a just solution and insisting that US allegations about the impossibility of effecting the partition by peaceful means were groundless. He said the Palestine Commission should continue its work in order to carry out the partition ‘so long as the General Assembly decisions remained in force’. “

Strizhov I; “Soviet Position”; Ibid; p.310-311; Pravda, 1 April 1948.

Now that in effect the damage had been done, the Soviet delegation promptly abstained from the decision to convene a special General Assembly. But at the General Assembly hearing on 20 April 1948, Gromyko again severely attacked the USA and Britain for refusing to accept partition:

“They are out to torpedo the partition decision and impose on the United Nations their decision on Palestine’s future, prompted by the self-seeking interests of the US ruling circles..have put forward new.. proposals to establish trusteeship over Palestine.”

Strizhov I; “Soviet Position”; Ibid; p. 311; Izvestiia, 23 April 1948.

The rejection of the previously “acceptable” UN trusteeship line, was now masked in high flown language as expressed by Tsarapkin:

“On 3 May 1948 Tsarapkin, addressing the 1st Committee, rejected the US attempts to impose a trusteeship regime on the peoples of Palestine’. He said: The high level of cultural, social, political and economic development of the Jewish people is indisputable. Such a people should not be put under trusteeship. Such a people has every right to a sovereign state of its own. Any attempts to impose trusteeship on such a people will only discredit the main idea and essence of trusteeship. And are the Palestinian Arabs less deserving of independent existence in their own state than Arabs living outside Palestine? Certainly not. Both the Jewish and the Arab people in Palestine have undoubtedly reached such a stage of political, economic and social development that placing them under trusteeship of any kind is out of the question.”

Strizhov I; “Soviet Position”; Ibid; p. 311; Izvestiia, 6 May 1948.

What was therefore the USA and British motives in now delaying?

It is true that the certain perceptive USA diplomats probably correctly and honestly, viewed the Partition as “un-workable.” Loy Henderson’s memorandum of September 22 was entitled “Certain Considerations Against Advocacy by the USA of the Majority Plan” and argued against Partition as follows:

“In summary, Henderson’s main points were that support of the majority plan would undermine US relations withe the Arab and Moslem worlds; that the USA would be expected to make a major contribution to the implementation of the Plan; that any plan for partitioning Palestine was unworkable; that adoption of the plan would not dispose of the Palestine problem; and finally that the proposals in the plan Awere not based on any principle of an international character…. but in definite contravention of… the Charter of the UN as well as the principles on which American Concepts of government are based.”

Wilson E.M. “Decision On Palestine-How the US Came to Recognise Israel”; Stanford;1979; p.117

But the real reason of the higher politicians of the USA, was to enable the maximum possible land grabbing by the Zionists.

While the filibustering at the UN was going on, the Jewish settlers were feverishly grabbing land and terrorising the Palestinians. This reality was referred to, but in a veiled manner by Gromyko who in effect – again simply justified the on-going practical “partition” as a “reality”:

“At the 1st Committee Session on 4 May 1948, Gromyko called on the General Assembly to admit that partition was in fact being implemented. This, he said, was clear from a statement made by a representative of the UN Secretariat, from reports of the Jewish Agency and publications in the US and elsewhere. ‘While the General Assembly is engaged in discussions, the Jewish state will become a reality despite the efforts of some UN members to create all kinds of obstacles’, he asserted.”

Finally the discussions were ended by the practical establishment of the state of Israel.

It was claimed by Pravda that the USA had “suffered a fiasco”:

“On 14 May 1948 the Special Session of the UN General Assembly ended, for on that day the establishment of the State of Israel was proclaimed in Tel Aviv. Pravda commented: ADevelopments at the Special Session of the General Assembly showed that the US, on whose initiative it had been convened, suffered a fiasco. The initial plans of the US were frustrated. The US delegation did not even dare to put its proposal for establishing a trusteeship regime over the whole of Palestine to the vote. The General Assembly also rejected the British proposal for a provisional regime for Palestine. This proposal, amounting to trusteeship but presented in a disguised form, was criticized by the delegation of the USSR and some other countries. In the course of the debate on the Palestine issue, the USSR pursued a consistent policy, upholding the decision on the partition of Palestine and exposing all scheming with respect to Palestine.”

After the fait accompli, when “On 16 May 1948 Moshe Shertok (later Sharett), Foreign Minister of the Provisional Government of Israel, sent a cable to Molotov”, asking for official recognition it was granted:

“In a telegram to Shertok of 17 May 1948 Molotov replied:
‘This is to inform you that the Government of the USSR has decided to extend official recognition to the State of Israel and its Provisional Government. The Soviet Government believes that the creation by the Jewish people of its sovereign state will serve the cause of strengthening peace and security in Palestine and the Middle East and expresses confidence that friendly relations between the USSR and the State of Israel will develop successfully.”

Strizhov I;:” ‘Soviet Position”; Ibid; p. 313; Pravda, 18 May 1948.

Soon after, within a month later, on 26 June 1948, the appointments were announced of P.I. Ershov, as “USSR Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in the State of Israel”; and of Mrs. Golda Meyerson “Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the State of Israel in the USSR”. (Strizhov I;:” ASoviet Position”; Ibid; p. 313). On 7 September 1948 Golda Meyerson, was received by Molotov in Moscow:

“After presenting her credentials, she said that her government had instructed her to take the first opportunity to express to Molotov the gratitude of the people and Government of the State of Israel for the help rendered by the Soviet Union in the United Nations….. The Soviet Government, Molotov replied, regarded this as its duty, all the more so in that it was fully in keeping with Soviet USSR policy vis-a-vis other peoples’… Molotov pointed out that the State of Israel was off to a good start and that there was a basis for the creation of a viable state.”

Strizhov I; “Soviet Position”; Ibid; p.314; AVP, f. 06, op. 10, pk. 46, d. 623, p.1.

As only one of the outstanding issues (leaving aside the whole matter of the Arab peoples’ response to this “legalised theft” of their lands) was that of continued Jewish immigration, and from where this would come? Would there be immigration from the USSR?

It was asserted by the diplomatic heads of the USSR that this would be from the “capitalist countries” if at all, and not from the Soviet countries. This was the previous Marxist-Leninist line of the Soviet Foreign Ministry until it was subverted by Gromyko:

“On 15 September 1948, while on a protocol visit to I. N. Bakulirt, head of the Middle East Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry, Meyerson declared:
‘The State of Israel will become viable when its population increases several-fold”.
Bakulin, like Deputy Foreign Ministers V. A. Zorin and F. T. Guseev to whom Meyerson also paid her respects on 15 and 17 September, respectively, made it clear that this immigration would have to come solely from the capitalist countries and that Israel could not even cope with all the repressed and persecuted Jews from these countries.”

Strizhov I; “Soviet Position”; Ibid; p.314;AVP, f 06, op. 10, pk. 46, d. 624, p.1.

There are as far as we know, no documents that show an approval of Gromyko’s step in the partition of Palestine – a step that allowed the formation of a singular state of Israel – by Stalin or the other minority Marxist-Leninists of the Central Committee.

This apparent volte-face by the USSR leaders of the international communist movement, totally alienated the Palestinian communists who were left very weakened. It has certainly assisted the alienation of the best of the Arab militants from the Marxist-Leninist movement. In Gromyko’s own English version of his memoirs, there is no discussion of this episode. (Gromyko “Memoirs”; New York; 1989. )

Nor is there any discussion of this episode in the official “History of Soviet Foreign Policy” edited by Gromyko himself, with another revisionist B.N. Ponomarev. (Gromyko A.A. & Ponomorev B.N. Ed:”Soviet Foreign Policy; 1945-1980″; Vol II; Moscow; 1980). Nonetheless, Gromyko does point out that a key member of the Soviet delegation to the UN was another arch-revisionist – Dmitri Manuilsky:

“At San Francisco and later at the first four sessions of the General Assembly and a number of other international meetings up to 19563 the Soviet Ukrainian delegation was invariably headed by Dmitri Zakharyevich Manuilsky, for whom I had the deepest regard.”

Gromyko “Memoirs” Ibid; p. 128.

The argument is today raised that: “Stalin sabotaged the Palestinian struggle”.
Various explanations to supposedly “explain Stalin’s support of the formation of Israel” are offered by non Marxist-Leninist sources.

We examine these below.

Standard Non Marxist-Leninist Explanations For “Stalin’s Support of Israel”;

1. “Stalin wanted to alienate the Arab Nations from the British”

Sudoplatov, amongst others, suggests it was deliberate ploy to undermine British rule:

“Clearly the intention was to strengthen the Soviet stand in the Middle East and to undermine the British influence among Arab states who objected to the Jewish state, by showing their inability to stop the Jews.”

Sudoplatov; op cit; p.292-293.

It is also alleged by Sudoplatov that Stalin said to Vetrov, who was Molotovs’ assistant & later an Ambassador to Denmark:

“Let’s agree to the establishment of Israel. This will be a pain in the ass for the Arab states & will make them turn their backs on the British. In the long run it will totally undermine British influence in Egypt, Syria, Turkey and Iraq”.

Albert Axell, “Stalin’s War Throughout the Eyes of His Commanders”; New York; 1997; p.296.

This tortuous explanation, in an alleged quotation from Stalin (rather like the older school of historians who state that in 1066 on a certain date and hour, William had a vision after eating grapes and said that he dreamed of his dynasty etc…) is buttressed by a “conversation with a confidential source”, who yet… remains nameless.

2. “Stalin wanted to justify pre-emptively an attack upon Soviet Jewry”:

He “wanted to neutralize the rumors about his changed course on the nationality policy… He felt that he had a psychological and political alibi for future events (arrests exiles, propaganda campaigns).” Vaksberg; Op Cit; p.184

We reject these “explanations” as self-evidently superficial, and again rather strained. But then what does explain these events?

A MARXIST-LENINIST ARGUMENT TO UNDERSTAND WHAT HAPPENED

We argue instead, that the only logical answer is two-fold:

(1) Firstly, the USSR, was not under Stalin’s full un-impeded control. Even following the victory of the Great People’s Anti-Fascist War, revisionist influence within the CPSU and in the leading echelons of the so called People’s Democracies undermined Marxist-Leninist policies; Stalin and the Marxist-Leninists, were in a minority in the Central Committee of the CPSU(B).

(2) Secondly, that post Second World War, Stalin and the USSR were in a position of a temporary objective weakness with respect to the foreign imperialism of the USA. Although epitomised by the “Atomic Gap”, closing that gap still left the USSR in an objectively weaker position than the USA.

PREMISE 1: Stalin And Marxists-Leninists Were In A Minority

Many lines of evidence make clear that revisionists had gone underground in order to continue subverting the Soviet Union, and outnumbered the honest Marxist-Leninists. Even astute observers of the USSR like President Harry S. Truman of the USA, who was a deadly foe of Communism, observed that:

“Stalin was a prisoner of the Politburo’.”

Resis A: ’Stalin, the Politburo & Onset of the Cold War. 1945-1946″, no.701, Carl Beck papers, Pittsburgh 1988; p.9. Citing D.Yergin: the Shattered Peace.”; Boston; 1977.; pp 101-104.

Previous issues of Alliance have discussed the general analysis underpinning this premise. In order to erect a facade behind which the revisionists could operate, a cult of Stalin was built. As time goes by, more evidence supporting this view emerges. We cite a participant in the Second World War:

“Konoplyanko, ex-KGB officer:
“I would put the blame for Stalin’s cult not so much on Stalin himself, but mostly on his environment – the cult was launched from the top not from the bottom.. His toadies and bootlickers competed in currying favour with him by praising him to the skies.”

A.Axell Ibid; p.179-180

It is true that the victory of the USSR in the Second World War gave the Marxist-Leninists strength. This victory was gained, in spite of the enormous sabotage performed from within the party and the army, both penetrated by traitors to the Soviet Union. This is confirmed by interviews with several of Stalin’s generals. For instance with General Shavrov:

“Author: General what puzzles me is why would Stalin undercut himself, I mean weaken the army with the pre-war purges? (Von Rauch says that of 6,000 of Stalin’s highest ranking officers who were arrested on charge of treason, 1500 were executed.”

Shavrov: “The T-34 tank was delivered to the army in 1939.. The weak points (were identified).. In two months time after the tanks was sent back to the factory, the whole research team on the T-34 was arrested.. Who gave the order? We don’t think it was Stalin. Nobody knows for certain who was responsible. Was it treason? Of course Hitler was interested in this.. I know another case.. The Lake Khasan Battle against the Japanese army in 1938. When the Japanese struck were about 200 miles away… That night and for a few more days, our regimental commanders, divisional commandeers, and senior commanders were arrested. At the very moment of the Japanese attack!.. Who did it? This question is still un-answered.”

A.Axell Ibid; p.20.

General Sergeyev has a similar view of the degree of sabotage:

“In 1990, General Igor Sergeyev, who was Deputy Commander-in-chief of Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces disclosed that 35,000 commanders’ were expelled from the Party and arrested in 1937-8. Between 1932 and 1939, the army’s numerical strength actually decreased. He said that experienced soldiers were replaced with hastily trained men’”.

A.Axell Ibid; p. 34

Similar is the testimony of the Czech President Eduard Benes:

“The Czech President Eduard Benes in his post war memoirs said that he learned in 1937 of the existence of the anti-Stalin clique in the Red Army which had close contacts with the Nazi officers.. Czech officials are said to have been shocked to learn that their country’s’s military secrets hitherto known only to the Russians through their mutual aid alliance, were also know to the German high Command. The secrets they claimed were given to Berlin by Marshall Mikhail Tukhachevsky. Some corroboration came from G.E.R. Gedye, the Prague correspondent of the New York Times, who cabled on 18 June that Atwo of the highest officials in Prague” say that the they have ‘definite knowledge that secret connection between the German General Staff and certain high Russian generals have existed since Rapallo.”

A.Axell Ibid; p.35

Stalin’s general response to this sabotage, within the Marxist-Leninist movement, both internally and externally of the USSR, was to weld together a small group of solidly Marxist-Leninist elements around him; to continue to pursue a correct line both outside and within the USSR.

Externally, the approach led to the creation of the Cominform, to pursue the task of ensuring Marxist-Leninist leadership in the Peoples’ Democracies. This occurred after a certain consolidation had taken place.

Internally within the USSR, this policy led to among other things, the creation of a Foreign Policy bureau to deal with the post Second World War manipulations of imperialism. Stalin took the Politburo function of foreign relations into his own hands, and he placed key tasks in the safekeeping of a few chosen comrades, a “sextet” of proven Marxist-Leninists upon whom Stalin could place trust:

“In the conduct of his postwar foreign policies Stalin had no use for the ordinary type of foreign ministry.. he reserved all important decisions to himself.. For a number of years the Politburo was practically eliminated; to Akeep some members away from participation in the decision,” a Asextet” was appointed to deal with international as well as a number of other issues. Among the members of the small committee, in addition to Stalin were Vyacheslev Molotov, Lavrenti Beria, Georgi Malenkov, and until his death in 1948, Andrei Zhdanov.”

Dallin D.J. “Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin”; Philadelphia 1961; p.3.

Stalin attempted to place strategically important branches of the foreign department directly under his own control:

“No less important than the sextets’ and septets’ was the large Foreign Department of the CC of the CPSU, the existence of which was not publicly acknowledged.. It was divided into sections by countries. The ties between these sections and the corresponding offices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were often very close. While the official Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not always headed by a member of the supreme Politburo-Presidium (For example neither Maxim Litvinov or Andrei Vyshinsky was a member of the Politburo), the foreign department of the CC was the organ of the “general” or “first” secretary.. This left the ultimate power.. In the hand of the party’s leader.”

Dallin D.J. “Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin”; Philadelphia 1961; p.3.

Even then the revisionists were too numerous to be kept entirely out of influential positions. For example, Nikolai Voznosensky – who was a revisionist already under suspicion but only later unmasked by Stalin, was added to the small “sextet” group. It is extremely doubtful that this was “on Stalin’s suggestion” as suggested by Dallin. As detailed elsewhere, Stalin had already realised the nature of Voznosensky’s revisionism. (See For instance Issues Number 12 and 14 of Alliance.)

But in fact it was only later, in 1949 in fact to effect Voznosensky’s arrest and execution. But wherever possible, Stalin ensured that the more steadfast and resolute Marxist-Leninists took the leading and responsible roles. Zhdanov was in the highest and most trusted category:

“In the early 1940’s the Foreign department of the CC was headed by Georgi Malenkov. Malenkov was succeeded by Andrei Zhdanov, whose role was enhanced when the leadership of the dissolved Comintern was incorporated into one of the departments of the CC.”… In 1944-45 under Zhdanov’s direction the Foreign Section of the CC carried out the remarkable operation of dispatching to the respective countries the leaders of the future governments of the satellites selected among emigres in the Soviet Union. The foreign Ministry acquired growing importance in the postwar era as the channel for relations with the communist parties of the satellites.”

Resis; Ibid; p. 4.

Again attempting to ensure Marxist-Leninist control, Stalin removed Ivan Maisky and Maxim Litvinov from diplomatic functions in London and Washington. But since all posts could not possibly be filled without recourse to skills that the revisionists undoubtedly still retained, they were given a post in heading two commissions – respectively the commission for state reparations and the commission for postwar peace treaties. (Vladislav Zubok & Pleshakov, Constantine “Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War-From Stalin to Khrushchev”; Cambridge Mass; 1996; p.28).

The two key ambassador posts in the USA and England were filled initially by Molotov. Litvinov in particular was suspected of secret contacts with the Western ruling classes. This was confirmed when he met with the CBS correspondent Richard C. Hottelet, and warned him to alert the West that “they had to beware of Soviet ambitions for territory,” saying:

“The outmoded concept of security in terms of territory – the more you’ve got the safer you are”.. No Western concessions would satisfy the Soviet leadership.”

Zubok & Pleshakov, Ibid p.37-38.

“If the West acceded to Soviet demands.. It would lead to the West being faced, after a more or less short time, with the next series of demands.”

D.Holloway; Op Cit; p.167

It was fully intended by Litvinov, that President Truman would be informed of this conversation, and “in secret” he was so informed. However Soviet Security was also aware of what had transpired. Within a month Litvinov was relieved of his position. One year later Litvinov told Alexander Werth a Western journalist in Moscow:

“That Russia could have cashed in on the goodwill that it had accumulated during the war, but that Stalin & Molotov did not believe that goodwill provided a lasting basis for policy; they had therefore grabbed all they could while the going was good.”

D.Holloway; Op Cit; p.167

In Summary, even though the Bolshevik party, was penetrated by revisionists, Stalin tried to ensure a personal control of the Ministry of Foreign affairs. However, given the paucity of Marxist-Leninists in the leading echelons of the CPSU, revisionists like Gromyko and Manuilsky, and Vosnoskensky were able to slip into key positions like that at the UN.

PREMISE 2: The Objectively Weak Post-war Soviet Union

How can it be legitimately argued that the Soviet state was objectively weak – even if only temporarily – over 1945-1948? After all the Soviet Union had just in effect, been the decisive factor in liberating the world from German and Japanese fascism. The heroic self-sacrifice of the USSR and its peoples in the war had gained many admirers in the working classes of the world. However, the Soviet people had been through an enormously costly war, moreover one on its own land, and a new frightening technology of the atomic bomb had been used.

(i) Human and Material Losses of the USSR in the Second World War

Neither the USA nor even the British had suffered the degree of destruction of either the industry, or the human resources that the USSR had. Professor John Erikson estimated in 1994, that the German invasion had led to 49 million solider and civilian deaths in Russia, far more than the previous conservative estimate of 20-25 million. In addition there was a drastic decline in Russian’ birth rate. (Cited by Axell A, Ibid; p. 177). The material damage was huge also :

“In July 1944 the Emergency State Commission headed by Niklai Svernik put a preliminary figure of damage at 375 billion rubles, not including damages to a large portion of Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Baltic countries, and the Finnish Karelia. The Maisky Commission (Ivan Maisky was head of the Reparations Commission of the Soviet Union-ed) assessed the overall damage Amust be no less than 700-800 billion rubles… surpassing the national wealth of Germany or England..”

Zubok & Pleshakov; Ibid; p.31.

Stalin pointed out to US Senator Claude Pepper on September 15th 1945, that (Cited Resis p. 3 Ibid. From:FRUS 1945, Vol V 881-893; dated Sep 15th 1945):

“Our people are tired, they couldn’t be induced to make war on anybody anymore.”

It is apparent that a certain degree of war weariness was bound to affect decision making. This affected the manner in which re-building the Soviet Union was approached.

(ii) The Post-Hiroshima Reality

As early as March 1942, the highest echelons of Soviet government were aware of the activities in the West towards the bomb. The secret British Maud Report of July 1941 had concluded that:

“It will be possible to make an effective uranium bomb which, containing some 25 il of active material, would be equivalent as regards destructive effect to 1,800 tons of T.N.T.; and would also release a large quantity of radioactive substances which would make places near to where the bomb exploded dangerous to human life for a long period.”

D.Holloway:”Stalin and the Bomb”; New Haven, 1994; p.79

Details of this were obtained by Anatolii Gorskii (codename Vadim) the NKVD London resident, and John Cairncross and Klaus Fuchs and transmitted to Beria. (D.Holloway:”Stalin and the Bomb”; New Haven, 1994; p82). Beria sent a memorandum to Stalin and the State Defence Committee urging evaluation of this information. (D.Holloway:”Stalin and the Bomb”; New Haven, 1994; p.84). Although a USSR nuclear programme was undertaken soon, the reality was that the decision itself was taken during the siege of Stalingrad. Consequently initial progress was understandably slow.

The scientific advances made under the Manhattan Project in the USA were also well known to the USSR. As the war proceeded, the imminent defeat of the Germans raised the question of joint Allied intervention against Japan. At Yalta, the meeting took place between Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, at which plans for the post war period were drawn up. In the section entitled “Agreement Regarding Japan”, it was made clear that after Germany’s surrender (“in two or three months time”), the USSR would enter into war against Japan on condition that the USSR regained its rights in the border zones with Japan, and was granted the Kurile Islands. In full these conditions were that:

“1. The status quo in Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian People’s Republic) shall be preserved.
2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz:
a) The southern part of Sakhalin as well as the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union;
(b) The commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded, and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U.S.S.R. restored;
(c) The Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad, which provide an outlet to Dairen, shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese company, it being understood that the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain sovereignty in Manchuria;
3. The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.”

(February 11, 1945. “A Decade of American Foreign Policy : Basic Documents, 1941-49; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC: 1950. WWW: World War II Page WW II Conferences Page; Avalon Home Page: William C. Fray & Lisa A. Spar.).

It was explicitly noted that reference to Outer Mongolia would require the “concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek.” But this was to be pursued by the USA President Roosevelt, and these claims of the USSR were to Abe unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.” But then, by the next meeting of the Allied leaders, at the Potsdam Conference of July 1945, the USA had successfully exploded a test device at Alamogordo on July 16th. In the interim Roosevelt had died.

Marshall Zhukov relates how Stalin and Molotov discussed the seemingly “casual” probing statement of the new USA President- Harry Truman, to Stalin that the USA had a “new weapon of unusual destructive force”:

“They’re raising the price,” said Molotov.
Stalin gave a laugh, “Let them. We’ll have to.. speed up our work.”

Holloway D; Ibid; p. 117.

Obviously both Stalin and Molotov understood the implications of Truman’s remark.

The USA exploded the first nuclear devices used in warfare – at Hiroshima on August 6th 1945 and Nagasaki on August 9th 1945. At this stage, the USSR programme was still incomplete.

So the USA possession of the atomic bomb was a potent threat, as both the American and the Soviet state leaders understood. As Yuli Khariton, a scientist who became one of the Soviet creators of the bomb said (Zubok & Pleshakov; Ibid; p.43):

“The Soviet Government interpreted Hiroshima as atomic blackmail against USSR, as a threat to unleash a new even more terrible and devastating war.”

This assessment accords with that of the British Ambassador to the USSR, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr who wrote to then Foreign Secretary Eden:

“The victory over Germany had made the Soviet leaders confident that national security was at last within their reach.
“Then plumb came the Atomic bomb.. At a blow the balance which had seemed set and steady was rudely shaken. Russia was baulked by the West when everything seemed to be within her grasp. The three hundred divisions were shorn of much of their value.”

Cited in D.Holloway:”Stalin and the Bomb”; New Haven, 1994; p.154.

This atomic possession, grounded a new threatening approach of the USA. This was manifested when Truman demanded the “right” of safe entry to any world port they “needed for security”. This threat, was specified in Truman’s Navy Day Address when he announced the so called 12 Principles of operating for the USA state:

“On Navy Day October 27 1945, President Harry S.Truman set forth his views … Although the US was demobilizing rapidly.. It would still retain the largest Navy. in the world, and one of the largest air forces. It would retain the atomic bomb .. The US needed this vast peacetime force not for territorial aggrandizement, because: Outside the right to establish necessary bases for our own protection, we look for nothing which belongs to any other power.’ A large military force was also needed to uphold the peace & the twelve fundamentals of US foreign policy.. Emphatically he said: “We shall refuse to recognise any government imposed upon any nation by the force of any foreign power.”

Resis Ibid, p. 4.

The Hiroshima bombing called into question the diplomatic gains won first at Yalta and Potsdam by the USSR. The Japanese had been on the verge of surrendering, and had posed by the time of Hiroshima no significant military threat. Moreover the entry of the Soviets into the Far Eastern theater of war, had been previously agreed at Yalta, between the Allies.

But if the USSR entered the theater, the USA was worried that concessions would have to be made to it. Hiroshima was therefore both a pre-emptive strike against the USSR presence in the Japanese-Pacific arena, and a threat for the future post-war realpolitik’.

Nonetheless the Soviets entered the Far Eastern war there as they had promised, and as they had been asked to by the USA previously. From August 9th at 00.10 am the Red Army attacked the Japanese in Manchuria. Thus the USA had not fully achieved their goal of preventing the USSR entry into the Far eastern war.
(See Holloway; Ibid p. 128.).

As Resis comments, the Navy Day speech of Truman (see above) was an assertive speech that

“Plainly coupled implicit threat with explicit friendliness”.
(Resis Ibid, p. 5).

For the Soviet Government, Molotov replied 10 days later in a speech to commemorate the 28th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. He stated that the imperialists were “exploiting the atomic bomb in international affairs”, and predicted the USSR would have atomic energy also.(Resis Ibid, p. 6).

He pointed out the continuing attempt to isolate the USSR in a renewed anti-Soviet bloc. Kaganovich warned in a speech in Tashkent, that:

“Our country still finds itself in capitalistic encirclement.”

Cited Resis Ibid, From Pravda, p. 10, Feb 8, 1946.

Molotov warned of the need to return to the task of “overtaking and surpassing the economically most developed countries of Europe and the USA,” in per-capita industrial production in the near future. This required a strategic decision regarding heavy or light industry. There was a division in the ranks of even the Marxist-Leninists on this question. Malenkov and Voroshilov explicitly pumped for heavy industry. Voroshilov in a speech in 1946, arguing that anyone who called for a priority to light industry was a latter-day “servitor of fascism”. (Resis Ibid, p. 11). Yet Zhdanov, only the previous day on Feb 6th had called for light industry priority. He said:

“Because the people who over the course of many years of war bore sacrifices and privations, legitimately demanded that material and every-day living conditions should speedily improve. All this is no trifle. The task of improving every-day living conditions and material well-being of the masses, improving the production of consumers’ goods, is a cause which must be defended, fought for, and invested with the same Bolshevist enthusiasm with which we moved in solving war tasks. The people will only thank us for this.”

Resis Ibid, p. 11

Clearly this difference of viewpoint, reflected a genuine debate about the merits of the case, in which legitimate differences were being though over.

Later Stalin pointed out in a key speech in February 9th 1946, preceding the elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet, that although there had been an alliance of “freedom loving states”, including the USSR, UK, USA, the process of uneven capitalist developments had continued unabated. Inevitably there would be another war, although this would be some time off – some 15-20 years. This could allow “special attention” to be “focused to expand the production of consumer goods.” (Resis Ibid, p. 16, Pravda February 10th, 1946).

Stalin also predicted that the next world war would be a war started between the imperialists in order to re-divide the world.

That the rulers of the USA were indeed in a bellicose and belligerent mood, is shown by the manner in which Stalin’s speech was interpreted. The USA Charge d’affaires, George Kennan in Moscow was requested to analyze Stalin’s speech. Kennan wrote the infamous “long telegram”, in which he insisted that the USSR was preparing to go to war for expansion. But this interpretation did not fit with either the speech of Stalin, or the message being sent out consistently by the Soviets, as noted by later independent historians such as Albert Resis.

Other interpreters of Moscow included the British Charge d’affaires in Moscow, Frank Roberts. He cabled to both London and Washington, that Moscow really did want peace at this juncture. (Resis Ibid, p. 19. ). And Stalin’s actions fully corroborated this.

Resis points out the “conciliatory deeds” of Stalin made in order to convey peaceful intent:

“In September 1945, despite Soviet claims on Bear Island and Spitzbergen, Moscow had announced the withdrawal of the Soviet Command from Norway without any quid pro quo and before the Western Allies withdrew their troops. This action was followed on April 6th 1946, when Moscow announced the withdrawal of the Soviet Command from the Danish Island of Bornholm, leaving no Soviet troops in Scandinavia. On the same day Moscow stated that it would complete evacuation of Soviet troops from China by the end of April. Moscow also announced (or was compelled to announce) that it would complete evacuation of all troops from Iran within one-month and a half. On May 22, 1946, Moscow announced that Soviet troops had been completely withdrawn from Manchuria, and on May 24 that the evacuation of Soviet troops from Iran had been completed. At the Paris Peace Conference the Soviet Union abandoned its request for a trusteeship over Tripolitania in favour of its passing to Italian trusteeship under United nations control.”

Resis A; Ibid; p. 25.

The Breaking of the Atomic Monopoly

However all signals from the USSR assuring the imperialists of the USSR peaceful intentions were in vain. The USSR was again being isolated. Therefore, on August 20th, ten days after the bombing of Nagasaki, the State Defence Committee correctly decreed that a special committee would:

“direct all work on the utilization of the intra-atomic energy of uranium.”
Holloway D; Ibid; p. 129.

As previously noted, the Special Committee on the Atomic Bomb was headed by Lavrenti Beria. It was set up by a special decree with extraordinary powers, and reported directly to Stalin himself. This special body was only dissolved by the Khrushchev revisionist controlled Politburo meeting after Stalin’s death, in fact the same one that arrested Beria. Yet it was this same Special Committee, that had succeeded in developing the bomb for the USSR and closing the USA military superiority:

“Focusing all the country’s forces on the solution of this complex problem called above all for the establishment of a new state management body endowed with appropriate power. Such a body, which was entrusted with practically unlimited authority, was the Special Committee, headed by L. P. Beria (a member of State Defense Committee and Vice Chairman of the USSR Council of People’s Commissars) and was founded by the USSR State Defense Committee’s Resolution No. GOKO-9887 of 20 August 1945. The Committee was founded under the State Defense Committee, but after the State Defense Committee was abolished in September 1945, the Special Committee functioned as a body of USSR Council of People’s Commissars (and after March 1946 as a body of the USSR Council of Ministers). In reality, the Special Committee was an independent state control body directly subordinate to Soviet leader J.V.Stalin. It functioned for almost eight years until it was abolished in accordance with a CC CPSU Presidium Resolution of 26 June 1953 at the same tumultuous meeting at which Beria was arrested. Thus, the Special Committee’s activities covered a most important, formative period of the Soviet atomic project, that is, the establishment and growth of the USSR atomic-energy industry, the development and testing of the first Soviet atomic bomb (in 1949) and early improved atomic bomb designs, and the development and virtual completion of the first Soviet hydrogen bomb (RDS-6), which was first tested in August 1953.”

Cold War International History Project; WWW: “Research Notes: the Russian Nuclear Project..the A-bomb Effort, 1946″ by G. A. Goncharov, N. I. Komov, A. S. Stepanov http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/CWIHP/BULLETINS/b8-9a38.htm

But again it was not possible to exclude fully the evident and known revisionists, such as Nikolia Vosnosensky, still the head of Gosplan, let alone political waverers like Malenkov. (Holloway D; Ibid; p. 134). Gosplan had apparently already expressed disapproval of the Plan, at an earlier stage of the Soviet plans. (Holloway, reference 78 note to p.86) . The industrial managers on the committee were Vannikov, Zaveniagin and Pervukhin. Two scientists on the committee were Khurchatov and Peter Kaptisa. In addition the NKVD representative was General V.A.Mekhnev. Beria reported to Stalin weekly on the progress. The mandate of the Committee of necessity had to be broad, and encompassed special dispensations for all matters related to the production of uranium:

“Considering and resolving all the most basic issues which arose in the course of the early Soviet atomic project, the Special Committee was empowered to supervise all work on the use of atomic energy of uranium:- the development of scientific research in this sphere;- the broad use of geological surveys and the establishment of a resource base for the USSR to obtain uranium…;- the organization of industry to process uranium and to produce special equipment and materials connected with the use of atomic energy; and the construction of atomic energy facilities, and the development and production of an atomic bomb”

Cold War International History Project Op Cit; Goncharov et al; Web site http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/CWIHP/BULLETINS/b8-9a38.htm

The USSR atomic bomb followed the design of the USA bombs, and they were termed the RDS systems. By August 1949, RDS-1 was successfully exploded:

“RDS-1 meant the analog of the first U.S. plutonium-239 implosion type atomic bomb tested on 16 July 1945 in New Mexico (and of the U.S. atomic bomb exploded over Nagasaki on 9 August 1945). This bomb was successfully tested in the USSR on 29 August 1949. RDS-2 signified the analog of the uranium-235 gun type bomb exploded over Hiroshima on 6 August 1945. This bomb passed a design verification in the USSR, but was not tested. Later the abbreviation RDS-2 was used to denote the improved plutonium-239 implosion type atomic bomb tested in 1951. During the period through 1954 the USSR verified and tested three more types of improved atomic bombs: RDS-3, RDS-4, and RDS-5.”

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/CWIHP/BULLETINS/b8-9a38.htm

The speed of the USSR catch-up of the technological gap, surprised the USA imperialists. The speed was no doubt, owed in part to successful Soviet espionage. However, even authors hostile to Marxism-Leninism recognise the achievements of Soviet science, and industry which had to overcome the appalling devastation of Nazi invasion:

“The short duration and arrangement of the parallel works became possible thanks to… intelligence materials about the designs of the U.S. atomic bombs Fat Man and Little Boy, prototypes of RDS-1 and RDS-2, Soviet atomic bombs, which the leaders of the USSR atomic project decided in 1946 should be copied as closely as possible from the American designs. It should be emphasized that the availability of the intelligence materials could not substitute for independent experimental, theoretical, and design verification of the Soviet atomic bombs which were being prepared for testing. Owing to the extraordinary responsibility of the leaders of and participants in the Soviet atomic project, RDS-1 was tested only after thorough confirmation of the available information and a full cycle of experimental, theoretical, and design studies whose level corresponded to the maximum capabilities of that time.”

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/CWIHP/BULLETINS/b8-9a38.htm

Since on December 25th 1946 the first Soviet nuclear reactor started a controlled chain reaction, the imminent likelihood of a tangible USSR atomic weapon had become clear. This began to tilt the balance of power back into the hands of the USSR.

It was at this juncture that the Szalarsa Poremba, First Cominform meeting was held in September 1947.

This exposed the French and Italian parties for revisionist tendencies, and laid the planks for exposing Titoite revisionism (See Alliance 18). Previous leaders of the ECCI such as Dimitrov, were deliberately excluded by Stalin. There is only one rational explanation – that Stalin had become convinced of their inability and sabotage, during the life of the previous Third International:

“As early as June 1946, Stalin had spoken with Dimitrov and Tito about the need of establishing an Information Bureau.. Rather than simply reviving the Comintern, on which Stalin heaped a torrent of insults and abuse which caused Dimitrov to become alternately pale and flushed with repressed anger”

Eugenio Reale :”Founding of the Cominform”, In M. M.Drachkovitch & Branko Lazitch (Eds): “The Comintern..”; Stanford (USA); 1966; p. 257-60.

The Continuing USSR Weakness Following the Acquisition of the Bomb

As we saw, the temporary military and political weakness of the USSR in being able to counter the atomic intimidation of the USA, had partially ended with the successful completion in August 1949, of the USSR atomic bomb. But even then the sharpest imperialist observers of the USSR noted military weaknesses. On just the atomic front the USA had already stockpiled over a hundred atomic bombs by the time the USSR was successful in building and exploding one. In fact, the Western imperialists remained confident that the German Nazi invasion had left the USSR significantly weakened. As the USA ambassador to the USSR, Admiral Alan G. Kirk, commented at a meeting of U.S. ambassadors at Rome, March 22-24, 1950:

“There were certain weaknesses in the Soviet Union which should be considered. The two basic shortages in terms of raw materials were those of rubber and petroleum. It was generally believed that there were no more large unexploited oil reserves available to the Russians. The other important weakness was that of the transportation system which in all respects, rail, highway, and water, was not highly developed in a modern sense.”

FRUS 1950-, Volume III, p. 823.

This was certainly not an isolated view, despite the public shrill fear-mongering of the USSR, that the Western Imperialists actively fanned. Colonel Robert B. Landry, Air Aide to President Truman in 1948, reported the weakness of the Russian mobilisation capability when directed at the West:

“I was told at the G-2 [intelligence] briefing that the Russians have dismantled hundreds of miles of railroads in Germany and sent the rails and ties back to Russia. There remains, at present time, so I was told, only a single track railroad running Eastward out of the Berlin area and upon which the Russians must largely depend for their logistical support. This same railroad line changes from a standard gauge, going Eastward, to a Russian wide gauge in Poland, which further complicates the problem of moving supplies and equipment forward.”

Cited Frank Kofsky: “The War Scare of 1948″, London; 1993, 1995. pp. 293-94.

As a recent commentator has pointed out, the highest levels of the US officialdom knew very clearly how affected the USSR had been by the war:

“In a memorandum to Secretary of State Dean Acheson dated April 5, 1950, Willard L. Thorp, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, offered his view of the Soviet Union’s economic condition vis-a-vis the United States’s. Thorp wrote this memorandum in response to a draft of NSC-68, the “State-Defense Staff Study,” which high-level State Department officials like Thorp received on March 30, 1950. They were instructed to provide written comments on it prior to the delivery of the final version of NSC-68 to President Truman set for April 7, 1950. Thorp’s comments concerned the overall economic conditions of the two countries and the amount each country devoted to military spending in relation to its total expenditures.

Disagreeing with the draft’s thesis that Athe USSR is steadily reducing the discrepancy between its overall economic strength and that of the United States,” Thorp stated:

“I do not feel that this position is demonstrated, but rather the reverse.. that the gap is actually widening in our favour.”


He pointed out that the United States’s economy increased twofold over the Soviet Union’s economy in 1949. Steel production in the U.S. outpaced steel production in the Soviet Union by two million tons, and stockpiling of goods and production of oil far exceeded Soviet amounts. Furthermore,

“if one compares the total economic capacity [of the two countries],” Thorp writes, “the gap is so tremendous that a slight and slow narrowing [on the part of the Soviets] would have little meaning.” As for Soviet military investment, Thorp opines: “I suspect a larger portion of Soviet investment went into housing.”

FRUS: 1950, Volume I, pp. 218-20. Cited In an Internet exchange dated October 1997, Upon a Controversy between Lloyd Gardner & John Gaddis; See MA Thesis of Curt Cardwell.

That Stalin tried hard to remain at peace with the Western imperialists was even accepted by A High Priest of The Cold War Warrior Western Academics, John Lewis Gaddis:

“What is often forgotten about Stalin is that he wanted, in his way, to remain ‘friends’ with the Americans and the British: his objective was to ensure the security of his regime and the state he governed, not to bring about the long-awaited international proletarian revolution; he hoped to do this by means short of war, and preferably with Western cooperation.”

John Lewis Gaddis: “Intelligence, Espionage and Cold War Origins”, DH, Spring 1989, 209.

Other academic Cold War historians, already cited above, have agreed with Gaddis’ view, such as V. Mastny; and Zubok and Pleshakov.

It is now necessary to detail the changing roles and leadership of the Soviet Security apparatus, in order to then correctly interpret the events of the so called Zionist Plot and the Doctors Plot. This forms the next section of this article.

Source

The Formation of the Soviet Jewish Homeland – Birobidzhan

birobidzhanmap

This article was published by Alliance (Marxist-Leninist) as part of the publication Alliance, issue #30, “Marx, Lenin and Stalin on Zionism.”

Russian Jewry prior to the revolution had been intensely persecuted. The Russian census of 1897 had enumerated 5,215,800 Jews – of whom nearly 2 million emigrated between the years 1881 and 1914. (Zvi Gitelman: p. 1; Introduction to Robert Weinberg: “Stalin’s Forgotten Zion-Birobidzhan & the Making of A Soviet Jewish Homeland, An Illustrated History 1928-1996.” Berkeley 1998 ).

The majority that stayed were left in the “Pale of Settlement.” The majority were peasants and earned their living from agriculture. But since they were banned from owning any land, they were condemned always to be at the poorest status of peasantry. By the beginning of the First World War, about 50,000 Jews (3% of the total Jewish population of the Russian Empire) were tilling agricultural land. Most Jews were engaged in commerce, manufacturing and services – mainly in a petit bourgeois capacity. (Weinberg Ibid, p. 18.)

Subject to the worst racism and pogroms, the Jewish leaders were split as to how to deal with this. One section argued they should readily embrace the limited reforms offered by some of the Tsars – and assimilate completely. At the extreme were those advocating conversion to Christianity. Another “moderate” section however wanted to modernise the Jewish traditions and including a dropping of the Yiddish language for Hebrew. These were known as the maskilim (enlighteners) and their movement as the Haskalah (enlightenment).

Others in reacting to the pogroms of Tsar Alexander III (1881-94) and Nicholas II (1894-1917) argued for a completely separate Jewish state. This tradition, led by such as the physician Leon Pinsker, became known as shivat zion (Return To Zion). In the midst of this was the Jewish Bund whose positions have been already discussed above.

After the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, the situation of the Jewish people was considered as part of the overall question of the minorities within the Soviet Union. Within a year the Bolsheviks had organised Jewish Sections within the Communist party (Evreiskie seketsii or Evsektsii or Yevsektsii). A commissariat for Jewish Affairs was set up known as Evkom. It was placed within the Commissariat of Nationalities, headed by Stalin. The language question was resolved in favour of Yiddish this being the language of the Jewish masses and not Hebrew.

There is no doubt that the correct Soviet policy of restricting the medium of the religious Hebrew language and encouraging Yiddish was at least in part responsible for the rapid assimilation of the USSR Jews:

“The Yevsektsii also campaign against the Hebrew language. In their eyes, Hebrew is the reactionary language of the Jewish bourgeoisie, whatever its content, and has to be eliminated in favour of Yiddish, the language of the Jewish proletariat. Hebrew schools and printing are closed. At the end of the 1920’s, Hebrew becomes the only language which is officially outlawed in the Soviet Union. Jewish religious education is now impossible. The only permitted expressions of Soviet-Jewish life are secular Yiddish education, literature, press and theatre… The newly established Yiddish schools are very popular at first. But as only few secondary school and no university courses are in Yiddish, their numbers decline. At the end of the 1930’s, they have completely disappeared. With the almost complete elimination of organized Jewish religious and communal life, the Yevsektsii have become redundant and are dissolved in 1930.”

WWW site “Beyond the Pale”; A History of Soviet Jews;
http://www.friends-partners.org/partners/beyond-the-pale/index.html

The same source makes the point that many of the Yevsektsii were later persecuted as “nationalists”:

“During the Stalinist purges of the late 1930’s, most of its members are accused of having had “nationalist tendencies”, and are deported or killed.”

“Beyond The Pale”; Ibid.

But the point has been repeatedly proven in the pages of Alliance, that the purges of the 1930’s were not under the control of Stalin, but the hidden revisionists such as Yezhov. They were aimed at the alienation and or physical elimination of the best Bolsheviks from the party. A policy of Korenizatsiia (“Implanting Bolshevism in the non-Russian masses”) was launched. Stalin’s view at the Commissariat of Nationalities was to stimulate cultural diversity, if it was “National in form and socialist in content”. (Cited Weinberg p.15)

As Gitelman puts it, the promotion of the Yiddish culture was – and remains – a unique experiment:

“This would be done by having party and government institutions operate in their language and educating their children with a Bolshevik content but a national form, as Stalin put it. For Jews this meant the creation of networks of Yiddish schools, newspapers, journals, and theatres. Two academic institutions operating in Yiddish were set up in Kiev and Minsk. Courts, trade unions and even party cells were encouraged to operate in Yiddish. This was the only time in history that a state invested heavily in Yiddish institutions and the promotion of Yiddish culture.”

Gitelman Ibid; p. 6-7.

According to Gitelman, largely speaking, the Jews rejected this effort to build a Jewish state. But this view is countered by Weinberg – who has become the most visible historian of the Birobidzhan:

“The notion of a Jewish homeland appealed to many Soviet Jews, and the Birobidzhan project was intended to undercut the Zionist focus on Palestine.”

Weinberg Ibid, p.13.

Weinberg’s book corroborates the view that a general interest was definitely present. In any case, if Gitelman’s view is accepted, Gitelman explains the lack of interest as being due to the power of the assimilation offered by the new Soviet state. For Gitelman, the main reason was an embrace of Russian language and the opportunities given by the revolution:

“Traditional Jews saw it as an attempt to replace authentic grassroots Judaism with an ersatz product imposed Afrom above”.. Those uninterested n traditional forms of Jewishness saw no reason to remain loyal to Yiddish culture when the broader horizons of Russian culture beckoned to them. Jews rushed to take advantage of the educational and vocational opportunities the revolution had given to them. Clearly Russian was much more useful than Yiddish.”

Gitelman Ibid; p. 6-7.

This confirmed the views of Lenin and Stalin – that once the Jews were allowed to play a part in society in free democratic manner – links to the past would be eroded. Gitelman draws an explicit parallel to the dying of Yiddish as a language in America.. where English was the key to assimilation. Gitelman’s states that on this basis:

“The idea of a territory in which Yiddish would be the dominant language as Birobidzhan, had limited appeal to Soviet Jews in the 1920’s.”

Gitelman, Ibid, p.7.

But as Weinberg argues, nonetheless there were still many Soviet Jews who retained the belief in a separate entity. In May 1934 that the Jewish Autonomous region was set up. It was located as Map 2 shows, in remote and poorly populated area of the Soviet Far East. In this setting it would not displace indigenous peoples. Of course this was in contrast to the creation of the future Israel which displaced the Palestinians in a brutal manner. To this end the plan was evolved to settle 100,000 Jews in agricultural colonies.

In Hard Copy form only:
MAP 2: From page 15 Weinberg Ibid.

By the early 1920’s the number of poor Jewish unemployed in the USSR was high. Around Belarus, in the city of Gomel it was about 70%. (Cited Weinberg Ibid; p. 16).

In addition, many of the petit bourgeoisie of the Jewish population had to be brought into the socialist economy. Since the petit bourgeois nature of their work had in the majority of Jews, been continually eroded by the socialist policies of collectivisation in both manufacturing and agriculture, a question arose of the “productivization” of Jewish life. Weinberg comments:

“Given the devastated condition of Soviet industry in the 1920’s government officials focused on agricultural resettlement as a strategy. Despite the long-term objectives of presiding over an industrialised society, the Kremlin in the 1920’s could not pursue a concerted policy of industrialisation that could absorb significant numbers of economically marginal Jews. The publication of two issues of the journal Evreiskii krest’ianin (The Jewish Peasant) in 1925 and 1926 underscores this official interest in Jewish land settlement.”

Cited Weinberg Ibid; p. 19.

In the 1920’s therefore two organisations were set up, OZET (Society for the Settlement of Jewish Toilers on the Land) and KOMZET (Committee for the Settlement of Jewish Toilers on the Land). OZET was controlled by KOMZET members, who examined conditions for settlement in Ukraine, Belarus, and the Crimea. After 1928, attention focused on the formation of a Jewish Autonomous Region (J.A.R).

Jews from the Shetls (Shetls were the villages or ghettoes where large numbers of Jews were concentrated) were moved to the area. By 1930, some 47,000 Jewish families were working in agriculture in the Soviet Union.
The 1928 decision to make the Biro-Bidzhanskii district a JAR – took in a region the size of Belgium. It had been annexed in 1858 by Russia. The Biro and the Bidzhan were tributaries of the river Amur. The population consisted then of “several hundred” indigenous Siberians and some settlers – Russians, Cossacks, Koreans and Ukrainians over the late 19th-early 20th century. There was some early resistance from 1924, until the decision was finally taken in 1928, to have the Biro-Bidzhanskii district as the site of the JAR. This resistance, from some activists in KOMZET, argued that it was too far from the current pockets of Jewish populations. Many Jews argued that Birobidzhan was preferable to Palestine, since it was within an area they already had roots – an argument put by I.Sudarskii in 1930 in the book “Birobdizhan And Palestine”. (Cited Weinberg Ibid; p. 22).

Moreover the Ukraine Belarus and Crimea were becoming crowded and the Far East resources had not been sufficiently tapped. This meant that the Soviet Government made conditions attractive for Jews to move there:

“Many in the Kremlin were interested in creating a Jewish national territory within the borders of the Soviet Union… Soviet policy in the 1920’s aimed at normalizing the status of non-territorial minorities by establishing official enclaves.”

Cited Weinberg Ibid; p. 21-22.

Official USSR sanction for the project was given by President Mikhail Kalinin:

“It is completely natural that the Jewish population.. Strives to find its place in the Soviet Union.. The Jewish people faces the great task of preserving its own nationality, and to this end a page part of the Jewish population must be transformed into an economically stable, agriculturally compact group, which should number at least hundreds of thousands. Only under such conditions can the Jewish masses hope for the further existence of their nationality.”

Cited Weinberg Ibid; p. 22

In March 1928 a decree was published reserving the district for the settlement of Jews who would work the land:

“The decree banned agricultural settlement by non-Jews and states that if Jewish settlement were successful, “a Jewish national administrative – territorial entity” might be set up. This idea was realised in 1934, when the district was designated as the Jewish Autonomous Region, (JAR) with Birobidzhan as its capital city.”

Cited Weinberg Ibid; p. 23.

Strong incentives were provided to move impoverished Jews to the JAR. Even those who had been declared as Anon-labourers” were allowed to have electoral rights in the JAR if they engaged in productive work. (Cited Weinberg Ibid; p. 24). But no doubt, conditions were hard, and were not helped by a serious flood in 1928 and 1932, and Soviet reporters criticised the lack of preparations for the settlers. So there was a yearly drop-out rate of about 50% in the first few years. By 1931, the territory was however decreed to become an autonomous administrative entity, and accordingly a broadening of the original agricultural focus allowed more scope for settlers to stay if they were not farmers. By 1939, only 23% (4,404 of 17,695) lived in the countryside of the JAR. (Cited Weinberg Ibid; p. 32.)

But the JAR grew as more Jews came . By World War II it’s capital Birobidzhan, had a population numbered at 30,000, and the JAR was an important source of cement, tin, bricks, paper products, and clothing. (Cited Weinberg Ibid; p. 39).

A number of non-Jews went also despite the original intention. In fact gentiles outnumbered Jews. By 1939 Jews were 18,000 of the 109,000 residents of the JAR. Seman Dimanshtein, a leading Jewish activist proclaimed:

“We do not set ourselves the goal of establishing quickly a Jewish majority in the JAR; we are confident that this will come about as a natural consequence of migration.. Our first task is the expansion of and strengthening of socialist construction in the JAR. Therefore we shall welcome assistance from abroad and non-Jewish cadres as the most important and vital form of help.”

Cited Weinberg Ibid; p. 43.

It is not surprising that foreign Jewish support was sought, including foreign emigration. Over one thousand foreign Jews moved to the JAR by the mid-1930’s. From 1935, each foreign Jew who wanted to move to the JAR, had to pay KOMZET two hundred dollars. The wholly bourgeois American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) (Later often known simply as the Joint) and the Jewish Colonization Committee were:

“Enthusiastic about the idea of Soviet Jews working the land. In 1928 there were nearly 220,000 Jewish farmers. By the mid 1930’s the JDC had depended $13.8 million on other agricultural work and an additional $10.3 million on other assistance.”

Gitelman Ibid; p. 8.

Gitelman cites one of the American leaders of the JDC, James Rosenberg saying approvingly in an international report:

“Anti-Semitism in Russia is a crime. The ghetto dwellers of Russia have been transformed into hardy workers on farms and in factories. For us in the United States, there is no Jewish problem in Russia”.

Gitelman Ibid; p. 8.

By 1930 the drive towards creating a socialist state, had both unified many of the former minorities into a common struggle, and had created a higher purpose. “Accordingly the Evsektii were abolished in 1930.” (Gitelman Ibid; p. 8). But still the JAR continued to attract world wide Jewish attention. Although certainly, simultaneously many Zionists bitterly attacked it. However many cites throughout the world organised committees of support that continued to donate both monies and equipment and people. Prominent Jews the world over defended the JAR. Lion Feuchtwangler, the prominent Jewish writer, wrote:

“The Jewish Republic of Birobidzhan is a reality”.

Weinberg Ibid; p. 53.

In the context of the Soviet state, hidden revisionists aiming to disrupt socialism sought ways of alienating the world wide Jewish support. The secret security apparatus was controlled by hidden revisionists such as Ezhov. At this juncture correct tactics to the minorites was subverted. Thus at this juncture, an anti-Jewish attack did take place. For example the leading Jewish official Iosif Liberberg – the former head of the Institute of Jewish Proletarian Culture in Kiev – was arrested and charged with:

“Attempting to establish the JAR as the center of Jewish culture in the Soviet Union.”

Weinberg Ibid; p. 67

But, since this was precisely what had been intended for the JAR, such charges themselves can be seen as provocative and anti-Soviet.

Further anti-Soviet acts ensued:

Following the charges, both OZET and KOMZET were disbanded; and Semen Dimanshei was executed. (Weinberg Ibid; p. 68).

By 1941, virtually all the Yiddish schools in the JAR were closed barring only two. But the institutional and legal foundations of the region were un-changed.

Nonetheless by 1939, the Jews accounted for only 16 % of the population(17,695 of about 109,000 inhabitants. Weinberg Ibid; p. 69.

After the war, while there was a temporary set-back for the hidden revisionists, there was a resurgence of Jewish immigration in the JAR. In 1948 Mikhail Kalinin continued his public support for the JAR:

“He stated in 1948 that he considered the region a “Jewish national state” that will Aregenerate Soviet Jews through creative toil.”

Cited Weinberg Ibid, p. 72.

Thus, following the war there was a revived Government sponsored support. Again only Jewish immigration was allowed into the JAR. In 1946 a synagogue was approved by the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults. In early 1946 the:

“Council of Ministers announced a plan to stimulate the development of the region……. focused on the building of industrial enterprise and the construction of new houses….. the government also offered free transportation a and loans and other incentives to those settlers who chose to till the land.”

Cited Weinberg Ibid, p. 72.

Again the international community of Jews rallied to the JAR. Between 1945 and 1948 some 6 million rubles worth of food and supplies were sent to the JAR from the USA alone. Albert Einstein was one of the prominent supporters.

The conventional wisdom is that:

“In 1948, Stalin launched a murderous campaign to destroy all Jewish intellectual and cultural activity throughout the Soviet Union. His ruthless attacks on “rootless cosmopolitanism” and Abourgeois nationalists” culminated in early 1953 with the infamous “Doctor’s Plot”. .. A rumour circulated that the JAR barracks to house the deported Jews were reportedly built, but Stalin’s death in 1953 prevented the implementation of this sinister plan.”

Cited Weinberg Ibid, p. 82.

As even Gitelman points out the ultimate failure of Birobidzhan left the reactionary alternative of a so-called “Homeland”, of Israel-Palestine , as was then being heavily promoted by the Zionists – with no competition from a socialist alternative:

“Even if the Project (Birobidzhan) was not designed to fail, the fate of Soviet Jewry raise serious questions about the viability of secular Jewishness outside a Jewish state….. The attempt to create a Jewish Autonomous Region in the Soviet Far East remains largely forgotten.. And Birobidzhan’s chief competitors, the Zionists have emerged triumphant.”

Gitelman Ibid, p. 9.

In Summary

 – It is no accident that a veneer of “socialism” was adopted in the fledgling state of Israel.
 – Not only did it serve to better harness the energies of immigrant Jews into the new state.
 – But it served to confuse those Jews who had been previously drawn to the example of the JAR of Birobidzhan.
 – The JAR itself was conciously sabotaged as a potential homeland for Jewish workers.

Source

The Bund and Early Zionism

A Bundist demonstration in 1917

A Bundist demonstration in 1917

This article was published by Alliance (Marxist-Leninist) as part of the publication Alliance, issue #30, “Marx, Lenin and Stalin on Zionism.”

The term Zionism, actually dates from the late 1890’s and was supposedly coined by Nathan Birnbaum. But many authorities accept that it was only made into a popular term by Theodore Herzl.

“The term Zionism was first used publicly by Nathan Birnbaum at a discussion meting in Vienna…23 January 1892. The history of political Zionism begins with the publication of Theodore Herzl’s Judenstaat four years later at the first Zionist Congress… Before the word Zionism became generally accepted, the term Palestinofilvsto (Hibat Zion) was widely used in Russia.”

Preface; Walter Lacquer; A History of Zionism; New York; 1976; p. xiii

Theodore Herzl was a first a lawyer, and then a journalist and playwright. He believed that the idea of the Jewish state was a historical necessity, that was essential in order to overcome anti-Semitism. He considered both the Argentine and Palestine as potential places where the Jews of the world could find a haven from persecution. Herzl always maintained that he had not made a new discovery, but that he had simply resurrected an old solution- that of a Jewish State:

“Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State: An Attempt at a Modern Solution of the Jewish Question) was written in 1896…(In it – Ed) Herzl disclaimed having made any sensational new discovery. On the contrary…’The idea which I have developed in this pamphlet is an ancient one. It is the restoration of the Jewish state…I have discovered neither the Jewish situation as it has crystallized in history, nor the means to remedy it.'”

Walter Lacquer; A History of Zionism; New York; 1976; p. 86

So convinced was Herzl that a separate state existence was the only solution for the Jews, that he came to a secret agreement with Plevhe – the notorious Tsarist Home minister who had sponsored pogroms in Russia (See above) to encourage Jews to leave Russia for Palestine. This was simply the first of many later “accomodations” of Zionists with rabid anti-Semites.

The First Zionist Congress was held in Basle, Switzerland on 29 August 1897. (Walter Lacquer; A History of Zionism; New York; 1976; p. 103).

Most Marxists agree that the growth of Zionism, reflected the intense anti-Semitism persecution that the Jewish people, workers especially, suffered. A Trotskyite Jew, the Belgian Abraham Leon, wrote a useful study of the Jewish Question. According to Leon, Zionism was a response to the worst racism, expressed in the anti-Jewish pogroms:

“Zionism was born in the light of the incendiary fire of the Russian pogroms of 1882 and in the tumult of the Dreyfus Affair…In Russia the association of the ‘Lovers of Zion’ were founded. Leo Pinsker wrote ‘Auto-emancipation’ in which he called for a return to Palestine as the sole possible solution of the Jewish question…In Paris Baron Rothschild, who like all the Jewish magnates viewed with very little favour the mass arrival of Jewish immigrants in the Western countries, became interested in Jewish colonization in the Palestine… A short while later.. Theodore Herzl saw anti-Semitic demonstrations at Paris provoked by the Dreyfus Affair.”

Abraham Leon, The Jewish Question-A Marxist Interpretation; New York; 1970; pp.244-245.

In Russia there were several Jewish ideological movements. The first Zionist movements were led by David Gordon and Perz Smolenskin. But these were superseded by various socialist currents within the Zionist stream. One sprung out of the Lovers of Zion movement mentioned above by Leon, and was called Workers of Zion (Poalei-Zion) which formed in 1906 from groups in Minsk and in Southern Russia. They were led by Ber Borochov, who:

“Affirmed that Jewish immigration would flow to Israel by a process of natural attraction. The Zionist revolution would be carried out by the Jewish proletariat through class struggle.”

Benjamin Pinkus: The Jews of the Soviet Union; Cambridge; 1988; p.41

But these various currents, were in general eclipsed by the Bund (Or the General Workers’ Union of Lithuania, Poland and Russia). This was the most important Jewish workers socialist party and was established in 1897. It stood for the autonomous organisation of Jewish workers. It was a section of the general Russian Social-Democrats until it formulated its policy for a so called cultural autonomy. This took place at Bialystok in May 1901. This step led to its membership being torn in two, but it nonetheless between the years 1903-1905, had some 30,000 members. But by 1916 it had declined, only to jump up in numbers by the time of December 1917. (Benjamin Pinkus: The Jews of the Soviet Union; Cambridge; 1988; p.43).

It took a social-chauvinist stand during World War I and during the Civil War supported the counter-revolutionary forces. It finally dissolved itself in 1921.

Stalin explained why the Bund was more or less, obliged to take up the position of the cultural autonomy in the way it did. By its Sixth Congress (1905), the national programme on the grounds of national autonomy was enshrined. Stalin argued that it was made inevitable by two factors.

The first was the organizational refusal to join with the larger international tide of Russian Social Democracy (ie Marxism-Bolshevism) as it grew:

“The first circumstance is the existence of the Bund as an organisation of Jewish and only Jewish Social Democratic workers. Even before 1897 the Social-Democratic groups active among the Jewish workers set themselves the aim of creating a ‘special Jewish workers’ organisations’. They founded such an organisation in 1897, by uniting to form the Bund. That was at a time when the Russian Social Democracy as an integral body virtually did not yet exist. The Bund steadily grew and spread, and stood out more vividly against the bleak days of Russian social democracy.. Then came the 1900’s. A mass labour movement came into being. Polish Social Democracy grew and drew the Jewish workers into the mass struggle. Russian social democracy grew and attracted the Bund workers. Lacking a territorial basis, the national framework of the Bund became too restrictive. The Bund was faced with the problem of either merging with the general international tide, or of upholding its independent existence as an extra-territorial organisation. The Bund chose the latter course. Thus grew up the ‘theory’ that the Bund is ‘the sole representative of the Jewish proletariat’. But to justify this strange ‘theory’ in any simple way became impossible… The Bund seized on >Cultural -national autonomy.”

Stalin; “Marxism & The National Question”: Ibid; p.346-347

The second factor was the peculiar and isolated position of the Jews:

“The second circumstance is the peculiar position of the Jews as separate national minorities within compact majorities of other nationalities in integral regions. We have already said that this position is undermining the existence of the Jews as a nation and puts them on the road to assimilation. But this is an objective process. Subjectively in the minds of the Jews, it provokes a reaction and gives rise to the demand for a guarantee of the rights of a national minority, for a guarantee against assimilation.. The Bund could not avoid being in favor of a ‘guarantee’.. it could not but accept national autonomy. For if the Bund could seize upon any autonomy at all, it could only be national autonomy, ie. Cultural national autonomy for the Jews since the Jews have no definite integral territory.”

Ibid; p.347.

Stalin asked pointedly:

“Can institutions guarantee a nation ‘complete freedom of cultural development?’ Can a Diet for cultural affairs guarantee a nation against nationalist persecution? The Bund believes it can. But history proves the contrary.”

Ibid; p.349

Stalin’s central point is that the absence of democracy ensures no guarantees for “freedom of cultural development.” Stalin goes on to cite the cases of Russian Poland and Finland. He then pointed out that the Bund’s splitting tendencies of the workers movements were exposed, by its further actions. These included the clauses whereby the Bund placed emphasis on the Jewish language above all others:

“But it becomes still more harmful when it is thrust upon a ‘nation’ whose existence and future are open to doubt. In such cases the advocates of national autonomy are obliged to protect and preserve all the peculiar features of the ‘nation’, the bad as well as the good, just for the sake of ‘saving the nation’ from assimilation, just for the sake of ‘preserving’ it. That the Bund should take this dangerous path was inevitable. And it did take it. We are referring to the resolutions of recent conferences of the Bund on the question of the ‘Sabbath,’ ‘Yiddish’, etc. Social democracy strives to secure for all nations the right to use their own language. But that does not satisfy the Bund; it demands that ‘the rights of the Jewish language’ be championed with ‘exceptional persistence’ and the Bund itself in the elections to the 4th Duma declared that it would give ‘preference to those of them (ie electors) who undertake to defend the rights of Jewish language.’ Not the general right of all nations to use their own language, but the particular right of the Jewish language, Yiddish!…But in what way then does the Bund differ from the bourgeois nationalists?”

Ibid; p.352-353

Stalin now exposed the Bund’s passage into a chauvinist position, one that was anti-internationalist and anti-proletarian:

“It is not surprising that the effect of this state of affairs upon the workers is to weaken their sense of solidarity and to demoralize them; and the latter process is also penetrating the Bund. We are referring to the increasing collisions between Jewish and Polish workers in connection with unemployment. Here is the kind of speech that was made on this subject at the 9th Conference of the Bund: ‘We regard the Polish workers, who are ousting us, as pogromists, as scabs, we do not support their strikes, we break them.'”

Ibid; p.358-359.

Lenin made clear in several subsequent articles that he agreed with Stalin. For example, in “Does the Jewish Proletariat Need an ‘Independent political party?'”, in 1903, Lenin expresses caustic surprise as to a recent violation by the Bund. Despite polemics with the Bund, where the Bund asserted its= wish to remain part of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP), the Bund was now proclaiming itself as an independent political party:

“The Jewish proletariat had formed itself into an independent political party, the Bund. We did not know this before. This is something new. Hitherto the Bund has been a constituent part of the RSDLP…It is true that at the 4th Congress of Bund, the Bund decided to change its name…On the other hand when Iskra polemicised with the decision of the Bund’s 4th Congress, the Bund itself stated very definitely that it only wanted to secure the acceptance of its wishes and decisions by the RSDLP; in other words it flatly and categorically acknowledged that until the RSDLP adopted new Rules and settled new forms of attitude towards the Bund, the latter would remain a section of the RSDLP…But now… this is something new.”

Lenin, V.I: “Does the Jewish proletariat need an independent political party?”; Iskra 1903; In Collected Works; Moscow; 1985; Vol 6; p. 328-329.

Lenin goes on to describe how the Bund has attacked the Jewish Ekaterinoslav Committee – which had adopted an internationalist position already. The Bund’s attack was on the question of where does anti-Semitism arise from? The Ekaterinoslav committee had argued that the roots of anti-Semitism were international, and that it found “adherents among the bourgeois and not among the working class sections of the population” (Lenin Ibid; p. 331).

But the Bund had chastised the Ekaterinoslav committee for this, arguing that anti-Semitism has “struck roots in the mass of the workers.” Lenin denied the Bund’s view linking anti-Semitism with the bourgeois interests:

“The link that undoubtedly exists between anti-Semitism and the interests of the bourgeois, and not of the working class sections of the population. If they had given it a little more thought they might have realised that the social character of anti-Semitism today is not changed by the fact that dozens or even hundreds of unorganised workers, nine-tenths of whom are still quite ignorant, take part in a pogrom…We must not weaken the force of our offensive by breaking up into numerous independent political parties.”

Lenin Ibid; p. 331-332.

He elsewhere repeated again that the way forward was assimilation, and not separation:

“Can we possibly attribute to chance the fact that it is the reactionary forces all over Europe and especially Russia who oppose the assimilation of the Jew and try to perpetuate their isolation? That is precisely what the Jewish problem amounts to: assimilation or isolation? — and the idea of a Jewish ‘nationality’ is definitely reactionary not only when expounded by its consistent advocates (the Zionists), but likewise on the lips of those who try to combine it with the ideas of Social Democracy (The Bundists). The idea of a Jewish nationality runs counter to the interests of the Jewish proletariat, for it fosters among them directly or indirectly, the spirit of the ‘ghetto.'”

Lenin: “Position of the Bund in the Party”; Collected Works; Vol 7; Moscow; 1986 p.101

Should Workers Always Support A National Status?

We argued earlier, that Stalin’s central position regarding Jewish claims of nationhood, was that democratic rights and freedom from oppressions were the key demands that needed to be won – and not “nationhood.” The position, of Lenin and Stalin, was always that nations – if a national status did in fact exist (by definitions provided by Stalin) – should have the full right to self-determination.

“The right of self-determination means that a nation may arrange its life in the way it wishes. It has the right to arrange its life on the basis of autonomy. It has the right to enter into federal relations with other nations. It has the right to complete secession. Nations are sovereign, and all nations have equal rights.”

Stalin; Ibid; p.321.

But even if there is a nation, NOT all claims to nationhood are strategically defensible from the workers perspective. For example the Marxist-Leninist will not necessarily support all claims to nationhood if they obstruct the working peoples. For instance, the resurrection of the influence of the beys and mullahs, in Transcaucasia, would not have been in the best interests of the toiling strata. The best answer for the workers and toilers, depends upon the precise historical situation. It must be carefully found by looking at the precise facts:

“A nation has the right to arrange its life on autonomous lines. It even the has the right to secede. But this does not mean that it should do so under all circumstances, that autonomy or separation, will everywhere and always be advantageous for a nation; ie. For its majority, ie for the toiling strata. The Transcacausian Tartars as a nation may assemble, let us say, in their Diet and succumbed to the influence of their beys and mullahs, decide to restore the old order of things and to secede from the state. According to the meaning of the clause on self-determination they are fully entitled to do so. But will this be in the interest of the toiling strata of the Tartar nation? Can Marxists look on indifferently when the beys and mullahs assume the leadership of the masses in the solution of the national question?…Should not Marxists come forward with a definite plan for the solution of the question, a plan which would be most advantageous for the Tartar masses?…But what solution would be most compatible with the interests of the toiling masses? Autonomy, federation or separation? All these are problems the solution of which will depend on the concrete historical conditions in which the given nation finds itself…Conditions like everything else change, and a decision which is correct at one particular time may prove to be entirely unsuitable at another.”

Stalin; Ibid; p.324

Stalin was clear upon the rights of minorities and the national question. For example, where there is one geographical region with different minorities, or proto-nations, living side by side. This is a special type of national problem. Such situations are still frequent. In Stalin’s day, in Europe, this situation existed in Transcaucasia. As a precondition to solve the problems of these areas, Stalin insisted that:

“The complete democratisation of the country is the basis and condition for the solution of the national question.”

Stalin; Ibid; p.373.

But, Stalin recognised that there was a possibility that independence and secession was necessary for some parts. He then considered the possibility that for some parts regional autonomy was preferable. This was so he argued, for “The Jews in Poland, the Letts in Lithuania, the Russians in the Caucasus, the Poles in the Ukraine and so on…”

This was for two reasons;
Firstly, because it disposed of a fiction bereft of territory; and,
Secondly, it did not divide people by nation:

“The only correct solution is regional autonomy, autonomy for such crystallised units as Poland, Lithuania, the Ukraine, the Caucasus etc. The advantage of regional autonomy consists first of all in the fact that it does not deal with a fiction bereft of territory, but with a definite population inhabiting a definite territory. Next it does not divide people according to nations, it does not strengthen national barriers; on the contrary it breaks down these barriers and unites the population in such a manner as to open the way for division of a different kind, division according to classes…Of course, not one of these regions constitutes a compact homogeneous nation, for each is interspersed with national minorities. Such are the Jews in Poland, the Letts in Lithuania, the Russians in the Caucasus, the Poles in the Ukraine, and so on. It may be feared therefore that the minorities will be oppressed by the national majorities. But there will be grounds for fear only if the old order continues to prevail in the country. Give the country complete democracy and all grounds for fear will vanish.”

Stalin; Ibid; p.376.

Again – the key issue for Stalin, was that definite, visible, meaningful and clear democratic rights (for instance to use its own language etc). should be granted. So strongly did he feel about this, that he repeats it. He argues that without it an “artificial union” means nothing; and that with it the perceived need for “national union” disappear. He identifies what is it that “agitates” a national minority as discrimination of language, liberty of conscience – religious liberty, self regulated schooling etc:

“What the minorities want is not an artificial union but real rights in the localities they inhabit. What can such a union give them without complete democratisation? On the other hand, what need is there for a national union when there is complete democratisation? What is that particularly agitates a national minority? A minority is discontented not because there is not national union but because it does not enjoy the right to use its native language. Permit it to use its native language and the discontent will pass of itself. A minority is discontented not because there is no artificial union but because it does not possess it own schools. Give it its own schools and all grounds for discontent will disappear. A minority is discontented not because there is not national union, but because it does not enjoy liberty of conscience (religious liberty), liberty of movement, etc. Give it those liberties and it will cease to be discontented. Thus equal rights of nation in all forms (language, schools, etc) is an essential element in the solution of the national question.. Complete democratisation of the country is required.”

Stalin; Ibid; p.375-377

Stalin’s view, regarding the formation of multi-national states, was the basis for Lenin’s viewpoint that echoed Kautsky (See Lenin above). This was that the formation of multi-national states, is a “special method” of the formation of states, and one which takes place in territories where certain conditions hold, that are more common in the East.

These conditions are:
1) Where more than one pre-nation (or nascent nationality) exists;
2) Where capitalism has not yet been eliminated; and
3) Where capitalism is feebly developed but is more developed in one of the pre-nations concerned than in the other (or others):

“Whereas in the West (of Europe-ed) nations developed into states, in the East multi-national states were formed…This special mode of formation of states could take place only where feudalism has not yet been eliminated, where capitalism was feebly developed, where the nationalities which had been forced into the background had not not been able to consolidate themselves economically into integral nations.”

Stalin Ibid; p.314.

Again, even in this context of the multi-national state, Stalin used the example of Transcaucasia. Stalin favoured Democratisation and Regional Autonomy – equating with national status – within a larger federation.

In summary the views of Lenin and Stalin on Zionism were:

1. The Jews did not form a nation;
2. The Jewish workers were the most oppressed section of the Jewish peoples, all of whom were discriminated against and maltreated;
3. The solution to their woes was assimilation; and ultimately socialism;
4. But their legitimate feelings of oppression should be directly addressed by immediate granting of full democratic rights, including language rights etc;
5. The Bund and other Zionist organisation which tried to pull workers away from affiliations with the internationalist workers movement, were objectively fomenting a counter-revolutionary division.

Source

Stalin and Lenin’s Views on the Jewish Question and the Bund; Early History of the Bund

This article was published by Alliance (Marxist-Leninist) as part of the publication Alliance, issue #30, “Marx, Lenin and Stalin on Zionism.”

Background – The Position of Russian Jewry

In 1791, Tsarina or Empress Catherine II created what was to become known as the Pale Of Settlement. This restricted Jewish residence to either territories annexed from Poland along the Russian Western border, or to territories seized from Turkey along the shores of the Black Sea. Later other annexed territories were added. (See Map below from web site Beyond the Pale). The same type of restrictions noted briefly above, on Jews in Germany, prevailed both here and Poland itself.

MapPaleSettlement
Perhaps the worst anti-Semitism in Europe was in these parts.

Tsar Alexander II‘s reign saw at least the legal and theoretical emancipation of the serfs in 1861. It marked some hopes on the part of Russian Jews for major change in their living circumstances. In fact there were some improvements with Jews being able to live outside the Pale of Settlement:

“On the first anniversary of Alexander’s coronation the hated Cantonist system is repealed. Bit by bit, small groups of Jews considered useful are allowed to settle outside the Pale: merchants, medical doctors and artisans. The Jewish communities of St. Petersburg, Moscow and Odessa grow rapidly, and Jews start to participate in the intellectual and cultural life. The industrial development of the 1860s, following the disastrous Crimean War creates opportunities for a small group of Jewish entrepreneurs, particularly in banking and the export trade, in mining and in the construction of railroads.”

(Web: Beyond The Pale:
http://www.friends-partners.org/partners/beyond-the-pale/english/32.html)

But this was short lived, and the Polish Uprising of 1863, led to an anti-Semitic wave again. After Tsar Alexander II was assassinated by Narodniks, in 1881 the following repression was associated with pogroms aimed at blaming the Jews for the social unrest, and to divert social criticism. The Tsarist authorities used the Jewish question as a means of “dividing and ruling”:

“Beginning in Elizabetgrad, a wave of pogroms spread throughout the southwestern regions, more than 200 in 1881 alone. The authorities… (often) showed sympathy for the pogromists. An official investigation confirmed: the plunderers were convinced that the attacks were sanctioned by the Czar himself. The same investigation blamed ‘Jewish exploitation’ as the cause for the pogroms.”

Web Site : (Web: Beyond The Pale:
http://www.friends-partners.org/partners/beyond-the-pale/english/32.html)

Severe restrictions and persecution under the so called “Temporary Laws” of May 1882 lasted until 1917:

“The area of the Pale of Settlement was reduced by 10 percent. Jews were once more prohibited from living in villages, to buy or rent property outside their prescribed residences, denied jobs in the civil service and forbidden to trade on Sundays and Christian holidays….. In 1887, the number of Jewish students entering secondary schools in the Pale was restricted to 10 percent. As in some towns Jews constituted 50 to 70 percent of the population, many high school classes remained half empty. In 1891 a degree was passed that the Jews of Moscow, who had settled in the city since 1865, were to be expelled. Within a few months about 20,000 people were forced to give up their homes and livelihood and deported from the already overcrowded Pale.”

Web Site : (Web: Beyond The Pale:
http://www.friends-partners.org/partners/beyond-the-pale/english/32.html)

Nicholas II, succeeded Alexander III in 1894, and was as autocratic. But the reform movement gained strength. Both workers and students rebelled. Again the tactic of divide and rule was used in pogroms against Jews. At the same time the anti-Japanese war was launched. The pogroms were directly financed and supported by the vicious reactionary Minister of the Interior Viacheslav Plehve. For example, a pogrom in Kishinev in 1903, led to forty-five people’s murders, and 1,300 homes and shops were plundered. The rioters were protected:

“For his anti-Semitic agitation, the editor of the local newspaper, Bessarabets, had received funds from…Viacheslav Plehve. When the perpetrators of the Kishinev pogroms received only very light sentences, it became clear that pogroms had become an instrument of government policy, and Jews began to form self-defence units.”

(Web: Beyond The Pale: http://www.friends-partners.org/partners/beyond-the-pale/english/32.html)

After the defeat of Russia by the Japanese, the pogroms intensified, led by the rabid ultra-reactionary Black Hundreds:

“The Black Hundreds now openly declared the extermination of the Jews as their program. But the worst orgy of violence broke out after the Czar was forced to grant a constitution in October 1905. Mainly organized by the monarchist Union of Russian People, and with the cooperation of local government officials, pogroms were staged in more than 300 towns and cities, leaving almost a thousand people dead and many thousands wounded.”

(Web: Beyond The Pale http://www.friends-partners.org/partners/beyond-the-pale/english/32.html)

But by end 19th Century, the Jewish population was over 5 million. Assimilation did occur and Jews took part in the political movements, including the Narodniki:

“The early Jewish revolutionaries among the Narodniki saw themselves as Russians fighting for the right of the Russian people, and believed that the Jewish problem would be solved through assimilation after the liberation of the masses.”

(Web: Beyond The Pale: http://www.friends-partners.org/partners/beyond-the-pale/english/32.html)

But more Jews were convinced of the need for a separate Jewish workers movement. In 1897, the Jewish labor movement Algemeyner Yiddisher Arbeter Bund was founded in Vilna, and argued for “national and cultural autonomy” but not for a territorial separation:

“The Bund advocated national and cultural autonomy for the Jews, but not in the territorial sense; it argued for a middle course between assimilation and a territorial solution. The Bund also developed trade union activities and formed self-defence organizations against pogrom violence. In 1905, it had about 33,000 members. “

(Web: Beyond The Pale: http://www.friends-partners.org/partners/beyond-the-pale/english/32.html)

It is this central question of a seperate territory that distinguished the Bundists from the Zionists. Of course the Bund was more orientated to the workers movement and socialism also. So much so, that even the avowedly Zionist organisation formed in Russia adopted a socialist tone:

“Many Jews no longer saw any point in the struggle for emancipation within Russian society and turn after the publication of Herzl’s Der Judenstaat in 1836 to Zionism instead. The largest Zionist party, Poalei Zion (Workers of Zion), founded in 1906, was Marxist in orientation and defined the establishment of a socialist-Jewish autonomous state in Palestine as its ultimate goal.”

Web Site : Beyond The Pale; Ibid; p.39

Even more Jews left Russia, rather than enter the political movement, going mainly to America and Western Europe:

“Between 1881 and 1914, more than 2 million Jews left Russia.”

Web Site : Beyond The Pale; Ibid; p.39

In March 1917, the revolution moves on and the Czarist regime is toppled. This was greeted:

“With joy among the Jewish community. The Provisional Government, as one of its first acts, abolished all limitations based on religion or nationality. For the first time in their history, the Jews of Russia were free to organize and express themselves. Synagogues and schools are opened, publications appeared in Hebrew and Yiddish, and political and cultural life flourishes…. The Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia recognized the right to both religious and national autonomy.”

Web Site: Beyond The Pale; Ibid; p.40

The separation of Church and State, was decreed by both the Zionists and the religious minded Jews. This edict, introduced in January 1918, was coupled with the active organisation of Jewish Bolshevik sections in the party termed Yevsektsii. All this:

“Resulted in the confiscation of religious properties and the prohibition of religious instruction in schools….the Yevsektsii conducted a systematic campaign against all aspects of Judaism and Jewish life. Its first decision was the dissolution of the kehilla, the Jewish community administration, which served as the main instrument of Jewish religious and cultural life.”

Web Site: Beyond The Pale; Ibid; p.40

After the Bolshevik Revolution, the Civil War against White counter-revolutionaries had a major focus in the Ukraine, where 60 percent of Russian Jews lived. The pogroms of the White led armies were only fought off by the Bolsheviks. That left the Jewish population at the end of the Civil War depleted, but with gratitude to the Bolsheviks:

“In spring 1918, the Red Army had to defend itself against the Germans, the Ukrainian Army under Petlyura struggling for Ukrainian independence, and the ‘White’ Armies under Denikin and Wrangel that tried to topple the Bolshevik government. Apart from these more organized armies, armed gangs of bandits under their own leaders (atamans) joined the fighting. All groups took part in anti-Jewish attacks, looting and murder. Only the Red Army Command prohibited anti-Semitic violence and even punished some of the attackers. No such policy was introduced in the Ukrainian Army. During 1919, when the Ukrainians had to retreat, anti-Jewish violence on an unprecedented scale claiming tens of thousands of lives. None of the perpetrators were prosecuted. The majority of Jews in the Ukraine, fearful of Ukrainian independence, came to regard the Red Army more and more as the only force capable to stop the violence. The other major participant in the Civil War, the ‘White’ Army, also engaged in looting, rape and murder, using the old slogan ‘Strike at the Jews and Save Russia.’ When they had to retreat southward at the end of 1919, they vented their rage on Jewish communities along the way. Jewish self-defence units were occasionally able to stop them, partly with material support from the Soviet government. By the time the Civil War was over, about 2,000 pogroms left an estimated 100,000 Jews dead and more than half a million homeless.”

Web Site: Beyond The Pale; Ibid; p.42

Stalin & Lenin’s View On the Jewish Question & The Bund

Stalin was asked by Lenin, in 1923, to write a work to define the Bolshevik response to the national question. This became the famous classic Marxism And The National Question. What did Stalin consider as the definition of a “nation?” Stalin held that nationality was not dependent upon religion, nor upon a racial mixture. The famous succinct definition given by Stalin is that:

“A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.”

J.V.Stalin Works, Moscow; 1956; Vol 2; Marxism and the National Question; p. 307.

Stalin pointed out, that under conditions of a national oppression, the workers suffer more than the bourgeoisie. One of the examples he uses to demonstrate this are the Jewish workers. This might in fact, imply that Stalin views Jews as a ‘nation’. He states :

“Restriction of freedom of movement, disfranchisement, repression of language, closing of schools, and other forms of persecution affect the workers no less, if not more, than the bourgeoisie. Such a state of affairs can only serve to retard the free development of the intellectual forces of the proletariat of subject nations. One cannot speak seriously of a full development of the intellectual faculties of the Tartar or Jewish worker if he is not allowed to use his native language at meetings and lectures, and if his schools are closed down.”

J.V.Stalin Works, Moscow; 1956; Vol 2; Marxism and the National Question; p.304. OR: via: http://gate.cruzio.com/~marx2mao/Stalin/MNQ12.html

Stalin therefore argued that the national liberation struggle was a key issue for the workers movement. But the national liberation struggle must also be supported for another reason. Because the national struggle is diversionary for the real interests of the working class. It obscures and diverts from the real workers struggle – for socialism:

“The policy of nationalist persecution is dangerous to the cause of the proletariat … It diverts the attention of large strata from social questions, questions of the class struggle, to national questions, questions ‘common’ to the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. And this creates a favourable soil for lying propaganda about ‘harmony of interests’, for glossing over the class interests of the proletariat and for the intellectual enslavement of the workers. This creates a serious obstacle to the cause of using the workers of all nationalities.”

J.V.Stalin Works, Moscow; 1956; Vol 2; Marxism and the National Question; p. 320-21

And linked to this, moreover, nationalism encourages a policy of “divide and rule,” allowing a ruling class to split workers apart, again diverting from the main struggle – the class struggle:

“The ‘system’ of oppression leads to a ‘system’ of inciting nations against each other to a ‘system’ of massacres and pogroms. Of course the latter system is not everywhere and always possible, but where it is possible – in the absence of elementary civil rights – it frequently assumes horrifying proportions and threatens to drown the cause of unity of the workers in blood and tears. The Caucasus and the South Russia furnish numerous examples. ‘Divide and rule’ – such is the purpose of the policy of incitement. And where such policy succeeds, it is a tremendous evil for the proletariat and a serious obstacle to the cause of uniting the workers of all the nationalities in the state.”

J.V.Stalin Works, Moscow; 1956; Vol 2; Marxism and the National Question; p. 321

In part, the work “Marxism and the National Question”, was written in order to refute the shallow reasoning of the Austrian revisionist Marxist, Otto Bauer. Otto Bauer had proposed a programme of so-called “Cultural-national autonomy” for groups of workers of one national background within a single state. Stalin explained what the programme actually meant:

“Let us now examine the essence of the programme itself. What is the national programme of the Austrian social-democrats? It is expressed into words: Cultural-national autonomy. This means firstly that autonomy would be granted let us say, not to Bohemia or Poland, which are inhabited mainly by Czechs and Poles, but to Czechs and Poles generally, irrespective of territory, no matter what part of Austria they inhabit. That is why this autonomy is called national and not territorial. It means secondly that the Czechs, Poles, Germans and so on, scattered over various parts of Austria, taken personally as individuals are to be organized into integral nations, and are as such to form part of the Austrian state. In this way Austria would represent not a union of autonomous nationalities, but a union of autonomous nationalities, constituted irrespective of territory.”

J.V.Stalin Works, Moscow; 1956; Vol 2; Marxism and the National Question; p. 331-332

The fact that Otto Bauer was a socialist leader, made such theories especially dangerous for the working class, as they dressed up bourgeois ideology in a more palatable dress, to mask it. This made it more likely for the workers movements to be fooled into adopting the theories:

“There is no need to mention the kind of ‘socialist principle of nationality’ glorified by Bauer…. True such nationalism is not so transparent, for it is skillfully masked by socialist phrases, but it is all the more harmful to the proletariat for that reason… But this does not exhaust the harm caused by national autonomy; it prepares the ground not only for the segregation of nations, but also for breaking up the united labour movements. The idea of national autonomy creates the psychological conditions for the division of the united workers’ party into separate parties built on national lines. The break-up of the party is followed by the break-up of the trade unions and complete segregation is the result. In this way, the united class movement is broken up into separate national rivulets.”

J.V.Stalin Works, Moscow; 1956; Vol 2; Marxism and the National Question; p. 342-343.

In specific reference to the Jews, Stalin explains that Otto Bauer, despite his praise for “cultural autonomy” in general, is against autonomy for the Jews. Why? In part on the basis of the historical background of assimilation:

“In brief the Jewish Nation is coming to an end, and hence there is nobody to demand national autonomy for. The Jews are being assimilated. This view of the fate of the Jews as a nation is not a new one. It was expressed by Marx as early as the forties, in reference chiefly to the German Jews.”

J.V.Stalin Works, Moscow; 1956; Vol 2; Marxism and the National Question; p.344

Stalin does not disagree with Otto Bauer’s view that the Jews cannot be preserved as a nation. But Stalin does question Bauer’s grounds for rejecting, Bauer’s own “cultural autonomy,” to the Jews. After all points out Stalin, while Bauer allows Pole, Germans etc this mythical “cultural autonomy,” he denies it to the Jews! But Stalin says, he does so on partial grounds. The reason Bauer offers is “That the Jews have no closed territory or settlement.” Stalin says: “This explanation in the main a correct one, does not however express the whole truth.” We may ask what is this “whole truth?” Stalin goes on to raise the issue of the absence of a national market:

“The fact of the matter is that there is no large and stable stratum connected with the land, which would naturally rivet the nation together, serving not only as its framework But also as a ‘national market.’ Of the five or six million Russian Jews only 3-4% are employed in trade industry, in urban institutions and in general are town dwellers; moreover they are spread all over Russia and do not constitute a majority in a single gubernia.”

J.V.Stalin Works, Moscow; 1956; Vol 2; Marxism and the National Question; p. 345

In conclusion, Stalin in Marxism And The National Question thought there was no stable geographical territory within which a Jewish nation could feasibly be “riveted” together. These views certainly influenced Stalin, or at least were indistinguishable on the whole from those of Stalin.

Lenin’s Remarks On The National Question: On Jews And The Bund

How did Lenin regard the Jewish minority, some of who saw themselves as a nation? Jews certainly wanted liberation from oppressions, and this wish frequently took the form of national aspirations. This was the explicit view of the socialists of the Jewish Bund. The Bund is discussed in more detail below. Lenin first discusses the Jews in a more general vein, in “Critical Remarks on the National Question,” written in 1913.

Here he states that the Jews were not a separate nation. He acknowledges that racist reactionary behaviour forms them into an “unhappy, downtrodden and disfranchised caste.” But rather than separation, Lenin argued that assimilation was the best progressive step:

“It is the Jewish nationalists in Russia in general and the Bundists in particular who vociferate most about Russian orthodox Marxists being ‘assimilators.’ And yet…out of the ten and a half million Jews all over the word, about half that number live in the civilised world, where conditions favouring ‘assimilation’ are strongest, whereas the unhappy downtrodden disfranchised Jews in Russia and Galicia who are crushed under the heel of the Purishkeviches [NB: Lenin uses ‘Purishkevich’, derived from the landowner monarchist, Vladimir Mitrofanovich Purishkevich; who founded the reactionary Black Hundreds in 1905 period to ward off revolution] (Both Russian and Polish), live where conditions for ‘assimilation’ least prevail, where there is most segregation and even a ‘Pale of Settlement’, a numerous clausus and other charming features of the Purishkevich regime. The Jews in the civilised world are not a nation, they have in the main become assimilated, say Karl Kautsky and Otto Bauer. The Jews in Galicia and in Russia are not a nation; unfortunately (through no fault of their own but through that of the Purishkeviches) they are still a caste here…”

Lenin “Critical Remarks on the National Question” In “Lenin On USA”; p. 87; or Collected Works; Vols 20; pp 28-30, and 37; OR:
http://gate.cruzio.com/~marx2mao/Lenin/CRNQ13.html

The Bund argued for “cultural autonomy” and a separate educational system. But Lenin replied that assimilation can work, even under capitalism he argued, pointing to the process at work in the USA:

“A rough idea of the scale which the general process of assimilation is assuming under the present conditions of advanced capitalism may be obtained from the immigration statistics of the United States of America.. The 1900 census in the USA recorded over 10,000,000 foreigners. New York state…grinds down national distinctions.”

Lenin “Critical Remarks National Question” In “Lenin On USA”; p. 87; or: Collected Works; Vols 20; p.28-37;

Lenin concludes that the plans for a non-assimilation is reactionary, and negatively compares it to the introduction of “separate” school systems in the South of the USA:

“In practice the plan for ‘extra-territoriality’ or ‘cultural national’ autonomy could mean only one thing: the division of educational affairs according to nationality i.e., the introduction of national curia in school affairs…How utterly reactionary it is even from the standpoint of democracy let alone from that of the proletarian class struggle for socialism.. A single instance and a single scheme for the ‘nationalisation’ of the school system will make this point abundantly clear. In the USA the division of the States into Northern and Southern, holds to this day in all departments of life: the former possess the greatest traditions of freedom and of struggle against the slaveowners; the latter possess the greatest traditions of slave ownership, survivals of persecution of the Negroes, who are economically oppressed and culturally backward (44% of Negroes are illiterate and 6% of whites), and so forth. In the Northern states Negro children attend the same schools as white children do. In the South there are separate ‘national’, or racial, whichever you please, schools for Negro children. I think this is the sole instance of actual ‘nationalisation’ of schools. In Eastern Europe there exists a country where things like the Beilis case are still possible, and Jews are condemned by the Purishkeviches to a condition worse than that of the Negroes. In that country a scheme for nationalisation Jewish schools was recently mooted in the Ministry. Happily this reactionary utopia is no more likely to realised than the utopia of the Austrian petty bourgeois.”

Lenin “Critical Remarks on the National Question”; Ibid; p. 88-89.

[Note: Beilis Case: An infamous case where a Jew was framed and brutally put to death for crimes he had not committed.]

Related to the issue of whether the Jews formed a nation, was the concept of a multi-national state. In his later polemics of 1914, with Rosa Luxemburg, Lenin wrote “The Right Of Nations To Self-Determination.” Here Lenin firmly upholds the rights of nations to self determination, against Luxemburg’s hesitations. But in this work, Lenin holds that the “typical normal” capitalist state is one inhabited by a single nation:

“The tendency of every national movement is towards the formation of national states, under which…requirements of modern capitalism are best satisfied. The most profound economic factors drive towards this goals and, therefore for the whole of Western Europe, nay, for the entire civilised world, the national state is typical and normal for the capitalist period.”

Lenin; “Right Of Nations Self Determination”; Selected Works; Vol 1; Moscow; 1977; p.569; C W 20; p 393;
OR http://gate.cruzio.com/~marx2mao/Lenin/RNSD14.html

Departures from this are unusual. Lenin goes on to cite the then Marxist, Karl Kautsky, who agreed that multi-national states are formed in territories where the state structure remains “abnormal or underdeveloped” in relation to the needs of capitalist society:

“States of mixed national composition (known as multi-national states, as distinct from national states) are ‘always those whose internal constitution has for some reason remained abnormal or underdeveloped (backward)’. Needless to say, Kautsky speaks of abnormality exclusively in the sense of lack of conformity with what is best adapted to the requirements of a developing capitalism.”

Lenin; “Right Of Nations to Self Determination”; Ibid; p. 569.

Elsewhere Lenin continues to be hostile to any chauvinism, on the part of the Jewish representatives. This naturally came to a head with the Bund.

Source

Karl Marx on the Jewish Question

Rabbis from Yemen. Photo: M.E. Lilien, 1906

Rabbis from Yemen. Photo: M.E. Lilien, 1906

This article was published by Alliance (Marxist-Leninist) as part of the publication Alliance, issue #30, “Marx, Lenin and Stalin on Zionism.”

Marx’s Views

There can be little doubt that the position of Germany Jewry was that of a discriminated section of the German people. This is attested to even in the biographies of the few that managed to climb out of the slums such as the Rothschilds (Elon A; “Rothschild”; London; 1993).

We will not need to itemize these discrimination in detail, as the texts and interpretation are easily available. In brief, the Jews suffered severe restrictions including curfews, limits on where they could live, special mandatory requirements in order to allow them to perform any work, no State employment allowed, and a host of petty problems including upon marriage rights. This does not even discuss the excluding the possibility of pogroms.

The views of Lenin and Stalin on the Jews, followed those of Karl Marx – himself a Jew. In turn, Marx’s views on the Jewish Question, were very similar to contemporary Jewish progressives, such as seen in the early views of Moses Hess, a Jewish social democrat. In essence they all urged Jews to fully embrace secular society in order to merge into it. But Hess then renounced a secular progressive stand to adopt Jewish mysticism. But Moses Hess turned to embraced mysticism. In doing so he ensured that later on, ‘progressive minded Zionists,’ would point to Hess rather than Marx, in order to argue that Socialism and Zionism are supposedly compatible!

In contrast to their support of Hess, Zionists loathe Marx, and charge him of racism. But the grounds for this Zionist charge, are transparently flimsy. The charges invoke a Marx – “alienated” from his Jewishness. The charges of anti-Jewish racism has to deal with the fact that Marx was a descendant of a long line of Rabbis in Germany and Italy. His father in Trier had converted to Christianity, in order obtain livelihood, although his mother never did convert. Marx, it is claimed hated ‘his Jewishness’ – Saul Padover uses the term:

“Selbsthass [self hatred] of Marx.”

(Padover S.K.; “Introduction” vol 5, “On Religion”; Karl Marx Library; New York; 1974, p. Xiii.).

As Padover puts it :

“As an understandable defense mechanism, young Marx deprived of a spiritual base of support in Judaism, imbibed the ancient hostility to his people and accepted all the ugly stereotypes of the brutally caricatured Jew then widely prevalent in Europe .. This was an expression of what the Germans call Selbsthass.”

(Padover Ibid; p. xiii)

The evidence for this is said to reside in his letters, and, especially in his early work. But when these are read, it is clear that what is objectionable to the Zionists, is simply the boldness of the following assertion: That to be free, and to truly and fully exercise civil rights, the Jew must renounce Jewishness, just as the Christian must renounce Christianity.

Even the most antagonistic Zionists, such as Saul Padover, are forced to acknowledge, that Marx’s first published work on the “Jewish Question” which appeared in the Cologne Rheinische Zeitung in the summer of 1842, was a forthright defence of the Jews. At that time, Heinrich Hermes of the Kolnische Zeitung, a Catholic paper, had attacked Jews. In this attack, Hermes denied that Jews had any rights to “Civil Equality.” Marx openly counter-attacked this in print. Following his defence of civil rights for the Jews, Marx told Arnold Ruge that he had been approached by local Jews, to put a petition on behalf of Jews to the Landtag (Diet):

“Just now the chief of the local Israelites came to see me and asked me to forward a petition for the Jews to the Landtag [Diet] and I want to do it. Revolting [Widerlich] though the Israelite religion is to me, nevertheless Bauer’s opinion [on the Jewish Question] seems to me to be too abstract.”

(Marx; Letter to Ruge A; March 13th 1843; Cited Padover Introduction Ibid; p. Xxi.)

The petition was successful, and marked the first time that a German parliament had granted “Complete equality of Jews in civil and political matters.” Padover is forced to take note of this, but he deals with it, by simply dismissing it as: a “political gesture taken by Marx” in spite of “his revulsion for Judaism.” But it is clear that Marx calls the “Israelite religion” revolting, not Jews themselves. In fact the whole of Marx’s work testifies to his determination to tear the veils that perpetuate slavery and enchainment. With Engels, Marx identified backward looking nationalisms and religion as narcotic-laden veils – Marx called a spade a spade. He is just as virulent about Christianity, about Islam, about Hinduism – and all religions. Indeed all these were means to disguise and veil the reality of the world. Hear Marx on the Hindus and the Brahmins:

“We must not forget that.. that they restrained the human mind within the smallest possible compass, making it the unresisting tool of superstition, enslaving it beneath traditional rules, depriving it of all grandeur and historical energies. We must not forget the barbarian egotism…the perpetuation of unspeakable cruelties, the massacre of the population of large towns…this passive sort of existence evoked…murder itself a religious rite in Hindostan…the little [Hindoo] communities were contaminated by distinctions of caste and by slavery…they subjected man to external circumstances instead of elevating man to be the sovereign of circumstances…they transformed a self-developing social state into a never changing natural destiny, … brought about a brutalising worship of nature, exhibiting its degradation in the fact that Man the sovereign of nature fell down on his knees in adoration of Hanuman the monkey, and Sabbala the cow.”

(Marx.,”British Rule in India”; “Marx & Engels on Britain.” Moscow; 1971; p.168. p171-172.)

“I share not the opinion of those who believe in a golden age of Hindostan…the mythological chronology of the Brahmin himself, places the commencement of Indian misery in an epoch even more remote than the Christian creation of the world.”

(Marx, “The British Rule In India,” Ibid. p.168)

Who denies that Marx fought the religious vapours of the Brahmins? Just so, he fought the religious and pseudo-nationalist Zionist vapours. Neither of these fights, made him an anti-Indian racist, or somehow ‘alienated’ from Indian problems, as Padover would have us believe!

What did Marx say on the Jewish Question?
Marx only wrote two main articles that explicitly dealt with the Jews as a central theme. They both took the same essential line.
Namely that:

That the Jews in general, had found a niche in capitalist society, by acting as money lenders. Stripping away sanctimony, Marx therefore proclaimed that something else, besides religion, defined the Jews. In his first article, Marx contrasted the “actual secular Jew” with the “Sabbath Jew.” Since the public role of he most prominent Jews was as money merchants, he concentrates on the “haggling” and usurious life of the Jewish trader:

“Let us consider the actual secular Jew, not the Sabbath Jew as Bauer does, but the everyday Jew. Let us not look for the secret of the Jew in his religion, but let us look for the secret of religion in the actual Jew. What is the secular basis of Judaism? Practical need, self-interest. What is the world cult of the Jew? Schacer [Bargaining, haggling, or huckstering-Ed]. What is his worldly god? Money! What actually was the foundation in and of itself, of the Jewish religion? Practical need, egoism. Hence the Jew’s monotheism, is in reality, the polytheism of many needs, a polytheism that makes even the toiler an object of divine law…The god of practical need and self-interest is money. Money is the jealous god of Israel before whom no other god may exist. Money degrades all the gods of mankind and converts them into commodities.. The god of the Jew has been secularized and has become the god of the world. The bill of exchange is the real god of the Jew. His god is only an illusory bill of exchange… What is contained abstractly in the Jewish religion – contempt for theory, for art, for history, for man as an end in himself – is the actual conscious standpoint and virtue of the money man…The chimerical nationality of the Jew is the nationality of the merchant, of the money-man in general.”

(On the Jewish Question – “Deutsch-Franzosische Jahrbucher,” Vol 3 Marx Collected Works; pp 146-74).

Padover makes Marx into a mythical Christian loving and Jew hating person. But in reality Marx describes clearly, from where in his view, Christianity came from. It arose from Judaism:

“Christianity arose of Judaism. It has again dissolved itself into Judaism…Christianity overcame real Judaism only in appearance, It was too noble, too spiritual to alienate the crudeness of practical need except by elevating it into the heavens. Christianity is the sublime thought of Judaism, and Judaism is the common practical application of Christianity; but this application could become universal only after Christianity as the compete religion had theoretically competed the alienation of man from himself and from nature.”

(Marx; “On the Jewish Question”; p.191; in Padover Ibid).

For Marx, it was necessary to emphasize the need to dissolve the religious fetters upon the Jews, and by so doing allow them to enter into the rest of society. The article ends with the words:

“The social emancipation of the Jew is the emancipation of society from Jewishness.”

(Marx; “The Holy Family” (b) The Jewish Question No 1. The setting of the question. Volume 4; CW; Moscow; 1975; p. 87; also in Marx “On The Jewish Question”; p.192; in Padover Ibid.)

The second article was contained within a section of the “Holy Family,” which was a settling of accounts, by Marx and Engels, with the pre-Marxist ideologies in Germany as represented by Bruno Bauer, a member of a philosophical grouping known as Absolute Criticism.

Bauer argued to deny civil rights to Jews, because like everyone else, they had no inborn “Rights of Man,” no ‘dogmatic’ claim for this that over-rode everything else. The implication was that nothing was “owed” to the Jews. In an attack on the materialists, whom he names the “spokesmen of the masses,” Bruno Bauer repudiates any ‘Rights of Man':

“How thoughtless the spokesmen of the Masses are; they have God knows what a great opinion of themselves for supporting emancipation and the dogma of the rights of man.”

(Karl Marx: “The Jewish Question No 1. The Setting of the Question.” Part of “The Holy Family.” (1844); In Collected Works; Volume 4; Moscow; 1975; p. 87).

Marx replies that the abstract “Rights of Man” are irrelevant as compared to the much more real, fundamental and practical assertions of the inborn rights of man to “fish, hunt etc,” as had been pointed out by Charles Fourier:

“As for the ‘rights of man,’ it has been proved to Herr Bruno (‘On the Jewish Question’ – Deutsch-Franzosische Jahrbucher)- Vol 3 M CW- pp 146-74) that it is ‘he himself,’ not the spokesmen of the Mass, who has misunderstood and dogmatically mishandled the essence of those rights. Compared to his discovery that the rights of man are not inborn – a discovery which has been made innumerable times in England during the last 40-odd years – Fourier’s assertions that the right to fish, hunt, etc are inborn rights of men is one of genius.”

(Karl Marx: “The Jewish Question No 1.” Part of “The Holy Family”; Ibid; p.87-89).

One of Bruno Bauer’s assertions, had been that it was only to be expected, and indeed was quite natural, that a Christian state would not enshrine rights for Jews:

“The Christian state having as its vital principle a definite religion, cannot allow adherents of another particular religion … Complete equality with its own social estates.”

(Bauer cited in Marx, “The Holy Family” Ibid; p. 88.)

Marx in reply, points out that the Christian states render this whole question meaningless, since they do not even allow civil equality to their Christian their “own social estates”- to use Bauer’s phrase, to even non-Jews:

“The Deutsch-Franzosische Jahrbucher [showed] that the state of social estates and of exclusive Christianity is not only an incomplete state but an incomplete Christian state… Absolute Criticism still regards the abolition of religion atheism, as the condition for civil equality… It has therefore not yet acquired any deeper insight into the essence of the state.”

(Karl Marx: “The Jewish Question No 1.” Part of “The Holy Family”; Ibid; p. 88).

For further detail, the interested reader can consult the Appendix [below] for a detailed annotation of Marx’s article. Although those two articles are the basic and longest exposition on the nature of the Jews by Marx, an isolated later description of the Jews by Marx is often quoted, as another example of Marx’s alleged “anti-Semitism.” Here Marx discussed the historical role of the Jews, and he was equally graphic as in his earlier remarks. Marx’s vivid phrasing – “Jews in the pores of society” – offends Zionists. It seems that this image of the Jews who were not fully visible in the middle of society, Marx painted by Marx, is somehow a ‘racist’ view of Marx. But in what context does Marx place this image? Marx is talking about trading for commodities in the ancient world, where the dominant relations of production are not commodity based. Marx asserts that Jewish trading is ancient in its history:

“In the modes of production of ancient Asia, of Antiquity etc; we find that the conversion of products into commodities, and hence the existence of men as mere producers of commodities plays a subordinate role, which however increases in importance as the ancient communities approach closer and closer to the stage of their decline. Trading nations proper exist in the ancient world only in its interstices, like the Gods of Epicurius in Intermundia, or like the Jew in the pores of Polish society. These ancient social organisms of production are extraordinarily more simple and transparent than the bourgeois ones, but they are based either on the immaturity of the individual man, who has not yet severed the umbilical cord that unites him naturally with his own species, or on direct master-servant relationships. They are conditioned by a lower stage of development of the productive forces of labour and the correspondingly encompassing relationships of men within their material generating processes, and hence to each other and to nature. This actual narrowness is realised ideally in the ancient worship of nature and in folk religions. The religious reflex of the real world can vanish altogether only when the relationships of practical everyday life offer men daily visible and reasonable relationships to each other and to nature.”

(Marx K; “Capital” Volume 1; Chapter 1; Section 4; Cited by Padover Ibid; p. 137.)

Well, is this unfair? Marx is simply pointing out that Jews were not given full civic right in then Poland. There is another dimension, relating to the Jewish concentration in trading. Perhaps Jews were not important traders in the ancient world, and perhaps commodity trading was a more main-stream and prominent feature in antiquity?

But, no evidence to contradict Marx, is shown by those such as Padover who critique Marx here.

The very useful function of providing loose monies for loan, had been the prerogative of the Jew, right up until the Reformation. Until then, loans were made only in the interstices of society. But the increasing need of capital, fueled a demand for the practice of charging interest, or usury. This became a root cause of the Reformation, the vast social movement that upturned traditional Catholicism, and is usually portrayed as the rise of the Protestant religion. But the underlying reasons for the Reformation are still often overlooked. The drawback of Catholicism, one the Protestant version of Christianity could overcome for society, was the lack of money trading. Under Catholicism but not under Protestantism, money trading by loans (known as usury) was forbidden as avarice:

“The historical background.. Consisted of the body of social theory stated & implicit, which was the legacy of the Middle Ages. The formal teaching was derived form the Bible, the works of the Fathers & Schoolmen, the canon law and its commentators, and have been popularized.”

(Tawney R.H. “Religion & The Rise of Capitalism”; London; 1975; p. 28)

The condemnation of usury supported a land owning feudal society. Pope Innocent IV argued:

“If usury were general, men would not give thought to the cultivation of their land except when they could do ought else, and so there would be so great a famine that all the poor would die of hunger.”

(Tawney R.H. “Religion & The Rise of Capitalism”; London; 1975; p. 56)

“Early Councils had forbidden usury to be taken by the clergy. The Councils of the 12th & 13th Centuries forbid it to be taken by clergy or laity, and laid down rules for dealing with offenders… The Legislation of the Councils of Lyons (1274) and of Viene (1312) … re-enacted the measures laid down by the third Lateran Council (1175) & supplemented them by rules which virtually made the money-lender an outlaw.”

(Tawney R.H. “Religion & The Rise of Capitalism”; London; 1975; p. 58.)

Luther‘s views largely echoed traditional Catholicism. But Calvinism, in contrast, was unlike Lutheranism – it was largely an urban movement that reflected the needs of the growing capitalist society. Calvin could write:

“What reason is there why the income from business should not be larger than that from landowning? Whence do the merchant’s profits come… except from his own indulgence & industry?”

(Tawney R.H. “Religion & The Rise of Capitalism”; London; 1975; p. 113)

There was an intense frustration, by all capitalists and traders, inside the developing capitalist Middle Ages society of developing nations. Even in Florence, the greatest mercantile centre in the Middle Ages, the patent nonsense of the old laws, was shown by the simultaneous hypocrisy of banning usury, whilst depending upon imported Jews to conduct it:

“Florence was the financial capital of medieval Europe; but even at Florence, the secular authorities fined bankers right and left for usury in the middle of the 14th Century, and fifty years later first prohibited credit transaction altogether, and then imported Jews to conduct a business forbidden to Christians.”

(Tawney R.H. “Religion & The Rise of Capitalism”; London; 1975; p. 49.)

So there was a societal need and drive, to adopt the mores of Calvinism.

Following this, the social utility of Judaism to a developing capitalist society diminished. Large scale pogroms would follow the rise of capitalism, which had now ensured its own secure form of usury. (This is a very truncated synopsis. Since Marx’s views on this question encompass the whole place of religion in civil society, we carry a more detailed view of this in Appendix 1).

In Conclusion: Marx stripped bare of camouflage, the vice in which modern workers of all colours and creed were held – capitalist relations. This meant the dissolution of religious faith. Naturally, religiously biased ideologues, like Zionists, will find this offensive. Too bad! We next examine how Marx’s views were echoed by Lenin and Stalin on this question.

Source

Appendix: A More Detailed Synopsis – with our commentary – of Marx’s views on the Jewish Question

All the quotations from Marx’s articles below are drawn from the Marx-Engels Internet Archive and can be found at the following web site for the full index of works by Marx on one particular Internet Archive: http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844-jq/index.htm

Please note that all emphases below in the quotes are from the Alliance editors.

Marx’s article contains more than simply an analysis not only of the attitude that revolutionaries should take to the Jewish Question. Because the Jewish Question is a complex mixture of political, civil and religious victimisation, Marx has to deal with the relation of religion to society. Marx also deals with Bauer’s misconceptions surrounding the Democratic Rights Of Man – as adopted by the French Revolution and the USA War of Independence.

Marx first summarises the position of Bruno Bauer.

Bauer starts out saying that no one in Germany, has the type of freedom that Jews want, ie “civic political emancipation.” He argues that it is therefore “egoist-ic” to want a “special emancipation” separate from other humans. He argues that emancipation cannot come from those who are themselves “not free”:

“Bruno Bauer: The German Jews desire emancipation. What kind of emancipation do they desire? Civic, political emancipation. Bruno Bauer replies to them: No one in Germany is politically emancipated. We ourselves are not free. How are we to free you? You Jews are ‘egoists’ if you demand a special emancipation for yourselves as Jews. As Germans, you ought to work for the political emancipation of Germany, and as human beings, for the emancipation of mankind, and you should feel the particular kind of your oppression and your shame not as an exception to the rule, but on the contrary as a confirmation of the rule.”

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844-jq/index.htm

For Bauer the roots of the “Jewish Question” lie in a religious opposition. This opposition can only be resolved by rendering the opposition impossible. Christianity and Judaism are simply different stages “in the development of the human mind.” But there is only one way to render opposition “impossible” – by abolishing religion. The Jew must follow Bauer’s dictum of self-emancipation, the Jew must renounce religion:

“How, then, does Bauer solve the Jewish question?…
‘We must emancipate ourselves before we can emancipate others.’
The most rigid form of the opposition between the Jew and the Christian is the religious opposition. How is an opposition resolved? By making it impossible. How is religious opposition made impossible? By ‘abolishing religion.’ As soon as Jew and Christian recognize that their respective religions are no more than ‘different stages in the development of the human mind,’ different snake skins cast off by ‘history,’ and that man is the snake who sloughed them, the relation of Jew and Christian is no longer religious but is only a critical, ‘scientific,’ and human relation. Science, then, constitutes their unity. But, contradictions in science are resolved by science itself.”

For Bauer this renunciation and self-emancipation is necessary for Christians as well as Jews. It has a “universal significance.” The question embraces more than the individual, being also a “question of the relation of religion to the state”:

“The ‘German Jew,’ in particular, is confronted by the general absence of political emancipation and the strongly marked Christian character of the state. In Bauer’s conception, however, the Jewish question has a universal significance, independent of specifically German conditions. It is the question of the relation of religion to the state, of the contradiction between religious constraint and political emancipation. Emancipation from religion is laid down as a condition, both to the Jew who wants to be emancipated politically, and to the state which is to effect emancipation and is itself to be emancipated.”

In any case, argues Bauer, even if the State itself took the actions demanded by Jews, the State’s formal actions will not achieve the desired results. Bauer cites the French State as an example. Here the formal declaration of equality for all was not matched in practice. He then stresses that the responsibility for emancipation lies with the victim, the Jew – who should renounce religion and the Sabbath allowing him/her to attend the Chamber of Deputies and vote down the “privileged religion.” With the ending of a “privileged religion” (ie Christianity) the freedom of worship as an individual act will follow. Marx concludes:

“Bauer, therefore, demands, on the one hand, that the Jew should renounce Judaism, and that mankind in general should renounce religion, in order to achieve ‘civic’ emancipation. On the other hand, he quite consistently regards the ‘political’ abolition of religion as the abolition of religion as such. The state which presupposes religion is not yet a true, real state.”

Marx now begins his demolition of Bauer. In essence, Marx shows that Bauer:

(i) Confuses civil and political emancipation;
(ii) Does not understand the distinction between full human freedoms and state granted political freedom;
(iii) That he does not understand the concrete manifestations of the Jewish Question in the different States;
(iv) That he does not understand the Declaration of Rights Of Man.

Marx outlines the limitations and the questions left unanswered by the mechanistic Bauer. Especially asks Marx, What is the nature of the emancipation being demanded that Bauer has not addressed?

“At this point, the one-sided formulation of the Jewish question becomes evident. It was by no means sufficient to investigate: Who is to emancipate? Who is to be emancipated? Criticism had to investigate a third point. It had to inquire: What kind of emancipation is in question? [Editor’s emphasis]. What conditions follow from the very nature of the emancipation that is demanded? Only the criticism of political emancipation itself would have been the conclusive criticism of the Jewish question and its real merging in the general question of time. Because Bauer does not raise the question to this level, he becomes entangled in contradictions. He puts forward conditions which are not based on the nature of political emancipation itself. He raises questions which are not part of his problem, and he solves problems which leave this question unanswered.”

Bauer excuses the bigots who opposed Jewish emancipation, seeing them as only committing only one error- they assume a Christian state to be the only true one, and they do not criticise it as they do Judaism. For Marx the relevant criticism is the state itself, and the relationship of political emancipation to human emancipation:

“We find that his error lies in the fact that he subjects to criticism only the ‘Christian state,’ not the ‘state as such,’ that he does not investigate the relation of political emancipation to human emancipation and, therefore, puts forward conditions which can be explained only by uncritical confusion of political emancipation with general human emancipation.”

Thus Marx turns Bauer’s question to the Jews around. Marx defends in effect the right of a private choice to religion and Judaism in particular. This right is not dependent upon, nor subordinate to a superior political emancipation:

“If Bauer asks the Jews: Have you, from your standpoint, the right to want political emancipation? We ask the converse question: Does the standpoint of political emancipation give the right to demand from the Jew the abolition of Judaism and from man the abolition of religion?”

Marx also points out that freedoms necessitate understanding concrete realities. There are particular aspects that the Jewish question takes in different societies. Thus in Germany, a state not yet undergone the bourgeois revolution, a theological State is encountered by the Jew:

“In Germany, where there is no political state, no state as such, the Jewish question is a purely theological one. The Jew finds himself in religious opposition to the state, which recognizes Christianity as its basis. This state is a theologian ex professo. Criticism here is criticism of theology, a double-edged criticism — criticism of Christian theology and of Jewish theology. Hence, we continue to operate in the sphere of theology, however much we may operate critically within it.”

Whereas since France is a constitutional state with differing effects on Jews, there it was a question of a incompleteness of political emancipation:

“In France, a constitutional state, the Jewish question is a question of constitutionalism, the question of the incompleteness of political emancipation. Since the semblance of a state religion is retained here, although in a meaningless and self-contradictory formula, that of a religion of the majority, the relation of the Jew to the state retains the semblance of a religious, theological opposition.”

Only one state, the USA, has an apparently fully secular relationship with its peoples, allowing religious freedoms. Although Marx made it clear that he obviously understood that hypocrisies abounded, saying that although the USA Constitution was clear on the freedom of worship, North America is pre-eminently the country of religiosity. Nonetheless:

“Only in the North American states — at least, in some of them — does the Jewish question lose its theological significance and become a really secular question. Only where the political state exists in its completely developed form can the relation of the Jew, and of the religious man in general, to the political state, and therefore the relation of religion to the state, show itself in its specific character, in its purity. The criticism of this relation ceases to be theological criticism as soon as the state ceases to adopt a theological attitude toward religion, as soon as it behaves towards religion as a state — i.e., politically. Criticism, then, becomes criticism of the political state. At this point, where the question ceases to be theological, Bauer’s criticism ceases to be critical.”

In any case, the fundamental question is the relation of political emancipation to religion. Marx argues that if religious motivations still remain, despite “political emancipation” in countries like the USA, it is because of an incomplete secular freedom, a defect of a secular narrowness. Religion itself is not the cause of the defect. Religion can only be overcome not by overcoming religious narrowness but by getting rid of secular restrictions – Not by abolishing religion as Bauer proclaims:

“The question is: What is the relation of complete political emancipation to religion? If we find that even in the country of complete political emancipation, religion not only exists, but displays a fresh and vigorous vitality, that is proof that the existence of religion is not in contradiction to the perfection of the state. Since, however, the existence of religion is the existence of defect, the source of this defect can only be sought in the nature of the state itself. We no longer regard religion as the cause, but only as the manifestation of secular narrowness. Therefore, we explain the religious limitations of the free citizen by their secular limitations. We do not assert that they must overcome their religious narrowness in order to get rid of their secular restrictions, we assert that they will overcome their religious narrowness once they get rid of their secular restrictions. We do not turn secular questions into theological ones… The question of the relation of political emancipation to religion becomes for us the question of the relation of political emancipation to human emancipation. We criticize the religious weakness of the political state by criticizing the political state in its secular form, apart from its weaknesses as regards religion.”

Marx agrees with Bauer, that for both Jews and Christians, full liberty means shedding religious superstitions. But for a fuller human liberation, the first and immediate need is for separation of state and religion, for the emancipation of the state from any particular secular elements and from state religion. This is a political emancipation & not a religious emancipation which requires human emancipation:

“The contradiction between the state and a particular religion, for instance Judaism, is given by us a human form as the contradiction between the state and particular secular elements; the contradiction between the state and religion in general as the contradiction between the state and its presuppositions in general. The political emancipation of the Jew, the Christian, and, in general, of religious man, is the emancipation of the state from Judaism, from Christianity, from religion in general… the state as a state emancipates itself from religion by emancipating itself from the state religion — that is to say, by the state as a state not professing any religion, but, on the contrary, asserting itself as a state. The political emancipation from religion is not a religious emancipation that has been carried through to completion and is free from contradiction, because political emancipation is not a form of human emancipation which has been carried through to completion and is free from contradiction.”

It is irrelevant if even the majority of the people remain religious. For religious sentiments remain, until the people undergo a more profound freedom. The problem is the limits of a political emancipation by itself:

“The limits of political emancipation are evident at once from the fact that the state can free itself from a restriction without man being really free from this restriction, that the state can be a free state without man being a free man.”

Marx means by this, the need for a further and profound liberation of the human. To drive his point home, Marx draws an analogy to private property relations. As the USA state had abolished requirements of property for the right to vote, he argues that it had effectively abolished private property. But Marx says this is ridiculous since clearly, private property not only exists in the USA, but that it forms the presupposed basis for the state:

“Nevertheless, the political annulment of private property not only fails to abolish private property but even presupposes it. The state abolishes, in its own way, distinctions of birth, social rank, education, occupation, when it declares that birth, social rank, education, occupation, are non-political distinctions, when it proclaims, without regard to these distinction, that every member of the nation is an equal participant in national sovereignty, when it treats all elements of the real life of the nation from the standpoint of the state. Nevertheless, the state allows private property, education, occupation, to act in their way – i.e., as private property, as education, as occupation, and to exert the influence of their special nature. Far from abolishing these real distinctions, the state only exists on the presupposition of their existence; it feels itself to be a political state and asserts its universality only in opposition to these elements of its being.”

Consistent with this type of hypocrisy of the tenets of the bourgeois Constitution, religious conflicts will exist in politically bourgeois states. But these are no different in kind from contradictions even the bourgeoisie find themselves in with respect to their status as supposed free citizens. Marx locates Jew’s problems in civil society, in the same conflicts of the citizen whose political powers are merely a sophistry and not a real one:

“Man, as the adherent of a particular religion, finds himself in conflict with his citizenship and with other men as members of the community. This conflict reduces itself to the secular division between the political state and civil society. For man as a bourgeois [ here, meaning, member of civil society, private life], life in the state is only a semblance or a temporary exception to the essential and the rule. Of course, the bourgeois, like the Jew, remains only sophistically in the sphere of political life, just as the citoyen only sophistically remains a Jew or a bourgeois. But, this sophistry is not personal. It is the sophistry of the political state itself. The difference between the merchant and the citizen, between the day-labourer and the citizen, between the landowner and the citizen, between the merchant and the citizen, between the living individual and the citizen. The contradiction in which the religious man finds himself with the political man is the same contradiction in which the bourgeois finds himself with the citoyen, and the member of civil society with his political lion’s skin.”

For Marx, Bauer ignores the Jew’s secular problems, confining himself to the purely religious conflicts:

“This secular conflict, to which the Jewish question ultimately reduces itself, the relation between the political state and its preconditions, whether these are material elements, such as private property, etc., or spiritual elements, such as culture or religion, the conflict between the general interest and private interest, the schism between the political state and civil society — these secular antitheses Bauer allows to persist, whereas he conducts a polemic against their religious expression.”

As explained, Marx distinguishes political emancipation from the full human emancipation that tackles the religious sentiment. It is not surprising then, that Marx says that political emancipation of itself, often leaves religion intact. A thorough liberation, including from religion, requires special periods when new political states arise out of civil society, where a permanent non-stop revolution does not baulk at hurdles:

“Of course, in periods when the political state as such is born violently out of civil society, when political liberation is the form in which men strive to achieve their liberation, the state can and must go as far as the abolition of religion, the destruction of religion. But, it can do so only in the same way that it proceeds to the abolition of private property, to the maximum, to confiscation, to progressive taxation, just as it goes as far as the abolition of life, the guillotine. At times of special self-confidence, political life seeks to suppress its prerequisite, civil society and the elements composing this society, and to constitute itself as the real species-life of man, devoid of contradictions. But, it can achieve this only by coming into violent contradiction with its own conditions of life, only by declaring the revolution to be permanent, and, therefore, the political drama necessarily ends with the re-establishment of religion, private property, and all elements of civil society, just as war ends with peace.”

So Marx differentiates between the more limited liberation in political emancipation of the secular state of bourgeois society (that which in words denies religious persecution and property rights, but in fact endorses them) and a fuller human liberation. Where does all this leave the Jew? Bauer had denied the Jew civil rights till renunciation of Judaism. Marx denies that. But he adds, for full liberation, the Jew must strive for a human liberation from religion itself – as well as striving for political emancipation. The latter can be achieved without renouncing Judaism, but human liberation requires leaving religion. The Jew however, in confronting the Christian state, in demanding civic rights is acting politically:

“Therefore, we do not say to the Jews, as Bauer does: You cannot be emancipated politically without emancipating yourselves radically from Judaism. On the contrary, we tell them: Because you can be emancipated politically without renouncing Judaism completely and incontrovertibly, political emancipation itself is not human emancipation. If you Jews want to be emancipated politically, without emancipating yourselves humanly, the half-hearted approach and contradiction is not in you alone, it is inherent in the nature and category of political emancipation. If you find yourself within the confines of this category, you share in a general confinement. Just as the state evangelizes when, although it is a state, it adopts a Christian attitude towards the Jews, so the Jew acts politically when, although a Jew, he demands civic rights.”

Bauer had a somewhat mystical idea of how Democratic Rights were obtained. According to Bauer, the rights of man were not a gift of nature but were obtained by struggle against historical tradition:

“But, if a man, although a Jew, can be emancipated politically and receive civic rights, can he lay claim to the so-called rights of man and receive them? Bauer denies it. [Says Bauer]:

‘The question is whether the Jew as such, that is, the Jew who himself admits that he is compelled by his true nature to live permanently in separation from other men, is capable of receiving the universal rights of man and of conceding them to others. For the Christian world, the idea of the rights of man was only discovered in the last century. It is not innate in men; on the contrary, it is gained only in a struggle against the historical traditions in which hitherto man was brought up. Thus the rights of man are not a gift of nature, not a legacy from past history, but the reward of the struggle against the accident of birth and against the privileges which up to now have been handed down by history from generation to generation. These rights are the result of culture, and only one who has earned and deserved them can possess them.

Can the Jew really take possession of them? As long as he is a Jew, the restricted nature which makes him a Jew is bound to triumph over the human nature which should link him as a man with other men, and will separate him from non-Jews. He declares by this separation that the particular nature which makes him a Jew is his true, highest nature, before which human nature has to give way. Similarly, the Christian as a Christian cannot grant the rights of man.'”

In countering this naive mystic view, Marx shows that Bauer had not even understood the notion of the universal rights of man. For Bauer, man has to sacrifice the privilege of faith to obtain universal rights of man. But Marx points out that these rights were never seen, by either the French and the USA framers of the Declaration of Rights, as being contingent upon abolition of religion:

“Let us examine, for a moment, the so-called rights of man — to be precise, the rights of man in their authentic form, in the form which they have among those who discovered them, the North Americans and the French. These rights of man are, in part, political rights, rights which can only be exercised in community with others. Their content is participation in the community, and specifically in the political community, in the life of the state. They come within the category of political freedom, the category of civic rights, which, as we have seen, in no way presuppose the incontrovertible and positive abolition of religion — nor, therefore, of Judaism.”

Marx now examines the possible differences between the rights of man and the rights of the citizen:

“There remains to be examined the other part of the rights of man — the rights of man, insofar as these differ from the rights of the citizen. Included among them is freedom of conscience, the right to practice any religion one chooses. The privilege of faith is expressly recognized either as a right of man or as the consequence of a right of man, that of liberty. Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 1791, Article 10:

‘The freedom of every man to practice the religion of which he is an adherent.'”

Marx quotes the Declaration, showing that the Right of freedom of conscience is drawn from Nature:

“All men have received from nature the imprescriptible right to worship the Almighty according to the dictates of their conscience, and no one can be legally compelled to follow, establish, or support against his will any religion or religious ministry. No human authority can, in any circumstances, intervene in a matter of conscience or control the forces of the soul.”

Marx now distinguishes between man and citizen. Man – as in rights of man – is the person who makes up civil society. Man, separated atomically from other men. He goes on to quote directly from the most radical Constitution that of 1793, that was used to define liberty, what is it that constitutes liberty?

“The rights of man, are, as such, distinct from… the rights of the citizen. Who is man as distinct from citizen? None other than the member of civil society. Why is the member of civil society called man; why are his rights called the rights of man? How is this fact to be explained? From the relationship between the political state and civil society, from the nature of political emancipation…

…Above all, we note the fact that the so-called rights of man.. as distinct from the rights of citizens, are nothing but the rights of a member of civil society — i.e., the rights of egoistic man, of man separated from other men and from the community. Let us hear what the most radical Constitution, the Constitution of 1793, has to say: Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. Article 2. These rights, etc., (the natural and imprescriptible rights) are: equality, liberty, security, property.

What constitutes liberty?

‘Article 6. Liberty is the power which man has to do everything that does not harm the rights of others, or, according to the Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1791: Liberty consists in being able to do everything which does not harm others.’

Liberty, therefore, is the right to do everything that harms no one else. The limits within which anyone can act without harming someone else are defined by law, just as the boundary between two fields is determined by a boundary post. It is a question of the liberty of man as an isolated monad, withdrawn into himself.”

Marx returns to contrast Bauer‘s position with that of the 1793 Constitution. Bauer’s position in demanding of the Jew to renounce Judaism before granting human rights – Liberty in the words of the Declaration of Rights Of Man – is that unless the Jew does renounce Judaism he will remain separate from non-Jews:

“Why is the Jew, according to Bauer, incapable of acquiring the rights of man? As long as he is a Jew, the restricted nature which makes him a Jew is bound to triumph over the human nature which should link him as a man with other men, and will separate him from non-Jews.”

And Marx replies to him saying that the very notion of liberty under the bourgeois Declaration of Rights is of a separation of man from man, on an isolated individual. This is easily illustrated with respect to another aspect of the Declaration of Rights of Man, that concerning private property:

“But, the right of man to liberty is based not on the association of man with man, but on the separation of man from man. It is the right of this separation, the right of the restricted individual, withdrawn into himself. The practical application of man’s right to liberty is man’s right to private property.

What constitutes man’s right to private property?
Article 16. (Constitution of 1793):
‘The right of property is that which every citizen has of enjoying and of disposing at his discretion of his goods and income, of the fruits of his labor and industry.’

The right of man to private property is, therefore, the right to enjoy one’s property and to dispose of it at one’s discretion (a son gre), without regard to other men, independently of society, the right of self-interest. This individual liberty and its application form the basis of civil society. It makes every man see in other men not the realization of his own freedom, but the barrier to it. But, above all, it proclaims the right of man of enjoying and of disposing at his discretion of his goods and income, of the fruits of his labor and industry.”

Of the other rights of man: There remains the other rights of man: equality and security. Marx goes on to show that these also consist of a guarantee of individual rights as a self-sufficient nomad:

“Equality, used here in its non-political sense, is nothing but the equality of the liberty described above — namely: each man is to the same extent regarded as such a self-sufficient monad. The Constitution of 1795 defines the concept of this equality, in..

Article 3 (Constitution of 1795):
Equality consists in the law being the same for all, whether it protects or punishes.
And Security? Article 8 (Constitution of 1793):
Security consists in the protection afforded by society to each of its members for the preservation of his person, his rights, and his property.

Security is the highest social concept of civil society, the concept of police, expressing the fact that the whole of society exists only in order to guarantee to each of its members the preservation of his person, his rights, and his property. It is in this sense that Hegel calls civil society the state of need and reason.”

Marx concludes that egoism is enshrined in the Democratic Rights of Man:

“None of the so-called rights of man, therefore, go beyond egoistic man, beyond man as a member of civil society — that is, an individual withdrawn into himself, into the confines of his private interests and private caprice, and separated from the community. In the rights of man, he is far from being conceived as a species-being; on the contrary, species-like itself, society, appears as a framework external to the individuals, as a restriction of their original independence. The sole bound holding them together it natural necessity, need and private interest, the preservation of their property and their egoistic selves.”

As the Democratic Rights of Man signalled the victory of the bourgeois production over feudal production, Marx finds it consistent that an egoistic man should result:

“Feudal society was resolved into its basic element — man, but man as he really formed its basis — egoistic man. This man, the member of civil society, is thus the basis, the precondition, of the political state. He is recognized as such by this state in the rights of man.”

Again Marx stresses the incompleteness of the emancipation achieved under bourgeois rule, that there is freedom of religious opinion, but not freedom from religion:

“Hence, man was not freed from religion, he received religious freedom. He was not freed from property, he received freedom to own property. He was not freed from the egoism of business, he received freedom to engage in business. Man as a member of civil society, unpolitical man, inevitably appears, however, as the natural man. The rights of man appears as natural rights, because conscious activity is concentrated on the political act. “

Full emancipation has still to come, when the abstract citizen is re-absorbed into the individual man, – that is when recognises and exerts his conscious social powers:

All emancipation is a reduction of the human world and relationships to man himself. Political emancipation is the reduction of man, on the one hand, to a member of civil society, to an egoistic, independent individual, and, on the other hand, to a citizen, a juridical person. Only when the real, individual man re-absorbs in himself the abstract citizen, and as an individual human being has become a species-being in his everyday life, in his particular work, and in his particular situation, only when man has recognized and organized his ‘own powers’ as social powers, and, consequently, no longer separates social power from himself in the shape of political power, only then will human emancipation have been accomplished.”

For Bauer, the Christian is closer to freedom than the Jew, since the Christian only needs to give up religion. But the Jew not only has to give up religion but also has to give up struggle to perfecting his religion. Marx realises that Bauer has simply re-dressed in civic clothes, the old religious conflict between Judaism and Christianity. Marx condemns the transformation of Jewish emancipation into a purely religious question:

“For Bauer: The Christian has to surmount only one stage, namely, that of his religion, in order to give up religion altogether, and therefore become free. The Jew, on the other hand, has to break not only with his Jewish nature, but also with the development towards perfecting his religion, a development which has remained alien to him. Thus, Bauer here transforms the question of Jewish emancipation into a purely religious question. The theological problem as to whether the Jew or the Christian has the better prospect of salvation is repeated here in the enlightened form: which of them is more capable of emancipation. No longer is the question asked: Is it Judaism or Christianity that makes a man free? On the contrary, the question is now: Which makes man freer, the negation of Judaism or the negation of Christianity?”

Bauer uses a complex theological argument to portray the Jews need to overcome not only Judaism itself, but also Judaism’s link with Christianity. Jews must not only come to terms with Judaism, but also with Christianity by carrying out the Critique of the Evangelical History of the Synoptics and the Life of Jesus, etc. Since Bauer conceives of Judaism as a Acrude religious criticism of Christianity, and of Judaism merely of religious significance, he transforms the emancipation of the Jews, also into a philosophical-theological act. Finally Bauer notes & excuses that Christians find Jews offensive. In contrast to this religious hocus-pocus, Marx emphasises the secular realities. This means an unsentimental analysis of the position of the Jew in society:

We are trying to break with the theological formulation of the question. For us, the question of the Jew’s capacity for emancipation becomes the question: What particular social element has to be overcome in order to abolish Judaism? For the present-day Jew’s capacity for emancipation is the relation of Judaism to the emancipation of the modern world. This relation necessarily results from the special position of Judaism in the contemporary enslaved world. Let us consider the actual, worldly Jew — not the Sabbath Jew, as Bauer does, but the everyday Jew. Let us not look for the secret of the Jew in his religion, but let us look for the secret of his religion in the real Jew.”

So saying Marx locates the Jewish reality in money trading, in sacher – or huckstering:

“What is the secular basis of Judaism? Practical need, self-interest. What is the worldly religion of the Jew? Huckstering. What is his worldly God? Money. Very well then! Emancipation from huckstering and money, consequently from practical, real Judaism, would be the self-emancipation of our time.”

This being so, only a societal change of society to abolish those preconditions of huckstering – can make the Jew impossible:

“An organization of society which would abolish the preconditions for huckstering, and therefore the possibility of huckstering, would make the Jew impossible. His religious consciousness would be dissipated like a thin haze in the real, vital air of society. On the other hand, if the Jew recognizes that this practical nature of his is futile and works to abolish it, he extricates himself from his previous development and works for human emancipation as such and turns against the supreme practical expression of human self-estrangement. We recognize in Judaism, therefore, a general anti-social element of the present time, an element which through historical development — to which in this harmful respect the Jews have zealously contributed — has been brought to its present high level, at which it must necessarily begin to disintegrate. In the final analysis, the emancipation of the Jews is the emancipation of mankind from Judaism.”

Bauer argues that the Jews have financial power, and goes so far as to state that it is fiction to say that the Jew is deprived of political rights, given the Jew has so much money power:

“According to Bauer, it is a fictitious state of affairs when in theory the Jew is deprived of political rights, whereas in practice he has immense power and exerts his political influence en gros, although it is curtailed en detail.”

Marx replies that money power is not always consonant with political power:

“The contradiction that exists between the practical political power of the Jew and his political rights is the contradiction between politics and the power of money in general. Although theoretically the former is superior to the latter, in actual fact politics has become the serf of financial power.”

The peculiar power of the Jews arises from the need for money free of restraints:

“Judaism has held its own alongside Christianity, not only as religious criticism of Christianity… but equally because the practical Jewish spirit, Judaism, has maintained itself and even attained its highest development in Christian society. The Jew, who exists as a distinct member of civil society, is only a particular manifestation of the Judaism of civil society… The Jew is perpetually created by civil society from its own entrails. What, in itself, was the basis of the Jewish religion? Practical need, egoism. … Practical need, egoism, is the principle of civil society, and as such appears in pure form as soon as civil society has fully given birth to the political state. The god of practical need and self-interest is money. Money is the jealous god of Israel, in face of which no other god may exist. Money degrades all the gods of man — and turns them into commodities. Money is the universal self-established value of all things. It has, therefore, robbed the whole world — both the world of men and nature — of its specific value. Money is the estranged essence of man’s work and man’s existence, and this alien essence dominates him, and he worships it. The god of the Jews has become secularized and has become the god of the world. The bill of exchange is the real god of the Jew. His god is only an illusory bill of exchange. The view of nature attained under the domination of private property and money is a real contempt for, and practical debasement of, nature; in the Jewish religion, nature exists, it is true, but it exists only in imagination.”

Indeed Judaism reaches its peak in Christian society, since its social function of money loaning is unique, and very much needed by Christians:

“Judaism reaches its highest point with the perfection of civil society, but it is only in the Christian world that civil society attains perfection. Only under the dominance of Christianity, which makes all national, natural, moral, and theoretical conditions extrinsic to man, could civil society separate itself completely from the life of the state, sever all the species-ties of man, put egoism and selfish need in the place of these species-ties, and dissolve the human world into a world of atomistic individuals who are inimically opposed to one another.

“Christianity sprang from Judaism. It has merged again in Judaism. From the outset, the Christian was the theorizing Jew, the Jew is, therefore, the practical Christian, and the practical Christian has become a Jew again. Christianity had only in semblance overcome real Judaism. It was too noble-minded, too spiritualistic to eliminate the crudity of practical need in any other way than by elevation to the skies. Christianity is the sublime thought of Judaism, Judaism is the common practical application of Christianity, but this application could only become general after Christianity as a developed religion had completed theoretically the estrangement of man from himself and from nature. Only then could Judaism achieve universal dominance and make alienated man and alienated nature into alienable, vendible objects subjected to the slavery of egoistic need and to trading. Selling [verausserung] is the practical aspect of alienation [Entausserung]. Just as man, as long as he is in the grip of religion, is able to objectify his essential nature only by turning it into something alien, something fantastic, so under the domination of egoistic need he can be active practically, and produce objects in practice, only by putting his products, and his activity, under the domination of an alien being, and bestowing the significance of an alien entity — money — on them. In its perfected practice, Christian egoism of heavenly bliss is necessarily transformed into the corporal egoism of the Jew, heavenly need is turned into world need, subjectivism into self-interest. We explain the tenacity of the Jew not by his religion, but, on the contrary, by the human basis of his religion — practical need, egoism.”

Is there a Jewish nation? Marx thinks this is a chimera:

“The chimerical nationality of the Jew is the nationality of the merchant, of the man of money in general. The groundless law of the Jew is only a religious caricature of groundless morality and right in general, of the purely formal rites with which the world of self-interest surrounds itself. Here, too, man’s supreme relation is the legal one, his relation to laws that are valid for him not because they are laws of his own will and nature, but because they are the dominant laws and because departure from them is avenged.”

Again the social emancipation of the Jew is the emancipation of society from Judaism ie the emancipation of society from money and mercantile bonds of trading:

“Once society has succeeded in abolishing the empirical essence of Judaism — huckstering and its preconditions — the Jew will have become impossible, because his consciousness no longer has an object, because the subjective basis of Judaism, practical need, has been humanized, and because the conflict between man’s individual-sensuous existence and his species-existence has been abolished.”

The social emancipation of the Jew is the emancipation of society from Judaism.

Source

Marx, Lenin & Stalin on Zionism: Introduction & Preface

This poster was from a campaign waged against anti-Semitism at the end of the 1920's.

This poster was from a campaign waged against anti-Semitism at the end of the 1920’s.

Preface

Bourgeoisie nationalists, whether of Zionist and Pan-Islamic persuasions, both accuse the USSR of the socialist era (from 1917-1953) of racism, aimed against either Jews or Arabs respectively. But, in reality Lenin and Stalin gave an even-handed and single reply, to both the Pan-Islamists and to the Zionists. This reply was to eschew a narrow bourgeois nationalism, in order to create socialism.

In Alliance 30 we attempt to put the recent history of Jewry into a Marxist-Leninist context. This means we will first examine the views of Marx, Lenin and Stalin upon the ideologies of Zionism and its precursors. Next we discuss the Jewish Autonomous Region of Birobidzhan established by the Soviets. Of necessity we examine the so called “Jewish Plot” and the “Doctor’s Plot” in the USSR. This is necessary to sensibly to discuss how it was that the USSR would come to agree at the United Nations, to a recognition of the imperialist-led partition of Palestine, and the planting of the colony of Israel.

In the companion Alliance Number 31, we will examine the views of Lenin and Stalin on Pan-Islamism. The form Pan-Islamism took in the USSR, was known as Sultan-Galiyev-ism. We then briefly examine the versions of Pan-Islamism represented by the Ba’ath Party ideology of Syria and Iraq; and finally we will assess the views of Samir Amin.

A Methodological Foreword Upon Recent Sources For Marxist-Leninists

Alliance has always tried to punctiliously show its source material with as precise references as is possible. This is not an academic peccadillo- to be disdained as “armchair Marxism.” Rather it is essential to root a Marxist-Leninist view of the world in an objective and clear manner. Only this permits any possible rebuttals that are based on facts rather than those of opinion. It has not been necessary to comment on this matter till now. However three new issues have arisen, regarding source materials that directly affect the Marxist-Leninist movement.

Firstly: Certain documents have been released in the Gorbachev era and more recently, from the Soviet archives. This is generally of benefit to Marxist-Leninists, who try to explain the real events inside the former USSR in its Marxist-Leninist days of Stalin’s life time. Previous readers of Alliance, will know that we generally try to highlight the most significant of such documents; and we draw readers’ attention to the confusion that this raises in the bourgeois academic circles. For instance, we previously discussed how the school of so called “revisionist” historians – such as Arch Getty Junior – have tried to struggle with such evidence that contradicts the standard Trotsky influenced bourgeois academic histories. But a caveat must be introduced. It is very unlikely that ALL relevant documents will surface in our lifetime. Moreover, we do not know what documents of Stalin’s and other relevant leading personalities may have been destroyed. All the written archival materials are unlikely to be made available to us anyway, since some of these will be deemed “too sensitive.” Why should the Russian state behave any differently to the British Kew Gardens Archives for instance? We therefore simply raise a caution regarding the appropriate interpretation of documents that may become available. These are likely to be only “spotty” and unlikely to give us all the facts.

Secondly: As a corollary, this leaves some to a continuing abundance of the hear-say, “he said-they said,” type of scurrilous evidence. This leads to a dilemma for the Marxist-Leninists, as to whether to even use this type of evidence at all. But to ignore it is to ignore the charges that the authors lay at Stalin. This does not help Marxists-Leninists currently since one of our current tasks – is to counter the bourgeois historiography and lies. On the other hand, in using these sources it is necessary to be highly selective. Instances are provided in Alliance 30 of two especially problematic sources.

Very little written is available on Stalin’s attitude to the Jewish Question. A new low in scurrilous writing on Stalin is provided by the virulent Arkady Vaksberg in “Stalin Against The Jews,” New York; 1994. Much of the tone and a large measure of the content of this book is scurrilous. For instance – Vaksberg alleges that Stalin did not really research and write the famous article on “The National Question.” Nonetheless we will use the Vaksberg source – albeit with caution – since little else is available on the subject.

Another such problem source is the memoirs of Pavel Sudoplatov, published in 1994. After 1939, he was the officer in charge of the NKVD (later MGB) special operations. Several attacks upon Sudoplatov’s honesty and reliability have been made. Sudoplatov claimed that he organized the assassination of Trotsky under direct orders from Stalin, and that the Soviet atomic bomb was only made possible by secrets divulged by the Danish physicist Niels Bohr.

Both claims are untrue. David Holloway has exposed the latter lie in an article in “Science,” (Holloway D; Science May 27th, 1994), and the former lie is contrary to key facts as discussed by the CL. (CL article reprinted Alliance Issue Number 7.) It is interesting that these memoirs were recorded from Sudoplatov by Jerrold L. & Leona P. Schecter. This same couple first fully published Khrushchev’s memoirs in 1970, in an association between Life magazine & Little Brown Publishers. (See Pavel & A Sudoplatov; with JL & LP Schecter: “Special Tasks”; Boston; 1995 p.xxiii) . It is also not a coincidence that one of the most anti-Communist writers, Robert Conquest, exonerates Sudoplatov of falsification in a glowing foreword.

Of course, Conquest is careful to cover himself by saying that:

“Sudoplatov is by no means immune from error”

(Ibid; p.xv).

Nonetheless Conquest ends by lauding the memoirs:

“But it will be seen that (criticisms-ed) are of little consequence compared with the solid substance we Sudoplatov offers is.. A unique document.. The most valuable of all possible sources for important matters over the whole period of High Stalinism”

(Ibid; p.xiv.)

We reply that the most solid evidence about the period is in Stalin’s own writings. The fragmentary additional evidence must be sensibly pieced together using in addition, Marxist-Leninist theory.

Thirdly: We have increasingly over the last few months/years used sources derived from the world wide web. We caution however that it is sometimes difficult to know who is posting these various documents on the web. We thus attempt to use these documents sparingly. Above all, if web sources are used, we attempt to fully reference the web site.

Introduction

When Zionists attack Lenin and Stalin for their alleged racism against the Jewish peoples, the accusation devolves onto one issue. That issue is that Lenin and Stalin denied at the turn of the century, that the Jewish people had a national status.

After German fascists, aided by Western imperialism launched the genocide against Jews, before and during World War II, a national identity was then formed in the state of Israel. In fact the German fascists helped to weld a later national possibility for Jews in the imperialist stooge state of Israel. This later event was not one that could have been dealt with by Lenin or Stalin in their early writings. In “The National Question,” Stalin had pointed out, that nations come into being and pass away. Obviously a different situation arose after World War II, engineered by imperialism, which before turned a blind eye to the genocide of the Jews. This was part of the overall strategy of turning Germany against the USSR. But some imperialisms, especially the USA promoted the migration of Jews into former Palestine, to consolidate their position against other imperialisms. This created a further tension between the British imperialists and the USA imperialists.

It was not racism that informed the views of Lenin and Stalin. The attitude of Lenin and Stalin was to destroy separatist tendencies that would ghetto-ise and narrow the proletariat. Lenin quoted with approval the words of Ernest Renan, which quickly summarize the views that Lenin had on ghettos and racism of all sorts:

“‘When the National Assembly of 1791 decreed the emancipation of the Jews,'” writes Renan, “It was very little concerned with the question of race.. It is the business of the Nineteenth Century to abolish all ‘ghettos,’ and I cannot compliment those who seek to restore them. The Jewish race has rendered the world the greatest services. Assimilated with the various nations, harmoniously blended with the various national units, it will render no less services in the future than in the past.”

(Lenin, Quoting Ernst Renan of Paris, 1887, in : “The Position of Bund In The Party” 1903)

Source

Three Tactics of the Nationalists in the Middle East

nasser109

This article was published by Alliance (Marxist-Leninist) as part of the publication Alliance, issue #51, “Pan-Arabic or Pan-Islamic ‘Socialism.’”

Originally written 1992

Since the end of World War II (WW II), the contradiction between the working classes and the developing capitalist class of the Middle Eastern nations was linked to a second contradiction – that between the different imperialists and the indigenous developing capitalists.  On top of these, there were contradictions between the imperialists themselves, reflecting the decline of British imperialism, and the rise of USA imperialism. After World War II explicit deals took place between the British and US, regarding future developments in the Middle East:

“In response to Winston Churchill’s questions about America’s interests in Iranian oil, Franklin Roosevelt wrote in March 1943 that:

‘I am having the oil studied by the Department of State and my oil experts, but please do accept my assurances that I am not making sheeps’ eyes at your oil fields in Iraq or Iran.’

Churchill responded:

‘Thank you very much for your assurances about no sheeps’ eyes at our oil fields in Iran and Iraq. Let me reciprocate by giving you the fullest assurances that we have not thought of trying to horn in upon your interests or property in Saudi Arabia.'”

James A. Bill “The Eagle and the Lion-The Tragedy of Iranian-American Relations”; New York , 1988. p.29

Unfortunately, with a small working class, the national bourgeoisies largely had no opposition to its leadership over a struggling peasantry. But the national bourgeoisie was also weak, because as the power of imperialism grew, the objective role for the national bourgeoisie was steadily getting smaller. Furthermore the previous history of Oriental Despotism of the Ottomans, had ensured a very weak development of the industrial forces necessary for nation development. Finally the many divisions between factions in the area were skilfully exploited by the imperialists to effectively divide and rule.

ANTI-COLONIAL STRUGGLES IN COLONIAL COUNTRIES

Imperialism used local indigenous rulers and leading individuals as their surrogates. These indigenous agents were usually buyers and traders whose livelihood depended upon the Imperialists. Often landed feudal gentry were also allied to imperialism. They were termed COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE.

Inevitably some indigenous capitalists wished to displace imperialism, so that they can then retain all the colony’s profits for itself. They were termed NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE. Because they were usually very weak, they tried to enlist the masses ie. working classes and peasantry. The weak and nascent national bourgeoisie of the Middle East struggled at first, in the main against British and French; then in the main against USA imperialism.

The line of Communists in the National Liberation movement dervies from the positions of Lenin at the Second Congress of the Comintern in 1921. Lenin thought that in the first stage of the revolution, the bourgeois democrats had a useful role to play:

“All the Communist parties must assist the bourgeois democratic liberation movement in these (ie colonial type countries-ed).. The Communist International (CI) must enter into a temporary alliance with bourgeois democracy in colonial and backward countries.”

V.I.Lenin: Preliminary Draft of Theses on National and Colonial Questions, 2nd Congress CI  in “Selected Works”, Volume 10, London, 1946; p. 236-7.

But Lenin and Stalin pointed out, that these national bourgeoisie, flinch from the final steps, as the unleashing of mass movements arouses socialist movements. Therefore, class coalitions of national bourgeoisie with working class organizations can only be temporary. They are also prone to sabotage by the national bourgeoisie. The working class organisations must remain independent, even in a United Front. It is imperative to find and ally only with and for long as, the sections of the bourgeoisie are genuinely in struggle with imperialism:

“I would like to particularly emphasise the question of the bourgeois democratic movements in backward countries. It was this question that gave rise to some disagreement. We argued about whether it would be correct, in principle and in theory, to declare that the CI and the CP’s should support the bourgeois-democratic movement in backward countries. As a result of this discussion we unanimously decided to speak of the nationalist-revolutionary movements instead of the ‘bourgeois-democratic’ movement. There is not the slightest doubt that every nationalist movement can only be a bourgeois-democratic movement.. But it was agreed that if we speak about the bourgeois-democratic movement all distinction between reformist and revolutionary movements will be obliterated; whereas in recent times this distinction has been fully and clearly revealed in the backward and colonial countries, of the imperialist bourgeois is trying with all its might to implant the reformist movement also among the oppressed nations.. In the Commission this was proved irrefutably, and we came to the conclusion that the only correct thing to do was to take this distinction into consideration and nearly everywhere to substitute the term “nationalist-revolutionary” for the term “bourgeois-democratic”. The meaning of this change is that we communists should, and will, support bourgeois liberation movements only when these movement do not hinder us in training and organising the peasants and the broad masses of the exploited in a revolutionary spirit.. The above mentioned distinction has now been drawn in all the theses, and I think that, thanks to this, our point of view has been formulated much more precisely.”

Lenin. Report Of Commission on the National and Colonial Questions, Ibid, p 241.

This Leninist line was further developed by Stalin, who in 1925, distinguished “at least three categories of colonial and dependent countries”:

Firstly countries like Morocco who have little or no proletariat, and are industrially quite undeveloped. Secondly countries like China and Egypt which are under-developed industries and have a relatively small proletariat. Thirdly countries like India.. capitalistically more or less developed and have a more or less numerous national proletariat. Clearly all these countries cannot possibly be put on a par with one another.”

J.V.Stalin; “Works” Volume 7: “Political Tasks of the University of the People’s of the East.  Speech Delivered at a meeting of Students of the Communist University of the Toilers of the East”, May 18th, 1925. pp. 148.

In each country the conditions were different and had to be concretely studied before deciding the exact tactic:

“In countries like Egypt and China, where the national bourgeoisie has already split up into a revolutionary party and a compromising party, but where the compromising section of the bourgeoises is not yet able to join up with imperialism, the Communists can no longer set themselves the aim of forming a united national front against imperialism. In such countries the Communists must pass from the policy of a united national front to the policy of a revolutionary bloc of the workers and the petty bourgeoisie. In such countries that bloc can assume the form of a single party, a workers and peasants’ party, provided, however, that this distinctive party actually represents a bloc of two forces – the Communist Party and the party of the revolutionary petty bourgeois. The tasks of this bloc are to expose the half-heartedness and inconsistency of the national bourgeoisie and to wage a determined struggle against imperialism. Such a dual party is necessary and expedient provided it does not bind the Communist Party hand and foot, provided it does not restrict the freedom of the Communist Party to conduct agitation and propaganda work, provided it does not hinder the rallying of the proletarians around and provided it facilitates the actual leadership of the revolutionary movement by the Communist party. Such a dual party is unnecessary and inexpedient if to does not conform to all these conditions for it can only lead to the Communist elements becoming dissolved in the ranks of the bourgeoisie to the Communist Party losing the proletarian army.”

J.V.Stalin Works Vol 7; “Tasks of University of People’s of East”, Ibid; pp. 149-150

If a large working class presence was felt, this strengthened the revolutionary prospects. When this happened, the most uncertain and vacillating elements of the bourgeoisie tended to desert the revolution, and form a bloc with imperialism:

“The situation is somewhat different in countries like India. The fundamental and new feature of the conditions of life in countries like India is not only that the national bourgeoisie has split up into a revolutionary part and a compromising part, but primarily that the compromising section of the bourgeoisie has already managed, in the main, to strike a deal with imperialism, Fearing revolution more than it fears imperialism, and concerned with more about its money bags than about the interests of its own country, this section of the bourgeoisie is going over entirely to the camp of the irreconcilable enemies of the revolution, it is forming a bloc with imperialism against the workers and peasants of its own country.”

J.V.Stalin Works Vol 7; “Tasks of University of People’s of East”, Ibid; pp. 150.

Such blocs between vacillating “national bourgeoise” and imperialisms, should be smashed:

“The victory of the revolution cannot be achieved unless this bloc is smashed, but in order to smash this bloc, fire must be concentrated on the compromising national bourgeoisie, its treachery exposed, the toiling masses freed from its influence, and the conditions necessary for the hegemony of the proletariat systematically prepared. In other words, in colonies like India it is a matter of preparing the proletariat for the role of leader of the liberation movement, step by step dislodging the bourgeoisie and its mouthpieces from this honourable post. The task is to create an anti-imperialist bloc and to ensure the hegemony of the proletariat in this bloc. This bloc can assume although it need not always necessarily do so, the form of a single Workers and Peasants Party, formally bound by a single platform. In such centuries the independence of the Communist Party must be, the chief slogan of the advanced communist elements, for the hegemony of the proletariat can be prepared and brought about by the Communist party. But the communist party can and must enter into an open bloc with the revolutionary part of the bourgeoisie in order, after isolating the compromising national bourgeoisie, to lead the vast masses of the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie in the struggle against imperialism.”

J.V.Stalin Works Vol 7; “Tasks of University of People’s of East”, Ibid; pp. 150-151.

But despite these warnings, organisations took part in un-principled coalitions, and led the working classes into massacres. The failure of the working class to organise along correct lines ensured that the many anti-imperialist struggles in the Middle East, never achieved the socialist – or even to the national democratic revolution.

After World War II imperialism was even stronger, and even more rapacious. This was as its markets were threatened by the Socialist USSR leading some European countries towards socialist development. Responding to imperialisms’ demands, the weak national bourgeoisie of the Middle East attempted to overcome their weaknesses by several tactics that would avoid harnessing the revolutionary masses. All these tactics would prove unsuccessful. These are detailed below; and culminated in a movement of cartelisation for oil selling – Organisation for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

THE WEAK NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE OF THE MIDDLE EAST TO SEEK TACTICS TO FIGHT IMPERIALISM

Tactic Number One: Wahda and Nasserism, Pan-Arabism; A Political Combination of Weak National Bourgeoisie

Given the bourgeois fear of rousing the working class movement too far, only a vacillating movement against imperialism was possible. Ultimately the national bourgeoisie always capitulated in the face of social revolution. This allowed the imperialist powers to retard the development of the states concerned. Coupled with this was the power of monopoly interests, of the imperialist companies. So that even in favourable situations, where these states led by national bourgeoisie could nationalise the major resource in the area (oil) the imperialist consortiums were able to dictate their demands.

Despite these failures, the nascent bourgeoisie of the area continued to harbour resentment against imperialism. To compensate for their unwillingness to fully enrol the working classes, they attempted to unite across “national” borders. This entailed a mystical PAN-ARABISM which preceded NASSERISM. For example the formation of the BA’TH PARTY in Syria took place in 1947, led by Michel ‘Aflaq, Salh al-Din Bitar and also Wahib al-Ghanim.

BA’TH means “re-birth” and took the notion as central, to mean the renaissance of the Arab movement. But it was Gamel Abdul Nasser who most effectively utilised this idea of pan-Arabism. Starting in the context of a nationalist movement in Egypt alone, Nasser struck a renewed hope for liberation from imperialism throughout large sections of the Middle East, using instead of Ba’th – the notion of Wahda, to mean ultimately the same.

The Nasserite movement aimed at WAHDA (Arabic for union). It was to be a renewal of Arabic “culture,” under a twentieth century guise of nationalism.

As a strategy of the national bourgeoisie in the Middle East, it aimed to contain the mass movement, it emphasised notions of an Arab peoples, denying any class content.

Revisionism in the parties of the area had effectively deprived the working class of capable leadership. Nasserism was only able to consolidate itself because the Egyptian Workers Party, the Communist Party, was itself under the influence of the now Soviet-revisionist leaders.

Wahda called for unity of several different struggling national bourgeoisie against imperialism. It hoped to be able to avoid the social revolution, by using nationalistic demagogic slogans. Effectively a class coalition was to be created, of all the national bourgeoisies, and the working classes of the different countries, led by the national bourgeoisie.

That way it was to be hoped apparently, that the singly weak national bourgeoisie, together, would be strong enough to fight imperialism, and yet still be able to contain the social revolution.

But ultimately Pan-Arabism failed, as there was a single dominant national bourgeoisie, which itself tried to create “comprador” relations with the other weaker national bourgeoisie. This dominant national bourgeoisie was Egyptian and it was led by Nasser. It was successful for a time, as evidenced by the short lived creation of the UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC– consisting of Egypt and Syria. However the dominant Egyptian bourgeoisie, could not suppress the Syrian national bourgeoisie of the coalition. The experiment thus failed.

Tactic Number Two: Playing on Contradictions Between Imperialists

The imperialists had long squabbled amongst themselves as to how to divide up the Middle East. French and British supremacy in the Middle East was surreptiously attacked by USA imperialism. After the death of Stalin the hegemony of revisionism in the USSR was rapidly completed. With the overthrow of socialism in the Soviet Union, the relations between the Soviet Union and dependent nations became imperialist. This was exemplified by the relations within the Warsaw Pact nations. In the semi-colonial and colonial nations, the USSR attempted to act as a brake on Western imperialism. This resulted in a struggle between US and Soviet social imperialism for control of these areas, including the Middle East.

In this context, the various timorous struggling national bourgeoisie would frequently switch “temporary masters.” Being interested in control of “their own” profit, the national bourgeoisie were  viewed as unreliable by the imperial super-powers. But they were used as pawns by the super powers to control the area. This allowed the national bourgeoisie some limited bargaining power. Ultimately, his strategy also failed to effect the national revolution.

American policy recognised the strength of the anti-colonial movements. Their plan was to disrupt the movement by using the compradors. To further blunt the movement they used the veneer of neutrality offered by the UNITED NATIONS. John Foster Dulles, US Secretary of State, said just prior to the Suez War :

“The USA cannot be expected to identify itself 100% either with the Colonial powers or the powers uniquely concerned with the problem of getting independence as rapidly and as fully as possible.. any areas encroaching in some form or another on the problem of so called colonialism find the US playing a somewhat independent role (Ed – of UK and France). The shift from colonialism to independence will be going on for another 50 years, and I believe that the task of the United Nations is to try to see that this process moves forward in a constructive, evolutionary way, and does not come to a halt or go forward through violent revolutionary processes which would be destructive of much good.”

Cited Carlton. “Antony Eden”. London 1981. p.426

After the SUEZ WAR, the USA and the USSR all contended in the area. Each super power developed its’ primary sphere of influence. But since neither power was able to totally control the area, they were for long periods content for an armed stalemate.

The major states in the area that were spheres of influence for the Soviet Union were Iraq, Syria, Egypt (until Nasser’s death), Yemen and Libya.

These countries often adopted a mask of “socialism”.

The main countries that supported the USA were Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and under Sadat – Egypt.

Examples of a national bourgeoisie that attempted the game of playing one imperialist off against another include Egypt under Nasser, Iraq under Hussein and Syria under Assad.

Due to the serious demise of the fortunes of the Soviet imperialists in the late 1980’s, the USA was able to exert a far more dominant role than previously, and for the first time saw an opportunity to be unopposed. It tested the waters for an exertion of its’ direct military presence in the Arab world by bombing Libya.

EGYPT, AND THE “FREE OFFICERS MOVEMENT”

The case of Egypt illustrates how a balancing act, was able to win a short term gain, for the nationalist bourgeoisie. But ultimately the short term gains could not be maintained. In Egypt the nationalist faction was represented by the Free Officer Movement, to which Nasser belonged. This movement, was supported initially by the USA, as a weapon to be used against the British superpower.

“The Free Officer movement originated within the regular army; its leaders were then preparing to oust the appointed military chiefs, seize all the command posts and present their program for national renovation to the entire army. They also tried to make sure that should they be successful, the US ambassador would not be hostile and would exert pressure on the British ambassador.”

Mahmoud Hussein . “Class Conflict in Egypt 1945-1970″. London , 1977. p.85-6 .

“The US hoped to capitalize on the situation to become the new protector of Egypt and force it to accept a military alliance which would officially recognize the need for national sovereignty.”

M.Hussein , Ibid. p.96.

“According to Miles Copeland, an American CIA official posted in the Middle East in the 1950’s – the CIA knew as early as March 1952 that a ‘secret military society’ was plotting a coup. ‘ Before the coup the CIA’s Cairo station, headed by Kermit Roosevelt, had three meetings with some of the officers of the group. ” the large area of agreement reached by Roosevelt and this (Egyptian ) officer, speaking for Nasser himself, is noteworthy,” writes Copeland.”

Dilip Hiro “Inside the Middle East” London. 1982. p. 297.

The aims of the Free Officer movement were to modernise and develop, and to get rid of the British military occupation of Egypt. Of course, even the first goal was unacceptable to either the British, or to those who immediately took their place, the USA imperialists. But for their own short term goals – to get rid of the British – the USA did help the Free Officers, by forcing the British to evacuate their 70,000 strong troops. However, in partial appeasement of the British, Eisenhower ensured a clause in the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement that entitled Britain to reoccupy the Suez zone with “Egypt’s agreement” in the case of an attack on Egypt by any outside power.”   (Hiro Ibid p.298.)

Nasser tried to exploit the tensions between the British and the Americans, and at the same time get maximal financial aid. Nasser from then on used both the US and UK imperialists for financing. But to retain his independence and to get the “best deal”, Nasser then also asked for financing from the revisionist USSR. Even the provision of USSR made arms via Czechoslovakia, did not however deter the West:

“Not wishing to alienate the charismatic leader of Egypt, a most strategic country in the region, Washington and London continued discussions with Cairo on financing the Aswan Dam- with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (known as the World Bank) offering credits for $ 200 million and America and Britain together another $70 million in hard currencies- matching $900 million to be provided by Egypt in local services and goods. An agreement was signed in February.”

Hiro Ibid p.298.

However, the Western imperialists certainly feared that Egypt was becoming drawn into the USSR sphere of influence. This was a more urgent fear for the weaker British, than it was for the USA. So the British exerted a considerable pressure on the USA, to tangibly support an anti-Russian policy. This pressure came from Antony Eden, then the Conservative Prime Minister of Britain. Winston Aldrich, the US ambassador to London said:

“Eden.. asked me to see him on a matter of the greatest importance and urgency. Eden told me that the emergency has arisen in connection with the Egyptian proposal, namely that the Russians had offered to finance the dam. Eden feared that this would give the Egyptians a dangerous foothold in an area vital to the interests of Great Britain. He asked me to take up at once with Washington the question of whether the US would underwrite the obligations which Great Britain would assume in making such a guarantee (of financing the dam).”

Cited David Carlton “Antony Eden” London 1981 p.391.

Eisenhower was more shrewd, and being the more dominant of the imperialists, was in less need of hasty action. His diary showed that he had already recognised that this was a doomed policy. He had concluded that Egypt was moving away from the likely control of the USA, and that the Saudis should be firmly lassoed into the USA sphere:

“We have reached the point where it looks as if Egypt, under Nasser is going to make no move.. the Arabs (ie Egypt – Ed) absorbing major consignments of arms from the Soviets are daily growing more arrogant and disregarding the interests of Western Europe and the US.. It would appear that our efforts should be directed towards separating the Saudi Arabians from the Egyptians and concentrating, for the moment..in making the former see that their best interests lie with us, and not with the Egyptians and with the Russians..”

D. Eisenhower , Diary , Cited by David Carlton Ibid p. 404.

Of course each of the imperialists were fully aware that they were being “two-timed.”

Nasser was forced to keep trying to find yet another “imperialist” or social-imperialist dancer, to help him fend off the last ardent suitor.

Nasser finally overstepped the lines, by recognising the People’s Republic of China in May. By the 20 th July, both the USA and the British rescinded their offers of financial aid. This prompted Nasser to attempt a retaliation, by nationalising the Suez Canal (Hiro Ibid. p.64). Naturally this provoked a loud uproar from the French owners (Universal Suez Maritime Canal Company), and at the same time, the British and Israelis.

These powers had already been planning an attack upon Gaza aiming at taking the Suez Canal. But for their own interests, these moves were not supported by the USA, who according to Eden himself were verbally offering him merely:

“Moral support and sympathy”, and “did not want to know the details of the Anglo-French plans.”

Cited Carlton , Ibid . p. 412.

However, attempting to assert Britain’s “rights” or self-interest, Eden  deliberately misled the USA about Britain’s aggressive intentions. Eisenhower had expressly warned Eden against war, writing to Eden that:

“The use of military force against Egypt under present circumstances might have consequences even more serious than causing the Arabs to support Nasser. It might cause a serious misunderstanding between our two countries.. the most significant public opinion is that..the United Nations was formed to prevent this very thing.. I assure you that we are not blind to the fact that eventually there may be no escape for the use of force.”

Carlton Ibid. p.419-20.

But in spite of this warning from the USA, the war was launched. But the revisionist USSR, correctly strongly condemned the war of aggression launched by Britain, France and Israel. In order to finally seize the Middle East away from British imperialism, the USA at the United Nations, also strongly condemned the invasion and called for a cease fire. Behind closed doors, the USA prompted a currency speculation against sterling, by the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank selling, and also refused to give either IMF or direct USA financial aid, to the United Kingdom. Further, and finally, the USSR threatened to enter the war:

“We are fully determined to use force to crush the aggressors and to restore peace in the Middle East.”

V.Trukhanovsky. ” Antony Eden ”  Moscow, 1974; p.332.

These moves combined to ensure the withdrawal of the 3 nation intervention. This fiasco for British and French imperialism, signalled their final retreat from the Middle East, as imperialist forces independent of the USA. America then was able to fill what Eisenhower described as a “vacuum” in the Middle East.

Eisenhower’s Doctrine promised to aid any Middle Eastern state seeking protection against:

“Overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism.”

Cited Hiro p.299

This blocked any moves to a regional Wahda, or Unity attempts. Yet, it was sufficiently elastic to interpretation to be acceptable, whilst still detering Egypt in particular. The Eisenhower Doctrine:

“Was applied 3 times: to solve the internal crisis of Jordan in April 1957, to pressure the nationalists – leftist regime of Syria.. and to provide troops to Lebanon in July 1958..In the case of Jordan and Lebanon, the American move was made to check the rise of the Nasserite forces there.”

Hiro, Ibid  p. 299.

Therefore, despite the early hopes of the Nasser forces in Egypt, they were checked. Egypt now became compradors for the USSR. The USA imperialists, who having just expelled the USA and France, did not have the necessary energy at that moment to expel Russia also. The economic relations between Egypt and Russia, were thereafter classic imperialist relations, raw goods given by Egypt, cotton – in return for finished goods, for military and economic aid. This dictated a colonial type relationship with the USSR (Hussein. Ibid. p.286).

But to counter the threat of “excess” USSR influence, the USA unleashed war. The USA moved vigorously, through their client states in the area, wishing also to check those various national bourgeoisie. As part of this policy, the USA heavily endorsed the Israelis, as their lynch pin in the area. The revisionist USSR, sought to maximise its own “area of influence”, and acted as a countervail in the cases of Syria and Egypt. But Israel was heavily armed by the USA and Britain.

In response, Egypt and Syria, signed a joint defence treaty fearing Israeli attack.

They were quite right to fear this.

When King Hussein of Jordan joined the Egyptian-Syrian Defence Pact on 30 May, Dean Rusk then American Secretary of State clearly signalled war:

“I don’t think it’s our business to restrain anybody.”

(Cited Hiro p.301).

The USA knew what was to be the likely outcome of such a war.

As President Johnson put it to an aide:

“Israel is going to hit them (the Arabs)..” Whilst (he was ) publicly responding positively to a Soviet appeal the next day for restraint.”

Cited by Hiro p.300.

The Israelis following the USA plan, launched a pre-emptive strike on the eve of a peace mission by the Egyptian Vice-President Zakaria Mohieddin. Nasser’s forces were effectively crushed.

This sealed the future role as to who would be the key agent of the USA in the area – Israel.

TACTIC NUMBER THREE: ECONOMIC COMBINATION. OPEC- A WEAK BOURGEOISIE ATTEMPTS TO FIGHT BACK

The creation of OPEC in 1960 was another attempt by the weak indecisive national bourgeois to find a “Third Way”. One that did not rely on the active involvement of the masses, nor one of total capitulation to the imperialists. OPEC attempted to bargain, or to horse trade; by forming a combination, or a cartel.

This was designed to deal with the cartel of the major Oil companies- the Seven Sisters. These had simply to refuse to buy oil from any producer country that challenged the price offered. The price “posted” was agreed to by the Seven Sisters. Even nationalisation could not help if the producer country could not market the oil. This tactic was used viciously against Iran.

The oil producing nations varied in the intensity with which they fought the Seven Sisters and the imperialist nations. In 1960 one of the weakest was Iran, ruled by the Shah Pahvlavi whose compliance to the USA was assured following CIA intervention in 1951. This had been necessary to prevent the nationalist Muhammed Mussadiq effecting nationalisation of Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AICO) later the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Musaddiq believed that:

“The Iranian must administer his own house.”

Cited J.A.Bill ” The Eagle and the Lion”; Ibid; New York 1988 p.56.

But in fact, Mussadiq clearly was not a fully committed nationalist. The mass movement was compelling him to go further than he perhaps would have otherwise. As John Foster Dulles said in February 1953:

“Musaddiq could not afford to reach any agreement with the British lest it cost him his political life.”

J.A.Bill, Ibid p. 78

When he became Prime Minister of the Majlis (the Iranian Parliament) in April 1951, he inherited a Bill that nationalised AICO. Refusing to rescind it, he was held to ransom by AICO which refused to allow Iran to sell its oil on the international market:

“This boycott was effective. Iran’s oil export income dropped from more than $400 million in 1950 to less than $2 million in the 2 year period from July 1951 to August 1953..Musaddiq faced a deteriorating economic and political situation in 1953..and was forced to rely on the radical left and the communist ( revisionist -ed) Tudeh party.. On May 28th Musaddiq wrote to President Eisenhower requesting economic aid..the answer was negative.”

J.A.Bill Ibid; p.66-7.

The British then persuaded the USA to participate in a putsch, termed Operation Boot by the British and Ajax by the US. The Chief British operative, Major C.M.Woodhouse was conscious of difficulties in getting the US to take part:

“Not wishing to be accused of trying to use the Americans to pull British chestnuts out of the fire, I decided to emphasis the Communist threat to Iran rather than to need to recover control of the oil industry. I argued that even if a settlement of the oil dispute could be negotiated with Musaddiq, which was doubtful, he was still incapable of resisting a coup by the Tudeh party, if it were backed by Soviet support. Therefore he must be removed.”

J.A.Bill, Cited, Ibid. p.86

Fully involved in the putsch was General Norman Schwarzkopf, former US adviser to the Iranian Gendarmerie (J.A.Bill. Ibid, p.90). He was the father of the US General – “Storming Norman” – in the 1991 USA Gulf War of aggression (See Alliance 2).

The coup resulted in the Shah of Iran being bought back to Iran. He understood who had placed him on the Peacock Throne, and remained indebted to US imperialism. Musaddiq was treated with relative leniency – he was not killed, but after 3 years in jail, was allowed to return to his home village Ahmadabad under house arrest (J.A.Bill Ibid p.101).

This episode influenced tactics in the Middle East for some years. The national bourgeoisie had been warned that nationalisation was not adequate to ensure marketing of the oil from the producer nations without the cooperation of the Seven Sisters. An alternative strategy was needed.

The CARTEL STRATEGY was first proposed by the national bourgeoisie of VENEZUELA, after the successful military led coup of 1948. This coup was precipitated 12 days following an act which imposed 50-50 split of the profits from oil, between Venezuela and the oil companies. After the coup, the new dictatorship, naturally, favoured the interests of the US imperialists, and it now dispensed new major oil concessions to the Oil companies.

Despite this failure, the 50-50 rule became a standard, in any dealings with oil-exporting nations. For instance Aramco (Arabian American Oil Company ) used this formula in Saudi Arabia in 1950  (J.A.Bill, op cit, p. 61). However even this partial retreat, still left considerable super-profits for the Seven Sisters.

The national bourgeoisie of Venezuela recognised, that a key factor in their defeat during prolonged negotiations with the companies, had been the erosion of Venezuela’s selling power by Middle East countries that could produce oil. Oil companies, when they were faced with demands for a fairer distribution of profit, simply expanded production from the Middle East. The leader of the “horse trading” strategy, Perez Alfonzo had:

“Only envisaged an ‘extent ‘ an ‘arrangement’ between a few producing countries to establish, links of solidarity between them, reduce the oil companies capacity for manoeuvring and prevent them from playing one country off against another.”

Statement in Petroleum Weekly, New York May 1 1959 p.19. Cited by Pierre Terzian; “OPEC : the inside story.” London 1985.

The national bourgeoisie of Venezuela returned to power in 1959 and again took up the cause of combination. Now they had significant support in the Middle East, from the Director of the Permanent Oil Bureau, Mohammed Salman of Iraq. The Permanent Oil Bureau had been set up by the Arab League in 1953. A secret agreement known as the Maadi Pact was concluded at the first Oil Arab Congress in Cairo on 16th April 1959. The reaction to the open Congress session, was frankly sceptical by the oil business:

“Venezuelan delegates arrived with high hopes of lining up Middle East producing states in a front to limit production and prevent further decline in prices, but were finally resigned to the fact that Arabs were more interested in other problems now and that all Venezuelans were supposed to do was to observe.”

Platts Oilgram News, New York; Cited by P.Terzian, Ibid, p.25.

However the secret Maadi Agreement between the UAR, Iraq, Venezuela, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia included the following:

“Agreement was reached … on:

1. Improvement of the oil producing countries participation on a reasonable and equitable basis. The consensus of opinion was that said government should tend to at least a 60-40 formula to be on a par with the recent Venezuelan attitude..and with other countries ..the price structure should be..maintained..any change in prices should be discussed with precedent in time and be approved by all parties concerned.

2. Convenience of arriving at an integration of the oil industry..to ensure stable markets to the producer countries avoiding transfers of gains from one phase of the operations to another, affecting the oil revenue of the governments.

4. Establishment of National Oil Companies that would operate side by side with the existing private companies.”

P.Teerzian. Ibid , p.27-8.

The most energetic of the group, Perez Alfonso, also arranged that the USSR would support the OPEC move. This was important because the Oil companies were constantly citing:

“The USSR’s tariff policy as a pretext to justify their own decision to cut prices.”

P.Terzian, Ibid, p.34.

After initial disbelief, the major oil companies, led by Shell, tested the OPEC resistance, by announcing cuts in the posted prices of oil that they were prepared to pay. The vigorous resistance they met, along with announcements of a meeting of producer nations at Baghdad in September, 1960, induced them to withdraw their price cuts. The Financial Times concluded:

“In effect Shell is.. paying a premium to the Governments of the producing states. What the countries particularly objected to was the fact that they were not consulted.”

Cited, Terzian. Ibid. p.53.

However efforts to involve the Middle East nations in effective combative combination were doomed to failure. This was evident, since combination had to involve both:

Countries that were ruled by comprador bourgeoisie ( eg Saudi Arabia and Iran );

as well as the countries that were ruled by national bourgeoisie (eg Iraq).

The Baghdad Meeting in September 10th 1960 started off very tensely. The Venezuelan nationalists were in the midst of fending off a coup at home. Even more dramatic was the fact that the Iraqi nationalists President Kassem was also besieged by a coup. He arrived for an honourary dinner wearing two revolvers in his belt! But tension rose even further, as it was clear that Iran was going to block any agreements, that would go further than the agreement already reached at Maadi. The Iranian representative Fuad Ruhani said he had been given:

“Very precise instructions from my Government.”

Terzani , Ibid. p.41.

Suddenly on 14th September the Shah sent new instructions to the Iranian team. This agreed to the creation of a permanent organisation. Moreover, the Shah even had a name for it – The Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC ).

But this about face indicated a new tack on the part of the Oil Companies.

They now accepted the inevitability of the cartel, but they emasculated it from within.

OPEC was therefore hijacked.

As Perez Alfonso found when he met the directors of the Seven Sisters :

“My impression is that the main companies recognise that the Baghdad Agreement was necessary, or at least inevitable.”

Ibid p.44.

Theoretically the OPEC countries were in a very strong position controlling 82 % of world crude exports. But The Times could accurately see the situation :

“The strength of these producing countries is not as great as might appear.. (There are) two reasons.. the surplus of supply over demand in the world oil market and the divergent interests of the 5 countries concerned, some of who wanted to increase production whilst other sought a reduction.”

The Times 15 September, 1960. Cited by Terzian p.44.

  • Of course, in addition the oil imperialist companies and their nations had the marketing and distribution monopoly.
  • Also they began to exploit other sources of oil.
  • The comprador states were key to the strategy of the oil companies.
  • Saudi Arabia was and is a reactionary state with strong elements of Muslim feudalism.
  • It is a key state representing USA interests in the Middle East.
  • As the US Senate Committee on Energy and Natural resources commented:

“The US, by virtue of its commercial oil interests ‘ long standing monopoly over the disposition of Saudi crude, now reinforced by the 1974 conclusion of a “special relationship” embracing economic and military agreements, is very widely regarded amongst its allies and by Arab and Iranians as having secured preferential and near- exclusive access to Saudi oil. Given the extraordinary importance of Saudi oil production to the world generally, the US relationship is considered key to supply security.”

US Senate : ” Access to oil – the USA relationships with Saudi Arabia and Iran.” Washington DC US Government Printing office , Publication No. 95-70. 1977 (p.xi). Cited by Petter Nore and Terisa Turner in : Oil and the class struggle “. London 1980

At critical times the Saudis have refused to allow the OPEC to raise prices in accordance with the demands of the more nationalistic of the OPEC countries such as Iraq and Libya. Saudi Crown Prince Fadh has pretentiously revealed his unwillingness to be an effective member of the cartel:

“My country which possesses the largest oil reserves in the world will not be the cause of a weakening in the capacity of humanity to live in stability and prosperity. In view of this lofty aim, commercial considerations cease to exist and consequently the methods which are used to increase or lower prices will likewise disappear.”

Frankfurter Rundschau. 1 April 1975. Cited by Mohssen Massarrat. The Energy Crisis p.67. in ” Oil and the class struggle” Ed. P.Nore and T.Turner. London, 1981

It is not surprising that:

“Saudi foreign policy consists largely of support for Washington in the Middle East.”

Sunday Times, 5th August 1990. p.12.

Nor is it surprising that given the membership of nations like Saudi Arabia in OPEC, that OPEC would not reflect the interests of the oil producing national bourgeoisie.

As Henry Kissinger commented:

“OPEC was not perceived as a serious cartel.”

Jack Anderson and James Boyd. ” Fiasco. The real story behind the disastrous worldwide energy crisis- Richard Nixon’s “Oilgate”;1983; Toronto;  p.163.

In fact as, the manufactured oil crisis of the 1970’s shows, OPEC was transformed into an agency that performed objectively in the interests of the USA imperialists.

THE PSEUDO OIL “CRISIS” OF THE 1970’s

It is widely believed that it was the pressure of the OPEC countries that led to a dramatic price rise and so called ” oil crisis ‘in the 1970’s. Certainly determined nationalist countries like Libya and Algeria increased the pressure inside OPEC for a price rise.

Though the oil exporting countries had their interest in a price rise, their effectiveness as a cartel has already been shown to be limited, due to the inclusion of “weak” member state such a Saudi Arabia. In reality, the manipulation of oil prices has followed the various requirements of the Seven Sisters, the minor oil companies and the USA monopoly capitalists.

“For the oil companies an increase in the general price of oil was also of great importance, not least because they had seen their distributional share steadily diminish over time..as a result of higher level of taxation by the oil-exporting countries..which was difficult to pass on to the consumer in a situation characterised by a global excess supply.”

Petter Nore and Terisa Turner, Editors;.”Oil and the class struggle”; London 1980, p.72.

The problems of the Major Seven Sisters, were compounded by the competition they now faced:

“Due to a three fold challenge.. the rise of the independents following the US import quota system in 1958; the emergence of important state oil companies in Europe like Italy’s E.N.I. which tried to outbid the concessions offered by the majors; and the increase in Soviet oil exports to the West.. resulting in a drop in the profit per barrel for the Majors. The reduction was only partly overcome by a sharp increase in total production. Profit rates for US direct foreign investment in the petroleum industry dropped from a 30 % return in 1955 to 14.7 % in 1963 and an all time low of 11.1 % in 1969.”

Nore; p.72 Ibid.

Added to this was the high cost of extraction from areas such as Alaska and the North Sea. This posed a problem for the major Oil companies. The oil crisis was “manufactured”, to raise the available oil profits, up to a point where it would become economically viable to begin extraction from the oil shales of the USA. This entailed the profit interests of both the major oil companies and their smaller rivals who were not in the cartel known as the Seven Sisters.

At this time despite the apparent oil shortage, the oil companies had stocked up supplies, in many tankers that lay outside New Jersey in the midst of the so called shortage as prices were driven up by the companies.

This tactic was portrayed as the work of the OPEC cartel.

But the general line was clearly supported by the oil companies :

“Though the oil companies created the appearances of fighting OPEC tooth and nail..they recognised that their best hopes of future profitability..depended upon successful cooperation..thus OPEC/oil companies cooperation became a fact of life..with the positive encouragement of the USA.”

P.R.Odell. “Oil and World power” London , 1980. p. 215.

But the USA Government representing the combined monopoly capital had its’ own reasons for seeing a price rise:

“From 1970 onwards the US clearly pressed for an increase in the general price of crude oil.”

Nore, Ibid, p.73.

THE USA INTERESTS IN THE RAISING THE PRICE OF OIL REVOLVED AROUND THREE MAIN ISSUES

Firstly, both the leading sections of American capital had major profit interests tied up in raising the price of oil. The big Northern Yankee financiers were involved with the oil Major Seven Sisters companies. The Cowboys who represented newer capital reliant on oil and arms, formed the smaller independent oil companies.

Secondly, the USA wanted to ensure a renewed attempt at peace – on their terms of an acceptable status quo to them – in the Middle East:

“The USA.. sought to provide stability..as basis for a renewed effort to find a political solution to the Middle East conflict, and argued that higher revenues and a greater degree of economic certainty for the Arab oil-producing nations would, make it easier for them, to accept a compromise in the their dispute with Israel.”

Odell , Ibid , p. 215.

But Thirdly this manoeuvre was also aimed at the competitors of American imperialism as recognised by the Economist:

“The Economist 7th July, 1973; under the title ” The Phoney oil crisis “voiced the suspicion that the US had capitulated only to readily to the OPEC demands for an increase in oil prices because such an increase would slow down the Japanese economy. Japanese exports were out-competing American demands at the time and its economy was more vulnerable to rises in the price of oil than any other nation.”

Cited by Petter Nore p.86; ” Oil and the Class struggle .” London, 1980.

As Odell points out:

“The USA was fed up with a situation in which the rest of the industrialised world had access to cheap energy. It deliberately initiated a foreign policy which aimed at getting oil – producing nations’ revenues moving strongly up by talking incessantly to the producers about their low oil prices and by showing them the favourable impact of much higher prices. It was of course assured..that these cost increases, plus further increases designed to ensure higher profit levels for the companies, were passed on to the European and Japanese energy consumers, so eliminating their energy cost advantage over their competitors in the USA..the actual timing..coincided with unusual circumstances..namely a strong demand for most oil products in most markets in a period of general economic advance, a shortage of oil refinery capacity in Europe and Japan and a temporary scarcity of tankers.”

Odell p. 215-216.

GERMAN INDUSTRY HAD ALREADY CAUSED PROBLEMS FOR THE MAJOR COMPANIES BY FLIRTING WITH THE RUSSIANS. USA GOVERNMENT PRESSURE HAD BEEN REQUIRED TO PREVENT FURTHER EROSION OF THE EUROPEAN MARKETS:

“In 1969 only the intervention of the Federal West German Government under severe pressure from the USA, thwarted an agreement between the Soviet Union and the Bavarian state government. Had this agreement gone through, the Soviet Union would have been in a very strong position to put in branch pipelines to the other countries..of Western Europe.. Soviet oil exports to Western Europe.. steadily increased form only 3 million ton in 1955 to over 40 million ton in 1969.. Under 1978 conditions the amount of oil in Western Europe is supply rather than demand constrained.”

Odell, Ibid; p.58-60.

In this context, in 1991, it was of significant aid to the USA imperialists that the USSR was then, unable to exploit its’ oil reserves, owing to the enormous dislocation in the state:

“Production from Siberian oil fields is dropping so rapidly that the Soviet Union, the world’s largest petroleum producer may begin to import expensive world price crude within 2 years Kremlin officials say..”We are talking catastrophic failure here ” one Western diplomatic observer said.. oil exports have been the Soviet Unions’ primary source of hard currency income, and the only bright spot..in trade,..the troubles appear to be related to a decaying infrastructure, including an inefficient distribution system vulnerable to sabotage. Production from the giant Tyumen oil filed of Western Siberia, which supplies about half of the country’s oil for export has dropped 10% since 1988, Pravda said ..former allies in Central and Eastern Europe are being hit the hardest with cuts of 30-50 %. The cuts, coupled with the significantly higher prices Moscow began charging Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia on January 1st are hobbling economic reforms in these countries.”

Jeff Sallot; In “Globe and Mail”; Toronto; Business Report; Feb 12th 1991.

The USA Senate recognised the oil demand in Europe and Japan as a vital issue for the general policy to be followed by the USA in the Middle East:

“One can argue that while the oil benefit is nowhere near so great to the US as it is to the European and Japanese importers, for which it is vital, the US relationship with Iran and Saudi Arabia serves the collective security interests of its allies in helping assure a continuous and adequate flow of oil.. But.. will the US government come to affect the destination of these 7 million barrels per day, exercising its influence through the Americans oil companies? Or will the companies be able to continue to supply, unhampered by considerations other than the meeting of their contractual commitments?”

US Senate Cited by P.Noore and T. Turner, Ibid p. 9.

THIS OIL SAGA WILL BE BROUGHT UP TO DATE SHORTLY

Bill Bland: The Case of Sultan-Galiyev

Sultan-Galiyev

This article was published by Alliance (Marxist-Leninist) as part of the publication Alliance, issue #51, “Pan-Arabic or Pan-Islamic ‘Socialism.’”

By Comrade Bland of the Communist League (UK); was written for the Marxist-Leninist Bureau Report no 3; and presented to the Stalin Society (circa 1994)

Marxist-Leninist Research Bureau Report No. 3, dated 1995

MIR-SAID SULTAN-GALIYEV* was a Volga Tatar who was born in a village in Bashkiria in 1880. He studied first at the village mekteb (Muslim primary school), and then at the teacher’s training college of Kazan. He returned to his native village as a teacher, and then went to Ufa as librarian. From 1911 he contributed articles to many Russian and Tatar periodicals.

He joined the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in November 1917. The Central Commissariat for Muslim Affairs (Muskom) was created by government decree in January 1918, and later that year Sultan-Galiyev became its Chairman.

The Central Muslim Military Collegium (CMMC) was formed in April 1918 to direct  Muslim troops fighting on the Red side, and Sultan-Galiyev became its Chairman in December 1918. In 1920 he was promoted to membership of the three-man, Inner Collegium of the Commissariat of Nationalities (Narkomnats), under Stalin as Commissar, and was made co-editor of the Commissariat’s official ‘Zhizn Natsionalnostei’ (The Life of the Nationalities).

By 1920 Sultan-Galiyev:

“had become the most important Muslim in the entire Soviet hierarchy and had acquired a unique position from which to influence the Eastern policies of the Communist regime.”

(Richard Pipes: ‘The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism: 1917, 1923′; Cambridge (USA); 1954; p. 169).

Sultan-Galiev and his followers formed

“The so-called right-wing of the Tatar Communist Party.”

(Richard Pipes: ibid.; p. 169),

which:

“had a distinct political ideology.”

(Pipes: ibid.; op. cit.; p. 169).

This political ideology became known as Sultan-Galiyevism.

Sultan-Galiyevism

Marxism-Leninism maintains that, in a colonial-type country, the revolutionary process must go through two successive stages — that of national-democratic revolution and that of socialist revolution. Marxist-Leninists must support the national-democratic revolution and strive to win leadership of that revolution for the working class and its party, so as to transform it, with the minimum possible interruption, into a socialist revolution that will construct a socialist society.

Sultan-Galiyevism, on the other hand, put forward the view:

1) ‘that Muslim peoples are ‘proletarian peoples’, so that national movements among them are movements of socialist revolution:

“The Muslim peoples are proletarian peoples. . . . National movements in Muslim countries have the characteristics of a socialist revolution.”

(Mir-said Sultan-Galiyev: Speech of 1918, in: Azade-Ayse Rorlich: ‘The Volga, Tatars: ‘A Profile in National Resilience”; Stanford (USA); p. 143).

“The material premises for a social transformation of humanity can be created only through the establishment of the dictatorship of the colonies and semi-colonies over the metropolises.”

(Mir Said Sultan-Galiev, in: Richard Pipes: op. cit.; p. 261).

2) That in areas inhabited by Muslims, the Communist Party must “integrate with Islam”:

In areas inhabited by Muslims, the CP:

“Must necessarily integrate its (Marxism’s – Ed.) teachings with those of Islam.”

(Alexandre A. Bennigsen & S. Enders Wimbush: ‘Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union: A Revolutionary Strategy for the:Colonial World”; page; 1979; p. 50).

and must accept:

“The need for conciliatory policies toward the Muslim religion and’ traditions.”

(Pipes: op. cit p. 170).

“The Muslim ‘national communists’ felt that . . . they had to reconcile Marxist teaching with that of Islam. They were therefore eager to preserve Islamic culture and the Muslim way of life. . . . Islam’s strong moral, social and political influence should be retained.”

(Alexandre Bennigsen & Marie Broxup: ‘The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State'; London; 1983; p. 82-83).

3) The integration of Marxism with Islam should be brouhgt about by a special party:

Sultan-Galiyev proposed that his programme must be brought about:

“By uniting the Muslim masses into an Autonomous Communist movement.”

(Azade-Ayse Rorlich: op. cit.; p. 144).

“Sultan-Galiyev . . . stood for the formation of a special Muslim Communist Party.”

(Walter Kolarz: ‘Russia and Her Colonies'; London; 1952; p. 33).

4) that geographically large territorial units should be formed embracing as many Muslims as possible:

“Sultan-Galiyev, in particular. was an ardent defender of pan-Turkish and pan-Islamic ideas. He . . . advocated the union of the Volga Muslims with those of Central Asia.”

(Walter Kolarz: ibid. p. 33).

Sultan-Galiyev had:

“pan-Turanian ambitions and the desire to create a vast Tartar-Turkish state stretching from the Volga over Central Asia”.

(Edward H. Carr: ‘The Interregnum: 1923-1924′; London; 1954; p. 289).

“His (Sultan-Galiyev’s — Ed.) plan…was to begin with the creation of a Muslim state on the Middle Volga…To this state were to be joined, first the Turkic Muslims of Russia and later all the other Russian Muslims.”

(Geoffrey Wheeler: ‘The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia’ London 1964; p. 124).

“Sultan-Galiyev . . . elaborated the concept of the Republic of Turan, embodying all the Muslim revolutionaries’ pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic aspirations.”

(Alexandre Bennigsen & Marie Broxup: op. cit.; p. 84).

The Moves For a Seperate Muslim Communist Party (1918)

In March 1918, the lst Conference of the Muslim Toilers of Russia in Moscow:

“. . . adopted the decision to organise a Party of Muslim Socialist Communists.”

(Azade-Ayse Rorlich: op. cit.; p. 145).

The leadership of the new party, headed by Sultan-Galiyev:

“Urged the Muslims to commit themselves to a purely Muslim Communist Party and refrain from joining the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks).”

(Azade-Ayse Rorlich: ibid.; p. 145).

and the new party:

“. . . was not joined organically to the Russian Communist Party.”

(Alexandre A. Bennigsen & S. Enders Wimbush: op. cit.; p. 60).

Three months later:

“. . . in June 1918, at the First Conference of Muslim Communists, held in Kazan, the Party of Muslim Socialist-Communists was transformed into the ‘Russian Party of Muslim Communists (Bolsheviks)’. . . . It was to be open to Muslims only, was to have equal status with the RCB(b), and was to enjoy organisational independence to the extent of having its own Central Committee.”

(Azade-Ayse Rorlich: ibid.; p. 145).

The Marxist-Leninists’ Counter-moves for a Unified Party (1918-20)

This movement by the “Sultan-galiyevists” for a separate Muslim Communist Party, came about during the Civil War. In this climate, it was tolerated since a counter-struggle was a distraction:

“Although not applauded by the RCP(b), was tolerated for purely tactical purposes under the stress of the Civil War.”

(Azade-Ayse Rorlich: ibid.; p. 145).

But as soon as the danger from the Civil War had passed, the Marxist-Leninists counter-moved:

“As soon as the Bolsheviks . . . regained the upper hand in the Civil War, especially after recapturing Kazan in September 1918, Moscow moved.”

(Azade-Ayse Rorlich: ibid.; p. 145).

At the 1st Congress of Muslim Communists in Moscow in November 1918, Sultan-Galiyev sought confirmation:

“Of the recognition of the autonomy of the Muslim Communist Party.”

(Alexandre Bennigsen & Chantal Quelquejay: ‘Les mouvements nationaux chez les Musulmans de Russie: Le ‘Sultangalievisme’ au Tatarstan’ (National Movements among the Muslims of Russia: Sultangaliyevism’ in Tatarstan) Paris; 1960; p. 128).

But Stalin:

“Representing the Central Committee of the RCP(b), rejected these demands in the name of centralism and administrative efficiency.”

(Alexandre Bennigsen & Chantal Quelquejay: ibid.; p. 128).

Stalin used the congress:

“To halt the centrifugal forces that had set the course for the emergence of a parallel and rival party organisation of the Russian Muslims. . . .The Russian Party of Muslim Communists underwent a substantial metamorphosis, re-emerging in the process as the ‘Central Bureau’ of Muslim Organisations of the RCP(b), whose central committee became the . . . Muskom (Central Commissariat for Muslim Affairs Ed.), presided over by Sultan Galiyev.”

(Azade-Ayse Rorlich: op. cit.; p. 145).

Thus, the Central Bureau of Muslim Organisations:

“Found itself closely attached to the Russian Communist Party, all the more so since the chairman of the new Central Bureau of Muslim Organisations of the RCP(b) elected at the conclusion of the congress was Stalin, a delegate of the Central Committee of the RCP(b)”.

(Alexandre Bennigsen & Chantal Quelquejay: op. cit.; p. 128).

In March 1919, the 8th Congress of the RCP(b) established

“A unified and centralised Communist Party (thoughout Soviet Russia-Ed)…All decisions of the RCP(b) and of its guiding organs are binding on Party organs, regardless of their national composition.”

(Russian Communist Party (bolsheviks): Resolution of 8th Congress of the RCP(b) (March 1919), in: Alexandre A. Bennigsen & S. Enders Wimbush: op. cit.; p. 62).

Immediately after the congress:

“The Central Bureau of Muslim Organisations was replaced by the ‘Central Bureau of Communist Organisations of the Peoples of the East.'”

(Alexandre Bennigsen & Chantal Quelquejay: op. cit.; p, 131).

In other words it:

“was stripped of its socio-cultural meaning and was instead endowed with a geographic attribute.”

(Azade-Ayse Rorlich: op. cit p. 145).

At the 2nd Congress of Communist Organisations of the Peoples of the East, held in Moscow in November/December 1919:

“The autonomy of the Muslim communist groupings was explicitly terminated….The congress condemned autonomy, invoking the precedent of the Bund**.”

(Alexandre Bennigsen & Chantal Quelquejay: op. cit.; p. 131).

These events:

“Left no doubt that the RCP(b) and its chief expert on nationality problems, Stalin, had reversed the tide of organisational independence that the Tatar ‘national communists’ had set in motion in 1918.”

(Azade-Ayse Rorlich: op. cit.; p. 145-46).

However in October 1919 the Tatar ‘national communists':

“Made a bid for autonomy for their party organisation at the local level.”

(Azade-Ayse Rorlich: ibid.; p. 146).

The Proposal for a Tatar-Bashkir Republic (1919-20)

Although a Bashkir Automonous Soviet Socialist Republic had been established in March 1919, in November 1919, at the Preparatory Conference for the 2nd Congress of Communist Organisations of the Peoples of the East:

“Sultan- Galiyev demanded . . . the speedy creation of the Tataro-Bashkir state. Lenin refused to consider this demand, and the matter was referred to the Central Committee of the RCP(b). … Some days later, Sultan-Galiyev renewed his attempt at the 2nd Congress of Communist Organisations of the Peoples of the East. …. Again the Russian leaders rejected these demands.”

(Alexandre Bennigsen & Chantal Quelquejay: op. cit.; p.141).

The proposed state would embrace both Bashkiria and Tataria and form:

“A large Turkic republic on the Middle Volga.”

(Azade-Ayse Rorlich: op. cit.; p. 137).

The delegates at the congress:

“Renewed their support for the formation of a Tatar-Bashkir republic.”

(Azade-Ayse Rorlich: ibid.; p. 137).

As proposed by Sultan-Galiyev.

But in view of the influence of Sultan-Galiyevism in the region:

“The Soviet government chose to sponsor the formation of smaller republics.”

(Azade-Ayse Rorlich: ibid.; p. 137-38).

So in December 1919:

” . . the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist (Bolshevik) Party, which was presided over by Lenin, decided to halt all efforts to create a Tatar-Bashkir republic.”

(Azade-Ayse Rorlich: ibid.; p. 137).

Nevertheless, in March 1920, a delegation of three, including Sultan-Galiyev:

“. . . visited Lenin to try to convince him of the necessity of enlarging the frontiers of the future Tatar republic so as to include the Bashkirs and other Muslims. Yet again Lenin rejected this demand and accused the Tatars of demonstrating ‘imperialist chauvinism’, of seeking to impose their domination over the more backward Bashkirs.”

(Alexandre Bennigsen & Chantal Quelquejay: op. cit.; p. 142-43).

In May 1920 a decree was issued:

“Declaring the formation of the Tatar ASSR.”

(Azade-Ayse Rorlich: op. cit.; p. 138).

The Moves for Further Weakening of Sultan-Galiyevism (1920)

In July 1920:

“. . . the First Regional Conferece of Tatar Communists … held in Kazan . . . , adopted the decision to rename the Muslim Bureau of Gubkom the ‘Tatar Regional Bureau of Communist Organisations.'”

(Azade-Ayse Rorlich: ibid.; p. 146).

In August 1920 a resolution of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) declared:

“that Sultan-Galiyev’s duties and assignments required his presence in Moscow”.

(Azade-Ayse Rorlich: ibid.; p. 146).

Most commentators assume that by this resolution:

“The Central Committee of the RCP(b) sought to weaken the Tatar and their independent stand by removing their most prominent Communists ‘leader from Kazan.”

(Azade-Ayse Rorlich: op. cit.; p. 146).

Sultan-Galiyev’s Mission to the Crimea (1921)

In the spring of 1921, Sultan-Galiyev was sent to the Crimea, to report on conditions there. His report, published in May 1921, proposed that a Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic be created. This recommendation was accepted by the Soviet authorities who:

“Despite objections from local Communists and the acceptance of a resolution by the Crimean Regional Communist Party Congress against the creation of a republic. . . . carried out Sultan-Galiyev’s recommendation and established in November 1921 the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Soviet Republic.”

(Richard Pipes: op Cit.; p.190.)

The territory of the Crimean ASSR, was occupied by German forces between 1941 and 1944:

“General Manstein* was relatively successful in his attempts to gain active support from the Tatars. According to both German and Tatar evidence, the Germans persuaded between 15,000 and 20,000 Tatars to form self-defence battalions that were partially armed by the Germans and sent into the mountains to hunt down partisan units. . . . Most accounts claim that the Crimean Tatars were unduly privileged during the German regime. ….. There is no question that large numbers of Tatar villagers, as well as the Tatar self-defence battalions, fought hard against the Soviet partisans. The traitors knew well the local inhabitants and turned over all suspicious characters (often the patriots) to the German police.”

(Alan;W.Fisher: ‘The Crimean Tatars'; Stanford (USA): 1978; p. 155, 157, 158).

As a result of this mass treason, in May/June 1944, the Crimean Tatars were deported from the Crimea to distant parts of the Soviet Union. And:

“On June 30 1945, a year after the deportation, the Crimean ASSR was abolished and transformed into the Crimean oblast (district – Ed.) of the RSFSR”.

(Alan,W. Fisher: ibid.; p. 167).

(A more detailed description of the background to the mass resettlements ‘Ls, to be found in a paper entitled ‘The Enforced Resettlements, read to the Stalin Society in July 1993. See web-page: Resettlements).

The First Arrest (1923)

Sultan-Galiyev was:

“arrested for the first time in May 1923 and excluded from the Communst Party for ‘nationalist deviation.'”

(Alexandre A. Bennigsen & S. Enders Wimbush: op. cit.; p. 208).

According to Trotsky, Sultan-Galiyev’s arrest was initiated by Stalin, with the approval of other leaders, including Kamenev and Zinoviev:

“‘Do you remember the arrest of Sultan-Galiyev in 1923?’, Kamenev continued.
‘This was the first arrest of a prominent Party member upon the initiative of Stalin. Unfortunately Zinoviev and I gave our consent.”

(Leon,Trotsky: ‘Stalin': New York; 1941; p. 417).

Sultan-Galiyev:

“Was never formally tried. He was released from custody in June 1923 … ‘in recognition of services rendered to the revolution.”‘

(A. Bennigsen & S. Enders Wimbush: op. cit.; p. 85).

Although at the 4th Conference on the National Republics and Regions held in June 1923 (a few weeks after his arrest), Sultan-Galiyev was accused of “treason” and participation in “objectively counter-revolutionary” activity, at this time the full scale of his subversive activity against the Soviet state was not known. For example, it was not known that in 1920:

“Sultan-Galiyev, Zeki Validov* and a group of prominent Muslim ‘national communists’ . . . met in Moscow and founded the secret group ‘Ittihad ve Tarakki’ (Union and Progress)…. ‘Ittihad ve Tarakki’ pursued a threefold goal: to infiltate ‘national communist’ Turks into the ‘Communist Party and the Soviet government apparatus; . . . to inculcate Islamic and pan-Turkic ideals; and to establish contacts with counter-revolutionary organisations abroad and in Soviet Russia, especially with the Basmachi.”**

(Alexandre A. Bennigsen & S. Enders Wimbush: op. cit.; p. 87).

The 4th Conference on the National Republics and Regions (1923)

On,9-12 June 1923, the 4th Conference of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party with Workers of the National Republics and Regions was held in Moscow:

“Convened on J. V. Stalin’s initiative”.

(Note to: Josef V. Stalin: ‘Works’, Volume 5; Moscow; 1953; p. 429).

With Stalin in the Chair, an important item on the agenda of the conference was ‘the Sultan-Galiyev Case.’ Sultan-Galiyev:

“was thoroughly vilified, accused of deviations and treason, and excluded from the Communist Party.”

(A. Bennigsen & S. Enders Wimbush: op. cit.; p. 83).

A resolution was adopted on ‘the Sultan-Galiyey’ case’, the principal points of which were:

“1. Sultan-Galiyev, appointed by the Party to a responsible post of the Collegium of the People’s Commisariat of Nationalities), profited from his situation and the relations which arose from it . . . to set up . . . an illegal organisation in order to oppose measures taken by the central organs of the Party. He had recourse to conspiratorial methods, and used secret information in order to deliberately falsify the decisions of the Party on national policy.
2. Sultan-Galiyev tried to utilise this anti-Party organisation to sap the confidence of the formerly oppressed nationalities in the revoluionary proletariat, and sought to prejudice the union of these two forces, which is one of the essential elements for the existence of
Soviet power and for the liberation of the peoples of the East from imperialism.
3. Sultan-Galiyev strove to extend his organisation beyond the the Union of Soviet Republics, trying to enter into relations with his supporters in certain Eastern countries (Persia, Turkey)
to rally them around a platform opposed to the policy of the Soviet power…..
4. The anti-Party, objectively counter-revolutionary aims of Sultan-Galiyev and the very logic of his anti-Party activity led him to treason, to alliance with the counter-revolutionary forces openly struggling to overthrow the Soviet regime. Thus, he has sought to link up through the medium of their chief, Zeki Validov, with the Basmachi** of Turkestan and Bokhara, who are supported by international imperialism.
5. The conference considers, in consequence, that the criminal acts of towards Party unity and the Soviet Republic, acts entirely admitted by him in his confessions, place him outside the Communist Party.”

(Alexandre Bennigsen & Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay: ‘Sultan-Galiev: Le pere de la revolution tiers-mondiale’ (Sultan-Galiyev: The Father of Third-World Revolution); Paris; 1986; p. 215-16).

At the conference, Stalin defended his past support of Sultan-Galiyev:

“I have been reproached….with having defended Sultan-Galiyev excessively. It is true that I defended him as long as it was possible, and I considered, and still consider, that it was my duty to do so. But I defended him only up to a certain point. . . . When Sultan-Galiyev went that point, I turned away from him. … There are so few intellectuals, so few thinking people, even so few literary people generally in the Eastern republics and regions, that one count them on one’s fingers. How can one help cherishing them?”

(Josef V. Stalin: Speech on the Sultan-Galiyev Case. 4th Conference of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) with Responsible Workers of the National Republics and Regions (June 1923), in: ‘Works’, Volume 5; Moscow;.1953; p. 309, 310).

Stalin tells how, after he had criticised Sultan-Galiyev, the latter:

“Replied, in great embarrassment, that he had always been a Party man and was so still, and he gave his word of honour that he would continue to be a Party man in the future.”

(Josef V. Stalin: ibid.; p. 310).

Despite, this promise, Stalin records,

“A week later he sent Adigamov a second secret letter instructing him to establish contact with the Basmachi** and with their leader Validov, and to ‘burn’ the letter. From that moment Sultan-Galiyev became for me a man beyond the pale of the Party, of the Soviets.”

(Josef V. Stalin: ibid.; p. 310).

When, following Sultan-Galiyev’s arrest, some Tatar Communists demanded his release on the grounds that the letters concerned in the case were were “forgeries,” an investigation was held:

“What did the investigation reveal? It revealed that all the documents were genuine. Their genuineness was admitted by Sultan-Galiyev himself, who, in fact, gave more information about his sins than is contained in the documents, who fully confessed his guilt and, after confessing, repented.”

(Josef,V. Stalin: ibid.; p. 312).

Further Conspiratorial Activity (1923-27)

Upon his release, Sultan-Galiyev:

“Again became a journalist and worked until 1928 in various state publishing houses, notably at ‘Gosizdat’ of Moscow.”

(Alexandre Bennigsen & Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay.: op. cit.; p. 219).

But he continued his deviationist political activity:

“He worked . . . in Georgia and in Moscow”;

(Alexandre A. Bennigsen & S. Enders Wimbush: op. cit.; p. 208).

“Having lost his positions in the Russian Communist Party for his deviationist tendencies, Sultan-Galiyev tried for a final time to create a structure which could embrace the proponents of the Eastern and set it in motion. This was his ‘Colonial International’. The Colonial International was to be independent of the Comintern and all European Communist Parties, including the Russian Communist Party, if not opposed to them.”

(Alexandre A. Bennigsen & S. Enders Wimbush: op, cit.; p. 58).

He also continued his clandestine subversive activity – he:

“Founded a clandestine ‘counter-revolutionary’ organisation”.

(Alexandre Bennigsen & Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay: op. cit.; p. 219).

“It was between 1923 and 1927 that Sultan-Galiyev, out of prison and living in Georgia and Moscow, most actively worked to create a system of secret underground organisations, centred in Moscow and Kazan, but with offshoots extending as far as Alma-Ata and Tashkent. . . Many Muslim ‘national communist’ leaders . . . were connected to this organisation. …. There can be little doubt that the latter did indeed conspire”.

(Alexandre A. Bennigsen & S. Enders Wimbush: op. cit.; p. 87, 88).

The Second Arrest (1928)

“In 1928 Sultan-Galivev was . . . arrested for the second time. He was tried and condemned to ten years of hard labour in the Solovki camp on the White Sea.”

(Alexandre A. Bennigsen & S. Enders Wimbush: ibid.; p. 208).

This arrest marked

“The ideological and organisational destruction of Sultan-Galiyevism.”

(Alexandre A. Bennigsen & S. Enders Wimbush: ibid.; op. cit.; p. 91).

In December 1928,

“The majority of the Tatar members of the Tatar Obkom (Regional Party Committee — Ed.) were arrested, tried for ‘Sultan-Galiyevism’ and “treason’, and executed.”

(Alexandre A. Bennigsen & S. Enders Wimbush: ibid.; p. 91).

At the same time, the Communist Party of the Tatar Republic of Crimea was purged.

“Veli Ibrahimov*, the 1st Secretary of the Crimean Obkom, was arrested, tried and executed for counter-revolutionary activity.”

(Alexandre A. Bennigsen & S. Enders Wimbush: ibid.; p. 91).

“The great purge in the Muslim republics ….. began in 1928. It started in Crimea with the execution of Veli Ibrahimov, First Secretary of the Tatar Communist Party.”

(Alexandre Bennigsen & Marie Broxup: op. cit.; p. 85).

In February 1921 and again in June 1923, Stalin summed up the role of bourgeois nationalism in the border regions of the Soviet Union:

“Communists from the local native population who experienced the harsh period of national oppression, and who have not yet fully freed themselves from the haunting memories of that period, often exaggerate the importance of specific national features in their Party work, leave the class interests of the working people in the shade, or simply confuse the interests of the working people of the nation concerned with the ‘national’ interests of that nation; they are unable to separate the from the latter and base their Party work on them. That, in its turn, leads to a deviation from communism towards bourgeois-democratic nationalism, which sometimes assumes the form of pan-Islamism, pan-Turkism (in the East).”

(Josef V. Stalin: Theses for the 10th Congress of the RCP(b) (February 1921), in: ‘Works’, Volume 5; Moscow; 1953; p. 28.

“In relation to our Communist organisations in the border regions and republics. . . . nationalism is playing the same role . . . as Menshevism in the past played in relation to the Bolshevik Party. Only under cover of nationalism can various kinds of bourgeois, including Menshevik, influences penetrate our organisations in the border regions.”

(Josef V. Stalin: Speech on the ‘Sultan-Galiyev Case’, 4th Conference of cc of RCB(b) with Responsible Workers of the National Republics and Regions (June 1923); in; ‘Works’, Volume 5; Moscow; 1953; p. 316).

The Death of Sultan-Galiyev (1939)

Sultan-Galiyev:

“. . . died 1939 in imprisonment.”

Heinrich E. Schulz, Paul K. Urban & Andrew I. Lebed (Eds.): ‘Who was Who In the USSR'; Metuchen (USA); 1972; p. 591).

In 1989, on the eve of the liquidation of the Soviet Union, Sultan-Galiyev remained one of very few early leading members of the Soviet Communist Party not rehabilitated by the revisionists:

“Sultan-Galiyev, the father of ‘Muslim Communism’, remained one of the only two prominent early Bolshevik leaders still considered as ‘non-persons’ in 1989.”

(Amir Taheri: ‘Crescent in a Red Sky: The Future of Islam in the Soviet Union. London; 1989; p. 212).

International Repercussions of Sultan-Galiyevism

Sultan-Galiyevism has attracted support from a number of bourgeois revolutionaries and revisionists in countries outside the Soviet Union.

“Several Muslim heads of state, among them Ben Bella* and Houari ‘Boumedienne,* have spoken of his (Sultan-Galiyev’s — Ed.) third-world theories.”

(Alexandre Bennigsen & Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay: op. cit.; p, 287).

“Algeria’s President, Ahmed Ben Bella, in a recent interview . . . disclosed that he was very much impressed by the theories of an early Russian Marxist named Sultan-Galiyev who believed that the real struggle in the world would commence when the underdeveloped nations rose up against the industrialised northern tier.”

(‘Newsweek’, 13 January 1964; p. 28).

Chinese revisionism contains theses closely similar to those of Sultan-Galiyevism. Lin Piao* declares:

“If North America and western Europe can be called ‘the cities of the world’, then Asia, Africa and Latin America constitute ‘the rural areas of the world’. . . . The contemporary world revolution . . . presents a picture of the encirclement of cities by the rural areas. In the final analysis, the whole cause of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggles of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples.”

(Lin Piao: “Long Live the Victory of People s War!”; Peking; 1965; p.48-49).

NOTES:

The BASMACHI were members of an anti-Soviet counter-revolutionary organisation in Central Asia in 1917-26. It was supported by British and US interventionists and by reactionary circles in Turkey, Afghanistan and China.

The BUND (= the General Workers’ Union of Lithuania, Poland and Russia) was formed in 1897. It stood for the autonomous organisation of Jewish workers. It took a social-chauvinist stand during World War I and during the Civil War supported the counter-revolutionary forces. It dissolved itself in 1921.

PAN-ISLAMISM is a movement for the union of all Muslims within a single state.
PAN-TURANIAN: supporting the union of all peoples speaking Turanian (Turkic) languages.
PAN-TURKISM is a movement for the union of all Turkic-speaking peoples a single state.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alexandre & BROXUP, Marie: ‘The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State'; London; 1983.

BENNIGSEN, Alexandre & LEMERCIER-QUELQUEJAY, Chantal: ‘Sultan-Galiev: Le pere de la revolution tiers-mondiale’ (Sultan-Galiyev: The Father of Third-World Revolution'; Paris; 1986.

BENNIGSEN, Alexandre & QUELQUEJAY, Chantal: ‘Les mouvements nationaux chez les Musulmans de Russie: ‘Le ‘Sultangalievisme’ au Tatarstan’ (The National Movements among the Muslims of Russia: ‘Sultangaliyevism’ in Tatarstan);”; Paris; 1960.

BENNIGSEN, Alexandre A. & WIMBUSH, S. Enders: ‘Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union: A Revolutionary Strategy for the Colonial World'; Chicago; 1979.

CARR,.Edward H.: ‘The Interregnum: 1923-1924′; London; 1954.

FISHER Alan W.:’The Crimean Tatars'; Stanford (USA); 1978.

KOLARZ, Walter: ‘Russia and Her Colonies'; London; 1952.

LIN Piao: ‘Long live the Victory of People’s War!'; Peking; 1965.

PIPES, Richard: ‘The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism., ”1917-1923′; Cambridge (USA); 1954.

RORLIM Azade-Ayse: ‘The Volga Tatars: A Profile in National Resilience';
Stanford (USA); 1986.

SCHULZ, Heinrich E., URBAN, Paul K. & LEBED, Andrew L. (Eds): ‘Who was Who in the USSR'; Metuchen (USA); 1972.

STALIN, Josef V.: Speech on the Sultan-Galiyev Case, 4th Conference of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) with Responsible Workers of the National Republics and Regions’, in: ‘Works;, Volume 5; Moscow; 1953.

STALIN, Josef V.: Theses for the 10th Congress of the RCP(b) (February 1921), in: ‘Works’, Volume 5; Moscow; 1953.

TAHERI, Amir: ‘Crescent in a Red Sky: The Future of Islam in the Soviet Union'; London; 1989.

TROTSKY,.Leon: ‘Stalin'; New York; 1941.

WHEELER Geoffrey: “The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia'; London; 1964.

‘Newsweek’ 13 January 1964.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

BEN BELLA, Mohammed, Algerian nationalist politician (1916- President (1963-65); overthrown in military coup led by Houari Boumedienne (1965); under house arrest (1965-79); to France (1980).

BOUMEDIENNE, Houari, Algerian military officer and politician (1925-78);
colonel (1960); chief of staff, National Liberation Army (1960-62); led against Ben Bella and established Islamic government (1962); President (1976-78).

IBRAHIMOV, Veli, Soviet (Tatar) revisionist politician (? – 1928); Premier Crimean ASSR (1920-27); 1st. Secretary, RCP(b), Crimean ASSR (1920-27);
arrested (1927); tried for treason, found guilty and executed (1928)

LIN Piao, Chinese revisionist military officer and politician (1908-71), member Politburo, CPC (1955-71); member, Standing Committee, Politburo CPC, (1958-71); Minister of Defence (1959-71); named official heir to Mao, Tse-tung (1968); vice-chairman, CPC (1969-71); reported killed in plane crash while escaping to Soviet Union to escape arrest for participating in attempted coup (1971).

MANSTEIN, Fritz E. Yon, German military officer (1887-1973); lieutenant general
(1936); field marshal (1949); dismissed (1944); captured convicted of war crimes in Rusaia and sentenced to imprisonment (1949); released and appointed adviser to West German government (1953).

SULTAN-GALIYEV, Mir Said, Soviet (Tatar) revisionist politician (1880-1939); Central Commissariat for Muslim Affairs (1918-23); chairman, Central Muslim Military Council (1918-23); member, Inner Collegium of Commissariat of Nationalities and co-editor of its organ ‘The Life of the Nationalities'; Premier, Tatar ASSR (1920-23); arrested and released without charge (1923); re-arrested (1929); tried and sentenced to imprisonment (1928); died in prison (1939).

ZEKI VALIDOV, Ahmed Soviet (Bashkir) revisionist historian and politician (1890-1969); Professor of History, University of Kazan (1909-17); People’s Commissar of War. Bashkir ASSR (1919-20); to Turkestan to join Basmachi counter-revolutionary forces (1920); to Afghanistan, then Turkey (1922).