Category Archives: The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.)

Michael Parenti on “Pure Socialism”

MP 2009 portrait BW

“[R]eal socialism, it is argued, would be controlled by the workers themselves through direct participation instead of being run by Leninists, Stalinists, Castroites, or other ill-willed, power-hungry, bureaucratic, cabals of evil men who betray revolutions. Unfortunately, this ‘pure socialism’ view is ahistorical and nonfalsifiable; it cannot be tested against the actualities of history. It compares an ideal against an imperfect reality, and the reality comes off a poor second. It imagines what socialism would be like in a world far better than this one, where no strong state structure or security force is required, where none of the value produced by workers needs to be expropriated to rebuild society and defend it from invasion and internal sabotage.”

– Michael Parenti, “Blackshirts and Reds”

Bill Bland: The German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939

MolotovRibbentropStalin

by Bill Bland

Introduction

One of the many stories which circulate about Stalin is that, while the Soviet government was negotiating for a collective security pact with Britain and France directed against German aggressive expansion, he initiated the signing of a pact with Germany which precipitated the Second World War.

Of course, not everything that happened in the Soviet Union at this time was done with the approval of Stalin. In the case of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of 1939, however, we have the testimony of Stalin’s closest collaborator, Vyacheslav Molotov, that:

“Comrade Stalin . . suggested the possibility of different, unhostile and good neighbourly relations between Germany and the USSR. . ..
The conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact . . . shows that Comrade Stalin’s historical foresight has been brilliantly confirmed”.

(V. M. Molotov: Speech at 4th (Special) Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 31 August 1939, in: ‘Soviet Peace Policy'; London; 1941; p. 16).

The charge that this was a serious mistake on Stalin’s part must, therefore, be examined seriously.

The Reorientation of Soviet Foreign Policy

In his notorious book ‘My Struggle’, written in mid-1920s, the Nazi leader Adolf Hitler expressed frankly the foreign policy the Nazis intended to follow:

“We National Socialists consciously draw a line beneath the foreign policy tendency of our pre-War period. . . . We stop the endless German movement to the south and west, and turn our gaze towards the land in the East. .
If we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have in mind only Russia”.

(A. Hitler: ‘Mein Kampf'; London; 1984; p. 598, 604).

Thus, the coming to power of the Nazi government in Germany in January 1933 heralded a situation in Europe which clearly presented great danger to the Soviet Union — and not, of course, to the Soviet Union alone.

The Marxist-Leninists in the leadership of the Soviet Union, concerned to defend the socialist state, responded to this new, more dangerous situation by reorientating Soviet foreign policy, by adopting a policy of striving for collective security with other states which had, objectively, an interest in maintaining the status quo in the international situation.

The Objective Basis of Collective Security

The objective basis of the Soviet policy of collective security was that the imperialist Powers of the world could be divided into two groups.

One group — Germany, Italy and Japan had a relatively high productive power and relatively restricted markets and spheres of influence. As a result, these Powers had an urgent need to change the world to their advantage; they were relatively aggressive Powers.

Another group of imperialist Powers — Britain, France and the United States — had relatively large markets and spheres of influence and thus had objectively more need to keep the world as it was than to see it changed; they were relatively non-aggressive Powers.

Stalin, who argued that the Second World War had already begun, summed up this position to the 18th Congress of the CPSU in March 1939:

“The war is being waged by aggressor states, who in every way infringe upon the interests of the non-aggressor states, primarily, England, France and the USA. .
Thus we are witnessing an open re-division of the world and spheres of influence at the expense of the non-aggressive states.”

(J. V. Stalin: op. cit.; p. 14).

As a socialist state, a working people’s state, the Soviet Union had the strongest interest of any state in the preservation of peace.

The Soviet government’s policy in the 1930s, therefore, was to strive to form a collective security alliance with the European non-aggressive imperialist states, Britain and France — a collective security alliance strong enough either to deter the aggressive imperialist states from launching war or to secure their speedy defeat.

The Soviet Government summed up this post-1933 foreign policy in 1948:

“Throughout the whole pre-war period, the Soviet delegation upheld the principle of collective security in the League of Nations”.

(‘Falsifiers of History: Historical Information'; London; 1948; p 15).

Appeasement 

Although, as we have seen, Stalin maintained that the British and French imperialists had, objectively, an interest in joining the Soviet Union in such a collective security alliance, the governments of Britain and France, led respectively by Neville Chamberlain and Edouard Daladier, did not recognise this objective fact because of their detestation of socialism and the Soviet Union and their wish to see it destroyed.

As Stalin told the 18th Congress of the CPSU in March 1939:

“England, France and the USA . . . draw back and retreat, making concession after concession to the aggressors.

Thus we are now witnessing an open redivision of the world and spheres of influence at the expense of the non-aggressive states, without the least attempt at resistance, and even with a certain amount of connivance. .

How is it that the non-aggressive countries . . . have so easily, and without any resistance, abandoned their positions and their obligations to please the aggressors?

Is it to be attributed to the weakness of the non-aggressive states? Of course not! Combined, the non-aggressive, democratic states are unquestionably stronger than the fascist states, both economically and militarily. . .

The chief reason is that the majority of the non-aggressive countries, particularly England and France, have rejected a policy of collective security, of collective resistance to the aggressors, and have taken up a position of ‘non-intervention’……

The policy of non-intervention reveals an eagerness, a desire, not to hinder Germany, say, . . . from embroiling herself in a war with the Soviet Union. .
One might think that the districts of Czechoslovakia were yielded to Germany as the price of an undertaking to launch war on the Soviet Union”.

(J. V. Stalin: op. cit.; p. 14-15, 16).

British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax is on record as telling Hitler in November 1937 that

“he and other members of the British Government were well aware that the Fuehrer had attained a great deal. . . . Having destroyed Communism in his country, he had barred the road of the latter to Western Europe and Germany was therefore entitled to be regarded as a bulwark of the West against Bolshevism. .

When the ground has been prepared for an Anglo-German rapprochement, the four great West European Powers must jointly set up the foundation of lasting peace in Europe”.

(‘Documents on German Foreign Policy: 1918-1945′, Series D, Volume 1; London; 1954; p. 55).

Nevertheless, the Soviet Marxist-Leninists understood that this policy of ‘appeasement’ ran, objectively, counter to the interests of the British and French imperialists and counter to the interests of the British working people They therefore calculated that, if the Soviet government persisted in its efforts to form a collective security alliance with Britain and France, sooner or later the appeasers in Britain, which dominated France,. would be forced out of office by the more far-seeing representatives of British imperialism (such as Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden) in cooperation with the British working people.

(This, of course, actually occurred in 1940, but only after war had broken out in Europe).

The Anglo-French-Soviet Negotiations

On 31 March 1939, without consulting the Soviet Union, the British government gave a unilateral guarantee to defend Poland against aggression.

The leader of the liberal Party, David Lloyd George, told the House of Commons:

“I cannot understand why, before committing ourselves to this tremendous enterprise, we did not secure beforehand the adhesion of Russia. . . . If Russia has not been brought into this matter because of certain feelings that Poles have that they do not want the Russians there, . . . unless the Poles are prepared to accept the one condition with which we can help them, the responsibility must be theirs”.

(Parliamentary Debates. 5th Series, House of Commons, Volume 35; London; 1939; Col. 2,510).

The Anglo-French guarantee stimulated public pressure on the appeaser governments to at least make gestures in the direction of collective security.

So, on 15 April 1939 the British government made an approach to the Soviet government suggesting that it might like to issue a public declaration offering military assistance to any state bordering the Soviet Union which was subject to aggression if that state desired it.

Two days later, on 17 April the Soviet government replied that it would not consider a unilateral guarantee, which would put the Soviet Union in a position of inequality with the other Powers concerned. It proposed:

Firstly, a trilateral mutual assistance treaty by Britain, France and the Soviet Union against aggression;

Secondly, the extension of guarantees to the Baltic States (Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Lithuania), on the grounds that failure to guarantee these states was an open invitation to Germany to expand eastwards through invasion of these states;

Thirdly, that the treaty must not be vague, but must detail the extent and forms of the military assistance to be rendered by the signatory Powers.

On 27 May the British and French governments replied to the Soviet proposals with the draft of a proposed tripartite pact. The British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain commented on the British draft in a letter to his sister at this time:

“In substance it gives the Russians what they want, but in form and presentation it avoids the idea of an alliance and substitutes declaration of intention. It is really a most ingenious idea”.

(Neville Chamberlain Archives, University of Birmingham, 11/1/1101).

Vyacheslav Molotov, who had just taken over the post of People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs from Maksim Litvinov, rejected the draft on the grounds that it proposed in the event of hostilities not immediate mutual assistance, but merely consultation through the League of Nations.

On 2 June the Soviet government submitted to Britain and France a counter-draft making these joints.

The British and French governments responded by saying that Finland, Estonia and Latvia refused to be guaranteed.

The Soviet government continued to insist that a military convention be signed at the same time as the political treaty, in order that there might be no possibility of any hedging about the application of the latter. On 17 July Molotov stated that there was no point in continuing discussions on the political treaty until the military convention had been concluded.

On 23 July the British and French governments finally agreed to begin military discussions before the political treaty of alliance had been finalised, and a British naval officer with the quadruple-barreled name of Admiral Reginald Plunkett-Ernie-Erle-Drax was appointed to head the British delegation. No one, apparently, had informed the British government that the aeroplane had been invented, and the delegation left Tilbury by a slow boat to Leningrad, from where they proceeded by train to Moscow. When the delegation finally arrived in Moscow on 11 August, the Soviet side discovered that it had no powers to negotiate, only to ‘hold talks’. Furthermore, the British delegation was officially instructed to:

“Go very slowly with the conversations”;

(‘Documents on British Foreign Policy;’, 3rd Series, Volume 6; London; 1953; Appendix 5; p. 763).

Nevertheless, the military talks began in Moscow on 12 August.

On 15 August the leader of the Soviet delegation, People’s Commissar for Defence  Marshal Kliment Voroshilov, told the delegates that unless Soviet troops were permitted to enter Polish territory it was physically impossible for the Soviet Union to assist Poland and it would be useless to continue discussions.

This point was never resolved before the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations were negotiations were adjourned indefinitely on 21 August — after the Soviet government had decided to sign the non-aggression pact with Germany.

Warning Shots from Moscow

At the risk of sounding chauvinistic, I think it is fair to say ‘that no diplomats are more expert in hypocritical double-dealing than British diplomats.

Nevertheless, the Soviet leaders were no fools and, as the negotiations for an Anglo-French-Soviet mutual security pact dragged on month after month, a number of warning shots were fired from Moscow.

On 11 March 1939 Joseph Davies, the former US Ambassador in Moscow, now posted to Brussels, wrote in his diary about Stalin’s speech to the 18th Congress of the CPSU a few days before:

“It is a most significant statement. It bears the earmarks of a definite warning to the British and French governments that the Soviets are getting tired of ‘non-realistic’ opposition to the aggressors. . .
It certainly is the most significant danger signal that I have yet seen”.

(J. E. Davies: ‘Mission to Moscow'; London; 1942; p. 279-80).

Then, on 3 May 1939 the resignation was announced of Maksim Litvinov as Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and his replacement by a close colleague of Stalin, Vyacheslav Molotov. Although the Soviet government denied that this signified any change in Soviet foreign policy, it was significant that Litvinov’s name was particularly associated with collective security and he was known to be personally sympathetic to the West.

On 29 June the leading Soviet Marxist-Leninist Andrei Zhdanov published an article in ‘Pravda’ which, most unusually, revealed that there were differences in the leadership of the CPSU on whether the British and French governments were sincere in saying that they wished for a genuine treaty of mutual assistance:

“the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations on the conclusion of an effective pact of mutual assistance against aggression have reached a deadlock. . . .
I permit myself to express my personal opinion in this matter, although my friends do not share it. They still think that when beginning the negotiations with the USSR, the English and French Governments had serious intentions of creating a powerful barrier against aggression in Europe. I believe, and shall try to prove it by facts, that the English and French Governments have no wish for a treaty . . . to which a self-respecting State can agree. .

The Soviet Government took 16 days in preparing answers to the various English projects and proposals, while the remaining 59 days have been consumed by delays and procrastinations on the part of the English and French. 

Not long ago . . . the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Beck, declared unequivocally that Poland neither demanded nor requested from the USSR anything in the sense of granting her any guarantee whatever…..However, this does not prevent England and France from demanding from the USSR guarantees . . . for Poland. . .

It seems to me that the English and French desire not a real treaty accepable to the USSR, but only talks about a treaty in order to speculate before the public opinion in their countries on the allegedly unyielding attitude of the USSR, and thus make easier for themselves the road to a deal with the aggressors.
The next few days must show whether this is so or not.”

(A. Zhdanov: Article in ‘Pravda’, 29 June 1939, in: J. Degras (Ed.): ‘Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy'; London; 1953; p. 352, 353, 354).

A final warning shot was fired on 22 July, when it was officially announced that Soviet-German trade negotiations were taking place in Berlin.

The Soviet-German Negotiations

At the 18th Congress of the CPSU in March 1939, Stalin described the basis of Soviet foreign policy as follows:

“We stand for peace and the strengthening of business relations with all countries. That is our position, and we shall adhere to this position as long as countries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union and as long as they make no attempt to trespass on the interests of our country”.

(J. V. Stalin: Report on the Work of the Central Committee to the 18th Congress of the CPSU (b). in : ‘The Land of Socialism Today and Tomorrow'; Moscow; 1939; p. 18).

On 17 April 1939, the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin, Aleksei Merekalov, had a conversation with the German State Secretary, Baron Ernst von Wiezsaecker, who asked him whether there was any prospect of the normalisation of relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. The Ambassador’s reply was in line with Soviet foreign policy:

“There exists for Russia no reason why she should not live with us on a normal footing. And from normal, the relations might become better and better”.

(‘Nazi-Soviet Relations: 1939-1941′, Doc. 1; Washington; 1948; p. 2).

On 29 July the German Foreign Office instructed the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union, Count Fritz von der Schulenburg, to tell Molotov:

“We would be prepared . . . to safeguard all Soviet interests and to come to an understanding with the Government in Moscow. . . . The idea could be advanced of so adjusting our attitude to the Baltic States as to respect vital Soviet interests in the Baltic Sea”.

(‘Documents on German Foreign Policy: 1918-1945′, Series D, Volume 6; London; 1956; p. 1,016).

On 14 August the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joachim von Ribbentropp, cabled Schulenburg, instructing him to call on the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov, and read him a communication:

“There is no question between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea which cannot be settled to the complete satisfaction of both countries. . . . The leadership of both countries, therefore, should . . . take action. . .

As we have been informed, the Soviet Government also feel the desire for a clarification of German-Russian relations. . . . I am prepared to make a short visit to Moscow in order, in the name of the Fuehrer, to set forth the Fuehrer ‘s views to M. Stalin. In my view, only through such a direct discussion can a change be brought about, and it should not be impossible thereby to lay the foundations for a final settlement of German-Russian relations.”

(‘Documents on German Foreign Policy: 1918-1945′, Series D, Volume 7; London; 1956; p. 63).

Schulenburg saw Molotov on 16 August and, as instructed, read to him Ribbentropp’s message. He reported to Berlin the same night that Molotov had heard

“With great interest the information I had been instructed to convey. . . ..

He was interested in the question of how the German Government were disposed towards the idea of concluding a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union”.

(‘Documents on German Foreign Policy . . ‘; op. cit., Volume 7; p. 77).

Ribbentropp replied the same day, directing Schulenburg to see Molotov again and inform him that:

“Germany is prepared to conclude a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. . . . Further, Germany is ready to guarantee the Baltic States jointly with the Soviet Union. . . .

I am prepared to come by aeroplane to Moscow at any time after Friday, August 18, to deal, on the basis of full powers from the Fuehrer, with the entire complex of German-Russian relations and, if the occasion arises, to sign the appropriate treaties”.

(‘Documents on German Foreign Policy . . .'; op. cit. Volume 7; p. 84).

On 17 August Molotov handed Schulenburg the Soviet government’s written reply. The Note began by recalling Germany’s policy of hostility to the Soviet Union in the past, and welcoming the prospect of an improvement in German-Soviet relations. It proposed a number of steps in this direction, beginning with a trade agreement and proceeding ‘shortly thereafter’ to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact.

On 18 August Ribbentropp sent a further urgent telegram to Schulenburg saying that the ‘first stage’ in the diplomatic process (the signing of the trade agreement) had been completed, and asking that Ribbentropp be permitted to make an ‘immediate departure for Moscow’, where he would:

“be in a position . . . to take the Russian wishes into account, for instance, the settlement of spheres of interest in the Baltic area”.

(‘Documents on German Foreign Policy . . . ‘ ; op. cit., Volume 7; p. 123).

On 19 August Schulenburg replied that Molotov had agreed that:

“The Reich Foreign Minister could arrive in Moscow on August 26 or 27.
Molotov handed me the draft of a non-aggression pact”.

(‘Documents on German Foreign Policy . . . ‘, op. cit., Volume 7; p. 134).

On 20 August Hitler himself intervened with a personal letter to Stalin, saying that he accepted the draft of the non-aggression pact but pleaded that Ribbentropp should be received in Moscow

“At the latest on Wednesday, August 27th.”

(‘Documents on German Foreign Policy . . . ‘, op. cit.. Volume 7; p. 157).

Stalin replied to Hitler on 21 August, thanking him for his letter and saying:

“The assent of the German Government to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact provides the foundation for eliminating the political tension and the establishment of peace and collaboration between our countries.

The Soviet government have instructed me to inform you that they agree to Herr von Ribbentropp’s arriving in Moscow on August 23″.

(‘Documents on German Foreign Policy . . . ‘, op. cit.; p. 168).

Ribbentropp and his delegation arrived in Moscow on 23 August, and the non-aggression pact was signed later the same day. Its text was almost identical with the Soviet draft which had been submitted to the Germans on 19 August. Neither party would attack the other, and should one party become the object of belligerent action by a third Power, the other party would render no support to this third Power.

Even more strongly criticised than the pact itself has been a ‘Secret Additional Protocol’ to the pact which laid down German and Soviet ‘spheres of interest’ in Europe.

But the term ‘sphere of interest’ does not necessarily have implications of imperialist domination. Where two states are likely to be affected by war but wish this not to involve them in mutual conflict, then the demarcation of spheres of interest is a legitimate and desirable act.

The ‘secret additional protocol’ declared:

“1. In the event of a territorial and political transformation in the territories belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) the northern frontier of Lithuania shall represent the frontier of the spheres of interest both of Germany and the USSR. . .
2. In the event of a territorial and political transformation of the territories belonging to the Polish State, the spheres of interest both of Germany and the USSR shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula and San”.

(‘Documents on German Foreign Policy . . . ‘, Series D, Volume 7; p. 246-47).

In ordinary language, this meant that the German government promised that, when German troops invaded Poland, they would not attempt to advance beyond the ‘Curzon Line’, drawn by the British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon, after the First World War as the ethnic boundary separating the Poles from the Ukrainians and Byelorussians. The area east of this line had been Soviet territiory which was seized from the Soviet Union following the Revolution.

Germany had thus agreed that it would raise no objection to the Soviet government taking whatever action it considered desirable east of this line.

The Effect of the Non-Aggression Pact

Speaking to the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union on 31 August, Molotov described the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact as:

“A turning-point in the history of Europe, and not of Europe alone”.

(V. M. Molotov: Speech to Supreme Soviet of 31 August 1939, in: ‘Soviet Peace Policy'; London; 1941; p. 18).

Molotov accepted Zhdanov’s conclusion — that the British and French had never been serious in their attitude to the negotiations:

“They themselves displayed extreme dilatoriness and anything but a serious attitude towards the negotiations, entrusting them to individuals of secondary importance who were not vested with adequate powers. . .
The British and French military missions came to Moscow without any definite powers and without the right to conclude any military convention. Furthermore, the British military mission arrived in Moscow without any mandate at all”.

(V. M. Molotov: ibid.; p. 13).

Molotov declared that the breakdown of the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations was only superficially the refusal of Poland or accept Soviet assistance, since:

“The negotiations showed that Great Britain was not anxious to overcome these objections of Poland, but on the contrary encouraged them.
Poland . . . had been acting on the instructions of Great Britain and France. .”

(V. M. Molotov: ibid.; p. 12, 14).

He stressed that it was not the Soviet government’s action in signing the pact which had disrupted the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations. On the contrary, the Soviet government had signed the pact only after the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations had been irrevocably sabotaged by the British and French governments:

“Attempts are being made to spread the fiction that the conclusion of the Soviet-German pact disrupted the negotiations with Britain and France for a mutual assistance pact. . . . In reality, as you know, the very reverse is true. . . . The Soviet Union signed the non-aggression pact with Germany, amongst other things, because negotiations with France and Great Britain had . . . ended in failure through the fault of the ruling circles of Britain and France”.

(V. M. Molotov: ibid.; p. 20).

The same point was made by the Soviet People’s Commissar for Defence, Marshal Kliment Voroshilov, at a press conference on 27 August 1939:

“Miltary negotiations with England and France were not broken off because the USSR concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany; on the contrary, the USSR concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany as a result, inter alia, of the fact that the military negotiations with France and England had reached a deadlock”.

(K. Y. Voroshilov: Press statement of 27 August 1939, in: J. Degras (Ed.): ‘Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy'; London; 1953; p. 361).

Furthermore, Molotov emphasised that the Soviet negotiations with Germany were on a completely different level to the Soviet negotiations with Britain and France:

“We are dealing not with a pact of mutual assistance, as in the case of the Anglo-French-Soviet relations, but only with a non-aggression Pact.”

(V. M. Molotov: ibid.; p. 18).

So that, as a result of the signing of the German-Soviet pact:

“the USSR is not obliged to involve itself in war, either on the side of Great Britain against Germany or on the side of Germany against Great Britain.”

(V. M. Molotov: ibid.,; p. 21).

Even such anti-Soviet writers as Edward Carr agree that the Soviet government’s decision to sign the non-aggression pact with Germany was an enforced second choice, which was taken only with extreme reluctance:

“The most striking feature of the Soviet-German negotiations . . . is the extreme caution with which they were conducted from the Soviet side, and the prolonged Soviet resistance to close the doors on the Western negotiations”.

(E. H. Carr: ‘From Munich to Moscow: II’, in: ‘Soviet Studies’, Volume 1, No. 12 (October 1949); p. 104).

Indeed, some Soviet leaders — notably Maksim Litvinov, the former People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs — urged that more time should be given for the British and French governments to be pressed by public opinion in their countries into serious negotiations for a pact of mutual assistance.

What precipitated the acceptance of the pressing German proposals for a rapprochement was the discovery by Soviet intelligence that the Chamberlain government was secretly negotiating for a military alliance with Germany, so threatening the Soviet Union with aggression from four Powers — Britain, France, Germany and Italy — combined. The British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Nevile Henderson, describes in an official report to Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax, dated 29 August 1939, a conversation with Hitler and Ribbentropp:

“Herr von Ribbentropp asked me whether I could guarantee that the Prime Minister could carry the country with him in a policy of friendship with Germany. I said that there was no possible doubt whatever that he could and would, provided Germany cooperated with him. Herr Hitler asked whether England would be willing to accept an alliance with Germany. I said, speaking personally, I did not exclude such a possibility”.

(‘Documents concerning German-Polish Relations and the Outbreak of Hostilites between Great Britain and Germany on September 3, 1939′; (Cmd. 6106); London; 1939; p. 130).

The fact that both German and Soviet troops entered Poland has been used to equate Fascist Germany with the socialist Soviet Union. But, of course, a socialist state cannot be equated with an aggressive imperialist state. It has to be noted,

Firstly, that Soviet troops entered what had been Polish territory only on 17 September — 16 days after the German invasion of Poland – when the Polish state had collapsed, as Molotov stressed to the Supreme Soviet on 31 October 1939:

“Our troops entered the territory of Poland only after the Polish State had collapsed and actually had ceased to exist. . . . The Soviet government could not but reckon with the exceptional situation created for our brothers in the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia, who had been abandoned to their fate as a result of the collapse of Poland”.

(V. M. Molotov: Speech to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 31 October 1939, in: ‘Soviet Foreign Policy'; London; 1941; p. 32).

And the correspondents of the capitalist press agree with Soviet contemporary Soviet sources that the Red Army was welcomed as liberators by the Ukrainian and Byelorussian population concerned. Molotov reported:

“The Red Army . . . was greeted with sympathy by the Ukrainian and Byelorussian population, who welcomed our troops as liberators from the yoke of the gentry and from the yoke of the Polish landlords and capitalists.”

(V. M. Molotov: ibid.; p. 33).

In the House of Commons on 20 September, Conservative MP Robert Boothby declared:

“I think it is legitimate to suppose that this action on the part of the Soviet Government was taken . . . from the point of view of self-preservation and self-defence. . . . The action taken by the Russian troops . . . has pushed the German frontier considerably westward. .
I am thankful that Russian troops are now along the Polish-Romanian frontier. I would rather have Russian troops there than German troops”.

(Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, Volume 351; House of Commons; London; 1939; Col. 996).

It is outside the scope of today’s seminar to discuss one of the most absurd of the anti-Stalin stories — that Stalin trusted the Nazis to adhere to the pact and was completely taken by surprise when the German army invaded the Soviet Union in 1941.

Who can forget Stalin’s prophetic words in 1931:

“We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or we shall go under”.

(J. V. Stalin: ‘The Tasks of Business Executives’, in: ‘Works’, Volume I13; Moscow; 1955; p. 41).

Exactly ten years later, in 1941, came the German invasion.

The test of the correctness or incorrectness of Stalin’s policy is whether or not it strengthened or weakened the ability of the socialist Soviet Union to defend itself against the future aggression which its leaders knew was inevitable.

Even such virulent anti-Soviet writers as Edward Carr admit that the signing of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact enabled the Soviet Union to put itself in an incomparably stronger defensive position to meet the German invasion:

“The Chamberlain government ., as a defender of capitalism, refused . . . to enter into an alliance with the USSR against Germany. . . .
In the pact of August 23rd, 1939, they (the Soviet government — Ed.) secured:
a) a breathing space of immunity from attack;
b) German assistance in mitigating Japanese pressure in the Far East;
c) German agreement to the establishment of an advanced defensive bastion beyond the existing Soviet frontiers in Eastern Europe; it was significant that this bastion was, and could only be, a line of defence against potential German attack, the eventual prospect of which was never far absent from Soviet reckonings. But what most of all was achieved by the pact was the assurance that, if the USSR had eventually to fight Hitler, the Western Powers would already be involved”.

(E. H. Carr: ‘From Munich to Moscow: II’, in: ‘Soviet Studies’, Volume 1, No. 2 (October 1949); p. 103).

——————————————————————————–

Questions Put By The Audience to The Speaker, And His Replies

Question 1: 

It has been suggested that Litvinov was removed from his post simply because he was a Jew, and as such would have been regarded as unsuitable as a negotiator by the Germans. Is there any truth in this?

Reply: 

In my opinion, no. We know that Stalin supported the replacement of Litvinov, and Stalin was known to be have been opposed not only to racism but to any concession to racism. Litvinov had, personally, been strongly associated with the policy of collective security and reliable sources testify to his conviction that, with more time, the British and French governments would sooner or later endorse this policy. As soon as the Soviet leaders began to give consideration to the possibility of a rapprochement with Germany, therefore, Litvinov ceased to be a reliable instrument of Soviet foreign policy.

Question 2: 

Did Litvinov actually oppose the signing of the non-aggression pact?

Reply: 

I have no concrete information as to whether he opposed it on principle, but he is known to have held the view that more time should be given to allow the Anglo-French representatives to see sense’. But he is on record later as declaring that it had been ‘a mistake’ resulting from Molotov’s ‘lack of understanding of the functioning of Western democracy’.

Question 3: 

In one of Molotov ‘s speeches following the occupation of Eastern Poland, he referred to the Polish state as being the illegitimate child of Versailles and commented that, happily, it had disappeared. This has been interpreted as demonstrating that the Soviet Union always had territorial designs upon Poland. Was the Soviet position one of supporting the destruction of the Polish state?

Question 3a. 

Does this mean that the Soviet Union was prepared to deny the aspirations of the Polish people to have their own state?

Reply: 

There is no doubt that the Polish people constitute a nation, and Marxist-Leninists have always recognised the right of any nation to have its own independent state. The Polish state which existed in 1939, however, did not have its boundaries drawn on ethnic lines; it included, for example, millions of Ukrainians and Byelorussians and I feel sure that it was such facts which lay at the basis of Molotov ‘s statement. In other words it was not any Polish state, but that existing in 1939 which Molotov depicted as a monstrosity. However, that Polish Polish state was not destroyed by the Red Army, but by the German army; the Red Army’s occupation of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia began only after the Polish state had collapsed and ceased to exist. The Polish state was restored after the United Nations victory over Germany in 1945.

Question 4: 

Was a protocol signed as part of the non-aggression pact which led to a line being drawn across Poland dividing the spheres of interest of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany? Is this the secret protocol referred to in the West and did such a protocol really exist? Was the dividing line the Curzon Line?

Reply: 

The Anglo-American imperialists published the ‘secret protocol’ after the Second World War, claiming that it had been discovered in the captured archives of the German Foreign Office. I know that the late Soviet President, Andrei Gromyko, denounces the ‘secret additional protocol’ as a forgery in his memoirs, but he was a notorious revisionist and not a source I would place any reliance on. As far as I recall, the Soviet government of the time neither confirmed nor denied its authenticity. However, in the Soviet Information Bureau published in 1948, Falsifiers of History, no charge is made that the document is spurious, and this official pamphlet states:

“The Soviet Union succeeded in making good use of the Soviet-German Pact to strengthen its defences, . . . in moving its frontiers far to the West and in barring the way of the unhampered eastward advance of German Aggression”.
(‘Falsifiers of History'; op. cit.; p. 45).

It would seem that this cannot possibly refer to the treaty itself (which makes no mention of spheres of interest or frontiers), but only to the ‘secret additional protocol’. As I said before, I do not accept the view that ‘spheres of interest’ between states are necessarily an phenomenon to be condemned. A socialist state may have its own spheres of interest which it sees as essential to its defence and, where these may conflict with the spheres of interest of other states, it seems to me correct to try to reach agreement with these other states, to map them out in order to maintain peaceful relations with these other states. On the evidence available to me at present, I believe the published ‘secret protocol’ to be genuine. Yes, the dividing line ‘ran along the old Curzon Line.

The above paper was read by Bill Bland at a seminar organised by the STALIN SOCIETY in London in February 1990.

Frederick Schuman on Kulak Destruction of Crops and Livestock

Away_With_Private_Peasants!

“Their [kulak] opposition took the initial form of slaughtering their cattle and horses in preference to having them collectivized. The result was a grievous blow to Soviet agriculture, for most of the cattle and horses were owned by the kulaks. Between 1928 and 1933 the number of horses in the USSR declined from almost 30,000,000 to less than 15,000,000; of horned cattle from 70,000,000 (including 31,000,0000 cows) to 38,000,000 (including 20,000,000 cows); of sheep and goats from 147,000,000 to 50,000,000; and of hogs from 20,000,000 to 12,000,000. Soviet rural economy had not recovered from this staggering loss by 1941.

[...] Some [kulaks] murdered officials, set the torch to the property of the collectives, and even burned their own crops and seed grain. More refused to sow or reap, perhaps on the assumption that the authorities would make concessions and would in any case feed them.

The aftermath was the ‘Ukraine famine’ of 1932—33 [….] Lurid accounts, mostly fictional, appeared in the Nazi press in Germany and in the Hearst press in the United States, often illustrated with photographs that turned out to have been taken along the Volga in 1921 [….] The ‘famine’ was not, in its later stages, a result of food shortage, despite the sharp reduction of seed grain and harvests flowing from special requisitions in the spring of 1932 which were apparently occasioned by fear of war in Japan. Most of the victims were kulaks who had refused to sow their fields or had destroyed their crops.”

– Frederick Schuman, quoted in Douglas Tottle, “Fraud, Famine, and Fascism: the Ukrainian Genocide Myth from Hitler to Harvard,” page 93-94.

Marxist-Leninist Research Bureau: The Kirov Murder

3506-164-cd24e50ab3b546ae76f0d0c02702f1fde81bd4b1

The Murder

On 2 December 1934, ‘Pravda’ announced that:

“On 1 December at 16.30, in the city of Leningrad in the building of the Leningrad Soviet (former Smolny), at the hands of a murderer, a concealed enemy of the working class, died Secretary of the Central and Leningrad Committees of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and member of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, Comrade Sergei Mironovich KIROV*. The gunman has been arrested. His identity is being established”.

(Robert Conquest: ‘Stalin and the Kirov Murder’ (hereafter listed as ‘Robert Conquest (1989)’; London; 1989; p. 7, citing “Pravda” 2 December 1934).

Having entered the building, the assassin went up to the second floor and:

” . . hid in the bathroom. From the bathroom window the main entrance was visible”.

(Anton Antonov-Ovseenko: ‘The Time of Stalin: Portrait of a Tyranny'; New York; 1981; p. 91).

Then, as Kirov walked along the corridor to his office, the assassin emerged from his hiding place:

“To shoot him in the back of the neck”.

(Stepan V. Krasnikov: ‘Sergei Mironovich Kirov'; Moscow; 1964; p. 200).

The murder was premeditated:

“The murder was not done on impulse. The assassin had been preparing his act since the summer”.

(Robert Conquest (1989): op. cit.; p. 9).

The assassin was arrested at the scene of the crime:

“The assassin fainted and fell beside his victim Kirov was carried, bleeding and unconscious into his office. . . . He soon died. The autopsy gives in great detail the path of the bullet and its effects. It was soon established that a Nagan revolver was used, and that this was what was found near the assassin. Meanwhile, NKVD men arrested the unconscious killer”.

(Robert Conquest (1989): ibid.; p. 9).

The Assassin

On 3 December 1934, it was announced that:

“Preliminary investigations had established that the assassin was Leonid Vasilevich NIKOLAYEV*, born 1904, a former worker in the Leningrad Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection (RKI) and that the investigation was continuing”.

(Robert Conquest (1989): ibid.; p. 10, citing; ‘Pravda’, 3 December 1934).

He:

“Was married to a woman named Milda Draule, and had two children. His wife was a Latvian. . . . She had a secretarial job at Party headquarters.”

(Robert Conquest (1989): ibid.; p. 11).

He ultimately got:

“A position in the RKI. He seems to have been found inadequate and was demoted to a lesser post”.

(Robert Conquest (1989): ibid.; p. 10).

He:

“Had joined the Communist Party in 1920, at the age of sixteen.
He . . . in March (1934– Ed.) was expelled from the Party for breach of its discipline, However, two months later he was reinstated, having made ‘a declaration of repentance”‘.

(Robert Conquest (1989): ibid.; p. 10, 11).

He had developed a single-minded hatred of authority:

“Which he blamed for failing to give him his due and ignoring his problems. He began to see himself as an assassin on the historic scale. One report has him saying at an early interrogation in times to come my name will be coupled with those of ZHELIABOV* and BALMASHEV*‘, the great assassins of the Russian past”.

(Robert Conquest (1989): ibid.; p. 11).

Nikolayev later admitted that in the period August-November 1934, he had:

“‘Tried out’ . . . the ‘Nagan revolver he possessed”‘.

(“The Crime of the Zinoviev Opposition” (hereafter listed as ‘Crime’ (1935)’ Moscow; 1935; p. 19).

And it emerged during the investigation that:

“With the object of covering up traces of the crime and concealing his accomplices, and also with the object of masking the true motives for the murder of Comrade Kirov, the accused Nikolayev prepared several documents (a diary, statements addressed to various institutions, etc.) in which he endeavoured to portray his crime as a personal act of desperation and dissatisfaction arising out of his straitened material circumstances and as a protest against ‘the unjust attitude of certain members of the government towards a live person.”

(‘Crime’ (1935): op. cit.; p. 19).

The Investigation

On the evening of 1 December, a high-level delegation, consisting of three members of the Political Bureau – Stalin, Kliment VOROSHILOV*, Vyacheslav MOLOTOV* – and Andrey ZHDANOV* set out from Moscow to head the investigation into Kirov’s murder. Lower-level members of the delegation included Aleksandr KOSAREV*, General Secretary of the Communist Youth League (Komsomol), Genrikh YAGODA* , USSR People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs, and Yakov AGRANOV*, Deputy People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs. The delegates from Moscow reached Leningrad

“Around 7.30-8.30 a.m. on 2 December”;

(Robert Conquest (1989): op. cit.; p. 41).

It was already apparent that there were several odd circumstances about the murder:

“The absence of all guards at the Smolny was, on the face of it, an astonishing lapse, and so was the failure of Kirov’s bodyguard to accompany him.”

(Robert Conquest (1989): op. cit.; p. 8, 39).

While the behaviour of the security police had been even stranger. They:

“Had long since been aware of Nikolayev’s attitude and threats. They had reported this to Zaporozhets (Ivan Zaporozhets, Deputy Head of Leningrad NKVD – Ed.)”.

(Robert Conquest (1989): op. cit.; p. 40).

It was discovered that, when Nikolayev visited the Smolny in December 1934 (a few days before Kirov was murdered), his brief-case had been searched and:

“In the brief-case there were a loaded pistol and a diary. Nikolayev was immediately detained and taken to the commandant’s office”.

(Alexander Orlov: ‘The Secret History of Stalin’s Crimes'; New York; 1953; p. 17).

However, as the defendant Pavel BULANOV* testified at the 1938 treason trial, Zaporozhets had ordered him to be released:

“I recall that . . . several days before the assassination of Kirov, the guard detained Nicolayev . . . and a notebook and revolver were found in his portfolio, but that Zaporozhets released him in time.”

(Pavel Bulanov: Testimony at 1938 Treason Trial (March 1938), in: Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet ‘Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites’ (hereafter listed as ‘Trial’ (1938)); Moscow; 1938; p. 558).

Stalin himself interrogated the assassin, Nikolayev. According to Alexander ORLOV* who defected from the Soviet security police in July 1938, when the prisoner was brought from his cell, Stalin asked him:

“‘Why did you kill such a nice man?”‘.

(Alexander Orlov: op. cit.; p. 22).

and:

“All accounts agree that Nikolayev replied boldly, pointing to the NKVD men and saying that Stalin should ask them that question.”

(Robert Conquest (1989): op. cit.; p. 41).

The Murder of Borisov (1934)

A vital witness in the case was clearly the head of Kirov’s personal bodyguard, a man named BORISOV:

“Accounts are agreed that Borisov was devoted to Kirov”.

(Robert Conquest (1989): op. cit.; p. 42).

Late in the morning of 2 December, in response to a request from Leningrad NKVD headquarters, Borisov was driven to the Smolny:

“Zaporozhets, being alarmed by this and fearing that Borisov would betray those who stood behind Nikolayev, decided to kill Borisov. Zaporozhetz so arranged it that an accident occurred to the automobile which took Borisov to the Smolny, Borisov was killed in the accident, and in this way they got rid of a dangerous witness.”

(Pavel Bulanov: Testimony at 1938 Treason Trial, in: ‘Trial’ (1938); op. cit.; p. 558-59).

The Arrest of the Leningrad Security Police Officers (1934)

During the day (2 December):

“Almost the whole leadership of the Leningrad NKVD . . . were removed from their posts and sent for trial for ‘negligence in connection with their duties”‘.

(Robert Conquest (1989): op. cit.; p. 42-43, citing ‘Pravda’, 4 December 1934).

Yakov Agranov:

“Was given temporary charge of the Leningrad NKVD”.

(Robert Conquest (1989): ibid.; p. 43, citing ‘Pravda’, 4 December 1934).

Kirov’s Funeral (1934)

Stalin left Leningrad on 4 December to return to Moscow,

“With Agranov running the actual investigation.”

(Robert Conquest (1989): op. cit.; p. 43.

On 4 December 1934:

“Kirov’s coffin arrived in Moscow at 10.30 a.m., . . . and the State funeral started at 2.30 p.m. on 6 December. Stalin was one of the guards of honour.”

(Robert Conquest (1989) op. cit.; p. 43.)

The Anti-Terrorist Legislation (1934)

On the evening of 1 December 1934, the day of Kirov’s murder:

“The Secretary of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee, YENUKIDZE*. signed the following directive:
1. Investigative agencies are directed to speed up the cases of those accused of the preparation or execution of acts of terror.
2. Judicial organs are directed not to hold up the execution of death sentences pertaining to crimes of this category in order to consider the possibility of pardon, because the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR does not consider as possible the receiving of petitions of this sort.
3. The organs of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs are directed to execute the death sentences against criminals of the above-mentioned category immediately after the passage of sentences.”

(Avel Yenukidze: Anti-Terrorism Directive of USSR Central Executive Committee (1 December 1934), cited in: Nikita S,. Khrushchev: Secret Speech to 20th Congress of CPSU (February 1956), in “‘The Dethronement of Stalin”; Manchester; 1956; p. 11).

However:

” . the ‘Law of 1 December 1934’ . . . was subsequently rarely used.”

(J. Arch Getty: ‘Origins of the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered: 1933-1938′; Cambridge; 1985; p. 298).

The Trial of the Whiteguard Terrorists (1934)

On 4 December 1934:

“It was announced that ‘cases of recently arrested Whiteguards charged with preparing terrorist attacks against workers of the Soviet power’ had been sent on 2 December for immediate consideration to the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court. The period from December 5 to 18 December saw the announcement of the trial and execution of 102 of these. . . . . .(17 were remanded for further investigation).. . .
All those indicted were accused of being terrorists sent over the frontiers with arms and instructions to assassinate”.

(Robert Conquest (1989) op. cit.; p. 44).

On 2 January 1935, Ivan MAISKY*, the Soviet Ambassador in London, responding on 2 January 1935 to representations on these cases, declared:

“The persons recently executed in various towns of the USSR under sentences imposed by the courts . . . were found guilty of the planning and execution of acts of terrorism. . . . The majority of them entered the Soviet Union illegally from abroad, and were found to have in their possession bombs, grenades, revolvers and other weapons. In court they openly admitted that they were enemies of the Soviet Union and confessed to the perpetration of the crimes with which they were charged”.

(Ivan Maisky; Statement on Trial and Execution of Terrorists (2 January 1935), in: Jane Degras (Ed.): ‘Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy’, Volume 3; London; 1953; p. 100).

It was not suggested that the terrorists involved in these cases were involved in the murder of Kirov. As J. Arch Getty comments:

“It seemed that the regime, unprepared for the crime and unclear about who should be punished, lashed out in a violent but ad hoc way at traditional enemies of the Soviet power.”

(J. Arch Getty: op. cit.; p. 209).

The ‘Leningrad Terrorist Centre’ (1934)

Yakov Agranov, as temporary head of the Leningrad NKVD:

“Quickly established a connection between Nikolayev and the men who had been the leading figures in the Leningrad Komsomol during ZINOVIEV’s* ascendancy in the city. The most prominent was I. I. KOTOLNYOV*, former member of the Central Committee of the Komsomol. . . . He had, in fact, been a real oppositionist”.

(Robert Conquest: ‘The Great Terror: Stalin’s Purge of the Thirties'; London; 1973; p. 86).

In fact:

“Nikolayev had been in the Vyborg district’s branch, whose head was of course a Zinovievite – I. I. Kotolnyov”.

(Robert Conquest (1989): op. cit.; p. 51).

Further investigation established that:

“in 1933 and 1934 . . . an underground counter-revolutionary and terrorist group was formed in Leningrad”.

(‘Crime’ (1935): op. cit.; p. 8)

and that the Kotolnyov group:

“was headed by the underground terrorist ‘Leningrad Centre’

(‘Crime’ (1935): ibid.; p. 9)

On 22 December 1934, Nikolayev, Kotolnyov and 12 other people:

“Were committed for trial before the Military Collegium”.

(Robert Conquest (1989): op. cit.; p. 53, citing ‘Pravda’, 17 December, 1934).

On 22 December 1934, the NKVD announced that:

“The investigation into Nikolaev and his accomplices had been concluded on 20 December. The act (the murder of Kirov — Ed.) had been carried out on the orders of ‘the illegal terrorist “Leningrad Centre” (described as ‘former members of the Zinoviev opposition’)”.

(Robert Conquest (1989): op. cit.; p. 53).

The indictment in the case of the ‘Leningrad Centre’, published on 27 December 1934, named Ivan Kotolnyov as among:

“The principal organisers of the conspiracy against Kirov”.

(‘Crime’ (1935): op. cit.; p. 8).

The Arrests of Members of the Moscow Terrorist Centre (1934)

Ivan BAKAYEV*, Zinoviev’s former Leningrad security police chief, and Grigory YEVDOKIMOV*, Kirov’s predecessor as Leningrad 1st Secretsry, were:

“Arrested around 14 December (1934 — Ed.)”.

(Robert Conquest (1989): op. cit.; p. 53).

Grigory Zinoviev and Lev KAMENEV* and five of their associates were:

“Arrested ‘in Moscow’ on 16 December ‘in connection with the Kirov murder.”

(Robert Conquest (1989): ibid.; p. 54, citing ‘Pravda’, 23 December 1934).

But on 23 December it was announced that:

“In the absence of sufficient evidence to put them on trial”,

(J. Arch Getty: op. cit.; p. 209).

Their cases had:

“Been handed over for examination to the Special Board of the NKVD with a view to the summary exile of these persons. Investigations in connection with the other arrested persons are proceeding”.

(Robert Conquest (1989): op. cit.; p. 55, citing ‘Pravda’, 23 December 1934).

The Trial of the ‘Leningrad Terrorist Centre’ (1935)

On 28-29 December 1934, the trial took place of Nikolayev, Kotolnyov and 10 other defendants accused of conspiracy to murder Kirov:

“All twelve accused, who were stated to have belonged to a ‘Leningrad Centre’, were sentenced to death and immediately shot”.

(Friedrich Adler: ‘The Witchcraft Trial in Moscow'; London; 1936; p. 25).

The First Trial of Kamenev and Zinoviev (1935)

In January 1935 it was announced that further investigation had produced:

“. . new material”.

(‘Crime’ (1935): op. cit.; p. 33).

relating to the activities of Kamenev, Yevdokimov, Zinoviev and others, and on 13 January they were indicted as members of the:

“. . so -called ‘Moscow Centre.”

(‘Crime’ (1935): ibid,; p. 33-34).

It was admitted that the further investigation had:

“Not established facts which might serve as grounds for directly accusing the members of the ‘Moscow Centre’ of having given their consent to . . . the terrorist attack committed against Comrade Kirov”,

(‘Crime’ (1935): ibid.; p. 41).

nevertheless, said the indictment, the facts proved:

“That they were aware of the terrorist sentiments of the members of the group and that they inflamed those sentiments”.

(‘Crime’ (1935): ibid.; p. 41).

and so:

“Must bear not only moral and political responsibility, but also responsibility before Soviet law, for the consequences of their underground counter-revolutionary activities which induced their Leningrad group to resort to terrorist acts”.

(‘Crime’ (1935): ibid; p. 41).

From 15 to 16 January 1935, the first trial of Kamenev, Zinoviev, Yevdokimov, Bakayev and 15 other defendants took place in Leningrad in camera before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court.

The defendant Yevdokimov admitted in court:

“When we are blamed for a terrorist attitude, I firmly declare: yes, for that we must take responsibility, for the venom by which we poisoned those who surrounded us over the last decade and which made possible a supreme crime, the murder of Kirov”.

(Grigory Yevdokimov: Testimony at 1935 Trial, in: Robert Conquest (1989): op. cit.; p. 65, citing ‘Pravda’, 16 January 1935).

A summary of the trial was published in ‘Pravda':

“The accused confessed . . . that they had tried . . . to strengthen their supporters’ feelings of bitterness and open hatred for the leaders of the Party and for Soviet power. . .
They were forced by the weight of the evidence to confess that in that poisionous, Zinovievist underground counter-revolutionary cesspool, they developed and strengthened authentic Whiteguard methods of struggle against Soviet power, and an openly terroristic temperament that led to the foul murder of Comrade Kirov”.

(Robert Conquest (1989): ibid.; p. 65, citing ‘Pravda’, 17 January 1935).

In short, at the trial, Kamenev and Zinoviev:

“Denied that they took any part in the murder of Comrade Kirov. . . . . stating at the trial that they bore only moral and political responsibility for the assassination of Comrade Kirov”.

(Report of Court Proceedings: The Case of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Centre (hereafter listed as ‘Report’ (1936); London; 1973; p. 10).

The accused were found guilty. Zinoviev and three minor figures were sentenced:

“to ten years’ imprisonment as the ‘active leaders’ and ‘most active members’ of the underground group”.

(Robert Conquest (1989): ibid.; p. 66).

Most of the others were sentenced:

“To eight or six years for ‘active participation’ and membership'”.

(Robert Conquest (1989): ibid.; p. 66).

while Kamenev and two other defendants were sentenced to five years as:

” . . less active members.”

(Robert Conquest (1989): ibid.; p. 66).

In addition:

” . . . . the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs sentenced 49 persons involved in the matter of the Zinoviev group to internment in camps for criminals for a period of four to five years, and 29 other persons to be removed to various places in the country for a period of two to five years.”

(Friedrich Adler: op cit.; p. 26).

The Trial of the Leningrad Security Police Officials (1935)

On 23 January 1935,

“The police officials whose arrest had been announced on 4 December were brought to trial”.

(Robert Conquest (1989): op. cit.; p. 69).

The 12 defendants, who included the head of the Leningrad NKVD Filip MEJDVED and his two deputies Ivan Zaporozhets and Fedor FOMIN, were charged with varying degrees of:

“Criminal negligence. All . . . pleaded guilty”,

(Robert Conquest (1989): op. cit.; p. 69, 70).

and were sentenced to terms of imprisonment of between ten and three years (Robert Conquest (1989): op. cit.; p. 70).

The convicted police officials were in fact treated very leniently:

“The chiefs of the Leningrad section of the Commissariat for Internal Affairs and their deputies . . . were . . . given responsible posts in the administratrion of the concentration camps to which they were sent. Actually, therefore, the punishment meant nothing more than a reduction in rank”.

(Boris Nikolayevsky: ‘Power and the Soviet Elite: “The Letter of an Old Bolshevik” and Other Essays'; New York; 1965; p. 53).

The Second Trial of Kamenev (1935)

The Yenukidze Affair (see Report No. 12) in the summer of 1935, involved:

“a woman employee in the Kremlin library. Among the forty-six persons arrested was Kamenev (whose brother was a doctor in the Kremlin)”.

(Robert Conquest (1989): op. cit.,; p. 78).

He was:

“sentenced on July 27 1935 to imprisonment for ten years”.

(‘Report’ (1936): op. cit.; p. 174).

The Trial of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Centre (1936)

In the late spring of 1936:

” Zinoviev, Kamenev, Yevdokimov and Bakayev were brought back from their isolators to face a new interrogation, with the veteran I. N. SMIRNOV“.

(Robert Conquest (1989): op. cit.; p. 79).

The Indictment:

“Was published on 15 August, and on 19 August the trial opened in public, . . . . with representatives of the Western press and diplomatic corps present”.

(Robert Conquest (1889): op. cit.; p. 80).

The seven principal defendants were:

Ivan Bakayev,
Grigory Yevdokimov,
Lev Kamenev,
Sergei MRACHOVSKY*,
Ivan Smirnov,
Vagvarshak TER-VAGANYAN*, and
Grigory Zinoviev,

and there were ten minor defendants, making 16 in all. (‘Report’ (1936): op. cit.; p. 38-39).

Leon TROTSKY and his son Leon SEDOV* were indicted in absentia:

“L. Trotsky and his son L. L. Sedov, both of whom are abroad, having been exposed by the materials in the present case as having directly prepared and personally guided the work of organising in the USSR terroristic acts against the leaders of the CPSU and of the Soviet State, in the event of their being discovered on the territory of the USSR, are subject to immediate arrest and trial”.

(‘Report’ (1936): ibid.; p. 39).

14 of the defendants (including all the major figures except Ivan Smirnov):

“pleaded guilty on all charges”.

(‘Report’ (1936): ibid.; p. 40).

Smirnov and one of the minor defendants denied:

“Only . . . personal participation in the preparation of terroristic acts”.

(‘Report’ (1936): ibid.; p. 40).

The defendant Sergei Mrachovsky testified that at the end of 1932, a unified terrorist bloc was formed between the Trotskyites and the Zinovievites and:

“That in the second half of 1932 the question was raised of the necessity of uniting the Trotskyite terrorist group with the Zinovievites. The question of this unification was raised by I. N. Smirnov. . . . In the autumn of 1932 a letter was received from Trotsky in which he approved the decision to unite with the Zinovievites. . . Union must take place on the basis of terrorism, and Trotsky once again emphasised the necessity of killing Stalin, Voroshiloy and Kirov.. . . The terrrorist bloc of the Trotskyites and the Zinovievites was formed at the end of 1932″.

(‘Report’ (1936): op. cit.; p. 41-42).

The defendants Grigory Zinoviev, Grigory Yevdokimov and Lev Kamenev admitted that Kirov’s murder had been organised by this unified Trotskyite-Zinovievite terrorist centre:

“VYSHINSKY (TO ZINOVIEV): Was the assassination of Sergei Mironovich Kirov organised by your centre . . .?

ZINOVIEV: Yes, by our centre.

VYSHINSKY: In that centre there were you, Kamenev, Smirnov, Mrachovsky and Ter-Vaganyan?

ZINOVIEV: Yes.

VYSHINSKY: So you all organised the assassination of Kirov?

ZINOVIEV: Yes”.

(‘Report’ (1936): ibid.; p. 44-45).

“VYSIIINSKY: Was the murder of Sergei Mironoviuch Kirov prepared by the centre?

YEVDOKIMOV: Yes.

VYSHINSKY: You personally took part in these preparations?

YEVDOKIMOV: Yes.

VYSHINSKY: Did Zinoviev and Kamenev participate with you in the preparations?

YEVDOKIMOV: Yes”.

(‘Report’ (1936): op. cit.; p. 49).

“VYSHINSKY (TO KAMENEV): Did you give instructions to make preparations for the assassination of Kirov?

KAMENEV: Yes, in the autumn. .The terrorist conspiracy was organised by myself, Zinoviev and Trotsky. . .In June 1934 I myself went to Leningrad . . . to prepare an attempt on the life of Kirov parallel with the Nikolayev-Kotolynov group. .

VYSHINSKY: Was Kirov’s assassination directly the work of your hands?

KAMENEV: Yes”.

(‘Report’ (1936): ibid.; p. 46, 65, 67).

Both Grigory Yevdokimov and Grigory Zinoviev admitted that they had lied at their previous trial in January 1935 when they had denied involvement in planning Kirov’s assassination:

“VYSHINSKY (TO YEVDOKIMOV): At the trial in Leningrad, on January l5-16, 1935, when facing the court as you do now, you emphatically asserted that you had nothing to do with that murder. At that time you told untruths?

YEVDOKIMOV: Yes, I deceived the court

(‘Report’ (1936): op. cit.; p. 47).

“VYSHINSKY: Are you telling the whole truth now?

ZINOVIEV: Now I am telling the whole truth to the end.

VYSHINSKY: Remember that on January 15-16 1935, at the session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, you also asserted that you were telling the whole truth.

ZINOVIEV: Yes, On January 15-16 I did not tell the whole truth.

VYSHINSKY: You did not tell the truth, but you maintained that you were telling the truth”.

(‘Report’ (1936): op. cit.; p. 72).

Defendant Ivan Bakayev admitted conspiring with the assassin, Leonid Nikolayev, to murder Kirov:

“VYSHINSKY (TO BAKAYEV): Did you meet Nikolayev in Leningrad?
BAKAYEV: Yes. . . .

VYSHINSKY: Nikolayev told you that he had decided to assassinate S. M. Kirov, didn’t he?

BAKAYEV: He did. .

VYSHINSKY: Did you take part in the assassination of Comrade Kirov?

BAKAYEV: Yes. .

VYSHINSKY: You were the organiser of the assassination of Kirov?

BAKAYEV: Well, yes, but I was not the only one”.

(‘Report’ (1936): op. cit.; p. 49, 61, 62).

The defendants waived their right to speeches in their defence, but made their last pleas to the court, as follows:

“MRACHOVSKY: I am a counter-revolutionary. . . I do not ask for mitigation of my punishment. . I depart as a traitor to my Party, as a traitor who should be shot.

YEVDOKIMOV: I don’t consider it possible to plead for clemency. Our crimes against the proletarian state and against the international revolutionary movement are too great to make it possible for us to expect clemency. . .

BAKAYEV: I am guilty of the assassination of Kirov. I took a direct part in the preparation of other terroristic acts against the leaders of the Party and the government. .

KAMENEV: I, together with Zinoviev and Trotsky, was the organiser and leader of a terrorist plot which planned and prepared a number of terroristic attempts on the lives of the leaders of the government and Party of our country, and which carried out the assassination of Kirov.

ZINOVIEV: I admit that I am fully and completely guilty . . . of having been an organiser of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc second only to Trotsky, the bloc which set itself the aim of assassinating Stalin, Voroshilov and a number of other leaders of the Party and the government. I plead guilty to having been principal organiser of the assassination of Kirov. .

TER-VAGANYAN: I bow my head in guilt before the Court and say:
whatever your decision may be, however stern your verdict, I accept it as deserved.

(‘Report’ (1936): ibid.; p. 165-73).

All 16 accused were found guilty and sentenced: “to be shot”. (‘Report’ (1936): ibid.; p. 180);

On 25 August 1936:

“It was announced . . . that all the accused had been shot.”

(Robert Conquest (1989): op. cit.; p. 86).

The 1937 Treason Trial (1937)

At the second public treason trial in January 1937:

PYATAKOV*, RADEK* and fifteen others were accused of having been a ‘Reserve Centre’, kept secret in case the Zinoviev plotters were discovered. The group shot in August 1936 were now accused of having deceived the court by concealing this second network”.

(Robert Conquest (1989): op. cit.; p. 95).

At this trial,

“Little was said about the Kirov case”.

(Robert Conquest (1989): op. cit.; p. 95).

But Yuri Pyatakov and Karl Radek testified that in July 1935, after the murder of Kirov, this ‘Reserve Centre’ has discussed the question of multiple assassinations of the Party leadership as a whole:

“RADEK: In July 1935, . . . there arose the question that it was senseless killing single individuals. This would produce no political results. .

VYSHINSKY: Do I understand you rightly: it was not enough to have killed Comrade Kirov, others must be killed also?

RADEK: Either abandon terrorism altogether, or start seriously organising mass terrorist acts which would give rise to a situation bringing us nearer to power. . Trotsky’s directive concerning terrorist acts, group acts, arrived in January 1936. .

VYSHINSKY: In the second half of 1935, . . . were preparations being made in your midst for a group terrorist act?

RADEK: Yes, there were. .
When the question arose against whom terrorism should be directed.. . .
I . . did not have the slightest doubt that the acts were to be directed against Stalin and his immediate colleagues, against Kirov, Molotov, Voroshilov and KAGANOVICH*“.

(Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre; Moscow; 1937; p. 72, 74, 77, 89).

The 1938 Treason Trial (1938)

In February 1937:

BUKHARIN* and RYKOV*, leaders of the ‘Rightists’, were arrested.
Yagoda was arrested in April 1937″.

(Robert Conquest (1989): op. cit.; p. 96).

and the 1938 treason trial, like those of 1936 and 1937 held in public,

“opened on 2 March 1938″.

(Robert Conquest (1989): ibid.; p. 97).

From the point of view of the Kirov murder:

“The main interest of the trial was that it was now that the NKVD was first publicly blamed not for mere negligence but for active complicity in the crime”.

(Robert Conquest (1989): ibid.; p. 97).

It was now revealed that Cenrikh Yagoda, who had held the post of People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs (in charge of the NKVD) from July 1934 to September 1936, had been a leading member of the conspiracy. Yagoda’s secretary, Pavel Bulanov, testified that:

“In the early part of 1936 . . . Yagoda . . . said that he had known that an attempt on S. M. Kirov was being prepared, that he had a reliable man in Leningrad who was inititiated into everything, Zaporozhets, Assistant Chief of the Leningrad Regional Administration of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs, and that he had so arranged matters as to facilitate the assassination of Kirov by Nikolayev. . . . The whole affair was nearly exposed when, several days before the assassination of Kiroy, the guard detained Nikolayev by mistake, and a notebook and revolver were found in his portfilio, but . . . Zaporozhets released him in time”.

(‘Report’ (1938): op. cit.; p. 558).

Yagoda himself confirmed that, on orders from Avel Yenukidze, the Secretary of the Central Executive Committee and a member of the conspiracy, he had instructed Zaporozhets to facilitate the assassination of Kirov by Nikolayev:

“VYSHINSKY (TO YAGODA): Did you personally take any measures to effect the assassination of Sergei Mironovich Kirov?

YAGODA: I gave instructions

VYSHINSKY: To whom?

YAGODA: To Zaporozhets in Leningrad. . . . Zaporozhets came to Moscow and reported that a man had been detained. . . .

VYSHINSKY: In whose brief-case. . .

YAGODA: There was a revolver and a diary. And he released him. . . .

VYSHINSKY: And then you gave instructions not to place obstacles in the way of the murder of Sergei Mironovich Kirov?.

YAGODA: Yes, I did.. . . .

YAGODA: In 1934, in the summer, Yenukidze informed me that the centre of the ‘bloc of Rights and Trotskyites’ had adopted a decision to organise the assasination of Kirov. . . . Yenukidze insisted that I was not to place any obstacles in the way; the terrorist act, he said, would be carried out by the Trotskyite-Zinovievite group. Owing to this, I was compelled to instruct Zaporozhets, who occupied the post of Assistant Chief of the Regional Administation of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs, not to place any obstacles in the way of the terrorist act against Kirov. Some time later Zaporozhets informed me that the organs the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs had detained Nikolayev, in whose possession a revolver and a chart of the route Kirov usually took had been found. Nikolayev was released, Soon after that Kirov was assassinated by this very Nikolayev”.

(‘Report'(1938): ibid.; p. 376, 572-73).

Bulanov also testified that Yagoda and Zaporozhets had arranged the murder of Kirov’s bodyguard, Borisov:

“Yagoda further told me that . . . when members of the government came to Leningrad and summoned this Borisov to the Smolny to interrogate him as a witness in connection with the assassination of Kirov, Zaporozhets, being alarmed by this and fearing that Borisov would betray those who stood behind Nikolayev, decided to kill Borisoy. On Yagoda’s instructions, Zaporozhets arranged it that an accident occurred to the automobile which took Borisov to the Smolny. Borisov was killed in the accident, and in this way they got rid of a dangerous witness”.

(‘Report’ (1938): ibid.; p. 558-59).

and explained the privileged treatment accorded to the convicted security police officials as having been ordered by Yagoda:

“I then understood the exceptional and unusual solicitude which Yagoda had displayed when Medved, Zaporozhets and the other officials were arrested and brought to trial. I recalled that he had entrusted the care of the families of Zaporozhets and Medved to me personally. I recalled that he had had them sent for detention to the camp in an unusual way, not in the car for prisoners, but in a special through car”.

(‘Report’ (1938): ibid.; p. 559).

The 20th Congress of the CPSU (1956)

In his secret speech to the 20th Congress of the CPSU in February 1956, the revisionist First Secretary of the CPSU Nikita KHRUSHCHEV* recounted a garbled version of the murder of Kirov in such a way as to imply that Stalin had been responsible for organising it:

“It must be asserted that to this day the circumstances surrounding Kirov’s murder hide many things which are inexplicable and mysterious and demand a most careful examination. There are reasons for the suspicion that the killer of Kirov, Nikolayev, was assisted by someone from among the people whose duty it was to protect the person of Kirov. Before the killing, Nikolayev was arrested on the grounds of suspicious behaviour, but he was released and not even searched. It was an unusually suspicious circumstance that when the Chekist assigned to protect Kirov was being brought for an interrogation, on December 2 1934, he was killed in a car ‘accident’ in which no other occupants of the car were harmed. After the murder of Kirov, top functionaries of the NKVD were given very light sentences, but in 1937 they were shot. We can assume they were shot in order to cover the traces of the organisers of Kirov’s killing”.

(Nikita S. Khrushchev: Secret Speech to 20th Congress, CPSU (February 1956), in: ‘The Dethronement of Stalin'; op. cit.; p. 12).

Even Robert Conquest*, who maintains that:

“Stalin’s guilt (of organising the murder of Kirov — Ed.) is indeed scarcely in doubt”.

(Robert Conquest: Preface to: Robert Conquest (1989): op. cit.; p. vii).

feels compelled to admit that:

“Though Khrushchev adds the odd detail, what he reveals does not differ essentially from the evidence of Yagoda and Bulanov at the 1938 trial”.

(Robert Conquest (1989): ibid.; p. 113).

The 22nd Congress of the CPSU (1961)

In October 1961, at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev again referred (this time publicly) to ‘suspicious’ features of the murder of Kirov:

“Great efforts are still needed to find out who was really to blame for his (Kirov’s – Ed.) death. The deeper we study the materials connected with Kirov’s death, the more questions arise. Noteworthy is the fact that Kirov’s killer had twice before been detained by Chekists (security men) near the Smolny, and that arms had been found on him. But he was released both times on someone’s instructions. And the next thing this man was in the Smolny, armed, in the corridor through which Kirov usually passed. And for some reason or other, at the moment of assassination Kirov’s chief bodyguard was far behind him, although instructions did not authorise him to be at such a distance away from Kirov.

Equally strange is the following fact: When Kirov’s chief bodyguard was being escorted for questioning – and he was to be questioned by Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov – the vehicle, as the driver said afterwards, was deliberately involved in an accident by those who were taking the man for interrogation. They said that he had died as a result of the accident, although he was in fact killed by those who were escorting him.

In this way, the man who guarded Kirov was killed. Later, those who had killed him were shot. This was no accident, apparently, but a carefully planned crime. Who could have done this? A thorough inquiry is now being made into the circumstances of this complicated case.

As it turned out, the driver of the vehicle in which Kirov’s chief bodyguard was being taken for questioning is still alive. He has said that an NKVD man sat with him in his cabin during the journey. They went in a lorry. (It is, of course, very strange why a lorry should have been used to take the man for questioning, as if no other vehicle could have been found for the purpose).

Evidently, everything had been planned in advance, in detail. Two other NKVD men were in the back of the lorry together with Kirov’s chief bodyguard.
Continuing his story, the driver said that when they were driving along a street, the man sitting next to him suddenly wrested the steering wheel from his hands and directed the vehicle straight at a house. The driver had regained control of the wheel and steered the lorry so that it hit the wall of the building only sideways. He had been later -told that Kirov’s chief bodyguard had lost his life in the accident.

Why did he lose his life while none of the other people in the vehicle suffered? Why were both the officials of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs who escorted Kirov’s chief bodyguard later shot? This means that someone had to have them killed in order to cover up all the traces.

Many, very many circumstances of this and other similar cases are still obscure”.

(Nikita S. Khrushchev: Report on the Programme of the CPSU, delivered to 22nd Congress of the CPSU (October 1961); London; 1961; p. 111-12).

As Robert Conquest comments:

‘Once again, the story was not incompatible with the Yagoda-Bulanov
version. . . .
Khrushchev . effectively repeated the accusations against Yagoda,
Zaporozhets and the NKVD”.

(Robert Conqest (1989): op. cit.; p. 115, 116).

However, although no direct accusation was made, the implication of Khrushchev’s diatribe was that:

“. . . the true culprit or culprits had yet to be named”,

(Robert Conqest (1989): op. cit.; p. 115).

and that these were headed by Stalin.

Stalin’s daughter, Svetlana Alliluyeva, refers to the

” . . . transparent hints”

(Sevetlana Alliluyeva: ‘Twenty Letters to a Friend'; London; 1968; p.147.

that Stalin had organised the murder of Kirov.

The Commissions of Inquiry (1956-91)

In 1956-57 the Politburo of the Central Committe of the Party set up a Commission of Inquiry into the murder of Kirov:

“It took a large amount of evidence – 200 volumes is the f igure mentioned. Hundreds of witnesses were called, and the commission had access to all the secret archives. . . *
The Commission went to look at the scene of Borisov’s accident, and heard the driver’s evidence”.

(Robert Conquest (1989): ibid.; p. 115).

However, one must presume that it proved impossible to reconcile the draft report with hypothesis desired by the revisionist leaders — that Stalin had master-minded Kirov’s murder — for

“. . . none of this was made public, and it is unoffically reported that the Commission’s report was simply shelved”.

(Robert Conquest (1989): ibid.; p. 115).

“The Commission’s report has never been made public”.

(Alan Bullock: ‘Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives'; London; 1991; p. 520).

In addition to the Commission of the 1950s, there were

” . . . at least two investigations in the 1960s, the PELSHE* Commission and the SHVERNIK* Commission”.

(J. Arch Getty & Roberta T. Manning (Eds.): Perspectives'; Cambridge; 1993; p. 46).

In 1989 a further Commission — the YAKOVLEV* Commission — was organised, charged with filling the ‘gaps’ left by the earlier inquiries:

“A. Yakovlev’s Politburo Commission . . . appointed an intra-agency investigative team consisting of personnel from the USSR Procurator’s Office, the Military Procuracy, the KGB and various archival administrations. For two years, this team conducted interviews, reviewed
thousands of documents, and attempted to check all possible scenarios; their work has added another fifteen volumes to the thirty-year old efforts. . . . The team’s charter was to show Stalin’s complicity . . . It had little political incentive to let him off the hook; quite the contrary. Nevertheless, members of the working team concluded that in this affair, no materials objectively support Stalin’s participation or NKVD participation in the organisation and carrying out of Kirov’s murder’. The team concludes that only ‘one-sided, superficial, unverified facts, rumours and conjectures’ support Stalin complicity”.

(J. Arch Getty & Roberta T. Manning (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 46-47).

True, Olga Shatunovskaia:

“has recently written that the Kirov investigation in the 1960s had uncovered
convincing evidence that Stalin was behind the assassination …. and claimed that materials from the 1960 investigation have since been removed by Party Control Commission (KPK) personnel in order to change that investigation’s conclusion”.

(J. Arch Getty & Roberta T. Manning (Eds.): ibid.; p. 46).

And yet:

” . . . in 1989 investigators checked the earlier commission’s documents against KPK and KGB files and concluded that nothing is missing from the earlier collection. They also found that as a Khrushchev-backed KPK investigator back in 1960, Shatunovskaia . . . at that time agreed with the conclusion that Stalin had not organised the killing”.

(J. Arch Getty & Roberta T. Manning (Eds.): ibid.; p. 46).

The Myth of Stalin’s Involvement (1953-94)

The myth that Stalin masterminded the murder of Kirov first appeared in the West in 1953 as a propaganda weapon in the ‘Cold War':

“Before the Cold War, no serious authority argued that Stalin was behind the assassination (of Kirov — Ed.). The KGB defector Aleksandr ORLOV* was the first to make such a claim in his dubious 1953 account. Boris Nikolaevsky repeated the story in his influential 1956 essays (his 1936 ‘Letter of an Old Bolshevik’ had not accused Stalin”.

(J. Arch Getty: op. cit.; p. 207).

The usual motive attached to the myth was that Kirov was a ‘moderate’ political opponent of Stalin:

“The standard view of Stalinist pre-purge politics in the thirties, derived from an oral tradition, runs roughly as follows. At the end of the first Five-Year Plan (1932), a majority of the Politburo favoured relaxation and reconciliation with political opponents. Led by the Leningrad party chief, Serge Kirov, this group of Stalinist ‘moderates’ opposed Stalin’s plans to apply the death penalty to . . . adherents of the ‘Ryutin Platform’. . . .
After that, Stalin planned to eliminate the popular Kirov.
This scenario of the Kirov affair comes to us almost entirely from two sources: . . . Boris J. Nikolaevsky and NKVD defector Aleksander Orlov.
. . Virtually all versions of the story inside and outside the USSR can be traced to one of these two original presentations”.

(J. Arch Getty & Roberta T. Manning (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 42-43).

On Orlov, the revisionist historian Roy MEDVEDEV* writes:

“It is obvious, in short, that Orlov’s 1956 article is a clumsy fabrication”

(Roy A. Medvedev: ‘Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism'; London; 1972; p. 318).

while BUKHARIN*‘s widow Anna LARINA* writes of Nikolaevsky:

“I consider both the ‘Letter of an Old Bolshevik’ and the interview’ with Nikolaevsky to be spurious documents”.

(Anna Larina: “This I cannot forget; The Memoirs of Nikolai Bukharin’s Wife'; London; 1993; p. 276).

In fact, most historians agree that there is no evidence that Kirov was a ‘moderate’ or had any political differences with Stalin:

“Kirov’s speech to the 1934 Party Congress, . . . actually praised the secret police’s use of forced labour and ridiculed the opposition. . . . Kirov was identified with Stalin, and the parts of his speech producing general ovations were the parts in which he praised Stalin and abused the opposition. . . . Careful scrutiny of Kirov’s speeches and writings reveal little difference between them and Stalin’s utterances, and Soviet scholars familiar with closed party archives scoff at the notion that Kirov was a moderate, an opponent of Stalin or the leader of any bloc. .

The Politburo Commission’s examination of the Ryutin group did not find any evidence that Stalin demanded their execution in 1932, or that Kirov opposed it”.

(J. Arch Getty & Roberta T. Manning (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 45).

“Stalin and Kirov were allies and . . . Kirov’s death was not the occasion for any change in policy . . . .
Virtually no evidence suggests that Kirov favoured or advocated any specific policy line other than Stalin’s General Line. . . .
Stalin chose Kirov for the sensitive Leningraad party leadership position and trusted him with delicate ‘trouble-shooter’ missions”.

(J. Arch Getty: op. cit.; p. 92, 93, 94).

Indeed, documents recently released with the intention of charging Stalin with organising Kirov’s murder have, paradoxically, tended to establish his non-involvement:

“Recent revelations, intended to show Stalin’s personal participation in the repression, have paradoxically produced documents and factual evidence that dispprove or contradict key elements of this story. The traditional understanding of Stalin’s motive, means and opportunity to arrange Kirov’s assassination. . . . can no longer be comfortably reconciled with the sources now available”.

(J. Arch Getty & Roberta T. Manning (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 43-44).

And other anti-Soviet defectors agree. For example, Grigory TOLKAEV*

” . . . believed that the assassination was really the work of misguided young oppositionists”,

(J. Arch Getty: op. cit.; p. 207).

while Genrikh LIUSHKOV*

” . . . an KNVD defector who outranked Orlov protectors ….. . told his Japanese that Stalin was not involved”.

(J. Arch Getty: op. cit.; p. 207).

To sum up.

” . . . neither the sources, circumstances nor consequences of the crime suggest Stalin’s complicity. . . . There is no good reason to believe that Stalin connived at Kirov’s assassination”.

(J. Arch Getty: op. cit.; p. 210).

Conclusion

SERGEI KIROV WAS MURDERED BY A GROUP OF REVISIONIST CONSPIRATORS WHO WERE CORRECTLY FOUND GUILTY AT THEIR TRIALS IN 1936-38.

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT STALIN WAS INVOLVED IN THE MURDER OR HAD ANY MOTIVE FOR INVOLVEMENT.

Published by: THE MARXIST-LENINIST RESEARCH BUREAU

Bibliography

ADLER, Friedrich: ‘The Witchcraft Trial in Moscow'; London; 1936.

ALLILUYEVA, Svetlana: ’20 Letters to a Friend'; London; 1967.

ANTONOV-OVSEENKO, Anton: York; 1983. ‘The Time of Stalin:

Portrait of a Tyranny'; New York 1983;

BULLOCK, Alan: ‘Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives'; London; 1991.

CONQUEST, Robert: ‘The Great Terror: Stalin’s Purge of the Thirties'; London; 1973.

——-: ‘Stalin and the Kirov Murder'; London; 1989.

DEGRAS, Jane (Ed.): ‘Soviet Documents on Foreign Affairs’, Volume 3; London; 1953.

GETTY, J. Arch: ‘Origins of the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered: 1933-1938′; Cambridge; 1985.

GETTY, J. Arch & MANNING, Roberta T. (Eds.): Perspectives'; Cambridge; 1993.

KHRUSHCHEV, Nikita S.: Secret Speech to 20th Congress of CPSU, in: ‘The ‘The Dethronement of Stalin'; Manchester; 1956.

—–: Report on the Programme of the CPSU, delivered to the 22nd Congress of the CPSU; London; 1961.

KRASNIKOV, Stepan V.: ‘Sergei Mironovich Kirov'; Moscow; 1964.

LARINA, Anna: ‘This I cannot forget: The Memoirs of Anna Larina, Nikolai Bukharin’s Wife'; London; 1993.

NIKOLAEVSKY, Boris: ‘Power and the Soviet Elite: “The Letter of an Old Bolshevik'; New York; 1965.

ORLOV, Alexander: ‘The Secret History of Stalin’s Crimes'; London; 1954.

———‘The Crime of the Zinoviev Opposition'; Moscow; 1935.

—— Report of the Court Proceedings: The Case of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Centre'; Moscow; 1936.

——– Report of the Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre; Moscow; 1937.

——— Report of the Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet ‘Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites'; Moscow; 1938.

Biographical Notes

AGRANOV, Yakov, Soviet revisionist politician (1893-1939); Deputy People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs (1921-34); Deputy Chairman, GPU (1934); expelled from CPSU (1937); arrested, tried and found guilty of subversion (1937); died in imprisonment (1938).

BAKAYEV, Ivan P. , Soviet revisionist politician (1887-1936); found guilty of subversion and sentenced to imprisonment (1935); re-arrested, retried for treason, found guilty, sentenced to death and executed (1936),

BALMASHEV, Stepan V., Russian terrorist (1881-1902); member, Socialist Revolutionary Party; assassinated Tsarist Minister of the Interior Dmitri S. Sitiagin (1853-1902); hanged (1902).

BUKHARIN, Nikolai I., Soviet revisionist politician (1888-1938); editor, ‘Communist’ and ‘Pravda’ (1918-31); President, Communist International (1925); editor, ‘Izvestia’ (1934-37); expelled from CP and arrested (1937); tried for and found guilty of treason, sentenced to death and executed (1938).

BULANOV, Pavel P., Soviet revisionist politician 1895-1938); secretary to Genrikh Yagoda (1929-37); arrested (1937); tried for and found guilty of treason, sentenced to death and executed (1938).

KAGANOVICH, Lazar M., Soviet Marxist-Leninist politician (1893-1991); secretary, CC, RCP (1924-25, 1928-30); General Secretary, CP Ukraine (1925-28); member, Political Bureau, AUCP/CPSU (1930-57); 1st Secretary, AUCB, Moscow District (1930-35); USSR People’s Commissar of Transport (1935-37, 1938-48); USSR People’s Commissar of Heavy Industry (1937-39); USSR People’s Commissar of Fuel Industry (1939-40); member, USSR State Defence Committee (1942-43); Minister of Construction Materials Industry (1946); lst Secretary, CP Ukraine (1947-55); director, Sverdlovsk Cement Works (1957-60); expelled from CP (1960),

KAMENEV, Lev B., Soviet revisionist politician (1883-1936); USSR People’s Commissar of Foreign Trade (1926-27); expelled CP (1927); readmitted (1928); re-expelled (1932); readmitted (1933); re-expelled (1934); sentenced to imprisonment for subversion (1935); retried for and found guilty of treason, sentenced to death and executed (1936).

KHRUSHCHEV, Nikita S., Soviet revisionist politician (1894-1971); lieutenant-general (1943); 1st, Secretary, CP Ukraine (1947-49); 1st Secretary, CP,. Moscow District and Secretary, CP, AUCP (1949-53); 1st Secretary, CPSU (1953-64); USSR Premier (1958-64).

KIROV, Sergei M., Soviet Marxist-Leninist politician (1888-1934); RSFSR Minister to Georgia (1920); Secretary, CC, CP Azerbaijan (1921-26); 1st Secretary Leningrad District Committee, AUCP (1926-34); member, Political Bureau, CC, CPSU (1930-34); Secretary, CC, CPSU (1934); murdered by revisionist conspirators (1934).

KOSAREV, Aleksandr V., Soviet revisionist youth leader (1903-39); Secretary. Moscow Communist Youth League (1926-27); Secretary, CC, CYL (1927-28); General Secretary, CYL (1929 -36);

KOTOLNYOV, Ivan I., Soviet revisionist student (1905-34); arrested, tried for and found guilty of treason, sentenced to death and executed (1934).

LARINA, Anna M., (1914- ); married Nikolai Bukharin (1934).

LIUSHKOV, Genrikh S., Soviet revisionist security official (1900-45); defected to Japanese (1938); executed by Japanese (1945).,

MAISKY, Ivan M., Soviet revisionist diplomat (1884-1975); USSR Minister to Finland (1929-32); USSR Ambassador to Britain (1932-43); USSR Deputy People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs (1943-46).

MEDVEDEV, Roy A, Soviet revisionist historian (1925- Deputy Editor–inChief, Publishing House of Educational Literature (1957-61); divisional head, Research Institute of Vocational Literature (1962-71); free-lance writer (1971-).

MOLOTOV, Vyacheslav M., Soviet Marxist-Leninist politician (1890-1986); Secretary, CC, AUCP (1921-30); member, Political Bureau, AUCP (1926-52); USSR Deputy Premier (1930-41); USSR People’s Commissar/Minister of Foreign Affairs (1939-49, 1953-56); USSR Deputy Premier (1941-57); member, State Defence Committee (1941-45); USSR Minister of State Control (1956-57); USSR Ambassador to Mongolia (1957-60); Chief USSR Delegate to International Atomic Energy Commission (1960-62); retired (1962); expelled from CP (1964); re-admitted (1984).

MRACHOVSKY, Sergei V., Soviet revisionist politician (1888-1936); expelled from CP (1927); re-admitted (1936); re-expelled (1936); arrested, tried for and found guilty of treason, sentenced to death and executed (1936).

NIKOLAYEV, Leonid V., Soviet revisionist terrorist (1904-35); expelled from and re-admitted to CP (1934); assassinated Sergei Kirov (1934); tried and found guilty of treason, sentenced to death and executed (1935).

ORLOV, Aleksdandr’ (= FELDBIN,Lev L.), Soviet revisionist intelligence officer (1895-1973); defected to USA (1937); died in USA (1973).

PELSHE, Arvid I., Latvian-born Soviet revisionist politician (1899-1983); Secretary, CC, AUCP/CPSU (1941-59); 1st Secretary, CP Latvia (1959-66); Chairman, Party Control Commission (1966-85); member, Political Bureau, CC, CPSU (1966-85).

PYATAKOV, Grigory (Yuri) L., Soviet revisionist politician (1890-1937); USSR Deputy People’s Commissar of Heavy Industry (1933-34); expelled from CP (1927); readmitted (1929); re-expelled (1936); tried for and found guilty of treason, sentenced to death and executed (1937),

RADEK, Karl B., Soviet revisionist politician (1885-1939); Secretary, Communist International (1920-24); expelled from CP (1927); re-admitted (1929); editor, ‘Izvestia’ (1931-36); re-expelled and arrested (1936); tried for and found guilty of subversion and sentenced to imprisonment (1937); died in prison (1939).

RYKOV, Aleksey I., Soviet revisionist politician (1881-1938); Chairman, RSFSR Supreme Council of National Economy (1918-21); member, Political Bureau, CC, AUCP (1922-30); USSR Premier (1924-30); USSR People’s Commissar of Communications (1931-36); expelled from CP (1937); tried for and found guilty of treason, sentenced to death and executed (1938).

SEDOV, Leon, Soviet revisionist politician (1905-38); son of Leon Trotsky; to Germany (1928); editor, ‘Bulletin of the Opposition’ (1928-38); to France (1933); died in France (1938).

SHVERNIK, Nikolai M., Soviet revisionist trade union leader and politician (1888-1970); member, Presidium, Central Control Commission, RCP/AUCP (1923-25); Secretary, Leningrad District Committee, AUCP (1925-26); Secretary, Central Comittee, AUCP (1926-27); Chairman, Metal Workers’ Union (1929-30); 1st Secretary, All-Union Council of Trade Unions (193044); USSR President (1946-53); member, Political Bureau, CC, CPSU (195253, 1957-66); Chairman, AUCTU (1953-56); Chairman, Party Control Committee (1956-66).

SMIRNOV, Ivan N., Soviet revisionist politician (1881-1936); expelled from CP (1927); readmitted (1930); re-expelled, tried for and found guilty of subversion and sentenced to imprisonment (1933); retried for and found guilty of treason, sentenced to death and executed (1936).

TER-VAGANYAN, Vagarshak A, Soviet revisionist politician (1893-1936); arrested, tried for and found guilty of treason, sentenced to death and executed (1936).

VOROSHILOV, Kliment Y., Soviet revisionist miltary officer and politician (1881-1969); Commander, Moscow Military District (1924-35); Chairman, Revolutionary Military Council (1925-34); member, Political Bureau, CC, AUCP (1926-52); USSR People’s Commissar of Defence (1925-40); USSR Deputy Premier (1946-53); USSR President (1953-60); retired (1960).

YAGODA, Genrikh G., Soviet revisionist politician (1891-1938); Chairman, GPU (1934); USSR People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs (1934-36); USSR People’s Commissar of Communications (1936-37); arrested, tried for and found guilty of treason, and executed (1938).

YAKOVLEV, Aleksandr N., Soviet revisionist politician (1923- ); USSR Ambassador to Canada (1973-83); Director, Institute of World Economics and International Relations (1983-86); member, Political Bureau, CPSU (1987-90); retired (1990); resigned from CP (1991).

YEVDOKIMOV, Grigory, Soviet revisionist politician (1894-1936); secretary, Leningrad RCP (1925-27); expelled from CP (1927); readmitted (1928); arrested, tried for and found guilty of subversion and sentenced to imprisonment (1935); retried for and found guilty of treason and sentenced to death (1936).

YENUKIDZE, Avel S., Soviet revisionist civil servant (1877-1937); head, Military Section, All-Russian Central Executive Committee (1917-18); Secretary, All-Russian/USSR Central Executive Committee (1918-35); arrested, tried for and found guilty of treason, sentenced to death and executed (1937).

ZHDANOV, Andrei A., Soviet Marxist-Leninist politician (1890-1948); Secretary, CPSU (1934-48); member, Political Bureau, CC, AUCP (1938-48); murdered by revisionists (1948).

ZHELIABOV, Andrei I., Russian terrorist (1851-81); member, ‘People’s Will'; one of organisers of the assassination of Tsar Aleksandr 11 (1855-81).

ZINOVIEV, Grigory Y., Soviet revisionist politician (1883-1936); President, Executive Committee of Communist International (1919-26); member, Political Bureau, CC, RCP/AUCP (1921-26); expelled from CP (1927); readmitted (1928); re-expelled (1932); re-expelled (1932); re-admitted (1933); re-expelled (1934); arrested (1934); tried for and found guilty of subversion and imprisoned (1935); re-tried for and found guilty of treason, sentenced to death and executed (1936).

Source

Jules Humbert-Droz on Nikolai Bukharin and the Use of Individual Terror Against Stalin

Bukharin1

“Before leaving I went to see Bukharin for one last time not knowing whether I would see him again upon my return. We had a long and frank conversation. He brought me up to date with the contacts made by his group with the Zinoviev-Kamenev fraction in order to coordinate the struggle against the power of Stalin. I did not hide from him that I did not approve of this liaison of the oppositions. ‘The struggle against Stalin is not a political programme. We had combatted with reason the programme of the Trotskyites on the essential questions, the danger of the kulaks in Russia, the struggle against the united front with the social-democrats, the Chinese problems, the very short-sighted revolutionary perspective, etc. On the morrow of a common victory against Stalin, the political problems will divide us. This bloc is a bloc without principles which will crumble away before achieving any results.’

Bukharin also told me that they had decided to utilise individual terror in order to rid themselves of Stalin. On this point as well I expressed my reservation: the introduction of individual terror into the political struggles born from the Russian Revolution would strongly risk turning against those who employed it. It had never been a revolutionary weapon. ‘My opinion is that we ought to continue the ideological and political struggle against Stalin. His line will lead in the near future to a catastrophe which will open the eyes of the communists and result in a changing of orientation. Fascism menaces Germany and our party of phrasemongers will be incapable of resisting it. Before the debacle of the Communist Party of Germany and the extension of fascism to Poland and to France, the International must change politics. That moment will then be our hour. It is necessary then to remain disciplined, to apply the sectarian decisions after having fought and opposed the leftist errors and measures, but to continue to struggle on the strictly political terrain’.

Bukharin doubtlessly had understood that I would not bind myself blindly to his fraction whose sole programme was to make Stalin disappear. This was our last meeting. It was clear that he did not have confidence in the tactic that I proposed. He also certainly knew better than I what crimes Stalin was capable of. In short, those who, after Lenin’s death and on the basis of his testament, could have destroyed Stalin politically, sought instead to eliminate him physically, when he held firmly in his hand the Party and the police apparatus of the state.”

 – Jules Humbert-Droz, Mémoirs de Jules Humbert-Droz. De Lénine à Staline. Dix ans au service de l’internationale communiste 1921-1931. Neufchâtel: A la Baconnière, 1971, pp. 379-80. Translated from the French by Vijay Singh.

Further Material on the Affair of Marshal Tukhachevsky

Mikhail20Tukhachevsky-2986d

“The Moscow press announced that they [the primary Generals on trial] had been in the pay of Hitler and had agreed to help him get the Ukraine. This charge was fairly widely believed in foreign military circles, and was later substantiated by revelations made abroad. Czech military circles seemed to be especially well informed. Czech officials in Prague bragged to me later that their military men had been the first to discover and to complain to Moscow that Czech military secrets, known to the Russians through the mutual aid alliance, were being revealed by Tukhachevsky to the German high command.”

– Anna L. Strong, “The Soviets Expected It,” page 134.

“The Trotskyist Deutscher rarely missed an opportunity to denigrate and slander Stalin. However, despite the fact that he claimed that there was only an ‘imaginary conspiracy’ as basis for the Moscow trials, he did have this to say about Tukhachevsky’s execution:

‘(A)ll the non-Stalinist versions concur in the following: the generals did indeed plan a coup d’état …. The main part of the coup was to be a palace revolt in the Kremlin, culminating in the assassination of Stalin. A decisive military operation outside the Kremlin, an assault on the headquarters of the G.P.U., was also prepared. Tukhachevsky was the moving spirit of the conspiracy …. He was, indeed, the only man among all the military and civilian leaders of that time who showed in many respects a resemblance to the original Bonaparte and could have played the Russian First Consul. The chief political commissar of the army, Gamarnik, who later committed suicide, was initiated into the plot. General Yakir, the commander of Leningrad, was to secure the co-operation of his garrison. Generals Uberovich, commander of the western military district, Kork, commander of the Military Academy in Moscow, Primakow, Budienny’s deputy in the command of the cavalry, and a few other generals were also in the plot.’

– Isaac Deutscher, “Stalin: A Political Biography,” page 379, cited in Ludo Martens “Another View of Stalin.”

“I gave him [Spiegelglass] the contents of a brief confidential dispatch from one of my chief agents in Germany. At a formal reception tendered by high Nazi officials, at which my informant was present, the question of the Tukhachevsky affair came up. Captain Fritz Wiedemann, personal political aide to Hitler – appointed subsequently to the post of Consul-General at San Francisco – was asked if there was any truth in Stalin’s charges of espionage against the Red Army generals. My agent’s report reproduced Wiedemann’s boastful reply:

‘We hadn’t nine spies in the Red Army, but many more. The GPU is still far from on the trail of all our men in Russia.’

– Walter G. Krivitsky, “I Was Stalin’s Agent,” page 242.

“But how could generals of the Red Army have envisaged collaborating with Hitler? If they were not good Communists, surely these military men were at least nationalists?

This question will first be answered with another question. Why should this hypothesis be any different for the Soviet Union than France? Was not Marshal Petain, the Victor at Verdun, a symbol of French chauvinist patriotism? Were not General Weygand and Admiral Darlan strong defenders of French colonialism? Despite all this, these three became key players in the collaboration with the Nazis. Would not the overthrow of capitalism in the Soviet Union and the bitter class struggle against the bourgeoisie be, for all the forces nostalgic for free enterprise, be additional motives for collaborating with German `dynamic capitalism?’

And did not the World War itself show that the tendency represented by Petain in France also existed among certain Soviet officers?

General Vlasov played an important role during the defence of Moscow at the end of 1941. Arrested in 1942 by the Germans, he changed sides. But it was only on September 16, 1944, after an interview with Himmler, that he received the official authorization to create his own Russian Liberation Army, whose first division was created as early as 1943. Other imprisoned officers offered their services to the Nazis; a few names follow.

Major-General Trukhin, head of the operational section of the Baltic Region Chief of Staffs, professor at the General Chiefs of Staff Academy. Major-General Malyshkin, head of the Chiefs of Staff of the 19th Army. Major-General Zakutny, professor at the General Chiefs of Staff Academy. Major-Generals Blagoveshchensky, brigade commander; Shapovalov, artillery corps commander; and Meandrov. Brigade commander Zhilenkov, member of the Military Council of the 32nd Army. Colonels Maltsev, Zverev, Nerianin and Buniachenko, commander of the 389th Armed Division.

What was the political profile of these men? The former British secret service officer and historian Cookridge writes:

‘Vlasov’s entourage was a strange motley. The most intelligent of his officers was Colonel Mileti Zykov (a Jew)…. He had a been a supporter of the ‘rightist deviationists’ of Bukharin and in 1936 had been banished by Stalin to Siberia, where he spent four years. Another survivor of Stalin’s purges was General Vasili Feodorovich Malyshkin, former chief of staff of the Far East Army; he had been imprisoned during the Tukhachevsky affair. A third officer, Major-General Georgi Nicolaievich Zhilenkov, had been a political army commissar. They and many of the officers whom Gehlen recruited had been ‘rehabilitated’ at the beginning of the war in 1941.’…”

– E. H. Cookridge, “Gehlen: Spy of the Century,” pages 57-58.

“I was to meet Tukhachevsky for the last time on the day after the funeral of King George V. At a dinner at the Soviet Embassy, the Russian general had been very conversational with Politis, Titulescu, Herriot, Boncour, Potemkin, and Madame Potemkin. On that occasion his eyes had been alive, and his melancholy had disappeared in constructive talk. For he had just returned from a trip to Germany, and was heaping glowing praise upon the Nazis. Seated at my right, he said over and over again, as he discussed an air pact between the great powers and Hitler’s country: ‘They are already invincible, Madame Tabouis!’

Why did he speak so trustfully? Was it because his head had been turned by the hearty reception he had found among German diplomats, who found it easy to talk to this man of the old Russian school? At any rate, I was not the only one that evening who was alarmed at his display of enthusiasm. One of the guests–an important diplomat– grumbled into my ear as we walked away from the Embassy: ‘Well, I hope all the Russians don’t feel that way!’

And two years later, when the Soviets were to accuse and convict Tukhachevsky of complicity in a military plot hatched by Germany, my thoughts often reverted to his attitude during that dinner.”

– Genevive Tabouis. “They Called Me Cassandra,” page 257.

“After Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech,’ it became the practice to accuse Stalin of murdering the ‘flower of the Red Army.’ At the same time, mitigating circumstances were adduced: Stalin had fallen victim to the forgeries of the Nazi Secret Service….[They ignore the fact that] Above all, it has been known for a long time that the first arrest (of Generals Putna and Primakov) took place almost a year before the Nazi forgeries reached the Kremlin. Furthermore Tukhachevsky had already been incriminated during the second Moscow show trial of former leading Bolsheviks (Pyatakov, Radek, et al.), which took place in early 1937.”

– Walter Laqueur, “Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations,” page 89.

“[...] the organs of state security began preparations for the trial of Soviet generals nine months before the German forgeries reached Moscow. Pavlenko had it on the authority of Major General Golushkevich (who was present at the 1937 trial) that the Heydrich documents were never once brought up in the course of the proceedings.”

- Ibid., page 90.

Grover Furr: New Light On Old Stories About Marshal Tukhachevskii : Some Documents Reconsidered

tukhachevsky

Grover Furr
Montclair State University

Originally published in RUSSIAN HISTORY/HISTOIRE RUSSE, 13, Nos 2-3 (Summer-Fall 1986), 293-308.

The innocence of Marshal Tukhachevskii and the other military commanders condemned with him in 1937 has become firmly accepted by both Soviet and Western historians. [1] The current scholarly consensus also includes the view that “the nazi secret archives contain no sort of evidence of anything” like a plot between the Soviet military and Germany, that “not a jot of evidence has emerged from the German archives.” [2] The present article re-examines some of the material bearing upon the Tukhachevskii case which has come to light so far from the captured German Foreign Office files, and concludes that it suggests a plot of some kind involving Tukhachevskii and the German High Command may, in fact, have existed.

In 1974 a newly-discovered document from these files was examined by British historian Frederick L. Carsten. [3] It is a report concerning high-level rumors current in Munich in early 1937, which ended up in the Vienna Bureau of the Austrian Chancellor. Among other matters it deals with relations between the German and Soviet military commanders, about which it makes four points: 1) It claims that the top men in the German General Staff, including Generaloberst Freiherr Werner von Fritsch, Chief of Staff of the German Army (Chef der Heeresleitung), were at that time involved in trying to form an alliance with the Soviet military. 2) It claims that Marshal Tukhachevskii had been present at the German army’s autumn maneuvers in the past year (den vorjährigan detuschen Herbstmanoevern). 3) At that time Tukhachevskii is said to have proposed a toast to the German Army “as the champion (Vorkämpferin) against world Jewry.” and to Goring. 4) It claims that the German military was closely following the “power struggle presently taking place in Russia,” in hopes that Stalin would be overthrown in favor of a military dictatorship. [4]

Carsten denies the validity of the first three of these points on several grounds: 1) He claims that the last time any Russian officers attended German maneuvers was the autumn of 1933. 2) Though admitting that Tukhachevskii congratulated General Ernst Köstring, German military attaché in Moscow, upon the German army’s successful occupation of the Rhineland in March 1936, Carsten avers that “this is a far cry from being a declared anti-semite and a sympathizer with the Nazi ideology. Even Karl Radek congratulated General Köstring on the same occasion in Moscow.” [5] 3) For Carsten, the existence of this document is explained by the story that Reinhardt Heydrich’s Sicherheitsdienst (SK, the intelligence division of the SS) was busy fabricating a dossier of forged materials to incriminate Tukhachevskii and decapitate the Soviet military. No doubt, then the SD would have been “spreading this kind of `news’ about Tukhachevskii, his sympathies with Nazism and his allegedly intimate relations with leading German officers.” [6]

The present article uses an analysis of this report from the Austrian Bundeskanzleramt (BKA) as a framework within which other documents, including those from the German Foreign Office files which bear on the Tukhachevskii case, are re-examined. It examines each of the assertions (one through four) in the document, and each of Professor Carsten’s objections (1 through 3).

General Ernst Köstring former German military attaché  in Moscow, stated in memoires published in 1965 that “Autumn 1935 was the last instance of Russian officers participating (Teilnahme) in our maneuvers.” [7] Evidently Carsten has misinterpreted this passage, for Köstring  says nothing to rule out Soviet attendance at, as opposed to participation in, German maneuvers in later years. In letters to Paris at the time General Renondeau, French military attach‚ to Berlin, reported that Soviet officers attended German army maneuvers in both 1936 and 1937. [8] Apparently either Komkor (corps commander) Orlov (according to Renondeau) or Komandarm (army commander) Uborevich (as Walter Görlitz has it) were present at German maneuvers in autumn 1936. [9] Tukhachevskii, Uborevich, and Orlov were closely associated with the Soviet military cooperation with Germany under the Treaty of Rapallo. This association might account for the rumor, reported in the Austrian BKA document, that it was Tukhachevskii who had attended the 1936 German maneuvers (point one) — particularly since the marshal had visited Berlin at least once in 1936. [10] Thus the rumor is perhaps not very wide of the mark.

Carsten would have it (2) that it is hard to believe Tukhachevskii would have made such a pro-Nazi and anti- Semitic toast as the document recounts. In fact, the opposite is true: such a statement would have been entirely consistent with what was widely reputed to be Tukhachevskii’s attitude.

In 1928 a former French officer published a short biography of Tukhachevskii “Pierre Fervacque” — nom de plume of the French journalist Remy Roure — had been Tukhachevskii’s fellow prisoner-of-war in 1917 in the German officers’ camp at Ingolstadt, Bavaria. In his biographical sketch he set down the contents of several conversations he had had with the young Russian lieutenant during their captivity, among them the following:

– You are an anti-semite, then, I said to him. Why? — The Jews brought us Christianity. That’s reason enough to hate them. But then they are a low race. I don’t even speak of the dangers they create in my country. You cannot understand that, you French, for you equality is a dogma. The Jew is a dog, son of a dog, which spreads his fleas in every land. It is he who has done the most to inoculate us with the plague of civilization, and who would like to give us his morality also, the morality of money, of capital. — You are now a socialist, then? — A socialist? Not at all! What a need you have for classifying! Besides the great socialists are Jews and socialist doctrine is a branch of universal Christianity. … No, I detest socialists, Jews and Christians. [11]

Tukhachevskii never protested the contents of this well-known book. On the contrary, until shortly before his execution Tukhachevskii maintained friendly relations with Roure. He spoke with the French journalist at a banquet in Paris in 1936, and then three days later held another, private, conversation with him. Roure recalled in July 1937 that, in his book, he had portrayed the young Tukhachevskii as expressing horror and disgust for Western civilization and a juvenile love of “barbarism” in hair-raising tones (which, we note, could have come from the most radical Nazis). Twenty years later Tukhachevskii had mellowed, had become an admirer of French culture, but remained a “patriotic” pan-Slavic nationalist and imperialist who felt that, by serving Bolshevism, he had served his country. [12]

We have examined and rejected Carsten’s first two objections to the Austrian BKA report, and in so doing have determined that the second and third points made in that report accord well with facts attested elsewhere. We now turn to points four and one of the Austrian document. The fourth point is the claim that the German military was watching the “power struggle” (meaning the Moscow trials) in the USSR in hopes that a military dictatorship might replace Stalin. In December 1936 the Soviet government assigned David Kandelaki, head of the Soviet Trade Delegation to Germany, the task of “feeling out” the German government concerning the possibility of opening secret talks. By early 1937 Hitler had turned the USSR down, [13] as is illustrated in an interesting document, noted by Erickson, from the German Foreign Office files whose significance for the Tukhachevskii Affair has not yet been appreciated. This is a letter to Dr. Hjalmar Schacht (head of the Reichsbank and the person whom Kandelaki had approached concerning the Soviet Government’s desire for formal secret talks) from the German Foreign Minister, Baron Constantine von Neurath. [14] In this letter Neurath summarizes Hitler’s view, with which Neurath also declares his agreement. This is expressed as follows:

As concerning the eventual acceptance of talks with the Russian government, I am, in agreement with the Führer, of the view that they could not lead to any result at this time, would rather be made great use of by the Russians to achieve the goal they seek of a closer military alliance with France and, if possible, to achieve as well a further rapprochement with England. A declaration by the Russian government that it dissociates itself from Comintern agitation, after the experience with these declarations in England and France, would be of no practical use whatever and therefore be unsatisfactory.

Neurath adds an interesting qualification: “It would be another thing if matters in Russia should develop in the direction of an absolute despotism propped up by the military. In this event we should not let the opportunity pass us by to involve ourselves in Russia again.” The Neurath-Schacht letter is dated 11 February, 1937, while the cover letter to the Austrian BKA document, on BKA stationery, is dated four days later, and the report itself deals with the previous month. Thus the letter proves that the rumor set down in the report does, in fact, reflect the real views of the Nazi hierarchy at precisely the time it claims: in other words, the Neurath-Schacht letter strikingly verifies point four of the Austrian BKA report.

In early 1937 there were two leading military figures in the soviet Union: Tukhachevskii and the Commissar for Defense, Marshal Kliment Voroshilov. It was well known that tensions within the top leadership of the Soviet military were profound. [15] Too much should not be made of an argument e silentio. But later in the same letter Neurath may be tacitly letting Schacht know which one of the two Soviet military leaders he means: “In this connection I should also note, for your personal information, that, according to reliable information reaching us concerning the events in Russia, there is nothing to any slit between Stalin and Voroshilov. So far as can be determined, this rumor, which is being spread by our press as well, originated in interested circles in Warsaw.” Perhaps this passage suggests that, with Voroshilov still a staunch Stalinist, German would only be interested in talks with Russia in the event of a military dictatorship under Tukhachevskii.

There remains the first point in the Austrian BKA report, the supposed attempt by the German General Staff to form an alliance with the Soviet Army. To begin with, we note that Neurath was very close to Fritsch and to General Blomberg, worked with them behind Hitler’s back on several occasions, and was replaced as foreign minister by Ribbentrop on 4 February, 1938, the same day that Fritsch and Blomberg resigned and dozens of other generals and officials were dismissed to be replaced by officers more compliant with Hitler’s desire for war. [16] If Fritsch were in secret touch with Tukhachevskii, Neurath might well have been informed. But there is other evidence of a Tukhachevskii-Fritsch connection.

In his famous book I Paid Hitler, Fritz Thyssen, the former German steel magnate, one of the immensely influential “Schlotbarone,” the Ruhr heavy industry magnates, and an early member of the Nazi party explicitly associated Tukhachevskii with Fritsch: “Fritsch always advocated an alliance with Russia, though not with a Communist Russia. Attempts were made to establish relations between Fritsch and the Russian generalissimo, Tukhachevskii. The two had one point in common: each desired to overthrow the dictator in his own country.” [17]

Thyssen was certainly in a position to know of the kind of secret liaisons he alleges here, and may have been in on it too, since by 1936 or 1937 he himself was deeply disillusioned with Hitler. Professor Erickson, who cites this passage but would clearly like to dismiss it, confidently states in the text of his book that “not a single item of evidence has emerged to justify the charge of treasonable contact with the Germans.” However, in a footnote on the same page he refers to the `Thyssen passage quoted above, and adds the following remark: “It is difficult to know where the support for this statement comes from, although there was a contemporary Polish newspaper report that a letter or note from Fritsch had been seized from Tukhachevskii.” [18]

There is yet more evidence from the German Foreign Office files hinting at a link between Tukhachevskii and the German General Staff. This is the set of documents referred to on page 435 of Erickson’s study, The Soviet High Command. These documents record the loan, between February and November, 1937, of military court papers concerning Tukhachevskii when he was a prisoner-of-war in Germany during World War I (the court papers themselves are not extant). A study of the four loan request documents reveals that the Tukhachevskii files were requested from the Potsdam branch of the Heeresarchiv(army archives) by the Wehrmachtamt, Aus. (Ausland) VI, the section which dealt with foreigners. Wehrmachtamt requested it on behalf of the “GZ.” This is the abbreviation for Generalstab-Zentralstellung, the main headquarters of the German General Staff. [19] GZ was of course in Berlin, and was headed by General von Fritsch.

It is noteworthy that someone in Fritsch’s Berlin HQ was apparently showing some considerable interest in Tukhachevskii at precisely the same time that: 1) the report to the Austrian BKA told of Fritsch’s interest in an alliance with the Soviet military — a report backed up by Thyssen’s testimony; and 2) both that report and Neurath speak of an interest in a military coup in the USSR.

Our examination of the Austrian BKA report shows that, as regards German-Soviet military relations, it is highly consistent with other evidence available. Points one, three, and four are fully consistent with this other evidence, while point two may simply be due to a confusion (or may even be correct as well). We have also disposed of the first two of Professor Carsten’s objections to it. However, there remains his third point: that the documents might have been related to the well-known SD plot to forge a dossier incriminating Tukhachevskii as a traitor. The whole matter of this alleged forgery is very complex, and cannot be unraveled in this article. In addition, it is in principle impossible to prove a negative — in this case, that no German forgery attempt was made. One can merely examine the evidence cited to support the existence of such a forgery attempt and see how it holds up. This said, several considerations are relevant to the matter at hand.

First, the crucial sources for the “SD-NKVD forgery” story are untrustworthy. In his introduction to the English edition of Walter Schellenberg’s memoires, Alan Bullock concludes: “nor would it be wise to accept Schellenberg as a trustworthy witness where his evidence cannot be corroborated.” Erickson also points out several important passages of Schellenberg’s which he recognizes cannot be true. [20] The account by Alfried Naujocks, the SS man who claimed to have been personally responsible for organizing the forgery and who is usually taken at his word, is even more patently false. [21]

Second, according to all the accounts of the forgery plot, Hitler and Himmler were both a party to it. But nothing of the kind could be inferred from their later references to the military purges. For example, Himmler is reported to have discussed the Tukhachevskii Affair in a conversation with the renegade Soviet General A. A. Vlasov on 16 September 1944 in a manner which makes it clear he believed Tukhachevskii had been guilty of some plotting: “Himmler asked Vlasov about the Tukhachevskii Affair. Why this had gone awry. Vlasov gave a frank answer: ‘Tukhachevskii made the same mistake that your people made on 20 July [21a]. He did not know the law of masses.'” [22] In an important speech in Posen on 4 October 1943 Himmler stated:

When — I believe it was in 1937 or 1938 — the great show trials took place in Moscow, and the former czarist military cadet, later Bolshevik general, Tukhachevskii, and other generals were executed, all of us in Europe, including us in the [Nazi] Party and in the SS, were of the opinion that here the Bolshevik system and Stalin had committed one of their greatest mistakes. In making this judgment of the situation we greatly deceived ourselves. We can truthfully and confidently state that. I believe that Russia would never have lasted through these two years of war — and she is now in the third year of war — if she had retained the former czarist generals. [23]

This probably reflected Hitler’s assessment as well, for, according to Goebbels (diary entry of 8 May 1943): “The conference of the Reichsleiters and Gauleiters followed…. The Führer  recalled the case of Tukhachevskii and expressed the opinion that we were entirely wrong then in believing that Stalin would ruin the Red Army by the way he handled it. The opposite was true: Stalin got rid of all opposition in the Red Army and thereby brought an end to defeatism.” [24]

Finally, the German forgery — if indeed there was one — does not exclude the existence of a real military plot. In fact, all of the  SD sources for the forgery story leave open the possibility that the marshal was in fact plotting with the German General Staff. [25]

Thus the story of the “SD-NKVD forgery” is very problematic. Based purely on hearsay, it abounds in contradictions and outright lies. If it were nonetheless consistent with the other evidence concerning the Tukhachevskii Affair, it might merit consideration despite it all. but the opposite is true.

The only pre-war account of any plot to frame Tukhachevskii is that of Walter Krivitsky, which concludes that the NKVD possessed its own evidence against Tukhachevskii quite independent of any forged dossier. [26] This coincides with the opinion of Heinz Höhne, the most recent student of the forgery plot from the German and SD side. [27]

Important testimony asserting the existence of a real conspiracy including Tukhachevskii and other military leaders comes from Nikolai N. Likhachyov, better known as Andrei V. Svetlanin. A lecturer in Russian at Cambridge, then journalist and finally editor (1955-65) of the emigre Russian journal Posev, Svetlanin claimed second-hand knowledge of the conspiracy as a member, during the mid-1930s, of the staff of the Far Eastern Army (later the Red Banner Far Eastern Front) commanded by Marshal Bliukher.

In this account, the military and party leaders executed during 1937 as part of the “Tukhachevskii Affair” were in fact part of a wider conspiracy the central figure in which was Yan Gamarnik. [28] Chief of the Political Directorate in the Army, Gamarnik had probably begun the plot, together with Tukhachevskii, as early as 1932. By the time of the Seventeenth Party Congress in 1934, it was well developed. The plotters, motivated by the disastrous consequences of collectivization, were said to have considered two distinct plans. Plan “A,”, originating with Tukhachevskii and the young commanders around him, centered on a coup in the Kremlin, to be supported by party and military leaders in some of the provinces. Plan “B,”, envisaging independent revolts in different border areas of the USSR, originated with Gamarnik and the state and party officials in the plot, and was the version finally approved by the conspiratorial center. The Far Eastern Region was to have been the site of the initial revolt.

Svetlanin never claims to have been a part of the conspiracy himself which, he insists, was limited to men of the highest rank. Apparently no one of his acquaintance in the Far Eastern Army believed the Tukhachevskii Affair to have been a frame-up against innocent men. His story can be partially checked from independent sources, the main one of which is the account by Genrikh S. Liushkov given to the Japanese interrogators after his defection to them in June, 1938 (Liushkov, head of the Far Eastern NKVD, had been sent there to help the 1938 purge). Liushkov disclosed to the Japanese the existence of an plot in the Far East, and his account of the plot confirms Svetlanin’s in several minor respects. [29]

Curiously, none of the post-1956 Soviet accounts have revealed any information other than that which was already available in the West, and draw principally upon the SD accounts of the forged dossier. Even the Western sources used by Nikulin, the “official” Khrushchev-era biographer of Tukhachevskii, are carefully pruned of evidence they contain that suggests some real conspiracy in fact occurred. there is, strictly speaking, so Soviet post-Stalin historical account of the Tukhachevskii Affair at all, since Nikulin’s work, upon which all others rely, is filled out with dramatic dialog and frankly termed fictionalized (povestvovanie). [30]

Taken single, none of these bits of evidence is very significant in itself. But when considered as a whole, they constitute at lest a prima facie case that some real military conspiracy involving Tukhachevskii may have actually existed. Nor is it difficult to understand why Khrushchev might have wanted to rehabilitate real conspirators. Khrushchev used the rehabilitations of the Tukhachevskii group as a stick with which to beat Stalin and, more importantly, remaining “Stalinists” in high places — that is, in order to hold power and support certain policy decisions. The Soviet military elite regards Marshal Tukhachevskii and those associated with him as the fathers of the contemporary Soviet armed forces. [31] To accuse Stalin of having wrongly killed them was at once to make of the military a firm ally and to blacken any policies associated with Stalin’s name.

In conclusion, each of the points concerning Tukhachevskii mentioned in the Austrian BKA document is consistent with other, independent evidence. The “SD forgery plot” story, and the Khrushchev-era versions of the Tukhachevskii Affair, have been accorded a degree of scholarly acceptance that is not justified by the contradictions and inconsistencies which abound in them. Any new study should examine them far more skeptically than has hitherto been the case. The present scholarly consensus notwithstanding, there is little about the Tukhachevskii Affair, including the very basic matter of Tukhachevskii’s guilt or innocence, about which we can be certain.

Montclair State University

APPENDIX

–N.A. Series T-120, Roll No. 1448, page D 567 777.

Now as always there are efforts under way within the Wehrmacht which aim at the possibility of an alliance with the Russian army. The argument is simple: the Russian army cannot be taken care of by force; therefore it should happen in friendship. Fritsch, Admiral Raeder, and even General von Reichenau are rumored to be proponents of this plan. Blomberg is seen as a mere accessory (Figurant). But the proponents of these efforts are found chiefly among the younger school of the General Staff. When he was in Berlin on the occasion of last year’s German autumn maneuvers, Marshal Tukhachevskii offered, in return for Colonel-General Fritsch’s toast to the Russian army in Wüzberg, a toast to the German army as the champion against world Jewry, and to General Goring. The power struggle presently taking place in Russia, which might possibly end with Stalin’s fall and the establishment of a military dictatorship, is being followed by the Wehrmacht with closest attention, and with unconcealed sympathy for a solution of that kind.

***********************************************************

* I would like to thank Professor J. Arch Getty, of the University of California at Riverside, and Professor S.G. Wheatcroft, of the University of Melbourne, who read and commented upon earlier versions of this article. Naturally they are not responsible for any shortcomings it still contains.

REFERENCES

1. Khrushchev’s “secret speech” to the Twentieth congress of the CPSU (February, 1956) attacked Stalin for his “annihilation of many military commanders” after 1937, but did not mention any of the executed officers. Marshal Tukhachevskii was first “rehabilitated” in 1958. See Robert Conquest, “De-Stalinization and the Heritage of Terror,”, in Alexander Dallin and Alan F. Weston, et al., eds. Politics in the Soviet Union: 7 Cases (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966), pp. 57-58. Virtually all Western scholars today accept Khrushchev’s story; e.g. Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: Stalin’s Purge of the Thirties, rev. ed. (New York: Collier Books, 1973), pp. 300-02.

2. Conquest, Great Terror, p. 285; Leonard Shapiro, “The Great Purge,”, chapter 6 of Basil Henry Liddle-Hart, ed., The Red Army (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1956), p. 70. Professor John Erickson, in his authoritative work The Soviet High Command (London: Macmillan; New York: St Martin’s Press, 1962, p. 464 and note), states that “not a single item of evidence has emerged to justify the charge of treasonable contact with the Germans,” and “no post-war evidence has come to light to disprove this.”

3. Frederick Ludwig Carsten, “New `Evidence’ against Marshal Tukhachevskii,” Slavonic and East European Review, 52 (1974), 272-73. The document itself is in N(ational) A(rchives) microfilm series T-1220, Roll no: 1448, pages D 567 772 – D 567 778; page D 567 771 is the cover letter.

4. page D 567 777; see the Appendix for a translation of this part of the document.

5. According to K; see Herman Teske, ed., Profile bedeutender Soldaten. Band I. General Ernst Köstring Der militärischer Mittler zwischen dem Deutschen Reich und der Sowjetunion. 1921-1941. (Frankfurt/M.: Mittler, 1965), pp. 125-26.

6. Carsten, “New ‘Evidence’,” p. 273.

7. Ibid., citing Teske, Profile bedeutender Soldaten, p. 69. These words were written by Köstring for this volume, more than thirty years after the fact.

8. Georges Castellan, “Reichswehr et Armée Rouge, 1920-1939,” in J.-B. Duroselle, ed., Les relations germano-sovietiques de 1933 – 1939  (Paris: Colin, 1954), pp. 218-19 and n. 97, p. 218.

9. Ibid., nn. 97 and 98, citing Gen. Renondeau’s letter to Paris of 5 October and 28 September, 1937. For Uborevich, see Walter Görlitz, History of the German General Staff, 1657-1945 (New York: Praeger 1962), p. 307 (German edition 1953). The whole affair is omitted, however, from Görlitz’s Kleine Geschichte des Deutschen Generalstabes (Berlin: Haude & Spener, 1967). Since the Austrian BKA report was compiled in December 1936-January 1937, it is impossible to be certain whether it refers to maneuvers in autumn 1935 or in autumn 1936.

10. On the question of this visit (or visits) see Castellan, “Reichswehr et Armée Rouge, 1920-1939,” pp. 217-18; 224; also Pierre Dominique, “L’affaire Toukhatchevski et l’opinion française,” L’Europe nouvelle, 19 June 1937, p 590; Ian Colvin, Chief of Intelligence (London: Gollancz, 1951), pp. 39-40; Erickson, Soviet High Command, pp. 411-13, and 729, n. 27. Disagreement exists about what Tukhachevskii did during this visit or visits but it is sufficient for our purposes to note that all agree he did visit Berlin in 1936.

11. Pierre Fervacque, Le Chef de Larm e Rouge: Mikhail Toukatchevski (Paris: Fasquelle, 1928), pp. 24- 45. Remy Roure was one of the most prominent journalists and newspapermen in France in his day, a founder of Le Monde and its political editor from 1945 to 1952, when he left it for the conservative Le Figaro. See the necrology by Louis Marin-Chauffier, “L’Honneur de Notre Profession,” Le Figaro, 9 Nov. 1966, pp. 1, 32; also,  “La Carrière de Remy Roure,” ibid, p. 32.

12. Pierre Fervacque, “Le Julien Sorel de bolchevisme,” Le Temps (Paris), 24 July 1937, p. 3. Julien Sorel, the protagonist of Stendhal’s novel Le rouge et le noir, assumes holy orders out of cold-blooded careerism; Fervacque implies this was also Tukhachevskii’s motive for adhering to Bolshevism.

13. Erickson, Soviet High Command, pp. 432 and 453.

14. N(ational) A(rchives) Series T-120 Roll No. 1057, pp. 429-296-7.

15. For tensions within the Soviet military leadership, see John Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin’s War with Germany. Vol. I (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), p. 3; and idem, Soviet High Command, passim.

16. There is no evidence that these dismissals (the famous “Fritsch Affair”) had anything to do with Tukhachevskii. What linked Neurath with Fritsch and Blomberg was opposition to Hitler’s plan to move swiftly against Austria and Czechoslovakia. See Harold C. Deutsch, Hitler and His Generals: The Hidden Crisis, January-June, 1938 (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1974), pp. 64, 70- 71, 258-66.

17. Fritz Thyssen, I Paid Hitler (New York: Cooperative Pub., 1941), p. 163. According to Henry Ashby Turner, Jr., “Fritz Thyssen und das Buch ‘I Paid Hitler’,”, in Turner, Faschismus und Kapitalismus in Deutschland (Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1973), p. 95, n. 20, the Tukhachevskii-Fritsch passages occurs in one of the few chapters in German in the original manuscript of the book and so probably reflects Thyssen’s personal work (Emery Reeves, Thyssen’s ghost-writer, conducted his interviews with Thyssen in French).

18. Erickson, Soviet High Command, p 464. According to Professor Alvin T. Coox, the Japanese considered Polish intelligence to be “the best anti-Soviet service in the world at the time.” See his “L’Affaire Lyushkov: Anatomy of a Soviet Defector,” Soviet Studies, 20 (Jan. 1968), 406.

19. N.A. Series T-78, Roll No. 10.

20. Alan Bullock, “Introduction,” in The Labyrinth: Memoires of Walter Schellenberg (New York: Harper, 1956), p. xix; Erickson, Soviet High Command, pp. 731, n. 84 and 735, nn. 25 and 27.

21. Naujocks’ story is in Gunter Peis, The Man Who Started the War (London: Oldham Press, n.d. [1960]), pp. 76-103. The names of the printing establishments Naujocks claimed to have visited in trying to find a forger do not occur in the very complete lists in the Berliner Adressbuch of 1932, 1936 or 1938. Erickson rejects Schellenberg’s account of the forgery because “it certainly took longer that four days to prepare the dossier” (Soviet High Command, p. 735, n. 25); what then can be said of the later Naujocks account, which states that the forgery took place in one night? Finally, Naujocks’ account of the Polish border incident (the “Gleiwitz transmitter” affair) set up by Hitler as a cause de guerre., has been proven heavily falsified; Jürgen Runzheimer: Der Überfall auf den Sender Gleiwitz im Jahre 1939,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 10 (1962), 408-26.

21a. This is a reference to the assassination attempt on Hitler of 20 July 1944.

22. Archiv des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte (Munich), Signatur ZS 2, Bd I., page 55. This document contains the notes of conversations between Gunter d’Alquen,  an SS officer present at the Himmler-Vlasov interview, and a co- worker of Jürgen Thorwald, the German author. The ambiguous (perhaps deliberately so) phrase “das Gesetz der Masse” could refer either to the law of inertia or to the behavior of the masses. In either case it means about the same thing. Thorwald cited the phrase in Wen Sie Verderben Wollen (Stuttgart: Steingr ben-Verlag, 1952), p. 394.

23. Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal {Nuremberg, 1949], Vol. 29, p. 111 (Document 1919-PS).

24. Joseph Goebbels, The Goebbels Diaries: 1942-1943, ed. & tr. Louis P. Lochner (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1948), p. 355.

25. Peis, Man Who Started the War, p. 79; Walter Schellenberg: Memoiren (Köln: Politik und Wirtschaft, 1959), pp. 48-49; Walter Hagen [pseudonym of Wilhelm Höttl], Die Geheime Front: Organization Personen und Aktionen des Deutschen Geheimdienstes (Linz und Wien: Nibelungen-Verlag, 1956), p. 63. A close study of these accounts reveals, however, that they are mutually contradictory more often than not and that, in general, they cannot be trusted.

26. Walter G. Krivitsky, I Was Stalin’s Agent (London: Right Book Club, 1940), pp. 257-58. But Krivitsky’s book is harshly condemned as untrustworthy by his friend of many years and wife of his assassinated friend Ignace Reiss; see Elizabeth Poretsky, in Our Own People: A Memoire of ‘Ignace Reiss’ and His Friends (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1970), pp. 71; 75, n.2; 124; 146; 204, n. 1; 211, n.1; 269-70. See also Castellan, “Reichswehr et Armée Rouge,” pp. 233, 2234 & nn.; 257, n. 194, for criticisms of Krivitsky.

27. Heinz Höhne, The Order of the Death’s Head: The Story of Hitler’s SS, tr. Richard Barry (New York: Coward-McCann, 1970), p. 233; similarly, idemCanaris, tr. J. Maxwell Brownjohn (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1979, p. 248. Höhne  interviewed other German sources and also studied the SD survivors’ accounts; while accepting their story of the forgery plot, he believes it was not the cause of the arrests of Tukhachevskii and the others.

28. A. Svetlanin, Dal’nevostochnyi zagovor (Frankfurt/M.: Possev-Verlag, 1953). Details about Likhachyov/Svetlanin’s life are given in the necrology by N. Tarasova, Grani, No. 61 (1966), pp. 82-97. A very intelligent discussion, from an emigre  viewpoint, of Svetlanin’s account of the conspiracy took place in the pages of the journal Posev in 1949-50; for a complete list of the articles, see ibid, No. 32 (1950), p. 10, n. I am indebted to the late Professor Nikolai Andreyev, of Cambridge, England, for additional information about his colleague and personal friend, Mr Likhachyov, alias Svetlanin.

29. See the article by Coox cited in n. 18 above. The post-war Soviet defector Grigory Tokaev also claimed first-hand knowledge of high-level military opposition to the Stalin government which survived even the military purges; he knows nothing of any Tukhachevskii involvement, however. See his Betrayal of an Ideal (London: Harville Press, 1954), and Comrade X (London: Harville Press, 1956). A Soviet dissident account of the Khar’kov trial, in November, 12969, of the engineer Genrikh Altunian (Khronika tekushchikh sobytii, No. 1, pp. 312-13), states the following: “IRKHA, witness for the prosecution and party organizer of the military academy at which ALTUNIAN taught, stated at the court that it was still not certain whether Komandarm I. Iakir’s rehabilitation was correct (`eshche neizvestno, pravil’no li reabilitirovan komandarm I. IAKIR’).” Robert Conquest also cites this quotation, though without identifying his source, in the introduction to Pyotr Yakir, A Childhood in Prison (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 12973), p. 17.

Altunian was involved in dissident activities with Pyotr Iakir, son of the general condemned with Tukhachevskii. According to Victor Krasin, Iakir and he were tried in 1973 for collaborating with “the old Russian emigre organization, the National Labor Union (N.T.S.).” (Victor Krasin, “How I Was Broken by the K.G.B., The New York Times Magazine, 19 March 1984, pp. 71, 75). Founded in the 1930s as a fascist-type organization the N.T.S. collaborated closely with the Germans during their invasion of the USSR. George Fischer, ed., Russian emigre Politics (New York: Free Russia Fund, 1951), p. 72. Iakir had thus been working with a fascist group whose “ultimate goal” is “the armed overthrow of the Soviet regime ” (Krasin, p. 71). Almost precisely these activities constituted the most dramatic charges against Iakir’s own father, condemned with Tukhachevskii — charges which Iakir believed were false. In a further irony, it was the N.T.S. publishing house, “Possev-Verlag,” that published Svetlanin/Likhachev’s 1952 book in which the author claimed direct knowledge of a plot against the Soviet government by Iakir, Tukhachevskii, and the others (Svetlanin/Likhachyov went on to edit Posev, the N.T.S’s main journal, from 1955 until his death in 1965).

30. Lev Nikulin, Tuchachevskii: Biograficheskii ocherk (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1964), pp. 192-93. uses the account of the forgery plot and President Benes’ involvement taken from Colvin and Churchill, but omits all their evidence for the marshal’s guilt. The Soviet reader would never suspect that Colvin, Benes, Churchill, and the SD agents all believed there really had been a Tukhachevskii conspiracy (Nikulin also leaves out Colvin’s name, making the source harder to identify). Cf. Colvin, Chief of Intelligence, pp. 39-40, and 42; Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), pp. 288-89;Memoires of Dr. Edward Benes: From Munich to New War and New Victory (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949), pp. 19-20, 47.

31. For examples, see Col M.P. Skirdo, The People, the Army, the Commander (Washington, DC, n.d.; orig. ed. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1970), p. 141; V. Savost’ianov and N. Egorov, Komandarm pervogo ranga (I.N. Uborevich) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1966), pp. 212-13; Soviet Life (June, 1981).

Source

Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov on Tukhachevsky

fcd4be7636a58aa3f56497eb8fc947bc

“In 1937, Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov was working for the Central Commitee of the Bolshevik Party. A bourgeois nationalist, he had close ties to opposition leaders and with the Central Committee members from the Caucausus. In his book The Reign of Stalin, he regrets that Tukhachevsky did not seize power in 1937. He claims that early in 1937, after his trip to England, Tukhachevsky spoke to his superior officers as follows:

‘The great thing about His Britannic Majesty’s Army is that there could not be a Scotland Yard agent at its head [allusion to the role played by state security in the USSR]. As for cobblers [allusion to Stalin's father], they belong in the supply depots, and they don’t need a Party card. The British don’t talk readily about patriotism, because it seems to them natural to be simply British. There is no political ‘line’ in Britain, right, left or centre; there is just British policy, which every peer and worker, every conservative and member of the Labour Party, every officer and soldier, is equally zealous in serving…The British soldier is completely ignorant of Party history and production figures, but on the other hand he knows the geography of the world as well as he knows his own barracks…The King is loaded with honours, but he has no personal power…Two qualities are called for in an officer — courage and professional competence.”

– Ludo Martens, “Another View of Stalin.”

Molotov on Marshal Tukhachevsky

_tukhachevsky

“CHUEV: Now some think you appointed such untrained people as Pavlov, but if it had been Tukhachevsky….
MOLOTOV: Take someone like Tukhachevsky. If trouble started, which side would he have been on? He was a rather dangerous man. I doubted he would have been fully on our side when things got tough, because he was a right-winger. The right wing danger was the main danger at the time.”

– Feliks Chuev, “Molotov Remembers,” page 26.

“The right wing already had a channel to Hitler even before this. Trotsky was definitely connected to him, that’s beyond any doubt…. Many of the ranking military officers were also involved. That goes without saying.”

– Feliks Chuev, “Molotov Remembers,” page 275.

“Nevertheless, he [Tukhachevsky] organized an anti-Soviet group in the army.”

– Feliks Chuev, “Molotov Remembers,” page 279.

“CHUEV: He [Tukhachevsky] was accused of being a German agent.
MOLOTOV: He hurried with plans for a coup. Both Krestinsky and Rosengoltz testified to that. It makes sense. He feared he was at the point of being arrested, and he could no longer put things off. And there was no one else he could rely on except the Germans. This sequence of events is plausible. I consider Tukhachevsky a most dangerous conspirator in the military who was caught only at the last minute. Had he not been apprehended, the consequences could have been catastrophic. He was most popular in the army.
Did everyone who was charged or executed take part in the conspiracy hatched by Tukhachevsky? Some were certainly involved….But as to whether Tukhachevsky and his group in the military were connected with Trotskyists and rightists and were preparing a coup, there is no doubt.”

– Feliks Chuev, “Molotov Remembers,” page 280.

“MOLOTOV: Take Tukhachevsky, for example. On what grounds was he rehabilitated? Did you read the records of the trial of the right-wing and Trotskyist bloc in 1938? Bukharin, Krestinsky, Rosengoltz, and others were on trial then. They stated flat out that in June 1937 Tukhachevsky pressed for a coup. People who have not read the record go on to say that the testimony was given under duress from the Chekists. But I say, had we not made those sweeping arrests in the 1930s, we would have suffered even greater losses in the war.”

– Feliks Chuev, “Molotov Remembers,” page 285.

Mikhail Tukhachevsky on Communists and the Jews

“Also in the camp [Ingolstadt] was a Russian officer, Mikhail Tukhachevsky, son of tsarist nobility, who also made repeated attempts to escape and with whom, according to a fellow prisoner, de Gaulle shared a cell for a time. Tukhachevsky played mournful airs on his violin, spouted nihilist beliefs and inveighed against Jews as dogs who ‘spread their fleas throughout the world.’”

– Jonathan Fenby, “The General: Charles De Gaulle and the France He Saved,” page 68.

“– You are an anti-semite, then, I said to him. Why?

– The Jews brought us Christianity. That’s reason enough to hate them. But then they are a low race. I don’t even speak of the dangers they create in my country. You cannot understand that, you French, for you equality is a dogma. The Jew is a dog, son of a dog, which spreads his fleas in every land. It is he who has done the most to inoculate us with the plague of civilization, and who would like to give us his morality also, the morality of money, of capital.

– You are now a socialist, then?

– A socialist? Not at all! What a need you have for classifying! Besides the great socialists are Jews and socialist doctrine is a branch of universal Christianity. … No, I detest socialists, Jews and Christians.”

– Pierre Fervacque (Remy Roure), Le Chef de Larm e Rouge: Mikhail Toukatchevski (Paris: Fasquelle, 1928), page 24- 45. Remy Roure was one of the most prominent journalists and newspapermen in France in his day, a founder of Le Monde and its political editor from 1945 to 1952, when he left it for the conservative Le Figaro. See the necrology by Louis Marin-Chauffier, “L’Honneur de Notre Profession,” Le Figaro, 9 Nov. 1966, pp. 1, 32; also, “La Carrière de Remy Roure,” ibid, p. 32.

Nazis Joseph Goebbels and Léon Degrelle on Tukhachevsky

Mikhail_Tukhachevsky

“The Führer explained one more time the Tukhachevsky case and stated that we erred completely at the time when we thought that Stalin had ruined the Red Army. The opposite is true: Stalin got rid of all the opposition circles within the army and thereby succeeded in making sure that there would no longer be any defeatist currents within that army…

With respect to us, Stalin also has the advantage of not having any social opposition, since Bolshevism has eliminated it through the purges of the last twenty-five years…Bolshevism has eliminated this danger in time and can henceforth focus all of its strength on its enemy.”

– Joseph Göbbels, Tagebücher aus den Jahren 1942–1943, (Zurich, 1948), p. 322. Quoted in Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, La seconde guerre mondiale: caractères fondamentaux de la politique et de la stratégie, vol. 1, pp. 213–214.

“Who would have thought during the crimes of the Great Terror during the French Revolution that soon after a Bonaparte would come out and raise France up from the abyss with an iron fist? A few years later, and Bonaparte almost created the United Europe.

A Russian Bonaparte could also rise up. The young Marshal Tukhachevsky executed by Stalin on Benes’ advice, was of the right stature in 1937.”

– Léon Degrelle, quoted in Degrelle m’a dit by Louise Narvaez, Postface by Degrelle (Brussels: Éditions du Baucens, 1977), page 360-361.

Winston Churchill on Conspiracies in the Soviet Union

245px-Sir_Winston_S_Churchill

“In the autumn of 1936, a message from a high military source in Germany was conveyed to President Beneš [President of Czechoslovakia – E.S.] to the effect that if he wanted to take advantage of the Fuehrer’s offer, he had better be quick, because events would shortly take place in Russia rendering any help he could give to Germany insignificant.

While Beneš was pondering over this disturbing hint he became aware that communications were passing through the Soviet Embassy in Prague between important personages in Russia and the German Government. This was a part of the so-called military and Old-Guard Communist conspiracy to overthrow Stalin and introduce a new régime based on a pro-German policy. President Beneš lost no time in communicating all he could find out to Stalin. Thereafter there followed the merciless, but perhaps not needless, military and political purge in Soviet Russia, and the series of trials in January 1937, in which Vyshinsky, the Public Prosecutor, played so masterful a part.

[….]

The Russian Army was purged of its pro-German elements [...] The bias of the Soviet Government was turned in a marked manner against Germany. […] The situation was, of course, thoroughly understood by Hitler; but I am not aware that the British and French Governments were equally enlightened. To Mr. Chamberlain and the British and French General Staffs the purge of 1937 presented itself mainly as a tearing to pieces internally of the Russian Army, and a picture of the Soviet Union as riven asunder by ferocious hatreds and vengeance.”

– Winston Churchill, “The Gathering Storm: The Second World War, Volume 1,” page 258.

Alexander Werth on the Military Purges and Tukhachevsky

tukhachevsky-2

“I am also pretty sure that the purge in the Red Army had a great deal to do with Stalin’s belief in an imminent war with Germany. What did Tukhachevsky stand for? People of the French Deuxieme Buereau told me long ago that Tukhachevsky was pro-German. And the Czechs told me the extraordinary story of Tukhachevsky’s visit to Prague, when towards the end of a banquet – he had got rather drunk – he blurted out that an agreement with Hitler was the only hope for both Czechoslovakia and Russia. And he then proceeded to abuse Stalin. The Czechs did not fail to report this to Kremlin, and that was the end of Tukhachevsky – and so many of his followers.”

– Alexander Werth, quoted in Harpal Brar, Perestroika: The Complete Collapse of Revisionism, page 161.

Joseph Davies on the Soviet Military Purges

joseph-e-davies

Entries dated June 28 and July 4, 1937

“[T]he best judgment seems to believe that in all probability there was a definite conspiracy in the making looking to a coup d’état by the army — not necessarily anti-Stalin, but antipolitical and antiparty, and that Stalin struck with characteristic speed, boldness and strength.’”

“Had a fine talk with Litvinov. I told him quite frankly the reactions in U.S. and Western Europe to the purges; and to the executions of the Red Army generals; that it definitely was bad…

Litvinov was very frank. He stated that they had to ‘make sure’ through these purges that there was no treason left which could co-operate with Berlin or Tokyo; that someday the world would understand that what they had done was to protect the government from ‘menacing treason.’ In fact, he said they were doing the whole world a service in protecting themselves against the menace of Hitler and Nazi world domination, and thereby preserving the Soviet Union strong as a bulwark against the Nazi threat. That the world would appreciate what a very great man Stalin was.”

– U.S. Ambassador Joseph E. Davies, Mission in Moscow, pages 99 and 103.

Lazar Kaganovich on Tukhachevsky

220px-Lazar_Kaganovich

“Tukhachevsky hid Napoleon’s baton in his rucksack.”

– Lazar Kaganovich, quoted in “Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar” by Simon Sebag Montefiore, page 222.