



**A COMING OF AGE  
ALBANIA UNDER ENVER HOXHA**

**BY  
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# Chapter 1:

## *Introduction*

A microcosm of the philosophy which Enver Hoxha sought to implement in the "new" Albania he would construct is found in the first two pages of the *Declaration of the 2nd Meeting of the Anti-Fascist National Liberation Council of Albania on the Rights of Citizens*, distributed publicly on October 23, 1944. The relevant passages of the *Declaration* include:

Throughout their centuries-long history, the Albanian people,... have never submitted to their enemies and have heroically weathered through all the storms that swept their territory and threatened them with extermination. ... In the heat of their heroic war [World War II], our people laid the foundations of their democratic power cemented with the blood of their worthy sons and genuine patriots. The Albanian people took to arms, hurled themselves boldly into this war of liberation, relying on their own forces and confident of their final victory. ... For the first time in their history the Albanian people have become masters of their destiny, firmly determined to buy their past of suffering and build instead a new state, in which they will live in peace and happiness, free and enjoying equal rights.<sup>1</sup>

Not only is the concept of building a new state present but also the buzzword of "relying on their own forces" which would play such an important role over thirty years later.

This study will investigate the forty year period in which Enver Hoxha was the leader of Albania. It will analyze in an objective fashion the impact, both positively and negatively, Enver Hoxha had upon the various components of Albanian life, both foreign and domestic.

The coverage of the subject matter in this study begins during World War II and details briefly the processes entailed in Hoxha's coming to power. It ends in 1985--the time of Hoxha's death. Although Albania's prior history as a whole is outside the scope of this study it is necessary that some mention is made of a few dominant themes which had great impact upon the events contained in this treatise.

Gjergj Kastrioti Skenderbëu, or Scanderbeg, is the hero of the Albanians because of his brilliant military tactics in repelling the Ottoman Turkish forces for a quarter of a century (1443-1468). Upon Skenderbëu's death, the Turks conquered Albania where she remained buried deeply in the backwaters of the Balkans until November 28, 1912, when an independent Albanian state was created primarily to deprive landlocked Serbia an outlet to the sea. This period of foreign domination left its mark which was felt throughout the tenure of Hoxha as its residual effects helped form many of modern Albania's policies.

Domination by the Turks kept the Albanian people as virtual slaves in their own country. For instance, the Albanian language was not allowed to be taught in school (except for an extremely brief period) throughout the nearly four hundred and fifty years of Turkish rule. A standard written alphabet for the language was not adopted until 1908 at the Congress of Monastir.

Likewise, Albania's position on the fringes of the Turkish empire caused it to be among the last territories to gain any modern technologies. The Ottoman Empire as a whole was not on the cutting edge of adopting modern methods. Therefore, Albania had the unenviable position of being the last among the last in terms of modernity and access to the outside world. Likewise, due to the Turks, Albania became the only predominately Moslem country in Europe. This factor did not lend itself to modern trends or forward thinking.

The cumulative effect of these various factors in Albania's past led it to cherish its independence and sovereignty to the utmost limits of possibility as well as dream of becoming a modern state. More important to the Albanian mindset than modernity was the question of independence. More than anything, the Albanian people desired to be

master of their own destiny. It was against this historical backdrop that Enver Hoxha assumed power. It proved to be a strong influence upon the development of Hoxha's future policies and plans for Albania

The foundation upon which this study rests is the incontrovertible fact that definite progress was made in Albania during the Enver Hoxha period. Progress, in terms of beginning the process of moving Albania from a position of pseudo-feudalism to a stage of development which compared favorably in terms of Twentieth Century modernity to its Balkan neighbors. This quite considerable feat is extremely significant because, for the first time in nearly half a millennium, Albania was a sovereign state sitting in its rightful position at the table of the family of European nations. It is true that Albania was certainly less developed than some other nations but it had closed substantially the chasm which had previously separated it from the mainstream of Twentieth Century civilization.

The entire gamut of Albanian life will be analyzed within this volume. Each component, both foreign and domestic, will be analyzed independently and as part of the whole. The conclusion arrived at is that Albania under Enver Hoxha came of age. Specifically, like adolescence itself, Albania too had begun to grow up. Most, if not all people will agree that one's teen-age years are difficult because the formation of what a person will become as an adult is forged in this period. Likewise, Albania began to develop from an extremely rudimentary starting point to the stage of development in which it found itself in 1985 at the time of Enver Hoxha's death. Considerable progress had taken place and most significantly, the foundation for future development was in place.

The premise to be analyzed herein is to show that progress had occurred as well as to tell the story of Albania's history during this forty-odd year period. This study is not intended to be a vehicle to debate the worthiness or lack thereof of Hoxha's methods. There is no question that along with positive steps many mistakes were made and many harmful policies implemented. The rhetorical question of whether a better alternative existed for Albania to follow in this period is left for conjecture. It is outside the scope of this book as well as outside the



prerogative a historian may take in terms of surmising in regards to the "what-ifs" of history. A historian's duty is to tell the story of the period in question based on the facts and draw conclusions which are based on the evidence.

It is worthwhile to mention the reaction of many Albanians to the ideas presented in this study. The author has experienced considerable negative reaction to his views from non-historians in the audiences of lectures given by the author. In the opinion of the author, many Albanians have had their judgments obscured by the hardships endured personally by themselves or their families. This first-hand experience is one which the author does not possess. Although this lack of experience may be viewed by some readers as a detriment, the author believes it to be an advantage in terms of viewing the facts of history in an objective and detached manner without any enfeeblement of bias.

Few objects, situations, or periods in history are completely positive or negative. Most subjects of historical inquiry have shadings of both contained within themselves. Enver Hoxha is a good example. He demonstrated both positive and negative actions during his tenure as leader of the Albanian people.

The final conclusion of this study is that Albania under Hoxha came of age by travelling the path from infancy, to adolescence to adulthood. Albania became a solidly independent sovereign nation. That is the legacy of Enver Hoxha.

*Notes*

<sup>1</sup>*Declaration of the 2nd Meeting of the Anti-Fascist National Liberation Council of Albania on the Rights of Citizens*, quoted in Luan Omari, *The People's Revolution and the Question of State Power in Albania* (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1986), 220-221.



## Chapter 2:

### *Communists Come to Power in Albania*

King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy created a puppet government in Albania during 1939 which was led by the large landowner Shefqet Verlaci. Italy and Albania were officially proclaimed to be a "single territory." Naturally, the Albanian people had no genuine autonomy over their affairs after the annexation of Albania to Italy. "...Albania was completely stripped of its sovereign powers, while the creation of a personal union, solely through the person of a common head of state, was a constitutional farce."<sup>1</sup> This situation whereby Albania either lost its sovereignty or was left standing on the proverbial banana peel in terms of potential loss is significant to this study as a whole. Thus, the Hegelian "one aim" of Enver Hoxha became first and foremost, to maintain the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Albania

Important historical factors which should be kept in mind are: the Italian abuse of Albanian sovereignty; the secret Treaty of London in 1915 whereby Albania's neighbors conspired without Albanian knowledge, much less consent, to cede Albanian territory; the legacy of centuries of Ottoman dominance combined to make an historical sickness which the single-mindedness of Enver Hoxha could provide a quick remedy.

The saga of Albania's sad history is one of perpetual domination by foreign powers. In fact, even Albania's independence (which began in 1912) was extremely shaky. Albania could quite easily have reverted to its centuries-long tradition of dependence. It is precisely because of this

sad and precarious history that Enver Hoxha's goal of maintaining independence was so important.

Enver Hoxha's coming to power began during World War II and the Italian and German occupation of Albania. Italy proceeded to build extensive military facilities in Albania from 1939 to 1941, in preparation for campaigns throughout the Balkans. Various Albanians attempted to retaliate against the Italian occupation by forming small resistance groups.

The resistance during World War II was largely a guerrilla movement which attacked Italian troops from the rear and sought safety in mountain bases. The major problem with the resistance groups circulating in Albania during 1941 and 1942 was that they lacked organization on a large scale. Also, the groups had squabbles among themselves and usually refused to work together, since all the groups had designs on gaining power in post-war Albania.

The largest obstacle facing the various political groups at this time was that there was no political system to take effective control after King Zog I left the country. The resistance movement proved to be the instrument by which the internal power struggle for control of post-war Albania was fought.

There were three major political groups involved in the Albanian resistance movement: (1) *Legaliteti* group; (2) *Balli Kombëtar*, and (3) the Albanian Communist Party. The *Legaliteti* group was led by Abas Kupa, an ex-member of the Communist partisans. Kupa, who was acting under British instructions (the British wanted to influence Albania after the war by the restoration of a monarchy), maintained that only Zog's regime was "legal" and demanded that the National Liberation Front unite under *Legaliteti* leadership.

*Balli Kombëtar*, also known as the "National Front" was led by Midhat Frasheri. This group was anti-fascist, anti-Zog, and anti-Communist.

The Albanian Communist Party was led by Enver Hoxha. It had been formed on November 8, 1941, when the influential Communist groups met at Tiranë and submerged their differences. Hoxha recounted this period:

I told the comrades that 'our fight against the occupiers cannot really get going or be crowned with success without rejecting the unhealthy views and spirit of groups, therefore we ought to make every effort to find a common language and to create the conditions which will lead us towards the founding of a single party, the Communist Party of Albania. That is the task which faces all the sound revolutionary forces of the country, which faces every comrade regardless of whether he is in the leadership of the group or a rank-and-file member, regardless of whether he works and struggles in Tirana, in Korça, in Shkodra, in Gjirokastra or anywhere else.'

The Albanian Communist Party received much assistance throughout their unification struggle from the Yugoslav Communist Party (in fact, the Yugoslavs sponsored the establishment of the Albanian Communist Party). This aid would become a thorny issue in post-war Albanian-Yugoslav relations.

The resistance became organized on September 16, 1942, at the Conference of National Liberation held at Pezë, which was attended by Communists and other nationalist groups. A General Council (temporary instrument of government) was formed with the aim of uniting all anti-fascist Albanians without any distinction as to class, political conviction, region of origin, or religion. Also, National Liberation Councils were created throughout the country. They were summoned to play an important role in organizing the popular front and to be political instruments in the future post-war government.

A secret meeting was held on August 3, 1943, at Mukjë between delegates of the *Balli Kombëtar* and the Albanian Communist Party. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss their differences and to come to an understanding concerning their respective roles in the resistance movement. The Mukjë Agreement, which was signed by both groups, stated that the two groups would put aside their differences and work toward the common goal of defeating the enemy invader. Also, that a greater Albania would be created after the war, including the Kosovë region of Yugoslavia and the Çamëria region of Greece. In addition, the agreement decided to hold free post-war elections to determine the type of government to be in force in Albania.

The Mukjë Agreement seemed to be a workable arrangement which both groups could live with and which would put the nationalistic needs of Albania first and the needs of the separate groups second. However, this approach toward unity was short-lived. One week after the signing of the agreement, it was denounced by Enver Hoxha and the Party as being a compromise of the ideals of the Albanian Communist Party, as well as a capitulation to *Balli Kombëtar* views. Another reason given by the Party for the repudiation was that the delegates had undertaken commitments far beyond their authorization.

A major reason behind the Albanian Communist Party's decision on the Mukjë Agreement was the influence of the Yugoslav Communist Party. The Yugoslav Communist Party opposed the plans for a greater Albania because it would entail the loss of the Kosovë region. Tito, a Croat, realized that keeping Kosovë was important to his fight to win Serbs over to his Communist cause. Enver Hoxha claims that during his visit to Belgrade in 1946 Tito told him that in his personal opinion, "Kosovë belonged to Albania but due to strong Serb opposition, to transfer it then would be inopportune."<sup>3</sup>

After the repudiation of the agreement, an attack was made against the Communist delegates which made them the scapegoats. This attack caused Abas Kupa (a delegate) to break from the Albanian Communist Party and form the *Legaliteti* group. Needless to say, after the rejection of the agreement by Enver Hoxha there was no longer any cooperation between the *Balli Kombëtar* and the Albanian Communist Party. Now they were enemies, more of themselves, than of the enemy Italian troops.

Italy capitulated to the Allies on September 8, 1943. 15,000 Italian troops surrendered to the Partisans instead of to the Germans, who killed most of them. These Italian troops were hidden in remote mountain villages and kept safe. They formed the "Antonio Gramsci" battalion and fought under Partisan leadership against the Nazis. At this time, the Communist-led Partisans started to attack not only the Germans but the *Balli Kombëtar*, as well.<sup>4</sup>

*Balli Kombëtar* saw that the attacks by the Partisans were so serious that their survival was at stake. Therefore, the Ballists started to collaborate with the Germans in joint offensives against the Albanian

Communist Party and the Partisans. During this time, the Partisans used the *Balli Kombëtar's* collaboration with the Germans as a powerful propaganda tool. This propaganda attack effectively caused the Albanian people on the side of the Communists and the Partisans, as well as removing *Balli Kombëtar* from having any further public influence.

Enver Hoxha summarized the wartime strategy which his fellow Communists' should follow by saying:

The Party must tell the people that it is fighting so they themselves will take power and, when this is achieved, the Party would carry out major economic, cultural and social reforms. The Party will tell the people that, 'freedom must be won, it is not donated.' Therefore, the Communist Party Liberation War and the people to victory. This must be the great mission of the Party in general outline.<sup>5</sup>

The focus of the Albanian Communist Party's attacks after the demise of *Balli Kombëtar* shifted to the new target of the *Legaliteti* group of Abas Kupi. *Legaliteti's* biggest problem was that it was loosely organized and could not provide strong competition to the Albanian Communist Party-Partisan movement. Eventually, this defect of the *Legaliteti* group led to its downfall and the existence of Enver Hoxha's Communists as the only organized group in the country.

The Communist seizure of power began at the Permet National Congress, held from May 24 to 28, 1944. The Congress was attended by representatives from all parts of the country. The Congress decided to "set up a new democratic Albania for the people" and that the permanent type of government would be decided after the war by "free" elections. Another decision made at this Congress was that King Zog could never return to Albania and that all agreements made by his government were officially void. An Anti-Fascist Committee for National Liberation (which shows the Yugoslav influence) was elected with its head being Enver Hoxha. On October 22, 1944, the Anti-Fascist Council met at Berat and decided to transform the Anti-Fascist Committee for National Liberation into the provisional government of Albania. The president of this government was Enver Hoxha.



The provisional government moved to Tiranë after its liberation at the end of November 1944. The first thing that it did was to set up police and courts in order to rid itself of opponents. By November 29, 1944, the Shkodër area in northern Albania was freed so the entire country was liberated and the new government began to put its measures into full operation.

Special tribunals were set up to try "war criminals" and "enemies of the people." In reality, these people were only "enemies of the party." These "trials" were presided over Koci Xoxe, the Minister of the Interior and the most powerful Communist behind Enver Hoxha. It is ironic that Xoxe would preside over tribunals which in a few short years would cause his own demise. The trials were conducted entirely by judges with no legal training and depended upon spectators to determine punishment. The spectators were encouraged by the police to give severe sentences. Thousands of opponents of the regime were sentenced to death or to long terms of imprisonment.<sup>6</sup>

The new Albanian government was first officially recognized as the legal government of Albania by Yugoslavia on April 28, 1945. In November 1945, the government of the Soviet Union followed suit. Later, the United States and Britain recognized the Albanian government as well.

The first general "free" elections in post-war Albania were held on December 2, 1945. The Communists were the only candidates, which went against the agreement of the Congress of Permet (May 1944). The Communists "won" the election with 90 percent of the vote. The new national assembly met in January 1946, and proclaimed that Albania was no longer a monarchy but a "people's republic" (January 11, 1946). The assembly also approved a constitution modeled after the Yugoslav Constitution of 1945, sans the federal structure.

An injustice shown toward the Albanian nation occurred when it was denied full participation at the 1946 Paris Peace Conference. There can be no question that Albania was a victim of aggression by both the Italians and the Germans. Enver Hoxha detailed the damages suffered by the Albanian people in his speech of August 21, 1946 to the Paris Peace Conference:

The sacrifices of our people were very great. Out of a population of one million, 28,000 were killed. 12,600 wounded, 10,000 were made political prisoners in Italy and Germany, and 35,000 made to do forced labour; of the 2,500 towns and villages of Albania, 850 were ruined or razed to the ground; all the communications, all the ports, mines and electric power installations were destroyed, our agriculture and livestock were plundered, and our entire national economy was wrecked.

On the other side, the enemy suffered these losses: 53,639 Italians and Germans were killed, wounded or taken prisoner, about 100 tanks and armoured cars knocked out, 1,334 artillery pieces and mortars, 1,934 trucks and 2,855 machine-guns captured or destroyed, not to mention the rifles, munitions, and stores destroyed or captured.

The policy which served to ignore the damages incurred, as well as the assistance given to the war effort by small nations was extremely short-sighted. A historian never should become overly involved in the "what-ifs" of history. Otherwise, objectivity is lost and the writing becomes only writing and no longer history. However, this is an instance where one is seriously tempted to indulge one's self in some theorizing over the impact a more humane and thoughtful policy toward small nations' rights may have had on the future developments in Albania. Would a different approach toward Albania at the Paris Peace Conference which gave credit to Albania for its contribution to the war effort have created a less anti-Western philosophy in Albania, as well as a less isolated Albania? One can not say with any degree of certainty, but it is indeed an interesting question.

This brief background has two major ideas to convey. First, the historical background of Albania's perpetual domination and scant independence is extremely relevant to later developments in Albania's history. Secondly, the shrewdness of Enver Hoxha is shown in the machinations which took place that brought Hoxha to the head of the Albanian Communist Party. Likewise, the subtle nuances which will be seen throughout the entire career of Enver Hoxha were seen in the repudiation of the Mukjë Agreement. The fine line between what is best for Albania and what is best for Enver Hoxha is shown here. One could easily argue that the repudiation of this agreement was better for Enver

Hoxha than it was for Albania. Thus, it is crucial to keep these factors in mind when trying to draw objective conclusions.

*Notes*

'Ramadan Marmullaku, *Albania and the Albanians*, trans. Margot and Bosko Milosavljevic (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1975), 42.

<sup>2</sup> Enver Hoxha, *Selected Works, 1980-1984*, vol. 6 (Tirane: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1987), 213.

<sup>3</sup> Nora Beloff, *Tito's Flawed Legacy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), 192.

<sup>4</sup> Stavro Skendi, *Albania* (London: Atlantic Press, 1957), 164.

<sup>5</sup> Hoxha, 279-280.

<sup>6</sup> This method of using the "people's courts" to rid opponents of the regime was used extensively by Enver Hoxha throughout his lifetime. Needless to say, its ruthless application made it an extremely powerful weapon of the regime.

<sup>7</sup> Enver Hoxha, *Selected Works, 1941-1948*, vol. 1 (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1974), 599-600.



## Chapter 3:

### *Albania and Yugoslavia*

Yugoslavia was Albania's closest ally between 1944 and 1948. This closeness was due primarily to the help the Yugoslav Communist Party gave the Albanian Communist Party in its formative years during the war. Yugoslavia also was among the first countries to recognize the Hoxha government and establish diplomatic relations with Albania on April 28, 1945.

Help was given to Albania by Yugoslavia in two important areas: first, in the United Nations and second, at the Paris Peace Conference. Edward Kardelj, the head of the Yugoslav delegation to the United Nations gave this message at the first session of the General Assembly in London in January 1945:

The delegation of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia wishes to give to the request of the People's Republic of Albania its heartiest support. Addressing myself, through you, to the Security Council, we demand that the Security Council recommend to the General Assembly that the People's Republic of Albania be admitted to the United Nations.

I also avail myself of this opportunity to draw the attention of the Security Council to the fact that Albania was one of the first victims of fascist aggression in Europe, that the Albanian people, through its National Liberation Army, fought with self-abnegation in the war on the side of the United Nations and that, proportionally to its forces, it contributed to the victory over the aggressors as a faithful ally of democratic countries.<sup>1</sup>

A similar scenario occurred at the Paris Peace Conference in 1946. The Yugoslav representative, Mosa Pijade, supported Albania's interests in a speech by saying that:

The Yugoslav delegation considers that failure to invite Albania to the Conference, as a member state having equal rights with all of us, cannot be justified. Is Albania an enemy country to be invited to the Conference only to be heard, as is the case of former enemy countries, or is it an Allied country which deserves the admiration and gratitude of all democratic countries?<sup>2</sup>

The Major-General of the Albanian Army, Bedri Spahiu summed up the initial Albanian ardor toward Yugoslavia:

Our people will never forget the assistance that was lent to us during of [sic.] the national liberation struggle by Marshal Tito, the great leader, and his heroic Army by attacking enemy divisions that had come down crashing upon the heads of our people; we shall never forget the material aid given to us [sic.] without any conditions in the first period of liberation of our country; we shall never forget the political assistance rendered to us in connexion [sic.] with all our international problems as well as the prompt [sic.] recognition of our Government. Our people see in the peace-loving role of Yugoslavia a firm guarantee of its independence. For all these reasons, Tito's name is resounding all over Albania together with the name of our Enver. For this reason, our people keep Tito's picture next to the picture of our great son Enver.<sup>3</sup>

Albania's faith in Yugoslavia's intentions as a guarantor of Albania's sovereignty and independence would eventually change completely.

The root of the break between the two groups began at the second Plenary session of the Albanian Communist Party on October 10, 1944, at Berat. The session was supposed to be concerned with solving problems which confronted Albania on the verge of being liberated. However, the meeting became an attack by the Yugoslav delegation led by Velimir Stoinich on the Albanian Communist Party and Enver Hoxha. The Party was accused of having "vacillated between sectarianism and opportunism" and Enver Hoxha was criticized as the source of these errors. Also, the liberation movement in Albania was said to owe its success almost entirely to the aid and advice given the Albanians by the Yugoslav Communist Party.

This attack, which might have been expected to be disregarded since it came from an outsider, was seriously considered by many members of the Albanian Communist Party because of the preparatory

propaganda work done behind the scenes by Koçi Xoxe, Sejfulla Maleshova, and the rest of the pro-Yugoslav faction in the Party. The Yugoslav position was that Albania was too small and too weak to stand on its own after the war. It could only be a "tempting morsel" for the imperialist powers. Therefore, it was necessary for Albania to agree to join the Yugoslav federation as a step toward the complete union of the two countries, with Tito as the symbol of the union since he was the "great liberator of the Balkans and Europe."

The period between 1945-1947, was marked by the continuous pressure applied by Tito from within the Albanian Party designed to force Albania into being more dependent upon Yugoslavia. On July 9, 1946, a Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Aid was concluded between the two states. The pressure which was given under the guise of "strengthening friendly relations," caused Albania to enter into unfair economic agreements. The agreements were theoretically mutually beneficial but were very much like the one-sided agreements made with Italy in pre-war Albania by King Zog's government.

Under these agreements, the Albanian *lek* was revalued in terms of the Yugoslav *dinar*, a customs union was formed, and Albania's economic plan was subordinated to Yugoslavia's.<sup>4</sup>

Albanian economists, H. Banja and V. Toci, stated their analysis of Yugoslav intentions:

...Albania didn't need to create its national industry, but should limit her production to agricultural and mineral raw materials, which were to be sent for industrial processing to Yugoslavia. In other words, they wanted the Albanian economy to be a mere appendage of the Yugoslav economy.<sup>5</sup>

Enver Hoxha commented further on the development of close ties in all areas between Albania and Yugoslavia:

We did not discuss as we should have the true meaning of coordination of planning, parity of currency, the unification of prices, the abolition of customs barriers, and the methods of activity of joint companies, nor did we properly define the question of credits. We had full trust in them, whereas the Yugoslavs had specific aims as far as the nature and development of economic relations were concerned. The aims of the policy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia



towards our country were anti-Marxist, exploitative and colonialist; in short, they were to the detriment of our people.<sup>6</sup>

Despite any underlying motivations or future designs on Albanian territory that Yugoslavia may have had, they nevertheless did give Albania considerable financial support in the first years following World War II. Examples of this assistance can be seen in the twenty thousand tons of wheat and corn given *gratis* in 1946 to Albania by Yugoslavia.

The Deputy Minister of Finance, Abdul Këllezzi (purged by Hoxha in 1975), stated at a meeting of the National Assembly on July 17, 1947 that: "The current valuable assistance of the peoples of Yugoslavia in the amount of 2 billion *lekë* represents 56.73 percent of our state budget." The following year, the Minister of Finance, Ramadan Çitaku said much of the same thing: "Yugoslavia is granting to Albania 3 billion *lekë* which represent income for the economic development of Albania based on coordinated plans and exchanges of goods, and this amounts to 48.13 percent of the total income of the national budget." Likewise, Yugoslavia gave Albania from 1945 to 1948, 704,791,000 *dinars* for equipping its army.<sup>7</sup> However, despite the generous aid given to Albania by Yugoslavia, the economies were becoming more and more enmeshed -- a fact which slowly was ensnaring Albania on its way into becoming the Seventh Republic of Yugoslavia.<sup>8</sup>

The inter-linking of the economies displeased Hoxha. The major flaws in the Yugoslav aspirations toward Albania were, according to Hoxha:

We [Albania] were expected to produce for the Yugoslavs all the raw materials which they needed. These raw materials were to be exported to the metropolis Yugoslavia to be processed there in Yugoslav factories. The same applied to the production of cotton and other industrial crops, as well as oil, bitumen, asphalt, chrome, etc. Yugoslavia would supply its 'colony', Albania, with exorbitantly priced consumer goods, including even such items as needles and thread, and would provide us with petrol and oil, as well as glass for the lamps in which we burn the fuel extracted from our subsoil, processed in Yugoslavia and sold to us at high prices. ... The aim of the Yugoslavs was, therefore, to prevent our country from developing either its industry or its working class, and to make it forever dependent on Yugoslavia.<sup>9</sup>

An issue which arose during this period was the advice Josef Stalin gave to Albania concerning Tito's intentions. Some questions Stalin asked Albania were: (1) Why was Yugoslavia so interested in forming joint industrial companies in Albania when they refused to form them with the Soviet Union in their own country? (2) Why was Yugoslavia sending military experts into Albania when Soviet experts were needed in their own military? (3) How could Yugoslavia, itself being poor and undeveloped, intend to assume the development of Albania? Stalin's answer to these questions was that Yugoslavia was intending to dominate, control, and ultimately annex Albania, making it the Seventh Republic of Yugoslavia.<sup>10</sup>

Further information concerning Yugoslavia's intentions toward Albania was given by Stalin to Hoxha:

We did not know that the Yugoslavs, under the pretext of 'defending' your country against an attack from the Greek fascists, wanted to bring units of their army into the PRA. They tried to do this in a very secret manner. In reality, their aim in this direction was utterly hostile, for they intended to overturn the situation in Albania.<sup>11</sup>

Enver Hoxha, of course, concurred with the view of Yugoslavia's anti-Albanian intentions. Hoxha's summary of Yugoslavia's aims regarding Albania was as follows:

The main aim...was to turn our country into the seventh republic of Yugoslavia, to make it submit to orders and directives from Belgrade, to transform our country into a Yugoslav colony with only formal independence, concealed and masked with the formulae of bourgeois pseudo-independence. The criticism aimed to separate Albania from the socialist camp, to turn it into an enemy of the Soviet Union and to divert our party into an anti-Marxist road. To the Yugoslav Trotskyites, Albania was the small state of the socialist camp in which they would make their first experiment in implementing their treacherous line against the socialist camp.<sup>12</sup>

Additional evidence given by Enver Hoxha concerning the increasingly precarious nature of Albania's sovereignty can be seen in the scenario in which "...there is published in a friendly country like Bulgaria a map of the Balkans in which Albania is included within the boundaries of Federal Yugoslavia...[in this intolerable situation] we

cannot keep silent. We are told that this happened due to a technical error of an employee, but why had this not happened before?"<sup>13</sup>

In June 1947, the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party began to put into motion their plans for the takeover of Albania by publicly attacking Enver Hoxha. The Central Committee accused Hoxha of taking an individualistic anti-Marxist line, which was hostile to Yugoslavia and against the interests of Albania itself. Another attack by Yugoslavia against Albania occurred in July 1947, when Albania made agreements with the Soviet Union to purchase a supply of agricultural machinery. Yugoslavia said that Albania could not enter into any agreements with other countries without Yugoslav approval.

Koçi Xoxe tried to stop Enver Hoxha from signing a treaty of friendship with Bulgaria. Xoxe's reasoning for his actions was that Albania must be kept isolated to facilitate its absorption into Yugoslavia. The case of Nako Spiru illustrates the seriousness of the situation. Spiru was a member of the Albanian Party who opposed the economic agreements between Albania and Yugoslavia. He favored Albanian self-sufficiency and economic development without Yugoslavia. Koçi Xoxe was ruthless in his attacks on Spiru. No one came to Spiru's defense for fear of their own positions. Finally, in November 1947, the pressure became too much to bear and Nako Spiru committed suicide. The first of many instances of a common theme which permeates the lives of the Albanian Communists under Hoxha; namely, the disappearance of people or one could say, the high incidence of "suicide."

Professor Dilaver Sadekaj, of the Institute of History of the University of Tiranë, whose field of specialization is the Hoxha period, gave his opinion concerning Yugoslav-Albanian relations during an interview in Tiranë. Professor Sadekaj opines:

All policies and agreements between the two governments were prepared for the annexation of Albania into Yugoslavia. There is no doubt this would have taken place in 1948 if there had not been the disagreements between Yugoslavia and the Soviet government.

It is difficult to make provisions in history but my opinion is that if these events did not happen in 1948, this process of annexation of Albania would have been carried out<sup>14</sup>

Yugoslavia was on the verge of taking over Albania in February 1948. In January 1948, Milovan Djilas of the Yugoslav Communist Party went to Moscow at Stalin's request to discuss the Albanian situation. At the meeting, Stalin told Djilas that "We have no special interest in Albania. We agree to Yugoslavia swallowing Albania!...the sooner the better."<sup>15</sup> Djilas states that Stalin noted that Hoxha was "...a petty bourgeois, inclined toward nationalism." Xoxe was the preferred replacement.<sup>16</sup>

Vladimir Dedijer gives a full account of the conversation between Edward Kardelj and Stalin in his book entitled *Tito*. The exchange began with Stalin asking Kardelj the following question:

'Do you know Enver well? What is your opinion of him? Is he a consistent man? Will he remain with us to the end?'

Kardelj: 'Our opinion is that he is good and honest on the whole, although he has certain characteristics of a petty bourgeoisie intellectual. He has a good war record and the people love him. But he lacks Marxist-Leninist training. But we consider that the best and most consistent man over there is Kochi Džodze [Koçi Xoxe], a worker, although he also lacks training.'<sup>17</sup>

Koçi Xoxe began to use his position as organizing secretary to exclude many of Hoxha's allies from attending the Party and Central Committee meetings. The Eight Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party, which was in session between February 26 and March 8, 1948, was the culmination of the Yugoslav plot to isolate Hoxha and ultimately, to remove him from his leadership position. Xoxe accused Hoxha of being responsible for all the mistakes the Albanian Party had made. In addition, Xoxe demanded that the Soviet military mission be expelled and replaced by its Yugoslav counterpart.

Hoxha managed to get the accusations and demands of the Xoxe-led pro-Yugoslav group of the Party rejected. This decision effectively ended all Yugoslav plans for the control of Albania.

Albanian-Yugoslav relations worsened, and on May 25, 1948, Albania sent no greeting to Tito on his birthday. One month later, Yugoslavia was expelled from the Communist Information Bureau (COMINFORM). Tito's break with Stalin was the significant factor which allowed Hoxha and Albania to break from Yugoslavia.

The significance of Tito's Yugoslav opposition against Soviet domination was truly historic. The conflict and the break between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union reveals some fundamental tensions in communist doctrine and practice which are often overlooked by the casual observer. It shattered a thirty-year dogma that Communism implies unconditional support of the Soviet Union.

On April 12, 1948, the members of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party convened for possibly the most significant meeting in Party history. According to Tito,

...this is not a matter here of any theoretical discussion...Comrades, the point here, first and foremost, is the relations between one state and another. ...No matter how much each of us loves the land of socialism, the U.S.S.R., he can in no case, love his own country less.<sup>18</sup>

The issue was not of ideology but independence! In other words, "it was a conflict between two different concepts by Communist leaders subscribing to the same strategic aims but divided by differences as to timing and tactics."<sup>19</sup>

Vladimir Dedijer sheds further light on the Yugoslav position in his book, *Yugoslav-Albanian Relations-1939-1948*:

The problem of the settlement of relations among socialist countries is seeking now for its urgent practical solution. Hundreds of millions of people are now being liberated from the imperialist yoke. The relations among socialist countries can now be solved only following the principle which is in accordance with the spirit of socialism, that means, through the comradely and open-hearted cooperation on the basis of mutual respect and equality, and not to [sic] through slanders, lies, provocations, and a multitude of frauds.

The FPRY in her relations with the Soviet Union and all the countries of people's democracies, in particular with the PR of Albania, showed by deeds how deeply she honors that principle. To desert the principle of just regulation of the relations among socialist countries would be not only uncommunist, would not only mean a hard blow to the cause of the revolution and socialism in Yugoslavia, but it would have unforeseeable [sic], harmful consequences for the further successful fight of progressive forces of the world against imperialist aggression<sup>20</sup>

The first notable instance of Yugoslav divergence from Soviet policy occurred in the winter of 1941-1942 in South Serbia and Bosnia. Tito and his Partisans defied Moscow's instructions concerning cooperation with the Chetniks led by Draza Mihajlovic. Stalin desired a united front against the Nazis, for both ideological and pragmatic reasons. Stalin sent a message to Tito which stated his position:

Take into account that the Soviet Union has treaty relations with the Yugoslav king [Peter] and government, and that taking an open stand against them would create new difficulties in the joint war efforts and the relations between the Soviet Union on the one hand and Britain and America on the other. Do not consider your fight only from your own national point of view, but also from the international standpoint of the British-American-Soviet coalition.. Show more elasticity and ability to maneuver.<sup>21</sup>

Tito however, would not cooperate with his domestic enemies and in fact, after 1942, Tito received ample military aid from Britain and the United States. By opposing Moscow on this issue, Tito succeeded in both defeating the Nazis without Soviet assistance (which completed his goal of liberating Yugoslavia) and in clinching the position of becoming post-war ruler of Yugoslavia. Mosa Pijade, a Yugoslav Party theoretician and former representative to the Paris Peace Conference, summarized the situation well by noting that Tito "wanted a short-cut to a full-fledged Communist regime, to destroy the old system and to annihilate domestic rivals or enemies regardless of broader Soviet interests."<sup>22</sup>

Josip Broz Tito further enraged Stalin by organizing a meeting of the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) at the Bosnian town of Jajce on November 29, 1943. The Council proceeded to name itself the provisional legislature and its executive as the provisional government headed by Tito (now accorded the title of "Marshal"). Also, King Peter's exile government was prohibited from returning to the country. Stalin called this a "stab in the back for the Soviet Union."<sup>23</sup>

Tito realized that he could have little impact on the overall war effort (since the Balkans were a relatively minor theater of operations) so he concentrated his efforts on solidifying his internal power base

which subsequently relegated the anti-Nazi struggle to a secondary position.

A divisive issue emerged immediately after the war concerning Stalin's and Tito's terminology for the description of their governments. Stalin used the term "people's democracy" and officially supported the facade of cooperation with non-Communist factions in the running of post-war governments. Tito refused to cooperate in this matter and operated an "open Communist totalitarian dictatorship" (the first and only).

Yugoslav-Soviet relations progressively deteriorated until they got to the point where Yugoslavia was challenging the Soviet position in the Balkans. First, in 1948, Yugoslavia was poised to send two divisions into Albania, allegedly due to an Albanian request to defend against a Greek attack. In reality, this was an effort to ease Yugoslav takeover of Albania.<sup>24</sup> Second, Yugoslavia tried to organize a federation with Bulgaria that ultimately would become a multi-state Balkan union. Following this expansionist exploit, Tito and Georgi Dimitrov, the Bulgarian leader, were summoned to Moscow and severely criticized by Stalin. Stalin told Tito that the issue of their conflict was "not your mistakes, but your policy."<sup>25</sup>

The Yugoslavs give a contradictory version concerning Stalin's opinion of a Balkan union being formed between Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania. Both Djilas and Dedijer agree that Stalin was in favor of this federation taking place; the sooner the better. In fact, Dedijer goes so far as to use the word, "annex" in terms of Stalin's intentions toward Albania's inclusion into the Balkan union.<sup>26</sup>

Interestingly enough, another Yugoslav source has a quite different focal point of forming a tripartite Balkan union. Josip Djerdja, a Yugoslav envoy in Tirane in 1948 gave testimony that:

He [Hoxha] told me he had read a report in which Dimitrov announced impending negotiations between Sofia and Belgrade on Bulgaria's entry into the Yugoslav Federation. He asked me to convey the Albanian leadership's surprise to Tito immediately, as well as the unconditional desire to resolve the question of Albania's federation with Yugoslavia before the federation with Bulgaria. Yugoslavia and Albania would then decide together whether to admit Bulgaria which had fought on the other side during the war. Hoxha said that Albanians would find it very hard to accept a situation in which Bulgaria, an opponent in the war, would be in

a position to decide whether Albania could join the Federation or not. Naturally, I immediately informed Tito of this conversation.<sup>27</sup>

Stalin ordered the Communist Information Bureau (COMINFORM) to take the ultimate action by issuing a writ of excommunication for Tito and Yugoslavia. This drastic decision was the culmination of Stalin's failure to reassert his authority in Yugoslavia. Stalin attempted to subvert and infiltrate the UDBA (Yugoslav secret police), the army command, and Yugoslav Communist Party leadership. On June 28, 1948, the Czechoslovakian state newspaper *Rude Pravo* announced that Yugoslavia was officially expelled from the COMINFORM.

The official communique affirms the charges leveled by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union against the Yugoslav Communist Party:

- 1) deviationist domestic and foreign policy;
- 2) determined hostilities toward the Soviet Union;
- 3) faulty agricultural policy;
- 4) anon-Marxist-Leninist conception of the role of the party;
- 5) a refusal to accept criticism;
- 6) arrogant behavior toward fraternal parties and claims to privilege.

Having detailed these charges, the COMINFORM expels the Yugoslav heretics from its ranks and openly appeals to the rank and file of the Yugoslav Party to oust its leadership

This action by the COMINFORM was a godsend to Enver Hoxha because it allowed him to extricate Albania from the Yugoslav alliance and strengthen his position as leader of the Albanian Party. Albania was the first East European nation to take public action against Yugoslavia following the COMINFORM expulsion. On July 1, 1948, Tiranë requested that all Yugoslav technical advisors leave the country within forty-eight hours, and unilaterally declared all treaties and agreements, except for the Treaty of Friendship, Collaboration, and Mutual Aid (This treaty was abrogated by Yugoslavia on November 12, 1949), null and void.<sup>29</sup>



The speed with which Albania broke relations with Yugoslavia after the COMINFORM resolution is illustrative due to the fact that only one month prior Enver Hoxha said in a speech:

Each day our people will strengthen and temper the brotherhood, precious friendship and alliance with the fraternal peoples of Marshal Tito's Yugoslavia with whom it fought shoulder to shoulder to win freedom and with whom it is working shoulder to shoulder to build a better, common life."<sup>30</sup>

Miodrag Djukic makes an astute observation in his book, *Anti-Yugoslav Pretensions of Enver Hoxha*, when he notes after Albania's break with Yugoslavia that:

Hoxha's quicksand loyalty always reflects his reading of political expediency. This first came to light in his relations with Yugoslavia. One nudge from the seemingly invincible Stalin was enough for him to go back overnight on everything he once swore by. This typically Stalinist trait was to surface time and again after 1948 with regard to many of his other, 'devoted' and 'eternal' allies and friends.<sup>31</sup>

Albanian analysis of the importance of the COMINFORM's expulsion of Tito can best be viewed in the "informative" article in *Zeri i popullit* entitled: "15 Years Since the Issue of the Information Bureau Resolution 'On the Situation in the Yugoslav Communist Party'":

For our Party and our country they spelled salvation. Tito's clique brutally interfered in the internal affairs of our Party and of our country and, proceeding from their covetousness to plunder and colonize, they attempted to turn Albania into a "7th Republic of Yugoslavia." In their relations with Albania and the Party of Labour of Albania, Tito's group displayed all the characteristics of modern revisionism: ideological and political deviation, lack of respect for equality, the chauvinism of the big state, arrogance, plots and so on. Therefore, their attitude towards our Party and our state constitutes the gravest indictment against the Yugoslav revisionists.

The Yugoslav revisionists tried to bring their troops, their divisions to Albania and, in this way, to lay hold of the strategic points of our country and to suppress the resistance of the people and the Party, to colonize our Fatherland through military pressure and such agents as Koçi Xoxe and his company, let us not forget that they intended to

carry out this military coup, this occupation under the guise of the military treaty of mutual assistance, under the guise of the so-called menace threatening Albania, under the guise of military measures, under the guise of "friendship." All of these were smoke-screens but our Party and people told the Yugoslav modern revisionists and their divisions to halt, otherwise there would be bloodshed. Stalin, glorious protector of Marxism-Leninism, of the freedom and sovereignty of peoples, came to our assistance and the subversive Yugoslav revisionists met with disgraceful failure.<sup>32</sup>

The action of Koçi Xoxe resulted in his expulsion from the Albanian Party of Labor. He was later brought to trial for treason and was sentenced to death. On June 13, 1949, Xoxe was executed by a firing squad.

Nikita Khrushchev in his memoirs gives this analysis of the situation regarding Hoxha and Xoxe:

Enver Hoxha, Mehmet Sheku [sic.], and Ballutu [sic.] had come to power in Albania by staging an uprising and overthrowing the original First Secretary of the Albanian Party, a very good comrade [Koçi Xoxe] whom Tito had always spoken well of and whom the Yugoslavs had generally supported. He had been from solid workers' stock, and he was the founder of the Communist Party of Albania. Tito told me that Mehmet Sheku [sic.] personally strangled this man. These three—Hoxha, Sheku [sic.], and Ballutu [sic.]—used to bring someone to trial and sentence them themselves, without ever putting anything in writing; then they would look for an opportunity to have their victim murdered secretly. It was all very similar to the system used by Stalin and Beria.<sup>33</sup>

The death of Koçi Xoxe marked the beginning of a recurring theme which prevailed throughout Hoxha's years in power in Albania. This theme was the strategic implementation of a policy of purging any person or thought which threatened Hoxha's preeminent position. The Yugoslav author, Miodrag Djukic, in a somewhat propagandist<sup>^</sup>, though accurate way, clearly describes the importance of purges to the maintenance of power of Enver Hoxha. Djukic writes:

Purges have become an established method of rule in Enver Hoxha's neo-Stalinist regime. They are the means by which he perpetuates his rule and keeps his country totally isolated from change. They are also convenient for shifting the blame for all the troubles and miseries he is responsible for in his country on to foreign countries, especially

Yugoslavia. Here, however, he falls into the trap of contradictions. The very fact of these purges is proof of the irrepressible opposition to Stalinism even in Enver Hoxha's closest circles. The very fact that he sees a Yugoslav hand behind even the most minor challenge to his rule and any inclination towards change, whatever the direction, is convincing testimony in itself of the reputation Yugoslavia enjoys among the Albanians and of Hoxha's repeated failure to destroy the Albanian people's friendly feelings towards Yugoslavia.<sup>34</sup>

The First Congress of the Albanian Communist Party was held in Tiranë from November 8 to 22, 1948. The name of the Party was changed to the Albanian Party of Labor. The Party's aims would remain unchanged but it was decided the new name would better reflect the make-up of the Albanian society which was comprised of eighty percent peasants.<sup>35</sup>

Yugoslavia, as one might well imagine, vehemently denounced the decision by Enver Hoxha to reject Albania's alliance with Yugoslavia. Hoxha was considered a traitor to those who had helped him. These sentiments were felt by many people of each of Albania's former allies after a break in diplomatic relations had occurred. Ranko Petkovic, a Yugoslav analyst, proposed an interesting explanation for the motivation behind Enver Hoxha's split with Yugoslavia:

Enver Hoxha saw in the campaign against Yugoslavia a favourable opportunity to consolidate his autocratic rule in the Albanian party and state. It was quite natural that there were, in the Albanian leadership, forces who, from the very outset, pleaded for the establishment of as close and sincere relations with Yugoslavia as possible. The joining of Stalin's attacks on Yugoslavia provided Enver Hoxha with the opportunity to liquidate the partisans of friendship with Yugoslavia and finally to achieve the dream of his life—to become the incontestable leader of the Albania [sic.] party and state. Enver Hoxha was not guided, in this case either, by the interests of the Albanian people, working class and party, but was prompted exclusively by his self-seeking motives.<sup>36</sup>

The questions raised by Petkovic have some degree of validity regardless of one's viewpoint on the question of sovereignty and the "Seventh Republic." For instance, if one rejects the "Seventh Republic" theory, then Petkovic's explanation concerning Hoxha's motivations, etc. seem quite plausible. However, if one accepts the likelihood of the "Seventh Republic" scenario almost occurring, as does this writer, then

one must reject Petkovic's theory for the most part. It is safe to say, that observers on both sides of this question will agree in general that Enver Hoxha was motivated by his desire to remain firmly entrenched in power. There is little doubt on this point. The crucial question rests on the issue of maintenance of independence and sovereignty.

Research data may help to clarify this issue. Question Number 11 of the questionnaire in Appendix A asked the respondents their opinion concerning the alliance between Albania and Yugoslavia. Ninety-eight percent felt that the alliance was negative and only two percent felt that it was a positive development in Albania's history. A few representative comments for the negative side were: "[The alliance was] very negative because Yugoslavia wanted to transform Albania into a colony." Also, "I thought that Albania may be the Seventh Republic of Yugoslavia." On the positive side, someone responded by saying "I think [the alliance] was positive for stability and for peace in the Balkans."<sup>37</sup>

Albania's split with Yugoslavia is significant because it was their first break with an ally over the principle of anti-revisionism and pro-Stalinism. It also foreshadowed a recurring trend in Albanian foreign relations.

The alliance with Yugoslavia was positive for the Albanian Party of Labor in a limited sense due to the help the Yugoslav Communists gave the Albanian Communists in terms of gaining power. Yugoslavia also gave Albania important economic assistance in beginning the process of industrialization. However, the negative aspects of the alliance with Yugoslavia overshadowed any positive benefits.

The issue which made the alliance as a whole a negative alliance was the crucial issue of maintaining sovereignty. There is no question that Tito had every intention of annexing Albania and making it the Seventh Republic of Yugoslavia. The authorization given to Tito by Stalin in this area confirms and strengthens this belief. It was the Albania-Yugoslav alliance which made this annexation of Albania with Yugoslavia and the subsequent accompanying loss of sovereignty and independence, that much closer to a reality. Therefore, due to the gravity of the question of sovereignty, which is the most precious commodity a nation or a people can possess, the alliance between

Albania and Yugoslavia can only be considered a negative development in Albania's history.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Ranko Petkovic, "Yugoslavia and Albania," in *Yugoslav-Albanian Relations*, trans. Zvonko Petnicki and Darinka Petkovic (Belgrade: Review of International Affairs, 1984), 267. Despite the efforts of Kardelj, Albania was not admitted to the United Nations until December 1955.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 269-270. Despite Yugoslavia's pleas on Albania's behalf, Albania was not granted full-fledged status at the Paris Peace Conference. Yugoslavia, in essence, was Albania's spokesperson at the Conference.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 269.

<sup>4</sup> Albania sent raw materials to Yugoslavia to be made into finished goods. See Nicholas C. Pano, *The People's Republic of Albania* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), 101.

<sup>5</sup> H. Banja and V. Toci, *Socialist Albania on the Road to Industrialization*, (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1979), 66.

<sup>6</sup> Enver Hoxha, *Selected Works, 1941-1948*, vol. 1 (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1974), 745.

'Petkovic, 274-275.

<sup>8</sup> An article which appeared in *Zeri i popullit* (Tiranë), 2 March 1949, p. 2 elaborated on the anti-Albanian aspirations of the Yugoslavs. The aid given by Yugoslavia to Albania had as its object to turn Albania into a Yugoslav colony due to the "help" given to the economy: "...kthenin Shqipërinë në një koloni të tyre. "

<sup>9</sup> Hoxha, 751.

<sup>10</sup> Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962), 135-136.

<sup>11</sup> Enver Hoxha, *With Stalin* (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1979), 92-93.

<sup>12</sup> Hoxha, *Selected Works, 1941-1948*, vol. 1, 759.

<sup>13</sup> Enver Hoxha, "Reject the Revisionist Theses of the XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Anti-Marxist Stand of Khrushchev's Group! Uphold Marxism-Leninism!", Speech delivered at the Meeting of the 81 Communist and Workers Parties, Moscow, 16 November 1960 (Tiranë: Naim Frasheri State Publishing Enterprise, 1969), 120.

<sup>14</sup> Dilaver Sadekaj, interview by author, Tape Recording, Tiranë, 13 April 1994.

"Djilas, 143. See also Vladimir Dedijer, *Tito* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953; repr., New York: Arno Press, 1972), 311.

<sup>16</sup> Djilas, 146.

<sup>17</sup> Dedijer, 303.

<sup>18</sup> Robert Bass and Elizabeth Marbury, eds., *The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-58: A Documentary Record* (New York: Prospect Books, 1959), 15.

<sup>19</sup> Paul Lendvai, *Eagles in Cobwebs* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1969), 76.

<sup>20</sup> Vladimir Dedijer, *Yugoslav-Albanian Relations-1939-1948*, trans. Joint Publications Research Service (Ljubljana: Borba Publishing House, 1949), 177.

<sup>21</sup> Lendvai, 78.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 77-78.

<sup>23</sup> Dedijer, *Tito*, 209.

<sup>24</sup> Milovan Djilas, First Vice-Premier of the Yugoslav government, recalled that he had asked Edward Kardelj, a top Yugoslav Communist Party official who held many positions, why it was necessary to send two divisions into Albania. The reply was: "Well, you know how it is, the Old Man [Tito] keeps on pressing for it." Nora Beloff, *Tito's Flawed Legacy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), 143.

<sup>25</sup> Lendvai, 85.

<sup>26</sup> Djilas, 177; Dedijer, *Tito*, 321.

<sup>27</sup> Miodrag Djukic, *Anti-Yugoslav Pretensions of Enver Hoxha*, (Belgrade: Tanjug News Agency, 1984), 24.

<sup>28</sup> Bass and Marbury, 40.

<sup>29</sup> Elez Biberaj, *Albania and China* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 24; Stavro Skendi, *Albania* (London: Atlantic Press, 1957), 354.

<sup>30</sup> Djukic, 32.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 33.

<sup>32</sup> "15 Years Since the Issue of the Information Bureau Resolution 'On the Situation in the Yugoslav Communist Party,'" *Zeri i popullit* (Tiranë), 29 June 1963, p. 1.

<sup>33</sup> Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, trans. Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1970), 476.

<sup>34</sup> Djukic, 36.

<sup>35</sup> The Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania, *History of the Party of Labor of Albania*, 2d ed. (Tirane: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1982), 242, 249.

<sup>36</sup> Petkovic, 277.

<sup>37</sup> Results of questionnaires given in Albania, March and April, 1994.



<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 77-78.

<sup>28</sup> *Dynker*, 72a, 209.

<sup>29</sup> *Interview* Dylak, First Vice-Premier of the Yugoslav government, recalled that he had asked Shpend Karbeli, a top Yugoslav Communist Party official who held many pensions, why it was necessary to send two divisions into Albania. The reply was "Well, you know how it is, the Old Man [Tito] likes to money for it." Nara Schell, *First Flower: Legacy* (London: Weidenfeld, 1984), 143.

<sup>30</sup> *London*, 35.

<sup>31</sup> *Paris*, 177; *Dynker*, 72a, 321.

<sup>32</sup> *Interview* Dylak, *40th Yugoslav Anniversary of Soviet War*, (Belgrade: Tanjug News Agency, 1984), 24.

<sup>33</sup> *Paris* and *London*, 40.

<sup>34</sup> *Elton Gilbert, Albania and China* (London: Weidenfeld, 1956), 24; *Stavro Gheche, Albania* (London: Athlone Press, 1957), 354.

<sup>35</sup> *Dynker*, 32.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 33.

## Chapter 4:

### *Albania and the Soviet Union*

The first five years of relations between Albania and the Soviet Union were marked by the cordiality and comradeship with which they dealt with each other. The relationship was mutually beneficial. Albania gained in the Soviet Union a strong ally, both militarily and ideologically, as well as its greatest source of aid (\$200 million dollars in aid between 1948 and 1960). There were many projects and trade agreements arranged to give the Albanians the technical expertise necessary to become self-sufficient.

In addition, Albania's status changed from a Yugoslav subsatellite to a Soviet satellite which enhanced Albania's prestige abroad. One practical advantage of Albania's new status was its admittance on February 22, 1949, to the COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance).<sup>1</sup>

The Soviet Union gained from its relationship with Albania because it received valuable mineral resources. Stalin was able to use Albania as an instrument by which the U. S. S. R. could keep military and political pressure on Tito and Yugoslavia (naturally, Albania was happy to oblige). Its most important benefit was the submarine base it was able to build on the island of Sazan, near Vlorë on the Adriatic. This base allowed the Soviets easy access to the strategic Adriatic-Mediterranean region and posed a serious threat to the United States' Sixth Fleet which was stationed in the area.

Prior to the Soviet-Yugoslav break in 1948, the Soviets had planned to build a submarine base at Gruz, near Dubrovnik in Yugoslavia. The Soviets chose Sazan as the replacement site for their base when a Yugoslav site was no longer possible. Work on the base

began in 1951 and was completed one year later (late spring 1952) when submarines from the Soviet Black Sea fleet arrived. Likewise, the Soviets built several airfields throughout Albania. Gradually, the submarine base in the Vlorë bay lost its strategic importance due to the development of long-range missiles and nuclear weapons. However, the Soviet Union continued to use the base until its expulsion from Albania in 1961.<sup>2</sup>

Relations between the two countries remained quite close until March 5, 1953, when the beginning of the end of their relationship occurred; Josef Vissarionovich Djugashvili (Stalin) died. Stalin's death was keenly felt in Albania. Enver Hoxha assembled the entire population of Tiranë into the capital's largest square, made them all kneel and take a two thousand word oath of "eternal fidelity" and "gratitude" to their "beloved father" and "great liberator" to whom the Albanian people owed "everything."<sup>3</sup> An interesting anecdote concerning this display of loyalty and overwhelming grief at the time of Stalin's death was relayed to this writer by Nicholas Costa, a long-time student of Albanian affairs. Costa claims that relatives and friends told him that many Albanians rubbed their children's eyes with freshly cut onions to make their eyes water in order to make an "appropriate" display of emotion and support for their loyalty toward both Stalin and the Albanian Party of Labor. This step was necessitated by the ever-present *Sigurimi* and their informers who would report those who were not "sufficiently" grieving upon hearing the news of Stalin's death.<sup>4</sup>

The questionnaire in *Appendix A*, Question Number 13 asked Albanians' their opinions of Stalin. Ninety-seven percent felt that Stalin was negative and only three percent felt that he was a positive figure. The comments describing him ranged from a typical response: "a bigger dictator than Hitler" to a less typical one: "If Stalin had not existed, all the world would speak the German language."<sup>5</sup>

Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev eventually became Stalin's successor and began to make changes, subtle at first, in the focus of the Communist cause (especially toward Albania) which made Hoxha and the Albanian Party of Labor apprehensive. There was a definite decline in Soviet military and political interest in Albania. One event which signaled a change in the Soviet position toward Albania was the reduction in Soviet and East European aid which occurred early in 1954.

Khrushchev seemed to believe that the high cost of economic aid to support Albania was not worth the return in terms of Soviet strategic interests in the country.

Enver Hoxha gives an account of his first meeting with the Soviets after Stalin's death in June 1953 in his book, *The Khrushchevites*. Hoxha said:

My conclusion from this meeting was unpleasant. I saw that the leadership of the Soviet Union was ill-disposed towards our country. The arrogant way they behaved during the meeting, their refusal to give those few things that we sought, and their slanderous attack on the cadres of our army were not good signs.<sup>6</sup>

An example of the coming changes that would take place after Stalin's death occurred in the Party itself. Deputy Prime Minister Tuk Jakova and the Minister of Education Bedri Spahiu attacked Hoxha in the April 1955 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor for being too harsh in his policy-making and for not allowing any free debate within the Party on important issues. Both men were later expelled from the Party as revisionists (Trotskyites and bourgeois nationalists) on June 17, 1955, but nonetheless, their stand signified a growing trend of moderation which was being felt throughout the Communist world.<sup>7</sup>

An event which had serious repercussions for Albania was the Soviet delegation's (Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Mikoyan) visit to Belgrade from May 16 to June 2, 1955. During his visit to Yugoslavia, Khrushchev renounced the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Communist bloc in 1948. Nikita Khrushchev made references to many roads to Socialism, thus admitting the polycentrism of Communism. Also, Khrushchev summed up his thoughts by noting: "...We [CPSU] sincerely regret what happened and resolutely reject the things that occurred."<sup>8</sup> The blame was placed upon Lavrenti Beria (Stalin's police chief who was executed on December 23, 1955) for disrupting relations between the two countries. A joint declaration (signed by Tito and Bulganin on June 2, 1955) was issued stating that a reconciliation had taken place between the two countries. The effect of Khrushchev's visit to Belgrade was profound among pro-Stalin factions throughout Eastern Europe.

Enver Hoxha and the entire leadership of the Party of Labor felt betrayed by Khrushchev's rapprochement with Tito. Not only had the U. S. S. R. failed to take into account Albania's interests but it had not even bothered to consult with Hoxha prior to Khrushchev's visit to Belgrade. Hoxha believed that Albania should have been consulted concerning a possible rapprochement with Yugoslavia considering Albania's position at the head of the anti-Yugoslav movement in the Soviet bloc. An important aspect of the Tito-Khrushchev reconciliation was its effect on Enver Hoxha personally. Although ideological reasons were important, this change threatened not only Hoxha's position as the head of the Albanian Party of Labor but quite conceivably, his life. Hoxha feared retaliation from the Yugoslavs for his bloody purge against Koçi Xoxe.

Albanian-Yugoslav relations remained tense. Belgrade demanded that Tiranë rehabilitate Xoxe and revise its negative assessment of Albanian-Yugoslav relations prior to the 1948 split. "Hoxha rejected these demands because to accept them would have been tantamount to committing political suicide."<sup>9</sup>

Stalinist sympathizers feared that the rehabilitation of Tito who was a nationalist, and a Communist heretic, would undermine the unity and discipline of the Soviet bloc. The reaction was stronger in Albania than in any other part of Eastern Europe because of the Albanian heritage. Their heritage with the emphasis on strong kinship ties does not allow the Albanians the opportunity to shift positions so dramatically or accept a middle position between friend or foe. The idea of denouncing Stalin (after the 1956 Soviet Twentieth Congress speech by Khrushchev) and praising Khrushchev and Tito was a total impossibility for the Albanian personality. Premier Mehmet Shehu summed up this factor by saying: "We Albanians love our friends with all our hearts, and we hate our enemies with all our hearts."<sup>10</sup> Also, Albania was worried that as Tito's biggest enemy, they might be sacrificed by Khrushchev to further appease Yugoslavia.

Elez Biberaj, in his book *Albania and China*, makes an astute observation which summarizes the tripartite relationship in this period between Albania, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union:

...Yugoslavia, for obvious reasons, was much more important to the Soviet Union than Albania. As Moscow-Belgrade relations improved, there was an inverse deterioration in Moscow-Tirane relations.<sup>11</sup>

The reaction to Khrushchev's visit with Tito from those who had suffered under Stalinist rule was one of satisfaction. They hoped that the new development in Yugoslavia would have some impact on their local situation.

A subsequent event which caused an uproar was the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, held from February 14 to 25, 1956. In an early open session, Anastas Mikoyan, the Deputy Prime Minister, criticized Stalin's rule in general terms and mentioned several examples of old Bolsheviks whom Stalin had destroyed after naming them as "enemies of the people."<sup>12</sup>

Later, in a four-hour speech to a closed session, Khrushchev attacked Stalin. Stalin was accused of believing the myth that he was a superman endowed with the extraordinary power of wisdom and infallibility. This myth caused Stalin to classify all people who disagreed with him as "enemies of the people," whom he had removed. It also made Stalin unable, according to Khrushchev, to put into practice Lenin's principle of collective leadership. Khrushchev charged in his memoirs, *Khrushchev Remembers*, that Stalin had made "mass arrests and deportations of many thousands of people, executions without trial and without normal investigation," particularly during the purges of 1935-1938. "It was determined that of the 139 members and candidates of the Party's Central Committee who were elected at the XVIIth Congress, 98 persons, i.e., 70 percent, were arrested and shot."<sup>13</sup>

Khrushchev complained that:

Stalin acted not through persuasion, explanation, and patient co-operation with people, but by imposing his concepts and demanding absolute submission to his opinion. Whoever opposed this concept or tried to prove his viewpoint, and the correctness of his position, was doomed to removal from the leading collective and to subsequent moral and physical annihilation.<sup>14</sup>

Among other charges, Khrushchev declared that:

Stalin was a very distrustful man, sickly suspicious; we knew this from our work with him. He could look at a man and say: 'Why are your eyes so shifty today,' or 'Why are you turning so much today and avoiding to look me directly in the eyes?'...Everywhere and in everything he saw 'enemies,' 'two-facers' and 'spies.'<sup>15</sup>

Also, Khrushchev believed that Stalin was responsible for the break with Yugoslavia. An example which demonstrates this reasoning is this quote of Stalin's: "I will shake my little finger—and there will be no more Tito. He will fall."<sup>16</sup>

This speech was intended by Nikita Khrushchev to remain secret, which is evidenced by his remarks: "We cannot let this matter get out of the Party, especially not to the press. It is for this reason that we are considering it here at a closed Congress session....We should not give ammunition to the enemy; we should not wash our dirty linen before their eyes."<sup>17</sup> However, this was not to be as it was revealed to the West by the U. S. State Department on June 4, 1956.<sup>18</sup>

The attack of Stalin was not the only notable event to take place during the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Nikita Khrushchev also made an important foreign policy announcement which made allowances for "peaceful coexistence" between the socialist and capitalist systems. Khrushchev called this new theory the "creative development of Marxism-Leninism." He intended it to be a way to rid the world of the threat of nuclear war. At least this is what he wanted people worldwide to believe his intentions to be.

Critics of Khrushchev's new policy believe it was merely a way to divide the world into spheres of influence inside which each side would enjoy unquestioned supremacy. Another way of stating this is seen in William Ash's (author of *Pickaxe and Rifle*) analogy: "A Twentieth Century version of the Pope's demarcation line sharing out the new world between Spain and Portugal."<sup>19</sup>

The official position of the Albanian Party of Labor is that this went against the teachings of Vladimir Lenin. According to Lenin,

The fundamental principle of the foreign policy of a socialist country and of a Communist party is proletarian internationalism (The official definition of proletarian internationalism is 'the alliance with the

revolutionaries of the advanced countries and with the oppressed peoples against the imperialists of all hues '); not peaceful coexistence.<sup>20</sup>

As one would expect, Enver Hoxha was not pleased with the events which took place during the Soviet Twentieth Congress. He felt that Khrushchev's speech served as the ideological basis for the revisionist movement which was influencing, to a greater or lesser degree, the entire Communist world. The Albanian Party was displeased to a further degree by the warm welcome Tito received in his visit to Moscow (June 1 to 23, 1956).

Not everyone in Albania was pleased with the APL's official stand against Khrushchev's sentiments espoused at the Soviet Twentieth Congress. A surprising special meeting of the delegates of the Party was held at Tiranë, in April 1956. William Griffith (author of *Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift*) used several Yugoslav sources to describe the conference as a meeting of approximately 450 delegates and additional Central Committee and Political Bureau members being presided over by the Minister of Defense Beqir Balluku. The delegates:

...criticized the conditions in the party, the negative attitude toward the masses, the absence of party and socialist democracy, the economic policy of the leadership, etc. They also asked for explanations to be given about the numerous executions carried out since 1949, they called for a rehabilitation of old Communists forcibly removed from responsible posts. .. Several delegates requested that the topics of discussion should be the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the cult of the personality, the case of Koçi Xoxe, relations with Yugoslavia, party democracy, and the standard of living.<sup>21</sup>

These bold attacks were not ignored by Hoxha who demanded the immediate adoption of a resolution which expressed confidence in his leadership. Once this resolution was adopted, Hoxha ended the meeting. Soon after, all the delegates who had spoken out against Hoxha were expelled from the Party and imprisoned. The major reasons behind the delegates' failure were that they were not organized and that Hoxha was ruthless in preserving his position. One Yugoslav source which Griffith cites gives a reason for the failure of the delegates' reform movement which should not be overlooked because it gets directly to the root of the issue: "...the number of graves was too



great, and the list of victims too long, for Enver Hoxha to agree to renounce the road which he had chosen..."<sup>22</sup> The long-term effect of this incident was that Hoxha was more firmly entrenched in power than ever and future protests were made more difficult.

Enver Hoxha led a high-ranking delegation to China for a visit which lasted from September 13 to October 3, 1956. The official reason for this trip was to attend the Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. Hoxha's true intentions seems to have been to gain support from the Chinese which would have the effect of relieving Soviet pressure upon Albania. Little is known about the exact nature of Enver Hoxha's meetings with Mao Zedong, however, a clear indication that Hoxha met with some degree of success can be seen in Albanian-Chinese trade figures. In 1955 (the year prior to Hoxha's visit to China), Chinese aid to Albania accounted for 4.2 percent of Albania's total passive trade balance; in 1956, this amount increased to 17 percent; in 1957, trade grew to 21.6 percent.<sup>23</sup>

Albania's increased trade and its accompanying closer relations with China did not escape the attention of the Soviet Union. In an effort to counteract China's increased influence, the U. S. S. R. increased their aid to Albania. On January 1, 1957, Albania was given a credit of \$18.5 million. In November 1957, the Soviet Union gave Albania a credit of \$75 million to finance its Third Five-Year Plan (1961-1965) and loaned \$8.75 million for the Albanian oil industry. In addition to this large amount of new aid, the Soviet Union wiped out \$105 million in past Albanian debts (from the period 1949-1957). Despite Soviet generosity, Albania continued to gradually pursue an opening toward China.

External events during October and November 1956, had a definite impact on Albanian as well as the rest of East European affairs. Wladyslaw Gomulka, the First Secretary of the Polish Communist Party, was able to win concessions of increased autonomy from Soviet intervention in Polish affairs (October 19 to 21, 1956). This event had repercussions in neighboring Hungary when on October 22, 1956, demonstrations began in Budapest calling for similar actions to take place there. Soviet troops invaded Budapest and the "Hungarian Revolution" (October 24 to November 5, 1956) was fought. After fierce fighting, Imre Nagy (an anti-Stalinist Communist and Hungarian patriot who wanted free elections and the end of the one-party system)

was defeated and the pro-Soviet Janos Kadar was installed as the head of the Hungarian Communist Party.

Enver Hoxha shrewdly used the Polish and Hungarian revolts to his advantage. Hoxha was able to relieve Soviet pressure to de-Stalinize in two ways: First, he was able in effect to tell Khrushchev "I told you so" meaning that the feeling of liberalization and the movement away from Stalinism, which Khrushchev introduced at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, was a mistake; second, Hoxha through an article which appeared in the November 8, 1956, edition of *Pravda* enlarged the scope of the issue by declaring Yugoslav revisionism was also at the root of the Polish and Hungarian disturbances. In these ways, he was able to move from his position of being a local politician concerned with his own security (Tiranë meeting of the Party delegates, April 1956) to the "vigorous [ideological] defender of the security of the Communist bloc as a whole."<sup>25</sup> In addition to the increased prestige, these actions allowed Hoxha considerable latitude in the handling of Albania's foreign policy, *i.e.*, the ability to work toward closer Albanian-Chinese relations.

An international conference of the ruling Communist Parties convened in Moscow during November 12 to 14, 1957. Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia refused to attend and sent Edward Kardelj in his place.<sup>25</sup> Yugoslavia also failed to sign the statement (which was signed by all other parties) issued at the end of the conference because it recognized the Soviet Union as the leader of the international Communist movement. These actions severely angered the Soviet Union as well as the rest of the Communist world. China also agreed (at this time) that the Soviet Union should lead the Communist movement. Mao Zedong said:

Our camp must have a head, because even the snake has a head, and imperialism has a head.... I would not agree that China should be called the head of the camp... because we do not merit this honor and cannot maintain this role, we are still poor.<sup>26</sup>

The significance of Yugoslavia's actions upon Albanian affairs was that there was a definite cooling of relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Therefore, there was much less of a threat of Khrushchev taking action against Albania to appease Tito. Prior to this

conference, Enver Hoxha was still under pressure from Khrushchev because of Tito to make reforms in his policies of de-Stalinization, rehabilitation of Koçi Xoxe, etc., despite the "breathing space" he had gained by his maneuvering subsequent to the Polish and Hungarian revolts. The Moscow Conference proved that once again Hoxha was able to use events over which he had no control to his advantage.

The next few years, until 1960, were relatively problem-free concerning trouble in Soviet-Albanian relations. Any trouble which did occur was kept strictly private. One exception to this general trend was a meeting held in Moscow early in June 1960, between Nikita Khrushchev and Sophocles Venizelos, the Greek left-wing political leader. The topic of their discussion was cultural autonomy for the Greek minority in southern Albania (northern Epirus). Khrushchev told Venizelos:

The Albanians as well as the Greeks...are very good people. The Communist parties salute the idea that every minority should be autonomous in order to be able to develop its language and civilization in accordance with its wishes... I can assure you that I will communicate these things to Comrade Enver Hoxha when I meet him in Bucharest.<sup>27</sup>

The obvious purpose of this discussion was to infuriate Enver Hoxha as Albanian-Greek relations were strained at this time.<sup>28</sup> It became known that Khrushchev had hinted to Venizelos that the Soviet Union would not be against territorial and/or political concessions to the Greeks by the Albanians. Hoxha said of Venizelos that he was an "...enemy of Albania, who has been and is for the partitioning of our Homeland."<sup>29</sup>

Khrushchev sincerely could have cared less about the cultural autonomy of minorities in Albania. It is likely that Khrushchev used the meeting with Venizelos as a way to pay back Hoxha for snubbing him during his visit to Albania (May 25 to June 5, 1959) when Hoxha refused to stop trying to make an alliance with China. Khrushchev was embarrassed at the failure of his trip and worried that if tiny Albania could go against the wishes of the Soviet Union and ally with China, what was to stop larger East European Communist nations from doing the same?

This "quiet" policy changed on June 22, 1960, when Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu, the Albanian Premier were absent from the meeting

in Bucharest of the Third Congress of the Romanian Communist Party (presumably due to Khrushchev's meeting with Venizelos). Normally the heads of the Party and state were present, but in this case only Hysni Kapo (a member of the Albanian Political Bureau and the "number three" man behind Hoxha and Shehu), represented Albania. The first public signal of the impending Soviet-Albanian rift was shown through Albania's leanings toward China.

This meeting is noteworthy because Khrushchev attacked Mao Zedong in two ways: first, by speaking against Mao's view of a literal interpretation of Marx, Engels, and Lenin which according to Khrushchev does not cope with certain problems found in the nuclear world; second, by accusing him of behaving like Stalin, "oblivious of any interests other than his own, spinning theories detached from the realities of the modern world."<sup>30</sup> All delegates supported Khrushchev's attack of Mao Zedong, except for the Albanian delegate, Kapo.

Mao responded to Khrushchev's attack through his representative Peng Zhen. The Chinese argument was that it was obvious that the sole reason for the meeting was to discredit the Chinese Communist Party and Mao Zedong. Peng Zhen added that the Chinese leadership did not believe in Khrushchev's analysis of the international situation since "it rested on illusions about the true nature and strength of western imperialism."<sup>31</sup>

Nikita Khrushchev lashed out at Enver Hoxha by saying:

Especially shameless was the behavior of that agent of Mao Zedong, Enver Hoxha. He bared his fangs at us even more menacingly than the Chinese themselves. After his speech, Comrade Dolores Ibarruri [a Spanish Communist], an old revolutionary and a devoted worker in the Communist movement, got up indignantly and said, very much to the point, that Hoxha was like a dog who bites the hand that feeds it.<sup>32</sup>

The Soviet Union realizing that peaceful persuasion had failed, adopted a new hard-line policy and retaliated against Albania by reducing its aid. This reduction included deliveries of grain, at a time when Albania desperately needed them because of famine due to floods, droughts, and earthquakes. The U.S.S.R. conspired with a pro-Soviet faction of the Albanian Party of Labor to overthrow Enver Hoxha's regime from within the Party. In July 1960, a plot for an armed *coup*

*d'etat* organized by some government and military officials led by the Soviet-trained Rear Admiral Teme Sejko (to take place in early autumn on the eve of the Fourth Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor) was thwarted.

The leaders of the pro-Soviet faction of the Albanian Party were Liri Belishova (a Central Committee member) and Koco Tashko (Chairman of the Central Auditing Committee). They were working inside the Party to divert Albanian attention away from China and toward the Soviet Union. The Eighteenth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party met on September 8, 1960, to determine the appropriate action to take against Belishova and Tashko. Belishova was expelled from the Central Committee for "grave errors in respect to the party line" but was not expelled from the Party probably due to her switch to a pro-Chinese position, distinguished war record, and lack of a real power base within the Party. Tashko was expelled from the Albanian Party of Labor altogether for his "hostile activity toward the party." Koco Tashko's fate was sealed due to his failure to recant his pro-Soviet position and because of the following incident which allegedly occurred at the meeting. When asked to speak on his behalf, Tashko read a prepared written statement and at the end of one sentence added the Russian word *tochka* which means "period."

This ridiculous action of Koco Tashko made it quite evident that the text of his contribution had been dictated by an official of the Soviet Embassy and during the translation he had become confused, failing to distinguish between the text and the punctuation marks."

Regardless of whether this humorous anecdote actually occurred it does clearly demonstrate the anti-Soviet feeling of the Albanian Party of Labor at this time.

Nikita Khrushchev claimed that the Soviets tried to avoid an actual break in relations between the U.S.S.R. and Albania.

We wanted to do everything we could to prevent a schism between the Albanians and ourselves, but all our efforts were to no avail. Our conflict with the Albanians developed in stages, as we gradually became aware that the Albanians were conspiring with the Chinese against us. We got wind of their treachery when an Albanian delegation was passing through Moscow on its way back from China. One of the Albanians, an honest

woman [Liri Oega], came to us and told us what was going on. I think she was strangled a short time later, poor woman. And it wasn't the Gestapo who strangled her. No, it was her own 'brothers.' I say this because she was a Communist and they were Communists, too. They strangled her because she, a Communist, had come to us at the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and told us about the Albanians' secret meetings with the Chinese.

How naive we were!<sup>34</sup>

Soviet-Albanian relations were on the verge of a complete break at the Conference of the Eighty-one Communist Parties held in Moscow during November 6 to 30, 1960. The Soviets gave all the delegations prior to the opening of the conference a document which attacked the Albanian leadership. Four private meetings between Khrushchev and Hoxha showed that no compromise was possible. In fact, prior to the official opening of the conference, preliminary meetings took place in Moscow. The Albanian delegates were Ramiz Alia, and Hysni Kapo. Enver Hoxha sent a letter to Kapo on October 7, 1960 detailing the strategy the Albanian delegation should follow. The directions to follow were:

If the opportunity presents itself, either to you in the plenary meeting, or to Ramiz in the commission, *you should defend* [Italics in original] the Communist Party of China more strongly, since the main assault is against it, the main batteries are aimed at it. They hate us just as much as the Chinese, and there is no doubt that they will attack us, but the main attack will be concentrated on the Communist Party of China, since they think, and with reason, that the greatest potential danger to them is the Communist Party of China, and they think. *If we can defeat them, the Albanians will be no problem* [Italics in original].<sup>35</sup>

Enver Hoxha sent Hysni Kapo a follow-up letter on October 13, 1960 giving him further detailed instructions. This correspondence elucidated Hoxha's premonitions for the outcome of the conference. The crucial passage in the text was as follows:

...I [Hoxha] am preparing the speech for the Moscow Meeting, as we have decided.... At this meeting, apart from the Chinese comrades, our stand will be unique. The majority will be angry with us, they will abuse us, but *we are right and time will prove us so* [Italics in original]. At the meeting you can be sure that people will not dare to side with us. .. But

we shall do our duty, we shall defend Marxism-Leninism. The Khrushchev group have committed sins [Italics in original]. If you do not put the finger on the sinners and sort out right from wrong, then your hands are tied, and you will do harm. No, we shall not allow ourselves to be impressed by those who say: 'How can one attack the glorious Soviet Union or the great Communist Party of Lenin for the faults of a few rascals?' We say: *Precisely to defend the Soviet Union and the Party of Lenin, these 'rascals' must be exposed, and there must be no toning down of criticism or covering up of the deviationists* [Italics in original]

The conference began with nothing going on out of the ordinary except for the attacks by the Soviets against the Chinese. All the delegations (except Albania) joined together to attack China. At this point, Enver Hoxha lost his temper and vehemently attacked Khrushchev and his policies.

Hoxha detailed in his speech the pressure Khrushchev subjected the Albanian Party and state to after the Bucharest meeting. There had been attempts made to undermine the loyalty of Party members, members of the Albanian army, and even Albanian college students studying in the Soviet Union.

On August 6, 1960, the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor sent an official letter of protest to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union complaining of the anti-Albanian activities of the Soviet Ambassador in Tiranë. A pertinent excerpt from this letter is as follows:

We have been very concerned particularly by the stand of the Soviet Ambassador, Comrade Ivanov, recently, who went to such lengths in his unfriendly activity toward our Party as to dare to ask our generals and officers publicly, at the Tirana airport, the astonishing and suspect question: 'To whom does the army stand loyal?'...For all of us, this stand of the Ambassador of the Soviet Union, Comrade Ivanov, is utterly impermissible<sup>37</sup>

Hoxha also told of Khrushchev's remark to the Chinese that: "...It is true we lost Albania, but what you've won is nothing much."<sup>38</sup>

Another incident cited by Hoxha in his attack of Khrushchev concerned the food shortage in Albania. During the famine caused by

several poor harvests, Albania requested to buy fifty thousand tons of grain from the U.S.S.R. to feed the people. After waiting forty-five days for a reply, Albania was sent 10,000 tons instead. Hoxha related a statement Khrushchev once told him about not worrying over Albania's grain supply because "the country's [Albania's] annual consumption amounted to what mice ate in the Soviet Union in one year." Hoxha's attack ended with the admission that the only crime Albania had committed was that it did not agree that the Chinese Communist Party should be "summarily and unjustly" condemned. For this it had been treated in a manner that was "shabby, anti-Marxist, and uncomradely."<sup>39</sup>

An interesting sidebar to the issue of Khrushchev's tardy decision to provide only a small amount of grain to Albania at this time is a comparison to Stalin's handling a similar situation on an earlier occasion. Enver Hoxha waxed nostalgically about Stalin who never would let the Albanian people starve. Hoxha remembered:

In 1945, when our people were threatened with starvation, comrade Stalin ordered the ships loaded with grain destined for the Soviet people, who also were in dire need of food at that time, and sent the grain at once to the Albanian people. Whereas, the present Soviet leaders permit themselves these ugly deeds.<sup>40</sup>

Hoxha's outburst had a profound effect on the Moscow gathering. A few of the notable quotes from leaders of the various parties include this one by Wladyslaw Gomulka, the Polish leader, who said that the speech was "a disgusting, shameful, gangsterish, and irresponsible attack on Khrushchev and the Soviet Party." Luigi Longo, the head of the Italian group described the speech as "not only disloyal but also infantile." Maurice Thorez, the French Communist leader said:

The members of our delegation had listened to [Hoxha's] speech with a feeling of shame. As militant Communists, they had never heard such language either in party meeting or in the meetings of the international Communist movement. .. The path followed by the delegation of the Albanian Party was a very dangerous one."<sup>41</sup>

Enver Hoxha gave a speech entitled "The Dictatorship of the Proletariat in Albania is Alive, Vigilant and Active" which gives a



succinct summary of the Albanian position toward Khrushchev and the Soviet Union in this period. Hoxha said:

Khrushchev and Co, probably think that through measures they have taken they will oblige us to pursue another line, to fall on our knees, and to hitch ourselves to their revisionist chariot. This is how they think themselves, because they are revisionists. We speak of our love for the Soviet people and Soviet communists, but at the same time we cannot sit back and not expose Khrushchev and his cronies.<sup>42</sup>

Mao Zedong's delegate Deng Xiaoping summarized China's position at the Conference of the Eighty-one Communist Parties as this:

there are neither superior nor inferior parties in the international Communist movement. China would not recognize the Soviet Union or any other party as the leader of the international Communist movement, each party was completely independent.<sup>43</sup>

The Fourth Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor was held in Tiranë, from February 13 to 20, 1961, which turned out to be the last meeting the Soviet Union or the other East European countries attended in Albania. During this congress, Soviet delegates were treated with hostility by their Albanian hosts while the Chinese delegates were treated warmly. Speeches given by Hoxha at this time declared that to follow the advice of Khrushchev and become less dictatorial would be suicidal because it would only lead to unrest which occurred in Hungary and Poland in 1956. Mehmet Shehu, in a speech admitted that he and other high officials of the Albanian Party of Labor were often accused of being tyrants and dogmatists. The reason for this according to Shehu was that unlike their adversaries, the Albanian Communists were true Marxists. Also announced at this congress was the basic outline of the Third Five-Year Plan (1961-1965). This called for the greatest investments in the economy to be put toward industry (China's advice) with little being put into agriculture (this went against Soviet advice). This plan was yet another rejection of Khrushchev and Soviet policy.

The Soviet Union retaliated to Albania's boldness by threatening on February 20, 1961, that Albanian criticisms would lead to dire consequences if not retracted. A few days later, Khrushchev and Czechoslovak President Antonin Novotny (Czechoslovakia was

Albania's greatest source of aid after the Soviet Union) threatened to cut off economic aid (\$132 million which had been promised for Albania's Third Five-Year Plan) unless Albania changed their stand.

Enver Hoxha gave a clear example of the problems encountered in inter-Party relations when he related the story of an economic delegation's experiences in Moscow:

This delegation was kept hanging about in Moscow for whole months. Our people go to Moscow, wander round and round and are unable to conclude anything with you because of the attitude you maintain towards them. Do you think we do not understand your contemptuous attitude? Comrade Mehmet [Shehu] was right when he said, a little while ago, that when Yugoslavs come, you conclude the talks within ten days! Likewise, the War Minister of Indonesia went to Moscow, and you immediately gave him large credits for armaments, while little Albania, which is looking down the wolf's mouth, with which you have signed agreements, and which is led by a Marxist party, is neglected<sup>44</sup>

Serious notice of the impending rift was given in March 1961, when Albania was not invited to attend the meeting of the Warsaw Pact nations (Albania had joined the Warsaw Pact on May 14, 1955). Enver Hoxha had made reference to the problems concerning Albania's membership in the Warsaw Pact during his speech entitled "Reject the Revisionist Theses of the XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Anti-Marxist Stand of Khrushchev's Group! Uphold Marxism-Leninism!" given on November 16, 1960 at the Meeting of the Eighty-one Communist Parties. According to Hoxha, Soviet Marshal Grechko, Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact said at a Chiefs of Staff of the Warsaw Pact nations meeting in Moscow: "You are in the Warsaw Treaty only for the time being," implying that Marshal Grechko seems to have decided to throw us out."<sup>45</sup>

On April 25, 1961, all Soviet technicians were withdrawn from Albania and all economic aid was canceled. Also, all Albanian students studying in the Soviet Union were sent home. A further step was taken on May 26, when all Soviet submarines at Sazan were withdrawn.

A counter move taken by Albania to retaliate against the Soviet moves was a show trial which lasted from May 15 to 27, 1961, for the ten pro-Soviet Albanians discovered trying to overthrow the Hoxha regime. All confessed to being agents of Yugoslavia, Greece, and the

United States. Four of the ten were sentenced to death, while the others received prison terms ranging from fifteen to twenty-five years.

At the Twenty-second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union held from October 17 to 31, 1961, Nikita Khrushchev made many comments in the opening and concluding speeches detailing the Soviet Union's position *vis a vis* Albania, Enver Hoxha and the Albanian Party of Labor. Khrushchev began in his opening speech of October 17th by detailing the close relations enjoyed between Albania and the Soviet Union prior to the recent problems. Specifically, Khrushchev said:

Everyone knows that until recently the relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of Albania, and between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Albanian Party of Labor, were good and friendly. The peoples of our country were giving Albania all-round disinterested help to enable her to develop the economy and carry on socialist construction. It has always been our sincere desire, as it is now, that Albania should be a prosperous socialist republic, and her people happy and enjoying all the benefits of a new life.

For many years the Albanian leaders signified their complete agreement with the Central Committee of our Party and the Soviet Government on all matters pertaining to the world Communist movement.

...We Soviet people believed the Albanian leaders and held that there was mutual understanding and unity of views between our Party and the Albanian Party of Labor

...It would appear that in their hearts the Albanian leaders disagreed with the conclusions of the 1957 and 1960 meetings of the fraternal parties, which as we all know approved of the decisions of the Twentieth Congress and our Party's policy directed towards eliminating the harmful consequences of the cult of the individual. This stand of the Albanian leaders is due to the fact that, to our deep regret, they are themselves using the same methods as were current in our country at the time of the cult of the individual.<sup>46</sup>

The concluding speech of the Congress by Khrushchev delivered on October 27th increased the attacks upon Enver Hoxha and the Party leadership. Khrushchev asked two rhetorical questions: "Why did the Albanian leaders launch a campaign against the decisions of the

Twentieth Congress of our Party? What is the heresy they detect in those decisions?"<sup>47</sup>

The answer to these questions was given by Khrushchev himself:

.. the Albanian leaders raised the cult of Stalin's person to a new high and began a bitter struggle against the decisions of the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U., in an effort to divert the socialist countries from their true course. That, of course, was no accident. All that was bad in our country at the time of the cult of the individual manifests itself in even worse form in the Albanian Party of Labor. It is no longer a secret to anyone that the Albanian leaders maintain their power by resorting to force and arbitrary methods.

The situation in the Albanian Party of Labor has been abnormal and dangerous for a long time now. In that situation, anyone whom the leadership does not favor may be subjected to cruel measures of repression.

Where are the Albanian Communists who founded the Party and fought against the Italian and German fascist invaders? Almost all of them have fallen victim to the bloody crimes committed by Mehmet Shehu and Enver Hoxha.<sup>48</sup>

Khrushchev's conclusion as to why Hoxha *et. al.* were reticent to put an end to the cult of individual was that "For Shehu, Hoxha and others, to put an end to the cult of the individual would mean, in effect, to relinquish key posts in Party and government, and that is something they do not want to do."<sup>49</sup>

The most aggressive development to appear in Nikita Khrushchev's speech of October 27, 1961, was that he carried his attack further than anyone had expected. He bluntly noted that the Albanians could not correct their errors (toward the CPSU) without removing Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu.

Khrushchev concluded the Congress by making the following accusation:

Our great Party has more than once been a target for bitter and foul attacks on the part of overt and covert enemies of communism. But it must be said in so many words that we do not recall anyone passing at such breakneck speed from protestations and vows of everlasting friendship to unbridled anti-Soviet calumny, the way the Albanian leaders have done.

They apparently expect in this manner to clear the ground for winning the right to receive hand-outs from the imperialists. The imperialists are always prepared to pay thirty pieces of silver to those who split the Communist ranks. But pieces of silver have never brought anyone anything but dishonor and shame.<sup>50</sup>

The Soviet news agency, *TASS*, released a statement from Nikita Khrushchev attacking the Albanian Party of Labor leadership which was published on October 28, 1961 in *Zeri i popullit*. The most serious attack was as follows: "...Tani për asnjë nuk sekret se udhëheqësit shqiptarë qëndrojnë në fuqi, duke përdorur dhunën dhe arbitraritetin."<sup>51</sup> The English translation of this passage is: "Now it is no longer a secret that the Albanian leaders rule through arbitrary power and violence."

The Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor struck back at Khrushchev on October 29, 1961, by challenging his right to speak. A colorful quotation of Hoxha's attacking the revisionism of Khrushchev and the Soviet Party leadership is demonstrative of the animosity each side felt toward the other. Hoxha said that:

Our people have a saying, 'The fish rots from its head.' That's what happened in the Soviet Union! Revisionism emerged in its head, and thence it developed and spread throughout its whole body.<sup>52</sup>

An interesting corollary to this situation concerning the disagreements and attacks upon and between the two "fraternal" Parties were the "spontaneous" articles which appeared in *Zeri i popullit* for a period of several months. These articles came from all regions of Albania, from Party members and common workers who were indignant over Khrushchev's denunciation of the Albanian leadership. A representative example can be seen in the letter from the Worker's Collective from Elbasan which appeared on October 22, 1961.<sup>53</sup>

Enver Hoxha gave a speech to the Albanian National Assembly on November 7, 1961, in which he called Khrushchev a "revisionist, anti-Marxist, and a defeatist." The Albanian leader portrayed Stalin as the ideal to be strived for; a true follower of Lenin. Stalin never "compromised" but always struggled for the purity of Marxism-Leninism. This speech is rather reminiscent of Hoxha's comments in

his speech at the Moscow Meeting a year earlier. In that speech, Enver Hoxha summarized Albania's "official" position toward Stalin, which was:

The Party of Labor of Albania found itself in a great dilemma [at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] It was not convinced and will never be convinced on the question of condemning Comrade Stalin in that way and in those forms that Comrade Khrushchev did it.

...The Party of Labor of Albania maintained a realistic stand on the question of Stalin. It was correct and grateful towards this glorious Marxist against whom, while he was alive, there was no one among us 'brave enough' to come out and criticize, but when he was dead a great deal of mud was thrown, creating in this way an intolerable situation in which a whole glorious epoch of the Soviet Union...is left without a helmsman, without a leader.<sup>54</sup>

The speech of November 7, 1961 is most noteworthy because in this speech Hoxha responded to Khrushchev's accusation that Albania would accept "thirty pieces of silver from the imperialists." Enver Hoxha retorted with one of his most famous sayings (which may have been "borrowed" from another source):

...the Albanian people and their Party of Labor will even live on grass if need be, but they will never sell themselves 'for 30 pieces of silver', ...They would rather die honourably on their feet than live in shame on their knees.<sup>55</sup>

The speech given by Hoxha caused the Soviet Union to break relations completely with Albania and the other Communist states of the eastern bloc to withdraw ambassadors on November 11, 1961.

The December 1961, issue of the Moscow-produced journal *International Affairs* in an article written by S. Sanakoyev gives the position (which can be assumed is the "official" position of the Soviet Union) that:

...The attitude of the present leadership of the Albanian Workers' Party which has set itself against the other countries of the world socialist system and the entire Communist movement is...the result of departing from the principles of proletarian internationalism and slipping into the morass of nationalism.<sup>6</sup>

Albania was also unofficially excluded (Albania was simply never invited to meetings anymore) from the Warsaw Pact and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). From this point forward, Albania's closest and only ally was China.

Question Number 12 of the questionnaire in Appendix A questions respondents' opinions concerning the positive and/or negative aspects of the Albanian-Soviet alliance. Seventy-nine percent of the respondents felt that this alliance was negative and twenty-one percent felt that it was positive for Albania. An interesting comment was made by one respondent who felt the alliance was a negative development: "I studied before in the U.S.S.R. and I think this alliance was very bad. In general, alliances between Albania and Slav countries have always had tragic consequences." On the positive side, one person felt that "the relations between Albania and the Soviet Union were like those between two sisters."<sup>57</sup>

The vast majority of historians believe that the sole reason for the break between Albania and the Soviet Union (which occurred after the November 7, 1961, speech by Enver Hoxha which attacked Nikita Khrushchev and the Soviet Union's policy of [what Hoxha called] revisionism and anti-Marxism) was merely a combination of the intransigence of Albania and Albania's public partiality toward China. Clearly, these factors are irrefutable and are the major causes of the Soviet-Albanian rift. However, they are not the only reasons and that an additional factor concerning Khrushchev's reasoning must be included in a list of decisive factors in the schism. Khrushchev was not dealing with Albania from the position of strength most "authorities" believe he was. In fact, Khrushchev's denunciation of Albania may have been an admission of weakness.

In support of this contention, this study offers the following facts: in the two years preceding the Twenty-second Congress, the Soviet Union imposed various reductions in aid; failed in an attempt to overthrow the Hoxha regime; and withdrew almost all of the submarine fleet from Sazan. The result of these actions was not the capitulation and subsequent rapprochement with Albania that the Soviet Union had intended. In fact, instead of retreating, Albania advanced by leaning more strongly toward China. In launching a frontal attack, therefore,

Khrushchev was in effect saying that all else failed in his attempt to bring Albania to heel and that the only way left was an open threat of expulsion from the Communist bloc.

In other words, Khrushchev could not control Albania as he had controlled it and other satellite countries in the past. Traditional strong-arm methods were not as effective and the Soviet Union's position as the only dictator of policy in the Communist bloc had passed. Thus, Nikita Khrushchev's method of attacking Albania denoted an admission of weakness, not of strength.

In conclusion, despite the increasing differences of opinion and problems Albania had with the Soviet Union after Stalin's death, the alliance between Albania and the Soviet Union must be considered a positive development. Generous Soviet aid was responsible for the majority of the large-scale industrialization projects which took place within Albania in this period. In fact, without Soviet help, the economic base may never have been fully constructed in Albania.

Additionally, the alliance with the Soviet Union gave Albania much needed help in terms of maintaining its national sovereignty. Rival nations had to think twice before involving themselves in any adverse fashion with Albania since it now had the powerful Soviet Union as its ally. Without such an alliance partner, Albania would have quite likely been viewed as a defenseless country which could easily be partitioned or annexed.



*Notes*

<sup>1</sup> The COMECON is the counterpart to the West European Common Market and was formed one month prior to Albania's admittance on January 25, 1949. Prior to Albania's shift from Yugoslavia to the Soviet Union, Albania would not likely have been asked to join this group. See William Griffith, *Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift* (Cambridge: M. I. T. Press, 1963), 21; George J. Prpic, *A Century of World Communism* (Woodbury, N.Y.: Barron's Educational Series, Inc., 1970), 160.

<sup>2</sup> Leo Heiman, "Peking's Adriatic Stronghold," *East Europe* 13 (April 1964): 16.; Anton Logoreci, *The Albanians: Europe's Forgotten Survivors* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), 106.

<sup>3</sup> *The Economist* 179 (June 16, 1956): 110.

<sup>4</sup> Nicholas Costa, interview with author, Telephone conversation, 19 October 1993.

<sup>5</sup> Results of questionnaires given in Albania, March and April, 1994.

<sup>6</sup> Enver Hoxha, *The Khrushchevites*. (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1980), 29.

<sup>7</sup> The Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania, *History of the Party of Labor of Albania*, 2d ed. (Tirane: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1982), 287-289.

<sup>8</sup> Logoreci, 115.

<sup>9</sup> Elez Biberaj, *Albania and China* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 26.

<sup>10</sup> *Bashkimi* (Tiranë), (11 October 1967): quoted in *Survey* 77 (Autumn 1970): 110.

<sup>11</sup> Biberaj, 26.

<sup>12</sup> Logoreci, 117.

<sup>13</sup> Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, trans. Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1970), 572.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid, 564.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 585.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 600.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 617.

<sup>18</sup> Congress, 84th Cong., 2d sess., *Congressional Record* (1956), vol. 102, pt. 6, 9389-9403.

<sup>19</sup> William Ash, *Pickaxe and Rifle* (London: Howard Baker, 1974), p. 184.

<sup>21</sup> The Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania, 296.

<sup>21</sup> Griffith, 25.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Biberaj, 27.

<sup>24</sup> Logoreci, 122.

<sup>25</sup> Tito used the excuse of sickness which Khrushchev called "a diplomatic illness." Hoxha, *The Khrushchevites*, 328.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 332.

"Griffith, 40.

<sup>28</sup> A factor which should be noted deals with Sophocles Venizelos' background. Sophocles is the son of Eleutherios Venizelos who signed the Tittoni-Venizelos Agreement on July 29, 1919 between Greece and Italy which agreed to partition Albania. At this time, any Greek leader that had discussion with Khrushchev would anger the Albanians but when Venizelos' background was considered, the intensity of the anger naturally increased. This situation is quite analogous to Bismarck's action of waving red in front of the Gallic bull.

<sup>29</sup> Enver Hoxha, *Speeches and Articles, 1961-1962*, vol. 1 (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1977), 140.

<sup>30</sup> Griffith, 87-89.

<sup>31</sup> Logoreci, 125.

<sup>32</sup> Khrushchev, 475-476.

<sup>33</sup> Enver Hoxha, *Albania Challenges Khrushchev Revisionism* (New York: Gamma Publishing, 1976), 109-110n.

<sup>34</sup> Khrushchev, 476.

<sup>35</sup> Hoxha, *Albania Challenges Khrushchev Revisionism*, 145

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 151-152.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 71.

<sup>38</sup> Hoxha, *Speeches and Articles, 1961-1962*, vol. 1, 323.

<sup>39</sup> Stefan aq Polio and Arben Puto, *The History of Albania* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), 229.

<sup>40</sup> Enver Hoxha, "Reject the Revisionist Theses of the XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Anti-Marxist Stand of Khrushchev's Group! Uphold Marxism-Leninism!", Speech delivered at the Meeting of the 81 Communist and Workers Parties, Moscow, 16 November 1960 (Tiranë: Naim Frasheri State Publishing Enterprise, 1969), 82-83.

<sup>41</sup> Logoreci, 108.

<sup>42</sup> Hoxha, *Speeches and Articles, 1961-1962*, vol. 1, 327.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 127.

<sup>44</sup> Hoxha, *Speeches and Articles, 1961-1962*, vol.1, 128-129.

<sup>45</sup> Hoxha, "Reject the Revisionist Theses of the XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Anti-Marxist Stand of Khrushchev's Group! Uphold Marxism-Leninism!", 72.

<sup>46</sup> Nikita Khrushchev, *Documents of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU*, vol. 1 (New York: Crosscurrents Press, 1961), 151, 152.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 215.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 216-217. Nikita Khrushchev is definitely correct concerning his final point of the demise of most of the leading Communists in Albania. Of all the prominent leaders in the Albanian Party of Labor since World War II [except for Ramiz Aha, who was the chosen successor], only Hysni Kapo died from natural causes, cancer of the pancreas. The others were purged or committed "suicide."

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 218.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 213-214. It is interesting to note the use by an avowed atheist to the reference to Judas and "thirty pieces of silver."

<sup>51</sup> *Zeri i popullit* (Tiranë), 28 October 1961, p. 4.

<sup>52</sup> Enver Hoxha, *Speeches and Articles, 1965-1966*, vol. 3 (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1977), 113.

<sup>53</sup> See *Zeri i popullit* (Tiranë), 22 October 1961, p. 4.

<sup>54</sup> Hoxha, "Reject the Revisionist Theses of the XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Anti-Marxist Stand of Khrushchev's Group! Uphold Marxism-Leninism!", 128, 129.

<sup>55</sup> The Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania, 359.

<sup>56</sup> S. Sanakoyev, *International Affairs*. (December 1961), 9.

<sup>57</sup> Results of questionnaires given in Albania, March and April, 1994.

<sup>58</sup> Donald Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961* (New York: Atheneum, 1969), 376-377.



## Chapter 5:

### *Albania and China*

The first step taken in the relations between the two countries was China's assumption of the Soviet Union's promise of aid for the Third Five-Year Plan (1961-1965). In February 1961, China promised to give Albania a loan of \$125 million to build twenty-five chemical, electrical, and metallurgical plants called for under the Third Five-Year Plan.<sup>1</sup> Despite the infusion of Chinese capital into the Albanian economy, Albania suffered through a difficult period in this transition from one aid donor to another. Enver Hoxha, in his address given to the Fifth Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor said: "The period of the 3rd five-year plan was for our people and our Party the period of the hardest test after the National-Liberation War."<sup>2</sup>

China then taught Albania an important lesson concerning planning. It is best to be self-reliant and not depend on foreign aid, whether from China or any other country. Albania took this message to heart and gradually began to take less aid each year. The principle of self-reliance became an integral part of Albanian life, not only in government but in family life as well. This lesson taught to the Albanians by the Chinese was especially important because it forced Albania to change from a dependent economy that received at least fifty percent of its total foreign commerce from the Soviet Union for each of the previous twelve years (1946-1961)<sup>3</sup> to an economy that (after the new 1976 Constitution was enacted which prohibited foreign debt and foreign aid) was basically self-sufficient, though in need of an influx of modern technology.

China was an attractive ally for Albania for many reasons. The most important reason was that China was practically the only country left for Albania to have as an ally since nearly every other country had been alienated in some manner by the "Land of the Eagle." Albania was looking for a country to ally with which could give it some degree of security from its more powerful neighbors and at the same time, not become a threat to its independence and sovereignty. This point was especially important to the xenophobic leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor. Also, unlike the opinions of Albanians concerning Albania's previous alliances with Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, most of the respondents to the questionnaire in Appendix A responded positively toward China. Seventy-eight percent answered positively and twenty-two percent negatively toward the Albanian-Chinese alliance in Question Number 14.<sup>4</sup>

Ideologically, China held the same views initially as Albania. China was anti-West, anti-Yugoslav (this factor was immensely important to the Albanians who historically had been enemies of Yugoslavia), and anti-Soviet.<sup>5</sup> A reason which should not be overlooked is the fact that both countries had similar philosophies of leadership. Mao Zedong followed a strict Stalinist program based on a fundamentalist interpretation of Marxism-Leninism like Hoxha and both encouraged the growth of a "cult of personality" to surround them. Other factors which made China an attractive ally include: the Chinese Communists seized power through their own efforts (like the Albanian Communists); that aid was interest-free and did not have to be repaid until Albania could afford to do so without cutting other areas short; China never decided for Albania what the emphasis in the economic Five-Year plan should be; and all Chinese technicians working in the country worked for the same wage as the Albanian workers, unlike Soviet technicians which sometimes made more than three times the pay of Enver Hoxha.<sup>6</sup>

Albania was a good ally for China too not only because of Hoxha's quote: "China has nothing to fear - Albania is China's ally now."<sup>7</sup> Albania was useful for its propaganda value to the Chinese because of the hostile propaganda against revisionism produced in Tiranë. Albanian propaganda was reprinted in Chinese newspapers and on radio. Albania was portrayed in the Chinese press as an influential

European Communist country allied with China in the struggle against revisionism and the Soviet Union. A popular Chinese slogan regarding Albania was. "we (Albania and Cina) are far away but we are neighbors."

In terms of trade, Albania's value as a trading partner to China was not negligible in all areas. It was one of the world's largest sources of chrome ore, which in finished form is used in high-grade alloys, stainless steel, and nuclear apparatus. During Enver Hoxha's period as First Secretary of the Albanian Party of Labor, Albania grew to be at one time the second largest producer of chromium in the world.

China had little choice other than to support Albania by allying with Hoxha. Politically and ideologically, China coveted Albania because as its ally it provided the means to form a pro-Chinese bloc to attack the pro-Soviet bloc in the Communist world. China could not allow Albania to change its pro-Chinese stand and reconcile with the Soviet Union due to pressure exerted by the Kremlin.

Additionally, Albania's strategic geographical position on the Adriatic, at the gateway to the Mediterranean, was an important practical advantage for China. China hoped to induce other East European nations to come into the Chinese sphere of influence by using Albania as a base for Chinese propaganda in Eastern Europe. This hope of China's was never realized.

Zhou Enlai visited Albania in January 1964. On January 9th, "The 1964 Sino-Albanian Joint Statement" was signed in Tiranë.<sup>8</sup> The document laid the groundwork (by stating common principles) concerning relations between the two countries. An excerpt from the statement shows that:

Both [Albania and China] hold that the relations between socialist countries are international relations of a new type. Relations between socialist countries, big or small, economically more developed or less developed, must be based on the principles of complete equality, respect for territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and must also be based on the principles of mutual support and mutual assistance in accordance with proletarian internationalism. It is necessary to oppose great-nation chauvinism and national egoism in relations between socialist countries. It is absolutely impermissible to impose the will of one country upon another, or to impair the independence, sovereignty and interests of the



people, of a fraternal country on the pretext of 'aid' or 'international division of labor.'<sup>9</sup>

Albanian Premier Mehmet Shehu visited China and signed "The 1966 Sino-Albanian Joint Statement" on May 11, 1966, at Beijing. This important document stated the common objectives of the two countries which were to defend the "purity" of Marxism by attacking imperialism (United States) and revisionism (Soviet Union and Yugoslavia).<sup>10</sup> It is important to note that in the formative years of the alliance China held the position (like Albania) of the "dual adversary" theory that the fight against Soviet "modern revisionism" was equal to the fight against American "imperialism." Yugoslavia was viewed as a "special detachment of U. S. imperialism" and as a "saboteur against world revolution." Gradually, China's views on these issues began to change 180 degrees which became one of the major causes of the Albanian split with China in 1978.<sup>11</sup>

The alliance between Albania and China was unusual because it was non-institutionalized. It lacked "...an organizational structure for regular consultations and policy coordination, and was characterized by an informal relationship conducted on an *ad hoc* basis."<sup>12</sup> This type of alliance had disadvantages due to the lack of regular consultations, however, this sometimes proved mutually advantageous because it provided considerable latitude in the handling of affairs between the two countries.

Mao Zedong's speech of November 3, 1966, given to the Fifth Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor glorified the Albanian Party of Labor's fight against revisionism and its strong support of Marxism-Leninism. Mao called Albania "the only beacon of true socialism left in Europe." Mao also promised that:

an attack on Albania will have to reckon with great People's China. If the U. S. imperialists, the modern Soviet revisionists or any of their lackeys dare to touch Albania in the slightest, nothing lies ahead for them but a complete, shameful and memorable defeat.<sup>13</sup>

Enver Hoxha said in a speech at the same congress that:

You may rest assured, comrades, that come what may in the world at large, our two parties and our two peoples will certainly remain together. They will fight together and they will win together.<sup>14</sup>

This sort of friendly relationship between the two nations in which each praised and promised to help the other was fairly common throughout the first ten years (until 1971) of their alliance.

An incident (which remained private) occurred during the summer of 1964, which proved to be an exception to the general trend of extremely close relations enjoyed between Albania and China. A delegation of the Japanese Socialist Party visited with Mao Zedong in July 1964. The topic of rectifying Chinese-Soviet border disputes was raised. Mao claimed that Chinese territory was unjustly claimed by the pre-Revolutionary Russians and post-Revolutionary Soviets. In September 1964, Albania protested against the raising of this issue by China on ideological grounds. Albania's position was that it was a mistake to raise the issue since it would provide a powerful propaganda tool to the Soviet Union to use against China and Albania, too.

One might assume that Albania would support such an issue, however, in addition to the ideological reasons given it is likely that Albania was afraid to side with the Chinese since this might provide encouragement to the Soviet Union to induce Yugoslavia and Greece to pressure for territorial concessions from Albania. Enver Hoxha suggested that this action "instigated war." The Chinese "forget that raising territorial claims at this time (even when fully justified, as is the case of Kosovë with us) leads to the creation of a situation of military conflict."<sup>15</sup>

Despite the aforementioned private incident, Albanian-Chinese relations remained very close. China had entered into a four-year period of relative diplomatic isolation due to the Cultural Revolution and mobilization of the Red Guards which caused China to focus on domestic issues. Between 1965 and 1969, the number of delegation exchanges between China and other countries dropped from 1,322 to 66.<sup>16</sup> This period marked the zenith of Chinese-Albanian relations. The gradual worsening of relations now began.

Events external to Albanian-Chinese relations which occurred during this time period had a sizeable impact upon them. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 20, 1968, to protest Alexander

Dubcek's reforms and the subsequent pronouncement of the Brezhnev Doctrine<sup>17</sup> caused Albania to officially withdraw from the Warsaw Pact on September 5, 1968. This action prevented a legal invasion of Warsaw Pact troops into Albania. The effect of these events on the Albanian-Chinese alliance in the short term, was to bring the nations closer together. Hysni Kapo, a senior member of the Albanian Party of Labor said: "If someone were to ask us how many people do we have, our answer is 701 million."<sup>18</sup> Kapo is obviously referring to the populations of Albania and China combined. The long term effect of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia upon Albanian-Chinese relations was that it forced both sides to reevaluate their positions in the alliance.

The first public hint of possible problems between the two countries occurred in 1969 when China showed signs of leaving isolation and moving toward economic and diplomatic relations with other countries. This move caused Albania to lose the political value (to China) of being China's staunchest ally. An even greater concern to Albania occurred when China began to have dialogue with the United States in 1971. Dr. Henry Kissinger visited with Zhou Enlai (July 9 to 11, 1971) for two days in Beijing. Their talks caused President Richard Nixon to announce on July 15, 1971, that he had accepted an invitation to visit China to meet with Zhou Enlai. These events resulted in a de facto Chinese-American rapprochement. Enver Hoxha felt betrayed by these actions (the news first heard from foreign news agencies, fell upon the Albanians like a "bombshell."<sup>19</sup>), not only because of ideology but due to the combination of the Albanian character which makes abrupt changes of loyalty difficult (See Page 57) and the fact that China failed to consult with Albania concerning the matter prior to the event taking place. Hoxha's feelings seemed to have been similar to those he experienced in 1955 when Khrushchev reconciled his differences with Tito.

The Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor sent a letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on August 6, 1971, which expressed its absolute condemnation of the Chinese action. It referred to Nixon as "a frenzied anti-Communist." The crux of the Albanian argument was that:

This strategy of ours envisages close alliance with the peoples who are struggling, with the revolutionaries of the whole world, in a common front against imperialism and social-imperialism, and never alliance with Soviet social-imperialism allegedly against American imperialism, never alliance with American imperialism allegedly against Soviet social-imperialism. The touchstone which distinguishes us Marxists-Leninists from the various anti-Marxists is the stem, uncompromising class struggle, a blow-for-blow fight to the finish on two fronts simultaneously, against American imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism.<sup>20</sup>

In addition to mere anger and fundamental disagreement over the Chinese decision concerning President Nixon, there was another issue troubling the Albanians. The Albanians had their feelings hurt as is evidenced in this excerpt of the letter previously quoted from where they wrote to their Chinese "comrades":

We trust that you will understand the reason for the delay in our reply. This was because your decision came as a surprise to us and was taken without any preliminary consultation between us on this question, so that we would be able to express and thrash out our opinions. This, we think, could have been useful, because preliminary consultations between close friends, determined co-fighters against imperialism and revisionism, are useful and necessary, and especially so, when steps which, in our opinion, have a major international effect and repercussion are taken.

...Considering the Communist Party of China as a sister party and our closest co-fighter, we have never hidden our views from it. That is why on this major problem which you put before us, we inform you that we consider your decision to receive Nixon in Beijing as incorrect and undesirable, and we do not approve or support it. It is also our opinion that Nixon's announced visit to China will not be understood or approved of by the peoples, the revolutionaries and the communists of different countries.<sup>21</sup>

The result of these divergencies was a 1971 message from Beijing to Tiranë stating that Albania could not depend on an indefinite flow of assistance. In 1972, Albania was advised "to curb its expectations about further Chinese contributions to its economic development."<sup>22</sup>

Despite these differences of opinion on key issues, China and Albania did not break their alliance at this point. On the one hand, China did not wish to break with Albania due to Hoxha's strong anti-Soviet position at a time when China was attempting to lead as broad as

possible an anti-Soviet united front. Also, it is likely that there were certain radical pro-Hoxha elements in the Chinese Communist Party that were loyal to Hoxha's ideological position. On the other hand, Albania wished to continue the alliance as long as possible due to its dependence on Chinese aid. Throughout the 1960's, nearly two-thirds of Albania's total foreign trade was with China.<sup>23</sup> This amount was gradually decreasing but China was still the integral element of aid and trade in the Albanian economy.

Chinese aid to Albania, not only the amount but timeliness of delivery, continued to be an issue of contention. Due to geographical distance, deliveries from China to Albania were difficult. Most deliveries were transported by ships which traveled the Pacific Ocean, around the Cape of Good Hope, to Albania. For example, the machinery for the Mao Zedong textile plant being built in Berat took one and a half years to be delivered.<sup>24</sup> These delays caused many problems for the Albanians.

By 1973, Enver Hoxha wrote in his diary *Reflections on China* that the Chinese leaders:

...have cut off their contacts with us, and the contacts which they maintain are merely formal diplomatic ones. Albania is no longer the 'faithful, special friend'...They are maintaining the economic agreements, though with delays, but it is quite obvious that their 'initial ardor' has died.<sup>25</sup>

The amount of aid was also reduced. On June 17, 1975, Hoxha wrote in his diary that:

The reply of the Chinese to our requests for credits and aid for the coming five-year period was despicable: the Chinese are according us only 25 percent of the credits we sought....This amount of aid is just enough to avoid saying we shall not accord you any. The reasons the Chinese give for this are a mockery: 'We are a very poor country.' However, five years ago, when they were a 'very much poorer country' they accorded us a credit several times greater.<sup>26</sup>

Also, that

This is the beginning of the powerful economic blockade which they are imposing on us. But they will fail in this direction, too. We shall never kowtow to anyone, either the Chinese or anyone else.<sup>27</sup>

The result of decreased Chinese aid to Albania was an increase of trade with countries other than China.<sup>28</sup> Between 1972 and 1974, Albania's trade with the industrialized West rose from \$39.5 million to \$94.2 million. This accounted for 12 percent of Albanian trade in 1972 and 18.2 percent in 1974. In the same period, trade with China did increase from \$167 million to \$219 million. However, in terms of percentage of trade, trade with China fell from 50.6 percent in 1972 to 42.3 percent in 1974. Trade with Yugoslavia and the COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) grew in this period (Albania would not resume trade with the Soviet Union). In 1972, Albania's trade with Yugoslavia amounted to \$12 million, or 3.6 percent, of the total trade. By 1974, these amounts rose to \$37.8 million, or 7.3 percent, of total Albanian trade. Trade with the COMECON rose from \$111.6 million in 1972 to \$158.4 million in 1974. However, this amounted to a decrease in percentage share of Albanian trade from 33.8 percent to 30.6 percent. This trend toward diversification of trade continued in terms of the "Third World." Trade with the "Third World" in 1973 was only \$0.5 million (nearly negligible) but it skyrocketed (relatively speaking) to \$8.3 million in 1974. The percentage of trade rose from 0.1 percent to 1.6 percent.<sup>29</sup>

An issue of Albanian affairs which should not be neglected is the inevitable purge which seemed to have occurred when inter-state relations became strained. Defense Minister Beqir Balluku in July 1974, wanted the leadership of the Albanian Party to discard the "dual adversary" theory because he did not believe that the two superpowers posed an equal threat to Albania. It is unknown which country Balluku presumed to be the larger threat. Balluku had not acquired any pro-Chinese leanings. He merely wanted to raise the professionalism of the Albanian armed forces by removing unwanted interference from the Party. This view caused him to be named as a Chinese agent. In addition, Chief of Staff Petrit Dume and the head of the Political Directorate Hito Cako were accused also of being traitors. A *Zeri i popullit* editorial of December 19, 1974, stressed that:

no important question [in the armed forces] should be implemented without first being examined by the party organization and their forums. No one can or should stand above the party organization. Our army is the product of the people. It is the affectionate creation of the party. It is the weapon of the party. It is the weapon of our victorious revolution.<sup>30</sup>

Balluku, Dume, and Cako are presumed to have been executed. This purge served to strengthen Party control over the armed forces and it gave Hoxha an anti-Chinese propaganda tool. Enver Hoxha's writings deal with the Balluku affair by saying that:

...their [China's] pressure is not imaginary, but took concrete form in the military and economic plot headed by Beqir Balluku, Petrit Dume, Hito Cako, Abdyl Kellezi, Koco Theodhosi, Lipe Nasi, etc. The aim of these traitors was the liquidation of the Party and its Marxist-Leninist leadership in order to turn socialist Albania into a revisionist country. The Soviets, the Yugoslavs, the Chinese and others dream of such an Albania.<sup>31</sup>

Hoxha believed this to be the most serious challenge to Party of Labor supremacy since the 1956 Tiranë Party meeting of delegates; so more purges were carried out. At the Seventh Albanian Party of Labor Congress held from November 1 to 7, 1976, the full impact of the purges was seen when the composition of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau was announced. In addition to the three deposed Political Bureau members (Balluku, Dume, Cako), three of the four Political Bureau candidate members elected in 1971 lost their posts. Of the seventy-one Central Committee members elected in 1971, twenty-eight were dropped from the Central Committee and seven were demoted to candidate status. Hoxha also replaced twenty-four of the twenty-six *rreth* (district) party first secretaries prior to the Seventh Albanian Party of Labor Congress.<sup>32</sup>

On September 9, 1976, Mao Zedong died, which caused much apprehension for Enver Hoxha. Despite his concern, Hoxha sent the following optimistic note to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to express his condolences:

...the strength which emanated from the friendship between China and Albania is truly inexhaustible. May our two parties and peoples unite yet

more closely with true Marxists throughout the world and the revolutionary peoples of various countries; may they fight side by side to bury the common enemies of the world: U. S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism.<sup>33</sup>

The Albanian message expressed the thought that Mao's words would continue to serve as a permanent source of inspiration in furthering the cause of Chinese-Albanian friendship. Despite Hoxha's hopeful tone, relations worsened between the two nations.

The situation at this time was reminiscent of the state of affairs which occurred previously when Stalin died and was replaced by Khrushchev. A new leadership often has a different perspective on what constitutes truly important considerations. Like Khrushchev, the new Chinese leadership had an abrupt shift in their view of Albania's importance to China. A point which the new Chinese leadership evidently forgot or ignored was the crucial role Albania played in terms of getting China admitted to the United Nations.

Hua Guofeng was chosen to replace Mao as Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party. In August 1977, Hua reported to the Eleventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party that Mao Zedong's theory of the "Three Worlds" (first introduced in 1974) would become China's official foreign policy position.

Hua Guofeng stated that the "Three Worlds" theory presented:

...a correct orientation to the present international struggle, and clearly defines the main revolutionary forces, the chief enemies, and the middle forces that can be won over and united to form the broadest united front in class struggles against the chief enemies of the world arena.<sup>34</sup>

The Chinese journal, *Peking Review*, published an in-depth analysis of the "Three Worlds" theory. The major components of Mao's doctrine were that the "imperialist" United States and the "social-imperialist" Soviet Union are "the common enemies of the world" and they comprise the "first world." The "second world" was made up of the developed countries in Europe, along with Canada and Japan. The "third world" consists of the developing nations of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and China. The object of the theory was that the "third world," which contains the majority of the oppressed peoples of the world, should "wage an unrelenting struggle" against the superpowers



of the "first world." The "third world" should try to win as many "second world" countries to the cause as possible since the "second world" was subject to exploitation and oppression also.<sup>35</sup>

The Chinese added an additional factor to the "Three Worlds" theory which allowed for considerable flexibility. According to Hua Guofeng:

Lenin said: 'The more powerful enemy can be vanquished only by exerting the utmost effort, and most thoroughly, carefully, attentively and skillfully making use without fail of every, even the smallest, rift among the enemies, ...and also by taking advantage of every, even the smallest, opportunity of gaining a mass ally, even though this ally be temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable and conditional.' Those who fail to understand this, fail to understand even a particle of Marxism, or of scientific, modern socialism in general.<sup>36</sup>

It is this factor which allowed the ideological justification for the Chinese to consider the United States as the secondary enemy in the fight against the Soviet Union, the principal enemy. Theoretically, after the Soviet Union was destroyed, the Chinese-led world movement would attack the United States which would have become the new principal enemy of the world.

Hoxha retaliated against the Chinese position by reiterating his "dual adversary" stance and stating that:

...the Chinese are not in agreement with our foreign policy because we do not follow their political stands. We do not accept that 'American imperialism is less dangerous than Soviet social-imperialism,' as the Chinese claim. We say, 'Both of them are dangerous and must be combatted sternly.'<sup>17</sup>

Also, .. the Chinese plan of the 'third world' is a major diabolical plan, with the aim that China should become another superpower, precisely by placing itself at the head of the 'third world' and the 'non-aligned world.'

The "last straw" which pushed Albanian objections to Chinese policies over the edge occurred from August 30- September 7, 1977, when Tito visited Beijing and was warmly received. Albania considered Tito's visit as well as the Chinese open endorsement of Yugoslavia's non-alignment policy and their interest in the Yugoslav self-management

system a calculated effort on the part of Mao's successors to embarrass Albania. It seemed that whenever Tito arrived on the scene in any fashion, the Albanians became infuriated!

Subsequently, Albania began to increase its attack on China on ideological grounds. The contacts and cooperation which China engaged in with American capitalists and Yugoslav revisionists had, according to Albanian propaganda, turned China into a revisionist state as well as being no longer genuinely socialist. Hoxha declared that China to him had become a collaborator with revisionists and was no different in principle than Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union. The result of the Albanian propaganda was that Albania claimed to be the only genuine revolutionary Marxist-Leninist state in the world:

The Chinese Leaders are acting like the leaders of a 'great state.' They think, 'The Albanians fell out with the Soviet Union because they had us, and if they fall out with us, too, they will go back to the Soviets,' therefore they say: 'Either with us or the Soviets, it is all the same, the Albanians are done for.' But to hell with them! We shall fight against all this trash, because we are Albanian Marxist-Leninists and on our correct course we shall always triumph!<sup>38</sup>

China responded by making an official announcement on July 13, 1978, that the People's Republic of China was cutting off all aid to the People's Socialist Republic of Albania. The amount of aid which China had given Albania has been estimated at ten billion *yuan Renminbi* or approximately five billion dollars.<sup>39</sup>

The *Letter of the Central Committee of Albanian Party of Labor and the Government of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and Government of China* was written on July 29, 1978 and published in *Zeri i popullit* on July 30th. This letter accused the Chinese Party and government of many "crimes" against the Albanian Party, government, and people, particularly in the economic sphere.

The Albanians charged that the Chinese sought to have Albania renounce the cornerstone of her strategy for economic development; i.e., the priority given to the development of heavy industry over all other sectors of the economy. In addition, the majority of the large-scale industrial projects constructed with Chinese help were all completed with one to six years delay. Likewise, projects currently in

construction were behind the timetable of the plan. For example, the Metallurgical Complex at Elbasan planned for completion at the time of the break had only sixty-seven per cent of the investments planned for its completion actually made and only seventy-four per cent of the equipment necessary for the complex were delivered.<sup>40</sup>

The break with China created a relatively isolated country in terms of number and extent of relations with major nations. Basically this is the condition in which Albania remained until Enver Hoxha's death in 1985 and beyond, well into the last years of Ramiz Alia's leadership.

The overall summation of the Albania-Chinese alliance is that it was rather benign, neither extremely positive nor extremely negative. At most, if one is forced to choose between positive and negative, one would lean toward a judgment of slightly positive. The Chinese did help the Albanians monetarily. This aid did allow further development to take place. Also, the policy of self-reliance was a product of Chinese policy. This itself, was not a negative factor, only the Albanian implementation of this policy. The concept of learning to be more self-sufficient and less dependent upon others for aid etc. is certainly not a bad philosophy for a nation to adopt.

The problem with the Sino-Albanian alliance was that instead of using the alliance strictly to gain as much aid as possible before moving on to "greener pastures" as Albania had done previously, Enver Hoxha insisted on isolating Albania. This decision caused Albania to begin to stagnate and growth slowed. The momentum which could have been built up due to the influx of Chinese aid was lost due to the inertia encountered as a result of the dogmatic, self-reliant, isolationist policies of Enver Hoxha. It merely failed to lead to anything closely resembling a dynamic result which it could have, had different policies been implemented by Enver Hoxha.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Anton Logoreci, "Albania and China: The Incongruous Alliance," *Current History* 52 (April 1967): 229.

<sup>2</sup> Enver Hoxha, *Report to the 5th Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor*, (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1966), 37.

<sup>3</sup> Elez Biberaj, *Albania and China* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 40.

<sup>4</sup> Results of questionnaires given in Albania, March and April, 1994.

<sup>5</sup> Elez Biberaj, 39.

<sup>6</sup> Harry Hamm, *Albania: China's Beachhead in Europe* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), 45.

<sup>7</sup> Michael S. Pap, Class lecture at John Carroll University, Cleveland, on 5 December 1985.

<sup>8</sup> Biberaj, 48.

<sup>9</sup> "Sino-Albanian Joint Statement," *Peking Review* (17 January 1964) 17.

<sup>10</sup> Biberaj, 48-49.

"ibid., 49.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 48.

<sup>13</sup> Hamm, 43.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 58.

<sup>15</sup> Enver Hoxha, *Reflections on China*, vol. 1: (Tirane: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1979), 72-73.

<sup>16</sup> Biberaj, 68.

<sup>17</sup> The Brezhnev Doctrine was the concept which justified the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact nations. The reasoning of Leonid Brezhnev in his doctrine was that the liberal Dubcek threatened the "common interests" of all socialist countries and needed to be stopped so liberalism would not spread beyond the Czech borders.

<sup>18</sup> Although this statement was made two years before the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia it is cited here because it best describes the feelings of both sides

immediately after the invasion. There were numerous protestations of mutual support which were not cited. See Biberaj, 72.

<sup>19</sup> Hoxha, *Reflections on China*, vol.1, 577.

<sup>20</sup> Enver Hoxha, *Selected Works, 1966-1975*, vol. 4 (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1982), 667.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 666-667, 668.

"Biberaj, 90.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 71.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., p. 69.

<sup>25</sup> Enver Hoxha, *Reflections on China*, vol. 2: (Toronto: Norman Bethune Institute, 1979), 41.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 107.

"Ibid., 109.

<sup>28</sup> This trend continued in diplomatic matters when Albania established ties with most West European countries and fifteen "Third World" countries. However, the level of transaction remained low.

<sup>29</sup> Biberaj, 98-99.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 102.

<sup>31</sup> Hoxha, *Reflections on China*, vol. 2, 109.

<sup>32</sup> Nicholas Pano, "Albania in the 1970's," *Problems of Communism* 26, no. 6, (November-December 1977): 40-41.

<sup>33</sup> Anton Logoreci, *The Albanians: Europe's Forgotten Survivors* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), 171

<sup>34</sup> Hua Guofeng, "Political Report to the 11th National Congress of the Communist Party of China," *Peking Review* (26 August 1977): 41.

<sup>35</sup> "Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism," *Peking Review* (4 November 1977): 10-41.

<sup>36</sup> Guofeng, 41-42.

"Hoxha, *Reflections on China*, vol.2, 108,656.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid, 277-278.

<sup>39</sup> Biberaj, 136.

<sup>40</sup> *Zeri i popullit* (Tiranë), 30 July 1978, p. 1. The importance of the Metallurgical Complex to Albanian plans can best be seen by the significance attached to it in its planning stages by Enver Hoxha: "To smelt iron is decisive for the economy of a country. When all this work is achieved, we will be justified in saying that henceforth Albania can march steadily on its own, that here, in the heart of Albania, this heavy industry is being erected, which is her backbone." See H. Banja and V. Toci, *Socialist Albania on the Road to Industrialization*, (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1979), 110. The importance of this plant to Albanian plans explains the galling aspect of Chinese delays to the mindset of Enver Hoxha.

1. The importance of the Albanian plan can be seen by the significance attached to it in the planning stages by Enver Hoxha. "To reach now is decisive for the economy of the country. When all this work is achieved, we will be justified in saying that perestroika can march steadily on its own, that there is the heart in Albania, the heart of the industry is being created, which is perestroika." See H. Hoxha and V. Topi, *Socialism in Albania on the Road to Modernization* (Tirana: E. Hoxha Publishing House, 1979).
2. The importance of this plan to Albanian plans explains the falling aspect of Chinese help to the plan of Enver Hoxha for the construction of the country.
3. Ibid., 1979.
4. Ibid., 1979.
5. Ibid., 1979.
6. This word continued in Albanian literature when Enver Hoxha established in 1977 the new Albanian constitution which stated that "the Albanian people will build the new socialist society on the basis of the transition to socialism."
7. Ibid., 1979.
8. Ibid., 1979.
9. Ibid., 1979.
10. Ibid., 1979.
11. Ibid., 1979.
12. Ibid., 1979.
13. Ibid., 1979.
14. Ibid., 1979.
15. Ibid., 1979.
16. Ibid., 1979.
17. Ibid., 1979.
18. Ibid., 1979.
19. Ibid., 1979.
20. Ibid., 1979.
21. Ibid., 1979.
22. Ibid., 1979.
23. Ibid., 1979.
24. Ibid., 1979.
25. Ibid., 1979.
26. Ibid., 1979.
27. Ibid., 1979.
28. Ibid., 1979.
29. Ibid., 1979.
30. Ibid., 1979.
31. Ibid., 1979.
32. Ibid., 1979.
33. Ibid., 1979.
34. Ibid., 1979.
35. Ibid., 1979.
36. Ibid., 1979.
37. Ibid., 1979.
38. Ibid., 1979.
39. Ibid., 1979.
40. Ibid., 1979.
41. Ibid., 1979.
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71. Ibid., 1979.
72. Ibid., 1979.
73. Ibid., 1979.
74. Ibid., 1979.
75. Ibid., 1979.
76. Ibid., 1979.
77. Ibid., 1979.
78. Ibid., 1979.
79. Ibid., 1979.
80. Ibid., 1979.
81. Ibid., 1979.
82. Ibid., 1979.
83. Ibid., 1979.
84. Ibid., 1979.
85. Ibid., 1979.
86. Ibid., 1979.
87. Ibid., 1979.
88. Ibid., 1979.
89. Ibid., 1979.
90. Ibid., 1979.
91. Ibid., 1979.
92. Ibid., 1979.
93. Ibid., 1979.
94. Ibid., 1979.
95. Ibid., 1979.
96. Ibid., 1979.
97. Ibid., 1979.
98. Ibid., 1979.
99. Ibid., 1979.
100. Ibid., 1979.

## Chapter 6:

### *Self-Reliant Albania*

Albania found itself in an unprecedented situation following the break with China; it, for the first time in its modern history, did not have a foreign protector or close friend. This was not a cataclysmic event, however, since Albania had taken steps prior to the break with China to prepare for such an eventuality. The most significant event, in terms of preparation for the break, had to be the formulation of a new constitution at the Seventh Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor, November 1 to 7, 1976.<sup>1</sup>

Enver Hoxha at the Seventh Congress spoke about the differences between the old and new constitutions. Hoxha said that: "The old Constitution was the Constitution of the building of the foundations of socialism, whereas the new Constitution will be the Constitution of the complete construction of the socialist society."<sup>2</sup>

The Constitution of 1976 was "in effect, Hoxha's political testament, designed to guarantee that Albania will always follow 'the correct Marxist-Leninist path' to the achievement of Communism."<sup>3</sup> It represented an attempt by Hoxha to make his policies binding on his successors and the nation. Evidence of the "eternal" intent behind the drafting of the new constitution is given by Mehmet Shehu in *Zeri i popullit*.

...our constitution is also a sacred trust of the present generations for the future generations so that anyone who may try to violate this article betrays Marxism-Leninism and freedom and independence of the country



and will unfailingly receive the deserved punishment by the merciless fist of the people.<sup>4</sup>

The major points of the constitution are: *Article 3*, the political monopoly of the Albanian Party of Labor; *Article 14*, the development of the country's socialist economy is to be based mainly on the principle of "self-reliance"; *Article 9*, the establishment of foreign military bases or the stationing of foreign troops in Albania is forbidden.<sup>5</sup>

*Article 28* of the constitution is the most crucial article because its implementation sets the policy course for economic matters and foreign policy. *Article 28* states:

The granting of concessions to, and the creation of foreign economic and financial companies and other institutions or ones formed jointly with bourgeois and revisionist capitalist monopolies and states as well as obtaining credits from them are prohibited in the People's Socialist Republic of Albania.<sup>6</sup>

This article forced Albania to work toward the goal of self-sufficiency, with a semi-viable barter system governing both Albania's trade practices and foreign relations. An interview with Professor Dilaver Sadekaj of the Institute of History of the University of Tiranë was highly critical of the 1976 Constitution. In his opinion, "it was a big mistake because Albania had no possibility to go on to develop [the] economy without relations with other countries."<sup>7</sup> It is exactly this issue which many Albanians believe was the ultimate downfall of Hoxha's policies.

For a complete understanding of Enver Hoxha's point of view it is important to look at his policy of rejecting any credits in his *Report to the Seventh Congress of the Party of Labor*:

No country whatsoever, big or small, can build socialism by taking credits and aid from the bourgeoisie and the revisionists or by integrating its economy into the world system of capitalist economy. Any such linking of the economy of a socialist country with the economy of bourgeois or revisionist countries opens the doors to the action of the economic laws of capitalism and the degeneration of the socialist order. This is the road of betrayal and the restoration of capitalism, which the revisionist cliques have pursued and are pursuing.<sup>8</sup>

The importance of self-reliance to Albanian public policy can best be viewed through this quotation of Enver Hoxha's:

Our country's experience proves that the safeguarding of the economic and political independence and the defence of national sovereignty are closely linked with the consistent implementation of the principle of self-reliance.<sup>9</sup>

There were two major components of Hoxha's self-reliance strategy. The first was that the policy flourished only when the complete energies of the people were directed in this one solitary cause. The second component was that the implementation of this policy was necessary in all phases of socialist life. The necessity of both components being accomplished was a prerequisite for the policy to achieve any degree of success. According to Enver Hoxha, the fate of the Albanian people rested upon the earnestness in which the strategy was adopted and the diligence in which it was put into everyday practice. In short, the population needed to feel that their actual existence depended on the strict adherence to this policy.

Enver Hoxha explained his wishes in the following manner:

The principle of self-reliance demands, first of all, firm reliance on the creative mental and physical energies of the people guided by the Party. Socialism is the work of the masses, therefore, everything produced and created is the fruit of the work, of the sweat and brains of the people.

...The principle of self-reliance is correctly understood when it is implemented in every field of social activity, on a national and district scale, when it is extended to every link and cell of our life, to every enterprise and cooperative, to every institution and army unit, when people work and live everywhere as in a state of siege.<sup>10</sup>

Part of the equation which demanded the necessity self-reliance entailed was caused in large part to the cessation of aid from foreign donors. In fact, the trend of breaking alliances seemingly on whim was actually a recurring theme of Hoxha's tenure. Naturally, Enver Hoxha vociferously rejected any notion that he instigated changes in alliances due to his personal prerogatives. It is hardly surprising, given the fact that Professor Sofokli Lazri presented a paper entitled: "Designer and Implementator of the Foreign Policy of Socialist Albania" at the

"esteemed" National Conference Dedicated to the Immortal Works of Comrade Enver Hoxha, October 15-16, 1985 in which he gave Hoxha's viewpoint concerning Albania's alliance shifts over the years. Lazri gives a good summary of Hoxha's alliance "strategy" by noting:

Many a one in foreign countries continue to say to this day that 'breaking with allies' is a characteristic of the policy of the Albanians, and especially Comrade Enver Hoxha.

...Socialist Albania has three times been in such situations that the enemies thought that by denying it economic aid and breaking off cooperation with it they would force it to capitulate and submit to them. And three times it has shown the world that there is no force that can shake, or means that can destabilize, an economy which is based on its own internal resources and forces. This happened in 1948 when in one day the Yugoslav revisionists ceased to honour all obligations they had towards our country and stopped all trade exchanges, thinking that the threat of starvation would make us surrender to them. In 1960 Khrushchev, too, brutally canceled not only the credits which had been officially stipulated and were in conformity with all the rules of international law, but also cut off ordinary trade exchanges and withdrew all the Soviet specialists working in Albania. He thought that our country would not be able to complete the industrial projects which were under construction or exploit the existing ones.

The Chinese revisionists repeated this arbitrary action. They, too, cut off the credits and withdrew the specialists, hoping that this would make Albania go bankrupt. The heroism of our workers, specialists and leaders was immense. But even greater was the heroism of our Party, the historical foresight of Comrade Enver Hoxha who had fought for the creation of the industrial and technical base and the training of those cadres so as to be able to cope with any blockade in order to develop an economy independent from any changing economic or political circumstances in the world.<sup>11</sup>

The themes of "self-reliance," "austerity," and "thrift" became key words for Albanian society. The Institute for Economic Planning of the State Planning Commission organized a major conference (twenty-three papers were presented dealing with thrift) on July 17, 1985, with the theme, "Let Us Have a Stronger Austerity Regimen Through the Frontal Realization of the Plan in All of Its Indices."<sup>12</sup> Although an awkward title, this approach seems to have achieved some limited degree of success. The impact of the austerity measures upon Albanian society

can only be appreciated when put into the context of the already harshly austere Albanian lifestyle. For example, a worker in a factory at Durrës was praised in *Zeri i popullit* for using in his work 50 percent of the old nails he succeeded in extracting from old armatures. Also, a popular slogan of the Albanian armed forces was: "Hit the bull's eye with the first bullet."<sup>13</sup>

One positive aspect of the thriftiness shown by the Albanian people was the increase shown in the amount of *lekë* in savings accounts. The average deposit in a savings account increased from 104 *lekë* in 1950, to 508 *lekë* in 1960, 571 *lekë* in 1970, 645 *lekë* in 1980, and 1,474 *lekë* in 1985.<sup>14</sup> This fourteen-fold increase during the entire period demonstrates that the people had surplus income which they desired to save and may be a reflection that people listened to the various campaigns extolling them to be thrifty and try to save as much as possible. However, the opposite point of view may also have some validity, namely, that the small amount of consumer goods available limited the opportunities to spend money if the people did wish to do so.

Enver Hoxha spoke at length on the necessity for saving in the Albanian economy. A 1973 speech contained this important passage:

Ours is a small country, but it has undertaken great tasks aimed at the major purpose of the full construction of our socialist society. If we consider the well-known political and economic factors which derive from the capitalist-revisionist blockade, we will understand more clearly the necessity of the high rates of accumulation carried out in our country, we will see more clearly the need for large investments which we are forced to allocate and the high rates we have to use to preserve our socialist construction, the need to observe in everything a severe regime of saving.<sup>15</sup>

This policy of severe savings which stressed a high rate of accumulation was advocated despite the drawback of limiting the growth of production of consumer goods. The rationale given by Albanian economists and Party leaders was that self-reliance was not only crucial for the development and continued well-being of the economy but was actually indivisible from the penultimate task of maintaining the independence and the actual existence of Albania:

If a different course were followed, a course of checking the growth of the fund of accumulation or of keeping it at a lower level and increasing of the fund of consumption more rapidly than envisaged, it would have had dangerous consequences for the building of socialism, for the freedom and independence of the Homeland. Such a thing would have given priority to the problems of the moment, to the detriment of the general interests of the future, it would have given priority to consumption to the detriment of strengthening of technical-material base of socialism and the development of productive forces which create the proper conditions for the constant growth of the people's consumption.<sup>16</sup>

The most obvious demonstration of the success of this policy is seen in the fact that Albania had little, if any foreign debt. This fact is astounding for any country but it is especially so for an East European country which traditionally has very high foreign debt. The Central Intelligence Agency's publication, *The World Factbook*, showed that in 1983, Albania imported goods worth \$280 million but exported goods worth \$290 million, which produced a trade surplus of \$ 10 million. The 1984 state budget showed expenditures of \$1.28 billion and revenues of \$1.29 billion.<sup>17</sup> "Self-reliance" was a limited success within the parameters of the Albanian historical experience. It is helpful to regress to a chronological account of the major events which brought Albania to this point in order to truly understand the significance of, as well as, the ramifications which this situation presented.

In November 1978, Enver Hoxha declared that Albania was determined to "forge ahead and build socialism relying on its own forces."<sup>18</sup> The principle of "self-reliance" was described as "an objective necessity for independent socialist development."<sup>19</sup> This principle had to work for Albania to survive (unless Albania rejected its ideological stand) because at the time of the break, China represented 35 to 40 percent of Albania's total trade.<sup>20</sup>

The rationale behind the policy of self-reliance was given by Enver Hoxha in his writings:

The struggle of a people for national existence does not and cannot depend on the combinations and diplomatic intrigues of other states, be they big or small. It depends on the consciousness of the people themselves, when they attain understanding of what their rights and true interests are, have confidence in their own strength at any moment and in any situation, and know how to defend these rights and interests with

iron will, sound logic, and revolutionary struggle. Only then the strength of the people becomes invincible, is multiplied a hundredfold and bursts out like an irresistible hurricane.<sup>21</sup>

The strategy which self-reliance entails is to produce as much as possible depending on domestic resources without becoming isolated. This philosophy is explained in further detail:

It is evident that a country as small as ours with limited material means could not aim at setting up a wholly independent and all-out developed national economy with all the principal branches of heavy industry, machine-making industry included which would be in position to meet all the needs of our country.

...We do not aim at building up a closed economy of an autarchic character. By relying on our own efforts, making the fullest possible use of all our reserves and setting up a powerful national economy to ensure enlarged reproduction by itself, we will create for ourselves the conditions for collaborating on the basis of equality with other countries as well as for a more effective mutual support and collaboration with socialist countries.<sup>22</sup>

The majority of Albanians who completed a questionnaire believed that the self-reliance policy was a negative experience for Albania. Seventy-seven percent replied negatively and twenty-three percent replied positively to Question Number 15 in *Appendix A*. A quotation which is representative of the group which felt self-reliance was negative is: "Nobody can do everything for themselves." On the other hand, one positive respondent commented that: "I think this slogan was positive because it stimulated our people to develop the country."<sup>23</sup>

After the break with China, Albania continued to diversify its trade relations with other countries. This diversification of trade was coupled with an expansion of relations with countries "irrespective of differences in social order."<sup>24</sup> However, priority was given to bilateral cooperation with neighboring countries.

Albania and Yugoslavia soon began to cooperate with each other more since they both realized that the Soviet Union was their common enemy. The Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Milos Minic, stated in a speech given in November 1979, that:

We [Yugoslavia] do not treat Albania as a small country but as one of our most important neighbors, with whom we can only share a common destiny ...Whatever befalls Yugoslavia will befall Albania, too, in relation to security. Therefore, it would be in the interest of the two countries, of nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia and of the peoples of Albania, to strengthen and to develop friendly cooperation. We are investing immense efforts in encouraging relations with Albania to develop as fully as possible.<sup>23</sup>

Trade between Albania and Yugoslavia increased dramatically in this period (until 1981). In 1978, \$28 million in trade took place. This figure rose to \$60 million in 1979, and \$115 million in 1980.<sup>26</sup> Albania also expanded relations significantly with Greece, Italy, Turkey, and Austria.

Albania's trade with the COMECON (except for the Soviet Union) grew significantly in the first years following the break with China. In 1978, the amount of reciprocal trade was \$170 million. It rose to \$220 million in 1979, and \$260 million in 1980.

By the end of 1980, Albania had succeeded in diversifying its trade sufficiently to counteract the effects upon the Albanian economy of the withdrawal of Chinese trade. At this time, Yugoslavia accounted for nineteen percent, industrialized West forty percent, and COMECON forty-one percent of Albania's total foreign trade.<sup>27</sup>

Despite this expansion of trade relations, Albania was still considered in the world at large as a very isolated country. Enver Hoxha, of course, vehemently denied this assertion. Hoxha explains:

Hence, from our standpoint and the standpoint of truth we are not and never will be isolated. We have told the imperialists and revisionists and we tell them once again that Albania is not an inn with its doors wide open for pigs and sows to enter. In the cities, the mountains, the plains and the shores of our socialist Homeland there is and will be no room for their ugly, degenerate way of life and thinking.<sup>28</sup>

Despite the typical stance of denying that any isolation occurred in Albania, Enver Hoxha himself did say on another occasion that:

Our Party has always seen to it that our country is free from foreigners in every respect, that it is fully independent from the outside world and never endangered by the classes which our revolution has deprived of their economic, political and moral power.<sup>29</sup>

Ignoring any sense that contradiction existed in the Party of Labor's stance toward isolation, Enver Hoxha enlarged upon the issue of not being isolated by summarizing the foreign policy of Albania. This was the policy which Hoxha envisioned Albania would follow indefinitely. This policy was:

The foreign policy of our state of the dictatorship of the proletariat, too, is a policy guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. It is principled and unchanging in its strategy. This policy supports the revolutionary movement of the working class and world proletariat for liberation from capital, hence it is against the latter, against its policy of oppression and exploitation, against its structure and infrastructure, it supports the struggle of the peoples for freedom, independence, social progress and socialism and relies on their solidarity. It is against any form of aggression and military intervention of one state against another, against colonial exploitation, against any form of tutelage, dictate and hegemony, national oppression and racial discrimination. It upholds the principle of the self-determination of peoples, the exercise of complete national sovereignty and the equality of all countries in international relations.

Hence the crucial orientations of the foreign policy of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania are: Support for the liberation of peoples from any bondage and exploitation by reactionary internal or external forces, struggle against imperialist wars and any other unjust war, struggle for genuine disarmament and peace, struggle for friendship between peoples and the denunciation of all enemies and every means they use to sabotage this friendship and understanding among peoples.<sup>30</sup>

...The People's Socialist Republic of Albania is a socialist steel fortress and it wants to have good relations with all the neighbouring peoples on the basis of the principles of equality, respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs and mutual respect. Whoever touches Albania will meet his death. Socialist Albania expresses its resolute opposition to whoever violates the integrity, independence and freedom of any people. As they have always done, the Albanian people will take the side of the victim against the aggressor.<sup>31</sup>

Not all Albanians shared Hoxha's vision for Albania's future. Many believed that isolation was a grave mistake for Albania. In fact, many blamed Hoxha's policy because of the first-hand effects it had upon their everyday existence. A good example was the food rationing



which took place in order to maintain the ability to remain self-reliant. A family only had one kilogram of meat, 250 grams of butter, and seven eggs per week. Size of the family had no bearing on the amount of the allotment.<sup>32</sup>

The issue of isolation was discussed by this writer in a chance meeting at a Tiranë café with Professor Arben Puto, a historian who has written books very favorable toward Enver Hoxha and the Albanian Party of Labor. In the opinion of Professor Puto, the isolation of Albania was the most negative aspect of Hoxha's years in power. If not for this policy, Albania would be a much richer country today.<sup>33</sup>

Self-reliance, as a policy, was the goal Enver Hoxha was striving to achieve throughout his tenure as leader of Albania. Hoxha felt it was necessary to gain as much aid and assistance as possible from the various aid donors Albania had been allied with over the years. In Hoxha's opinion, this aid would eventually lead to the position where Albania was in 1978 at the time of the break in alliance with China. Enver Hoxha believed at that time that Albania was strong enough "to rely on its own forces."

There are both positive and negative aspects to the policy of self-reliance employed in Albania. Naturally, there is a large degree of logic and pragmatism involved in the inherent premise which advocates self-reliance. It is of course preferable in many cases to develop as much as possible internally rather than the alternative of incurring a large amount of foreign debt. However, this policy can not be logically imposed in all situations. In fact, in some instances, as will be discussed in Chapter Ten of this study which deals with the Albanian economy, self-reliance can be counter-productive. There are times when it is best, due to lower cost and/or higher quality, to acquire a commodity abroad rather than attempting to produce it domestically.

There were three main positive aspects to a policy of self-reliance in the Albanian context. The first was that self-reliance helps to keep in check the growth of foreign debt. Second, the policy of self-reliance as Enver Hoxha employed it helped him to maintain his larger all-encompassing goal of maintaining sovereignty. Self-reliance precluded dependence on a foreign donor who could hypothetically gain an ever-increasing degree of control of the internal policy of Albania, as was the case under King Zog *vis a vis* Italy. Third, self-reliance had the

psychological effect of meshing with the propagandist^ notion which Enver Hoxha continually preached concerning the encirclement of Albania and the siege mentality. A policy of self-reliance went hand-in-hand with this type of isolated condition where Albania was going it alone against the majority of nations in the world.

The negative aspect of self-reliance was the isolation of the country which kept Albania from receiving the modern technology and assistance necessary for sustained growth and advancement in all areas of society. There is no question that the isolation which stemmed from the policy of self-reliance can be considered one of the most serious mistakes made by Enver Hoxha.

Self-reliance must be considered a negative development in the overall context of the Albanian experience. Albania did have an economic base in place but it was not developed to the point where it could internally sustain a policy of self-reliance with little or no outside technology.

*Notes*

<sup>1</sup> The new Constitution of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania was officially promulgated on December 28, 1976.

<sup>2</sup> Enver Hoxha, *Report on the Activity of the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania* (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1977), 12.

<sup>3</sup> Nicholas Pano, "Albania in the 1970's," *Problems of Communism* 26, no. 6, (November-December 1977), 41.

<sup>4</sup> *Zeri i popullit* (Tiranë), 2 November 1976, p. 1.

<sup>5</sup> Pano, 41.

<sup>6</sup> Elez Biberaj, *Albania and China* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 162n.

<sup>7</sup> Dilaver Sadekaj, interview by author, Tape recording, Tiranë, 13 April 1994.

<sup>8</sup> Hoxha, 27.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 28.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 72-73. The final phrase of the above quotation 'live everywhere as in a state of siege' is quite significant. This reference immediately reminds one of the siege mentality that was constantly instilled. This feeling permeated the country through the campaign to build bunkers, as well as the concept of "encirclement," etc.

<sup>11</sup> Sofokli Lazri, "Designer and Implementator of the Foreign Policy of Socialist Albania," quoted in *National Conference Dedicated to the Immortal Work of Comrade Enver Hoxha* (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1985), 156, 164-165.

<sup>12</sup> *1986 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs*, ed. Richard F. Staar, (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), 261.

<sup>13</sup> Robert Owen Freedman, *Economic Warfare in the Communist Bloc: A Study of Soviet Economic Pressure Against Yugoslavia, Albania, and Communist China* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), 83.

<sup>14</sup> Ministria e Ekonomise Drejtoria e Statistikes. *Vjetari Statistikor i Shqiperise 1991* [1991 Statistical Yearbook of Albania] (n.p., 1991), 338.

<sup>15</sup> Enver Hoxha, *We Must Deepen the Ideological Struggle Against Alien Manifestations and Liberal Stand Towards Them* (1973): 65, quoted in H. Banja and V. Toci. *Socialist Albania on the Road to Industrialization*, (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1979), 58.

<sup>16</sup> H. Banja and V. Toci, 61.

<sup>17</sup> The Directorate of Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1986), 3.

<sup>18</sup> Enver Hoxha, *Albania is Forging Ahead Confidently and Unafraid* (Tirane: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1978), 20.

"Biberaj, 146.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Enver Hoxha, *Selected Works*, vol. 6, (Tirane: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1987), 285.

<sup>22</sup> *Answers to Questions About Albania*. (Tiranë: Nairn Frasheri Publishing House, 1969), 169-170.

<sup>23</sup> Results of questionnaires given in Albania, March and April, 1994

<sup>24</sup> *Zeri i popullit* (Tirane), 29 November 1979, p. 1.

<sup>25</sup> Biberaj, 147.

<sup>26</sup> Elez Biberaj, "Albanian-Yugoslav Relations and the Question of Kosove," *East European Quarterly* 16, no. 4 (January 1983): 496; Biberaj, *Albania and China*, 147.

<sup>27</sup> Trade figures obtained in *Borba* (Belgrade), 4 November 1981: quoted in Elez Biberaj, *Albania and China*, 148.

<sup>28</sup> Hoxha, *Selected Works*, vol. 6, 295.

<sup>29</sup> Enver Hoxha, *Proletarian Democracy is Genuine Democracy* (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1978), 10-11.

<sup>30</sup> Hoxha, *Selected Works*, vol. 6, 303.

<sup>31</sup> Enver Hoxha, "Neither the Tanks Nor the Diplomacy of the Soviet Revisionists Can Defeat the Peoples," *Zeri i Popullit* (Tiranë), 4 September 1969: quoted in Hoxha, *Speeches and Articles*, vol. 4 (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1980), 278-279.

<sup>32</sup> Natasha and Sonja Beribashi, interview with author, Tape recording, Tiranë, 4 April 1994.

<sup>33</sup> Arben Puto, interview with author, Written notes, Tiranë, 11 April 1994.

## Chapter 7:

### *Code Of Lekë, Role Of Women And Blood Feud*

The *Kanuni i Lekë Dukagjinit* or the *Code of Lekë Dukagjini* (hereafter cited as the *Code*) is the extremely influential work of Lekë Dukagjini. It can not be overemphasized how important this work has been in the five hundred years of Albanian history since it was written.

Lekë (Alexander) Dukagjini (Duke John) was the chieftain of a noble tribe in Northern Albania. Lekë was a contemporary of the Albanian national hero, Gjergj Kastrioti Skenderbëu, or Scanderbeg. Lekë continued the fight against the Turks after Skenderbëu's death in 1468 by allying with Venice. Shkodër fell in 1472 which forced Lekë to flee to Italy. The fight against the Turks in Albania was over. The Ottoman Empire retained nominal control over Albania until Albania's independence in 1912.

The death of Sultan Mohammed II in 1481 and the subsequent fighting for the throne by his sons gave Lekë Dukagjini the opening he needed and he returned to Albania. Lekë technically ruled only the Dukagjini lands which was the territory bounded by the *Malesi e Madhe* (great mountains of the far north) and the Drin River. However, due to the *Code*, Lekë's fame and influence spread throughout all Albanian-inhabited territory regardless of national boundaries.

A major factor which helps to explain why the *Code* had such influence over the Albanian people was because Skenderbëu said "Let it be as Leka said."<sup>1</sup> Nothing could have given greater authority to an Albanian than the approbation given to Lekë Dukagjini and his *Code* by the national hero, Skenderbëu. In fact, evidence of the far-flung influence of the *Code* can be seen in Mary Edith Durham's claim that "it

is said that in 1464 Pope Paul II had excommunicated him for his most un-Christian code."<sup>2</sup>

The *Code* was passed on orally throughout the centuries (there was no generally accepted Albanian alphabet until the Congress of Monastir in 1908). The Franciscan priest, Father Shtjefen Gjecov collected and arranged the *Code* into a written form over a period of years, circa. 1913. The *Code* was translated into English by Leonard Fox. Fox succinctly states the nature of the *Code* which helps to make its influence understood. The *Code* "...is the expression and reflection of the Albanian character, a character which embodies an uncompromising morality based on justice, honor, and respect for oneself and others."<sup>3</sup> Syrja Pupovci further emphasizes the importance of the *Code* in his introduction to a 1972 reprint edition of the *Kanuni i Lekë Dukagjinit*. "In essence, the preservation of customary law was one of the most important elements in helping the Albanian people to maintain their individuality under Ottoman domination."<sup>4</sup>

An explanation of the *Code* which was a product of the fifteenth century is a necessity when discussing social conditions of twentieth century Albania under Enver Hoxha. Before one can begin to understand the changes which took place under Hoxha's leadership, one must come to grips with the social mores of the prevailing culture. An understanding of the *Code* is the necessary starting point to begin an analysis of two aspects of Albanian society which underwent a fundamental transformation under Hoxha, namely: the role of women and the disappearance of the blood feud.

### **Role of Women**

Albania historically has been one of the world's penultimate patriarchal societies. One can safely assume that even the most strident male chauvinist would be appalled at the lowly state of women in Albanian society.

The definition of marriage according to the *Code* is to "... form a household, adding another family to the household, for the purpose of adding to the work force and increasing the number of children."<sup>5</sup> Notice that there is no mention of love or mutual respect.

Once the Albanian woman is married, the *Code* specifies the following duties she must perform toward her husband:

- a) To preserve the honor of her husband;
- b) To serve her husband in an unblemished manner;
- c) To submit to his domination;
- d) To fulfill her conjugal duties;
- e) To raise and nurture her children with honor;
- f) To keep clothes and shoes in good order (by sewing);
- g) Not to interfere in the betrothals of her sons and daughters [almost all marriages in Albania were arranged marriages where the male elders chose the partners based on the suitability of the families involved. Oftentimes, the betrothals were arranged in infancy with the marriages taking place when the woman reached the age of thirteen and the man fifteen or sixteen years of age.]<sup>6</sup>

The "high esteem" of women can be easily identified within the context of the following quotation from the *Code* which states that: "A woman is known as a sack, made to endure as long as she lives in her husband's house."<sup>7</sup>

Women's "special" status continued in questions of inheritance as well. "The Albanian woman does not inherit anything from her parents— neither possessions nor house; the *Kanun* considers a woman as a *superfluity* [emphasis added] in the household."<sup>8</sup> Also, "The *Kanun* recognizes the son as an heir, but not the daughter."<sup>9</sup>

A striking illustration of the discrepancy between the worth of a man versus the worth of a woman can be seen in the fines levied against a murderer of a pregnant woman. Sections 936 and 937 of Book Ten, Chapter 22, Number CXXX of the *Code* state that it is permissible for:

...the dead woman to be opened up, in order to see whether the fetus is a boy or a girl.

If it is a boy, the murderer must pay 3 purses [a set amount of local currency] for the woman's blood and 6 purses for the boy's blood; if it is a girl, aside from the three purses for the murdered woman, 3 purses must also be paid for the female child.<sup>10</sup>

Thus, one can see that the fine for killing a male is twice that of killing a female. In fact, one may argue that the discrepancy between male and female roles in society would be a proportion of much greater range than merely two to one.



A modern-day Western solution to this sort of intolerable situation would be for the woman to leave her husband. However, divorce was not a possibility because under no circumstances could a woman divorce her husband. The woman also could not leave her husband and attempt to return to her parents' home. The parents of the woman were obliged to return their daughter to her husband or this would dishonor the husband and his entire tribe. The refusal to return the woman to the husband would inevitably lead to a blood feud which could last for generations.

The husband however had the option to separate from or to divorce his wife seemingly on whim. "If a wife does not conduct herself properly toward her husband [the husband was the one to decide proper or improper conduct, of course], the *Kanun* gives him the right... to leave her."<sup>11</sup> A footnote in the *Code* explains the procedure to be followed in a case of separation: "Having cut off her hair and stripping her nude, the husband expels her from the house in the presence of relatives and drives her with a whip through the entire village."<sup>12</sup>

Last but not least, the husband has the right to divorce his wife for a variety of specific reasons listed in the *Code*. One extremely grievous error that the woman could commit which would constitute grounds for divorce would be "...if she drank wine without her husband's knowledge."<sup>13</sup>

The status of women in Albania remained relatively static for centuries. Stirrings began under the reign of King Zog to improve the plight of women. Democratic women's organizations were formed and educational reforms were made in the 1920's and 1930's. However, these improvements were very limited in scope and affected few women. Nonetheless, considering the starting point, these developments were significant. The huge improvements in the position of women in Albanian society took place during the years of Enver Hoxha's reign as First Party Secretary of the Albanian Party of Labor.

*Articles 40 and 41* of the 1976 Constitution of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania deal specifically with women's rights. *Article 40* declares: All citizens are equal before the law. No restriction or privilege is recognized on the rights and duties of citizens on account of sex..."<sup>14</sup> *Article 41* elaborates further:

The woman, liberated from political oppression and economic exploitation, as a great force of the revolution, takes an active part in the socialist construction of the country and the defense of the Homeland

The woman enjoys equal rights with man in work, pay, holidays, social security, education, in all social-political activity, as well as the family. Mother and child enjoy special solicitude and protection. A mother is entitled to paid leave prior to and after childbirth. The state opens maternity homes and creches and kindergartens for the children.<sup>15</sup>

The chain of events which culminated in the establishment of the above mentioned *de facto* and *de jure* rights for women began during World War II. The scenario was such that the factions (Communists, *Balli Kombëtar*, and *Legaliteti*) supposedly united in the struggle against the invading powers of Italy and Germany, were in reality, much more concerned with filling the post-war power vacuum and the exit (abdication or not is a debatable issue) of King Zog. Women played no significant role in the leadership or day-to-day activities of either *Balli Kombëtar* or *Legaliteti*, both tradition-minded organizations. The Communists, however embraced the idea of women joining the ranks of the Partisans. This strategy of the Communists was wise since historically speaking, the Communists in Albania faced such an uphill battle in gaining power if conventionally accepted concepts of necessary prerequisites to the assumption of power are considered. The basic needs of an urban, industrial worker population being led by a group of intellectuals were certainly absent in Albania. Enver Hoxha<sup>16</sup> realized that first and foremost, if his party was to have any chance whatsoever to assume power, if not even merely to survive then he had to attract as many followers as possible to his cause. In a population which was nearly eighty to ninety percent illiterate, a theoretical approach citing the "advantages" of communism over capitalism would fall on fallow soil. The premise was to appeal to a broad-based constituency by simply telling the various groups what they wanted to hear (this scenario is followed throughout the world by politicians of many hues). For some, patriotism and nationalism were the strongest lures. However, to one half of the population, the strongest inducement lay in attacking the injustices traditional Albanian society placed upon women. Women were

now portrayed and appealed to as viable and important members of society. Women were included in the Partisans' war effort — as foot soldiers to commanders to leaders in the Party.

The Albanian women, just as their men, took part in the National-liberation war [World War II] arm in hand under the leadership of the Communist Party, now the Party of Labor of Albania. The foundations of our People's Power were cemented also with the blood of the Albanian women and girls who laid down their lives in this war.<sup>17</sup>

This first crucial step of enlisting the participation and inclusion of women into the ranks of the Partisans where they were given meaningful, responsible positions was the turning point in the role of women in Albanian society. Once women fought side by side with men carrying their rifles up the mountainside and began to engage in guerrilla warfare, they could no longer be expected to, nor would they accept, a return to wearing the veil in Moslem regions or following the precepts of the *Code* which generally excluded them from the mainstream of society.

In the years immediately following World War II, women were introduced initially into rather ordinary or menial jobs, both in agricultural and industrial applications. This was due primarily to the low level of education and skills which Albanian women possessed at this time. It is important to keep in mind, that the rate of literacy was much lower among women than men. Centuries of the *Code* did not lend itself to enlightened thinking concerning the need to educate women.

Gradually, as the campaign to eradicate illiteracy began to succeed, women became better educated and were thus able to accomplish higher levels of skilled work and occupy managerial positions. Over the years, women rose to positions of importance in all sections of the economy and began to enjoy real equality with men. "In 1960, women accounted for 25 per cent of the working people of the various sectors of the economy, as against 4 per cent [that] they were in 1938; in 1970 this percentage was 38 and in 1982 they made up 46 per cent of the total number of working people."<sup>18</sup> In fact, in certain industries, "...such as textile, tobacco, canned fish, and rubber, women comprise 40 to 90 percent of the workers."<sup>19</sup>

Also, in 1979 as against 1960, the number of women engaged in industry increased 5.9 times, in construction 3.2 times, in trade and procurement 2.1 times, in transport and communications 8.3 times, in education 4.5 times, in the health service 3.9 times, in administration 2.9 times, and in the cooperativist sector of agriculture 2.3 times.<sup>20</sup> Another set of statistics which show the dramatic change in the position of women is the number of workers per 1,000 inhabitants. In 1938, 14 workers per 1,000 inhabitants; in 1950, 45 per 1,000; in 1955, 71 per 1,000; in 1960, 95 per 1,000; in 1965, 109 per 1,000; in 1970, 145 per 1,000; and in 1973, 160 workers per 1,000 inhabitants.<sup>21</sup> This increase was caused primarily by the greater number of women being included in the work force.

A common phenomenon among all of the Communist nations was the praise given in the media to exemplary workers. In the case about to be cited, the subject of the story is a female who has achieved success beyond the wildest imagination of most Albanians prior to Hoxha's period in power. In the words of Vojsava Hoxha (no relation to Enver):

A few years ago when I came to the machine and tractor station, I was struck by the magnificence of the work people were doing here. There, in the fields, I saw for myself the difficult but pleasant job of the tractor-driver. I had heard of a young woman who drove a tractor, Caje Shelnja, who works in Fushe-Kruja. When I came to work here I was sorry I had not begun it earlier. Caje Shelnja, on her tractor, her image, flashed again in my mind. I wondered at her courage and marveled with her work. She, a whisp [sic] of a woman, with her brittle built [sic], operated the steel machine which rumbled and roared across the fields.

When I got home, I told my husband.

'I want to become a tractor-driver.'

'Really! But can you do it? You've got two children.'

'Yes, I know I'm a mother of two children, and you a father of two children! What of it?'

We laughed. But still, a question haunted me: 'Can I do it? And I answered myself, tightening my fists as if to strike down that evil boding: I'll do it or die, by all means, I'll do it!'

Vojsava became a tractor-driver.<sup>22</sup>

Superficially, the above passage drips with its obvious propagandistic message extolling the virtues of women and work under the aegis of the Albanian Party of Labor. However, if that truly was the only significance of the story in question, it would not have been cited here. One must look deeper to gain insight into the importance of this saga.

The reader must interpret this story of Vojsava always with the *Code of Lekë Dukagjini* in the mind's eye. First, for a woman to work at all in Albania is significant. Second, to work in a field traditionally thought of as a male occupation, that of the tractor-driver, is startling. Third, Vojsava did not go home and ask her husband's permission to become a tractor-driver, she merely told him of her decision. Although it may seem strange to think of a female tractor-driver as an emancipated woman, within Albanian parameters this indeed was a milestone. The concept of viewing events within Albanian parameters is a recurring theme of this study.

Despite a near-consensus level of agreement among nearly all sources on the issue of the improvement of the role of women in Albanian society, there are some critics of the status of Albanian women. Alexander Dako, an eighty-year old engineer, believes that the role of women actually regressed during the Hoxha years. Dako's opinion is that:

Women under Hoxha were made slaves. They were called emancipated they were all obliged to work because if they didn't work the salary of the husband was not sufficient to keep the family. [For example, in a peasant family, the woman] ...had to work in the fields eight hours a day, do the housework, and take care of the children. Now tell me, if a person who has these duties is not a slave, and what emancipation you could call it.<sup>23</sup>

Although there is unquestionably a certain degree of truth to the viewpoint espoused by Aleksander Dako, it is not definitive on the subject. This writer interviewed many women professionals who were a product of the society Enver Hoxha created. Prior to the implementation of Hoxha's policies concerning women, these women would have had little chance, in fact, nearly zero chance, of acquiring

ail education beyond a few years of primary education at best. A career was unthinkable. The unanimous opinion of the women interviewed was that they did agree with Mr. Dako to a limited degree. Namely, the women did say having a career along with their added household tasks was quite difficult. However, they all agreed that the ability to have an education and a professional career outweighed any negative aspects of having dual responsibilities. Not one of the women yearned nostalgically for the "good old days" prior to Enver Hoxha's government.<sup>24</sup>

One example given in an interview with Edmira Mextari, a female History teacher serves to succinctly summarize the progress made by women in Albania under Hoxha. "Prior to the emancipation of women, a woman could only serve their guests. Now, the woman can sit at the table with the guests."<sup>25</sup> Although this may not seem that significant to those readers imbued with a Western mindset concerning the role of women in society, this was indeed a dramatic, even revolutionary change.

In summation, the adoption and continual strengthening of women's rights under the leadership of Enver Hoxha mark a positive development in Albanian history. The role of women in Albanian society unquestionably can be considered a success by any unit of measure, especially by any Albanian measure. Albania under Enver Hoxha truly did seem to arrive at the stage Hoxha was striving for at the height of the Cultural and Ideological Revolution. On February 6, 1967, Hoxha said: "the entire party and country should hurl into the fire and break the neck of anyone who dared trample underfoot the sacred edict of the party on the defense of women's rights."<sup>26</sup>

### **Blood Feud<sup>27</sup>**

The blood feud is an aspect of Albania's history which is not a pleasant topic to discuss. However, it is illuminating of some characteristics of the Albanian persona. The blood feud is demonstrative of the great importance Albanians place on the upholding of one's personal honor or that of one's family, tribe, or nation.

Any action, whether great or small, against one's person or reputation (or against a member of one's family, tribe, or nation) had to be avenged. For small offenses, the indiscretion could be adjudicated

by village elders and a fine levied which would conclude the matter. However, any situation involving murder there is only one option. The *Code* says: "Blood is never unavenged."<sup>28</sup> In other words, *koka per kokë* (a head for a head).

The blood feud can only be properly understood within the Albanian context. Albanian territory, particularly the northern highlands, was for all intents and purposes (other than in the spheres of taxation and military service), outside the scope of significant influence of the Turkish authorities for centuries. This minimal level of central authority created a vacuum which needed to be filled by some sort of common law. The common law of sorts in Albania was the *Code*. In extreme circumstances, the *Code's* system of justice and rules of conduct ended up being applied through the mechanism of the blood feud.

There are many components of a blood feud. One of the most important is the concept that a retaliatory murder is a righteous act. This idea is coupled with the negative peer pressure attached to the loss of personal and familial, tribal, and/or national honor for failing to avenge the death of one's kinsman.

Accurate recording of the details of each death and the actual tallying of the number of deaths must take place. The importance of this tracking of details, can be seen in the minutiae of details delegating the steps to be taken and by whom in the ritual surrounding each death. For example, specific rules are noted for acceptable and unacceptable forms of ambush, burial, etc.

The all-encompassing impact upon society of the blood feud can be seen in the *Code* which "...extends the blood-feud to all males in the family of the murderer, even an infant in the cradle; cousins and close nephews... [also] incur the blood-feud."<sup>29</sup> The only exceptions are "a woman and a priest [which] do not incur the blood-feud."<sup>3</sup>

A feud can end as soon as the murderer or one member of his extended family is killed. However, the original murderer's family feels like a victim once the initial murder is avenged and quite often seeks vengeance against the family of the original victim. Thus, a blood feud often lasted for many years or even generations with each side alternating between offense and defense.

The blood feud does seem to be quite barbaric and purposeless, particularly in the twentieth century. Yet, it did serve a valuable

function. The function of the blood feud was to serve as a quite powerful method of social control. The inherent power of the blood feud was derived from the fear of committing any action which could possibly set off the chain of events leading to a full-blown blood feud coupled with the basic fear of revenge.

The Albanian government claimed to have ended blood feuds within Albania's borders *circa.* 1955. However, blood feuds were still a problem in other regions of the Balkans. For instance, in Kosovë, the region of the former Yugoslavia inhabited primarily by ethnic Albanians, the circuit court of Prishtinë, had three hundred twenty cases involving blood feuds on its docket between 1964 and 1970.<sup>31</sup>

The gravity of this phenomenon [the blood feud], however, should not be measured simply by the numbers of lives lost [many villages were inhabited primarily by women because most of the male population were killed in blood feuds], but rather by its economic, political, social and psychological consequences, the most grievous of which is certainly the cases of closed families — those which owe blood and live more or less under house arrest, self-imposed of course, often for as long as ten years or more. Such isolation has enormous implications for society — economic (unfilled fields), social (restricted movement), political (a suspicion of society and 'the authorities' in general) and psychological (constant fear for one's own life).<sup>32</sup>

A result of the end of blood feuds which should not be overlooked was its implications upon the role of women in Albanian society. While the blood feuds were taking place, most men remained in hiding during the daylight hours for fear of being attacked. This naturally led to the women having to do most of the work in order for the family to survive. This included not only the domestic tasks of the household (cooking, cleaning, etc.) but the production of food as well. The elimination of the blood feuds, coupled with the increase in opportunities for women to become educated, greatly facilitated the inclusion of women into the labor force and into a more equitable position in Albanian society. Thus, the eradication of the blood feud was a significant accomplishment which took place under the leadership of Enver Hoxha.

The improvement in the role of women in Albanian society and the eradication of the blood feuds are both extremely positive results of



Enver Hoxha's government. The elimination of the *Code* as a ruling set of laws and principles is an important development in terms of bringing the population as a whole under the rule of the central government and served to bring more and more people into the mainstream of Albanian national life. The Albanian people began to think of themselves less as members of a particular tribe and more as an Albanian.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>*Kanun i Lekë Dukagjinit* [The Code of Lekë Dukagjini], comp. Shtjefen Gjeçov, trans. Leonard Fox (New York: Gjonlekaj Publishing Co., 1989), 240.

<sup>2</sup>Mary Edith Durham, *Some Tribal Origins, Laws and Customs of the Balkans* (London: George Allen Unwin, Ltd., 1928; repr., Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1970) 66.

<sup>3</sup>*Kanuni i Lekë Dukagjinit* [The Code of Lekë Dukagjini], xix.

<sup>4</sup>*Kanuni i Lekë Dukagjinit* [The Code of Lekë Dukagjini] (Prishtinë, Kosove: Rilindja, 1972): lxxx quoted in *Kanun i Lekë Dukagjinit* [The Code of Lekë Dukagjini], comp. Shtjefen Gjeçov, trans. Leonard Fox (New York: Gjonlekaj Publishing Co. 1989), xvii.

<sup>5</sup> *Kanuni i Lekë Dukagjinit* [The Code of Lekë Dukagjini], bk. 3, chap. 1, no. 11, sec. 28, 20.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., bk. 3, chap. 1, no. 13, sec. 33, 22.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., bk. 3, chap. 5, no. 29, 38.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., bk. 3, chap. 3, no. 20, 28.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., bk. 3, chap. 8, no. 36, sec. 88, 52.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., bk. 10, chap. 22, no. 130, sees. 936-937, 178.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., bk. 3, chap. 5, no. 31, 40.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., n. 1.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., n. 2.

<sup>14</sup> *The Albanian Woman — A Great Force of the Revolution* (Tirane: 8 Nentori Publishing House), 7.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 7-8.

<sup>16</sup> Hoxha was tried, convicted, and condemned to death in absentia by the Italians for organizing the anti-Italian demonstration in Tiranë on October 28, 1941—the anniversary of the "March on Rome."

<sup>17</sup> Harilla Papajorgi, *Our Friends Ask* (Tirane: The Naim Frasheri Publishing House, 1970), 130.

<sup>18</sup> Ksanthipi Begeja, *The Family in the People's Socialist Republic of Albania*, (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1984), 61.

<sup>19</sup> Pandi Geco, *Albania, A Physical and Economic Survey*, trans. U. S. Government (Tiranë: n.p., 1959), 76.

<sup>20</sup> Begeja, 62.

<sup>21</sup> The Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania, *The Social Class Structure of the Working Class in Albania*. (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1978), 74.

<sup>22</sup> *The Albanian Woman — A Great Force of the Revolution*, 60-61

<sup>23</sup> Alexander Dako, interview by author, Tape recording, Tiranë, 12 April 1994.

<sup>24</sup> Edmira Mextari, interview by author, Tape recording, Tiranë, 4 April 1994; Nimete Minga, interview by author, Tape recording, Tiranë, 8 April 1994.

<sup>25</sup> Edmira Mextari, interview by author, Tape recording, Tiranë, 4 April 1994

<sup>26</sup> Enver Hoxha, Speech given 6 February 1967, quoted in Anton Logoreci, *The Albanians: Europe's Forgotten Survivors* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1977), 158.

<sup>27</sup> For an in-depth look at the interrelationship between the *Code* and the blood feud, See *The Unwritten Law in Albania* by Margaret Halsuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954), particularly Chapters 22-25. See Mary Edith Durham's (1909) *High Albania and Some Tribal Origins, Laws and Customs of the Balkans* (1928) for more information concerning the role and workings of the Code in everyday Albanian life. See also *Broken April* by Ismail Kadare for a fictional account for further illustration of the *Code* in Albanian life.

<sup>28</sup> *Kanuni i Lekë Dukagjinit* [The Code of Lekë Dukagjim], bk. 10, chap. 22, no. 128, sec. 917, 174

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., bk. 10, chap. 22, no. 125, sec. 900, 172.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., bk. 10, chap. 22, no. 124, sec. 987, 172.

<sup>31</sup> Ramadan Marmullaku, *Albania and the Albanians*, trans. Margot and Bosko Milosavljevic (Hamden, Conn. Archon Books, 1975), 88.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

## Chapter 8:

### *Education and Health Care*

#### Education

Albania was the only country in Europe not to have a university prior to World War II. The Enver Hoxha University or State University of Tiranë did not open until 1957. Higher education was and is important to Albania's future. However, an educational system which would include higher institutes and a university was initially only a dream. There were more pressing educational needs for the population as a whole.

In 1938, more than eighty percent of the Albanian population was illiterate. This percentage rose to ninety to ninety-five percent among peasants in remote mountain regions.<sup>1</sup> The situation was very bleak. There were only 643 schools in Albania in 1938. Despite "compulsory" primary schooling under King Zog, only 25 percent of the children attended school.<sup>2</sup> This is the "educational system" Hoxha and the Albanian Party of Labor inherited.

The necessity of improving the educational level of the Albanian population did not escape the notice of the Albanian Party of Labor. Vladimir Misja and Ylli Vejsiu summarized the Party's position toward education in their book, *Demographic Development in the People's Socialist Republic of Albania*:

The ceaseless development of the socialist revolution, as a long and complex process, demanded, apart from other things, the ceaseless raising of the educational and cultural level of the working masses, which was to play an active role in the strengthening and perfection of the material-technical base, in the formation of the new man, the perfection of socialist relations of production and in the raising of the standards of living of the working masses. From the very outset, the PLA [APL]

regarded education as a powerful means of overcoming the backwardness inherited and ensuring the all-round progress of the country on the road of socialism.<sup>3</sup>

The war against illiteracy was a two-front attack which entailed in the short-term, an emphasis on teaching all men and women up to the age of forty to read and write; in the long term, to set up a network of educational institutions to prevent the emergence of a new illiterate population. In September 1949, a law required the attendance of all illiterates aged twelve to forty years at special night classes held in each town and village designed to teach everyone how to read and write. Hoxha launched his famous slogan which was intended to inspire the people to end the scourge of illiteracy: "In order to build we must acquire knowledge and in order to acquire knowledge we must learn."<sup>4</sup> The Albanian Party claimed that illiteracy was eliminated among all adults under forty years of age in 1955.<sup>5</sup>

The emphasis upon the importance of education did not slacken once illiteracy was eliminated. Education was deemed to be of paramount importance to achieve Albania's long term goals. Education would not only increase the productivity and efficiency of worker and intellectual alike, but also ensure that illiteracy would not arise again in future generations.

There has been vast, undeniable improvement in both the quantity and quality, with one major limitation, of Albanian education during the years in power of Enver Hoxha.

The commitment to education by the Albanian Party of Labor can be seen in the continuous increase in spending and investment in education. A few examples of this can be seen in these statistics: the investment in education during the 6th Five Year Plan (1976-1980) was nearly equal to that of the fifteen year period from 1951-1965; 11.4 times as many funds were spent on education in 1978 than in 1950; 10.7% of the entire state budget for 1983 was earmarked for education.<sup>6</sup>

Pre-school education was greatly expanded. In 1938, there were 2,400 children attending kindergarten. This figure increased to 10,000 in 1950, 23,000 in 1960, 47,500 in 1970 and all the way to 103,000 in 1983—an increase of over fifty fold in a country whose population increased only three fold during this period.<sup>7</sup> Also, the number of

kindergartens increased by 116 times and the number of kindergarten teachers 104 times from 1938 to 1980.<sup>8</sup>

An important step in the development of education in Albania took place when the *Educational Reform Law of 1946* was instituted. This law provided for compulsory primary education for all children to be paid for by the state.

The law entitled: *On the Reorganization of the Educational System in the PRA* was passed in 1963. The result was the change from compulsory 7 grade education to compulsory 8 grade education.

Higher education began in 1946 with the opening of the Two-Year Teachers' Training institution later known as the "Alexander Xhuvani" Teachers' Training Institute. The Institute of Sciences was opened in 1947, the Four-Year Teachers' Training Institute was opened in 1951. Other higher schools include: the Agricultural Institute (1951), the Politechnical Institute (1951), the Medical Institute (1952), the Economics Institute (1952), the Juridical Institute (1954). The ultimate achievement in terms of higher education occurred on September 16, 1957 when the State University of Tirane was opened. Other higher schools, including post-graduate institutes, were established at a later date.

There are some illuminating statistics which demonstrate the achievements attained in the educational sphere in Albania under Enver Hoxha. 8 Grade schools increased from 0 in 1938 (there were 643 primary (4 or 5 Grade schools) to 1,621 in 1983; secondary schools increased from 11 in 1938 to 333 in 1983; higher schools increased from 0 in 1938 to 8 in 1983. The number of students in Albania in 1938 was 56,300 which increased to 713,600 in 1983. The number of teachers rose from 1,551 in 1938 to 39,342 in 1983. Further proof of the greater accessibility of education to the population is demonstrated by the statistic of only one in eighteen attended school in 1938 as compared to one in four in 1983.<sup>9</sup>

The inclusion of females in an ever-heightening level into the educational system parallels their advances in all strata of society under Hoxha's reign as First Secretary of the Albanian Party of Labor. Women were considered unworthy as well as unable to receive an education under the *Code of Lekë Dukagjini*. In fact, it was considered

shameful and dangerous to educate a woman lest she forget her "role" in life.

In 1978, 15.1 times as many females attended 8 Year schools (or their 1938 counterparts) and 175.7 times as many attended secondary schools as in 1938. 101.9 times as many women attended higher schools in 1978 as in 1957.<sup>10</sup>

Although education must be viewed as a success—and in fact, one could quite comfortably argue that it was one of, if not *the*, greatest achievement of Hoxha's tenure — there were some serious shortcomings which must be discussed. Connections with the Party of Labor helped immeasurably, not only in terms of being able to study at the university but in being able to graduate as well as being able to work in a desirable post-graduation assignment.

Dr. Ilia Çoka, an emigre who came to Cleveland in 1992 for further study at a local hospital, was himself a victim of this process of determination based on connections. In a series of interviews with Dr. Çoka, it was discovered that the opportunity to study at the university was not based solely upon grades, but mostly upon familial affiliation. Permission to study at the university would be denied, even with the highest grades, if there was a "bad" family tree in one's dossier. Likewise, a clearly inferior student who possessed low grades would not only be allowed to study at the university but oftentimes in one of the most desirable and limited-access fields, such as medicine.<sup>11</sup>

Once a student graduated and in Ilia Çoka's case, became a doctor, one still had to abide by decisions made based upon familial and Party affiliations. For instance, every graduate was assigned a job after they had finished school. The most desirable positions were those in Tiranë. Those students with Party affiliations were assigned these desirable posts. Dr. Çoka was assigned a position in a remote village in northern Albania. He called his eight and one-half years there, "[his] Siberia."<sup>12</sup> There was absolutely no choice concerning job assignment. Dr. Çokasaid: "If I said to the government, 'I don't want to go there,' they would say to me, 'Who are you?'"<sup>13</sup>

The role of ideology and the propagation of communist propaganda was also a serious limitation in the Albanian system. As stated in an official publication:

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The educational system in the People's Republic of Albania aims at the all-sided education of the younger generation preparing them to take an active part in the construction of the new socialist society. Its task is to impart to young men and young women sound scientific knowledge, *to inculcate in them the Marxist-Leninist world outlook* [emphasis added], to give them professional skill and habits of work, to imbue them with the spirit of socialist patriotism and proletarian inter-nationalism, ensuring, thus, their all-out moral, physical and esthetical education.<sup>14</sup>

Ideological inculcation began in the pre-schools. The education "...of the children from 3 to 6 years of age, secures their mental and physical development, equips them with the *elementary features of communist ethics* [emphasis added] and prepares them for school."<sup>15</sup> As the students grow older, more intensive indoctrination took place.

During the Ideological and Cultural Revolution, soon after the Fifth Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor, November 1-8, 1966, "spontaneously," "initiatives burst out in the schools for the systematic studying of the documents of the Party and the Works of Comrade Enver Hoxha."<sup>16</sup>

In a speech, Enver Hoxha detailed the importance of teaching the population in a manner which lends itself to the building of a Communist mind-set:

the education of people with the communist morality is one of the most important things. He who steals, he who violates the laws of our state, our Party and society, who violates communist morality, who tells lies, etc., was not born like that—his consciousness has been ruined because he has been influenced more heavily by bourgeois morality, by petty-bourgeois hangovers, and less by the communist education of the Party and society. The task of the Party has been, and still is to educate people, to re-educate them to prevent their degeneration from going further and to prevent the worm, which is gnawing at them, from infecting others and causing them to rot. It is a primary task of the Party to cleanse the consciousness of men of all the evils inherited from the bourgeoisie.

...We educate the people with the communist morality in order to build socialism and communism and, to complete this construction successfully, we educate them ideologically, morally, technically, right through the construction of socialism. This construction follows the basic laws which Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin teach us. This is the mother theory, the main outlines of which the communists must master first of all. The proper study and assimilation of it by all naturally has



its difficulties, therefore the Party has opened schools of various branches, has prepared appropriate text-books, has trained and is continuously training cadres to teach theory and apply it in practice. But, in this direction even greater efforts must be made to master theory.<sup>17</sup>

A further limitation in the Albanian system of education was found in the criteria used in the selection of teachers. A logical person would assume that those with the highest level of education would be the most qualified candidates to become teachers. However, this was not the case since ideology reared its ugly head in not only curriculum but in teacher selection as well. This was particularly troublesome in Albania where the talent pool of truly qualified people was very small.

Hoxha and the Party clearly adopted the doctrine espoused by Karl Marx in his *Theses on Feuerbach*<sup>18</sup> in the area of teacher selection. Marx's Third Thesis states:

the materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of other circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men that change circumstances and that *the educator himself needs educating* [emphasis added].<sup>19</sup>

In other words, only the ideologically sound teacher should instruct the malleable minds of youth. The most educationally qualified to be instructors, especially in the first years of the Albanian Party of Labor's leadership would have most likely been educated abroad or if educated domestically, been the products of foreign "imperialist" and/or church-run schools. These sorts of people would have quite possibly reintroduced bourgeois values into Albanian schools which would have ideologically allowed the restoration of capitalism. This sort of "severe" threat could not be tolerated by the ever-vigilant Enver Hoxha. Therefore, these potential teachers would have to be educated themselves into the methods of socialism as Marx suggests:

Here stands out the especially great contribution of Comrade Enver Hoxha. He has laid the stress on the need for a consistent struggle to overthrow alien bourgeois and revisionist reactionary conceptions, old and new, about education and school, and to affirm, instead of them, new revolutionary and socialist conceptions...In the centre [sic] of all this

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process is the Marxist-Leninist ideological axis of the Party, the hard backbone of our socialist school. The roads to the embodiment of this axis in the teaching-educational activity of our school express the absolute priority of Marxist-Leninist ideo-political education in all the present-day system of communist education.<sup>20</sup>

The lengths to which the Albanian Party of Labor controlled all aspects of the educational system was made clear in an interview with Professor Kosta Koçi. Koçi, a chemist, explained that every chemistry book had to have one or more obligatory quotes of Enver Hoxha discussing some aspect of science or else they would not be published.<sup>21</sup>

It is interesting to view the opinions of those Albanians who responded to Question Number 18 of the questionnaire in *Appendix A*. Eighty-seven percent felt that education in the Hoxha period was positive and thirteen percent felt that it was negative. The overwhelming general opinion was that the greatest achievement was the removal of illiteracy from Albanian society. The greatest drawback mentioned was the propagandists nature of education. A good example of a comment showing the Party's influence on education, almost synonymous with the comments given previously by Professor Kosta Koçi, was stated by Sonja Beribashi that "...in a Physics class, credit was given to Enver Hoxha and not Newton for the law of gravity."<sup>22</sup>

Thus, through this sort of vehement protestation of support for the ideology of Enver Hoxha and the Albanian Party of Labor which clearly permeated every level of Albanian education, coupled with the use of many "ideologically correct" but less-qualified teachers, one can see the limitations in the Albanian system of education. The obvious question which arises in this type of situation is what is the long-term cost incurred by forty-plus years of education in which freedom of thought and freedom of expression were strictly prohibited? Only after the passage of time will a historian be able to begin to make any historically sound observations and analyses. In the meantime, rhetorical questions such as these must be left to philosophers.

#### **Health Care**

The Albanian health care system is undoubtedly substandard according to Western specifications. However, as in many other

spheres of Albanian life, it is unfair to attempt to analyze a system using familiar Western criteria. In order to objectively assess the development, both positively and negatively, one must limit oneself to the parameters of the Albanian experience. Namely, one must begin with the state of Albanian health care in 1938 and note any progress made or deficiencies which existed in 1985 at the time of Enver Hoxha's death. This methodology promises to provide the most accurate appraisal of the Albanian health care system.

One important qualification which needs to be stated at the beginning of any analysis of the Albanian health care system is that it is totally inaccurate to discuss the concept of an effective health care system in 1938. The majority of health care which did exist was conducted on a strictly *ad hoc* basis.

For instance, during the period prior to World War II, an institution known as the General Directory of Health was in existence, but its care was extremely rudimentary and quite limited in scope. In 1920, in all of Albania there were only fifty-one doctors, twenty-five pharmacists and five dentists with university training. By 1938, the number of Albanian doctors had only increased to one hundred and two, plus a few foreign doctors.<sup>23</sup> In addition, in 1939, there were only eight hundred twenty hospital beds in the entire country. The "...infantile mortality in some of the main cities reached 20 to 30 per cent (Shkodra, Tirana), the overall death-rate amounted to 17.8 per thousand inhabitants and the average life expectancy did not exceed 38 years."<sup>24</sup>

Thus, one can easily see that an organized health care system was of necessity beginning from "square one." Likewise, due to the primitive "system" in place, any new system had little opportunity to do anything other than improve.

The best available figures concerning infant mortality were obtained from the United Nation's *Demographic Yearbook* and *Statistical Yearbook* (various issues).

Table 8-1: Infant Mortality Rates Per 1,000 Live Births:<sup>1</sup>

1938 <sup>2</sup>	1950 <sup>3</sup>	1955 <sup>4</sup>	1960 <sup>5</sup>	1965 <sup>6</sup>	1975- 1980 <sup>7</sup>	1980- 1985 <sup>8</sup>
80.9	121.2	103.9	83.0	86.8	50.0 est.	44.8

<sup>1</sup> Infant mortality is defined as death of children under one year of age.

<sup>2</sup> United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook, 1949-1950*, Second Issue (New York, 1950), p. 414.

United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook, 1960*, Twelfth Issue (New York, 1960), pp 506-507.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 107.

<sup>6</sup> United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook, 1965*, Seventeenth Issue (New York, 1966), p. 727.

United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook, 1985*, Thirty-Seventh Issue (New York, 1985), p. 401.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

There is statistical evidence that improvement did occur in the area of infant mortality rates. However, in an interview with an Albanian doctor, Dr. Ilia Çoka, it was revealed that statistics were deliberately misreported due to pressure by Ministry of Health officials, *circa.* 1983-1987. For instance, there were no official quotas concerning the number of deaths that were allowed to be reported, only unofficial "suggestions."

Oftentimes, the "acceptable" infant mortality rate for Dr. Çoka's zone was two percent, but in actuality, the figure was five percent. However, five percent could not be reported, especially if one had hopes of eventual reassignment away from this remote region. The actual method used to circumvent these quotas was to simply delay in reporting the child's death. For example, if a child died at the age of ten months, the parents were told not to report his or her death for two months. At this time, the child would be one year old and its' death would no longer "count" toward infant mortality statistics.<sup>25</sup>

A statistic which shows definite progress is in the number of doctors per inhabitant:

Table 8-2: Number of Inhabitants Per Doctor and Dentist<sup>1</sup>

Year	1938	1950	1960	1970	1980	1982
Number of inhabitants per one doctor and dentist	10,000	8,156	3,360	1,180	597	583

<sup>1</sup> Cikuli, *Health Care in the People's Socialist Republic of Albania*, p. 20.

The increase in the number of doctors and dentists per inhabitant is particularly impressive when one considers the high growth rate in population (the highest in Europe) which Albania enjoyed during Enver Hoxha's period in power. The following table lists the population, the number of live births, deaths, deaths per 1,000 inhabitants, and natural increase over time.

**Table 8-3:** Pertinent Demographic Statistics<sup>1</sup>

Year	1950	1960	1970	1980	1985
Population	1,215,000	1,607,300	2,135,600	2,670,500	2,957,400
Number of Live Births	47,291	69,686	69,507	70,680	77,535
Deaths	17,215	16,775	19,774	16,981	17,179
Deaths Per 1,000 Inhabitants	No Figure Available	10.4	6.7 <sup>2</sup>	6.4	5.8
Natural Increase Per 1,000 Inhabitants	24.5	32.9	23.3	20.1	20.4
Life Expectancy at Birth (In Years)	53.5	64.9	No figure Available	70.2	71.5-71.9 <sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Ministria e Ekonomise Drejtoria e Statistikes. *Vjetari Statistikor i Shqiperise 1991* (Location of publishing unknown [likely Paris], 1991) pp. 35, 36, 40-41, 66-67.

<sup>2</sup> No figure exists for 1970. 6.7 is the figure for 1975.

<sup>3</sup> No figures exist only for 1985. 71.5 is for the years 1984-1985 and 71.9 is for the years 1985-1986.

Prior to World War II, there were three chronic diseases relatively widespread throughout the country. These diseases were: malaria, syphilis, and tuberculosis. Positive results were achieved in eradicating or controlling these diseases.

The most widespread disease was malaria. Malaria previously affected 500,000 people or about half of the population. "In 1930, 81 per cent of the school children examined in Vlora for the splenic index suffered from this disease."<sup>26</sup> Malaria has been eradicated from Albania. Supposedly, in 1985, a case had not been seen in Albania for twenty

years. This quite likely was due to improved medical procedures as well as a result of the widespread land reclamation projects which were undertaken, especially the draining of the swamps. Previously, Albania had the greatest number of patients infected with malaria in Europe.<sup>27</sup>

Syphilis is another disease which previously had been widespread in Albania that too was allegedly eradicated. "In 1944, 10.2 per cent of the serum tests proved positive while in 1959 this figure was reduced to 0.19 per cent.. .not a single fresh case of syphilis has been diagnosed in Albania for more than 30 years."<sup>28</sup>

Tuberculosis also has been a disease which has become controlled. In 1938, only fifty beds were devoted to tuberculosis treatment throughout the country. This number was increased to over two thousand in an effort to control the disease. The results of this strategy were:

The number of new cases discovered per hundred thousand inhabitants has diminished as follows: during 1951 — 296, during 1970 ~ 107, during 1981 — 35. This index is relatively low in comparison with other countries. Deaths from tuberculosis per 100,000 inhabitants have steadily diminished: in 1951 there were 45, in 1970 — 12.6, while in 1981 the figure was quite inconsiderable.<sup>29</sup>

A glorification of Albania's health care system was given by Mehmet Shehu in a speech on November 28, 1979:

...the health service is free of charge for all and has been extended to the remotest villages. In 1960 we had one doctor per every 3,360 inhabitants, while in 1978 we had one doctor per every 687 inhabitants, and this despite the rapid growth of the population. The natural increase of the population in our country is 3.5 times higher than the annual average of European countries, whereas mortality in 1978 was 37 per cent lower than the average level of mortality in the countries of Europe, and the average life expectancy in our country has risen, from about 38 years in 1938, to 69 years. That is, for each year of the existence of our people's state power, the average life expectancy has risen by about 11 months. That is what socialism does for man! Is there a loftier humanism than socialist humanism, which, in 35 years, doubles the average life expectancy of the whole population of the country?<sup>30</sup>

A few relevant statistics to this portion of the study include the increase in the number of hospital beds and the number of doctors per 1,000 inhabitants.

Table 8-4: Number of Hospital Beds and Number of Doctors Per 1,000 Inhabitants

	1960	1980	1985
Number of Hospital Beds	8,600	17,300	18,100
Number of Doctors Per 1,000 Inhabitants	3.0	16.8	17.2

<sup>1</sup> Ministria e Ekonomise Drejtoria e Statistikes. *Vjetari Statistikor i Shqiperise 1991*, p 121.

This writer personally toured various hospitals in Tirane which were considered to be the best of their kind in the country. These included *Spital Nr. 4*, the infectious disease hospital, as well as the psychiatric hospital. Conditions were quite unhygienic according to Western standards. For instance, tubing for transfusions and intravenous medications, as well as syringes were typically reused under quite dubious "sterile" conditions.

In trying to assess objectively the Albanian health care system, Dr. Kastriot Melyshi, a doctor at *Spital Nr. 4*, felt that the most positive achievement of the Hoxha period was that every part of the country had doctors and nurses to care for the people for the first time. However, Dr. Melyshi felt that the most negative aspect of the health care system was that doctors in remote regions had no opportunity to specialize in any particular type of medicine and thus, never reached their full potential as doctors.<sup>31</sup>

One of the greatest flaws of the Albanian health care system came to light during an interview with Dr. Melyshi. A question requesting an explanation was posed to Dr. Melyshi concerning the procedure to be used, if any, if a patient in a remote district had an illness or injury too severe to be treated locally. Dr. Melyshi explained



that there was a systematic plan in place for the transferal of such patients to a more advanced health care facility. However, there was so much bureaucracy involved that few if any patients could survive.

A hypothetical scenario was presented to Dr. Melyshi concerning a seriously ill patient in northern Albania who needed complex surgery to save his or her life. Dr. Melyshi explained that the system would function as follows in this type of scenario: the system would not send this patient directly to Tiranë. First, this patient would be sent to the main hospital of the particular zone. In northern Albania, this patient would be sent to Shkodër. If the problem was too severe to be handled in Shkodër, then the patient would be transferred to Tiranë. Likewise, if the problem was too severe to be handled in Tiranë, arrangements would be made for the patient to be sent abroad for treatment.

This system does not superficially seem to be problematic, although somewhat bureaucratic. However, in reality, this system was extremely flawed due to the time lags caused by bureaucracy. For instance, Dr. Melyshi said that at least two weeks would pass before the patient would be transferred from the village to Shkodër. A period of one month would pass in Shkodër prior to transfer to Tiranë. Usually, a period of two months would elapse in Tiranë prior to contacting the Ministry of Health so that arrangements could be made for transfer of the patient abroad for health care. Finally, this transfer abroad would entail a wait of two years before it could be approved and money allocated for this trip. It does not take a doctor's knowledge of medicine to realize that in a case where a patient needs serious life-saving surgery, that the above-mentioned delays would usually be fatal. Dr. Melyshi concurred when he said: "...most of these patients die due to bureaucracy."<sup>31</sup>

The majority of Albanians responding to Question Number 20 of the questionnaire in *Appendix A*, sixty-seven percent in fact, felt that health care was a positive development under Hoxha. Thirty-three percent felt that this was not the case. The most common comment made by many respondents was that under the old system, health care was free of charge. The counterpoint to this was given by one person who said now he pays twenty-eight percent of his pay for a visit to a dentist.<sup>32</sup>

Health care is a topic which seems to plug quite well into the overall thesis of this study. Namely, that it is unquestionable that great strides have been made in the area of health care. Life expectancy and infant mortality rates have greatly improved. Health services as a whole, in terms of quality and most importantly, in terms of availability have improved exponentially. However, the Albanian health care system has serious shortcomings in terms of the acquisition of up to date technology. In many cases, the most modern techniques and equipment are simply unknown and unavailable.

This technological lag was due to the isolation Albania was subjected to under Enver Hoxha. On the one hand, one must objectively applaud the improvements made which were substantial and indeed a positive development. However, on the other hand, one must also objectively condemn the paucity of modern equipment and supplies due to ideological concerns and isolation.

In conclusion, there are both positive and negative aspects to both issues discussed in this chapter, education and health care. On the positive side, both systems, education and health, were essentially begun since there was little, if any, organized system in place previously. Likewise, care was given to Albania's citizens in both areas on a widespread basis, usually for the first time in Albania's history in the case of remote regions.

In terms of education, where the vast majority of the population was previously illiterate, as a result of Hoxha's educational system, nearly all Albanians can read and write. This is unquestionably a positive and significant achievement.

Health care, albeit of a rudimentary nature, was now established throughout the country. Moreover, the people were living considerably longer and had access to medical care when little access was available previously. Therefore, health care must be considered a positive development in the history of Enver Hoxha's years in power in Albania.

On the negative side, ideological concerns entered into both areas. The education system was adversely affected by the double-edged sword of the propagandist<sup>^</sup> nature of education which by design limited the freedom of students' thought, as well as the inclusion into the system of many ill-qualified teachers due to ideological "purity."

Health care also was disadvantaged by the inclusion of underqualified doctors into the health care system. In both health and education, the converse is true in this situation whereby many extremely well-qualified professionals were excluded due to ideological concerns. Health care was also adversely affected by extreme bureaucracy in the Ministry of Health. Likewise, Hoxha's imposition of isolation and restriction of travel abroad, severely limited Albania's doctors from gaining substantial training abroad, as well as significant amounts of modern medicines, equipment, and technologies.

In terms of this analysis, despite serious shortcomings in both areas, both education and health care must be entered as positive developments into this study's equation. The advantages of literacy and basic medical care outweigh the disadvantages incurred by the above-mentioned negative aspects of each issue discussed.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> *Answers to Questions About Albania* (Tiranë: Naim Frasheri Publishing House, 1969), 351.

<sup>2</sup> Sotir Temo. *Education in the People's Socialist Republic of Albania* (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1985), 10.

<sup>3</sup> Vladimir Misja and Ylli Vejsiu. *Demographic Development in the People's Socialist Republic of Albania* (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1985), 86.

<sup>4</sup> *Answers to Questions About Albania*, 352.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 353.

<sup>6</sup> Temo, 25.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 27A.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 29.

<sup>9</sup> Misja and Vejsiu, 87; Temo, 20 A,B, C, D (Graphs).

<sup>10</sup> The Directorate of Statistics at the State Planning Commission, *35 Years of Socialist Albania* (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1981), 129.

<sup>11</sup> Ilia Çoka, interview by author, Tape recording, Cleveland, Ohio, 25 August 1993.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> *Answers to Questions About Albania*, 353.

<sup>15</sup> Temo, 29.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 16. For a more detailed list of the specific works studied by the Albanian students see pp. 60-61 of Temo's book.

<sup>17</sup> Enver Hoxha, *Speeches and Articles, 1963-1964*, vol. 2 (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1977), 195-197.

<sup>18</sup> The *Theses on Feuerbach* were an unpublished collection of ideas written by Marx in sort of outline style in 1845 (supposedly for completion at a later date). They were a critique of Ludwig Feuerbach's philosophy which many writers believe to have contained the kerygma of Marx's program. Friedrich Engels later published these eleven points in

1888 as an appendix to his book *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*.

<sup>19</sup> Friedrich Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, n.d.) 98.

<sup>20</sup> Anastas Kondo, "The Ideological and Cultural Revolution in the Work of the Party and Comrade Enver Hoxha," in *Scientific Conference on the Marxist-Leninist Thinking of the Party of Labor of Albania and Comrade Enver Hoxha, October 3-4, 1983*, by the Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the Central Committee of the PLA, (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1983), 184.

<sup>21</sup> Kosta Koçi, interview by author, Tape recording, Tiranë, 12 April 1994.

<sup>22</sup> Sonja Beribashi, interview by author, Tape recording, Tiranë, 4 April 1994.

<sup>23</sup> Zisa Cikuli, *Health Care in the People's Socialist Republic of Albania* (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1984), 10, 12.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 12, 13.

<sup>25</sup> Interview with Dr. Ilia Çoka, Cleveland, Ohio, 25 August 1993.

<sup>26</sup> Cikuli, *Health Care in the People's Socialist Republic of Albania*, p. 72.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 33.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 72.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 73.

<sup>30</sup> Mehmet Shehu, "Magnificent Balance of Victories in the Course of 35 Years of Socialist Albania," Speech (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1979), p. 21.

<sup>31</sup> Interview with Doctor Kastriot Melyshi, Tiranë, Albania, April 8, 1994.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> Results of questionnaires given in Albania, March and April, 1994.

## Chapter 9:

### *Human Rights and Religion*

Two issues which are very important to consider when attempting to analyze the positive and/or negative aspects of Albanian society are the protection (or lack thereof) of the human rights of Albanian citizens and the freedom (or lack thereof) to practice religion. *Article 53* of the 1976 Albanian Constitution (adopted December 28, 1976) does guarantee "freedom of speech, press, organization, association, assembly" etc. The seemingly "carte blanche" permission allowed and granted by this version of the Albanian "Bill of Rights" concerning discretionary freedom is severely restricted and in effect, completely rescinded by *Article 39* of the 1976 Albanian Constitution. *Article 39* states that:

The rights and duties of citizens are established on the basis of the reconciliation of the interests of the individual and those of socialist society, with priority given to general interest. The rights of citizens are inseparable from the fulfillment of their duties and cannot be exercised in opposition to the socialist order.

The situation created whereby *Article 39* in effect negates *Article 53* gave the government of Enver Hoxha the "legal" justification to compel Albanian citizens to toe the line of the Party or else risk facing severe penal penalties.

A serious shortcoming of the new Constitution is stated in its *Preamble*:

...the class struggle is developing in Albania and that 'the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat is constantly growing stronger.' This means that, according to this Constitution, the state does not begin nor

continue to wither away [the traditional aim of Communism] but constantly gains strength. For this reason, the Constitution often makes mention of the state and its wide authority. For instance, 'the state organizes, manages and develops the whole economic and social life through a single and general plan...' (from Art. 25), disregarding the rights of producers and working people as a whole. It is said further, for example: 'the state takes care...' (in Art. 29, paragraph 4); 'the state exercises [sic] control...' (in Art. 30, paragraph 5); 'the state does not recognize...' (in paragraph 37); 'the state organizes and manages...' (in Art. 34, paragraph 1), etc.

It ensues, therefore, that — in accordance with what history teaches us — the sphere of freedoms and rights of man and citizen is restricted, that his freedoms and rights are not respected in practice and that man is enslaved by the state and by the boundless authority of its organs.<sup>1</sup>

The combination of a contradictory Constitution and a concept of non-impartial justice which is very different from the standard Western notion created a quite volatile mix. A new Albanian Criminal Code was introduced on October 1, 1977. This Code stresses that the aims are primarily political and ideological. *Article I* of the 1977 Criminal Code is in and of itself a microcosm of the true lack of actual rights an Albanian citizen enjoyed under Hoxha's government. The text of this article is as follows:

The penal legislation of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania expresses the will of the working class and other working masses and is a powerful weapon of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the class struggle.

Penal legislation has the task of defending the socialist state, the Albanian Party of Labor as the sole political guiding force of the state and society, socialist property, the rights and interests of citizens and the whole socialist order from socially dangerous acts by means of the application of penal measures against those who commit them.

An important duty of the penal legislation of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania is the fight against bureaucracy and liberalism as the chief dangers to the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat.<sup>2</sup>

A supplementary problem which quite likely was intentionally caused by the government is the very vague language of many statutes in the Albanian Criminal Code. This lack of specificity of language

allows almost any action or inaction to be construed under a broad interpretation as a violation of a given statute. A concrete example of this situation can be seen in the verbiage of *Article 53* concerning "sabotage:"

An action or lack of action intended to weaken or undermine state activity or that of the Albanian Party of Labor, the socialist economy, the organization and direction of the state and society will be punished by deprivation of liberty for not less than 10 years or by death.<sup>3</sup>

In other words, practically anything which deviated from the "norm" established by the Albanian Party of Labor could be considered a "crime." It is this sort of scenario which caused so many people to be imprisoned or sent for reeducation through labor in forced labor camps.

An intriguing aspect of Albanian life during the Hoxha years was the tight control placed upon the society in many areas. All Albanians were required to register with the police if they owned a typewriter. A typing sample produced on every individual machine was kept on file by the police. This enabled the authorities to have the capability to track any person bold enough to circulate anti-Party literature.

The workings of the Albanian "Justice" System also were skewed toward injustice. For example, one former prisoner stated that: "...he was not permitted to question the witnesses and that, although he was permitted to state his objections to certain aspects of the case, his objections were dismissed by the prosecutor who said, 'Sit down and be quiet. We know better than you.'"<sup>5</sup>

Two court cases of former prisoners are going to be discussed at length to give complete treatment to the various scenarios which arose during trials in the Albanian Justice System. Alexander Dako, an eighty-year old Harvard University-educated engineer, served seven years in prison because as an American university graduate he "had" to be working for foreign governments. A most illuminating insight into the workings of an Albanian court can be seen through the testimony given to this writer in an interview with the defendant in Tiranë. Mr. Dako explained his experiences as follows:



When I was being judged, the judge asked me whether I accepted the accusation or not. I said, 'No.' He said, 'We will prove it.'

He brought in a White Russian who had worked as a waiter. He [the judge] said, 'Now, Nikolla tell what you said about Alexander during your interrogation.' Nikolla had been condemned to life imprisonment but he was courageous enough to say: 'that he [Alexander] is absolutely innocent and everything I said about him was untrue.' They [members of the court] cursed him and sent him away and brought another. The other person came and said about the same thing—I don't know anything about this person and what I have said I have said unconsciously because of torture.'

The case was stopped for two hours. After two hours, a new witness was brought in who had been prepared to say what he had to say. He began to ...condemn me. This person had never met me. [The first two witnesses who had said that Alexander Dako was innocent knew him. The third witness who condemned him had never met him and did not know him.] I began to ask him [the third witness] questions, but he could not answer them because in two hours you can't prepare.

The chancellor of the court wrote down what he wanted to write down. He did not write down what I said. Everything that I said that was in my favor was [skipped]."

Another example of a "typical" court proceeding is described by a former prisoner, Nika Stajka. Stajka describes the scene in this manner:

In the courtroom, all the accused sit at the defendants' bench.

The courtroom is full of so-called 'chosen people' since an unauthorized person cannot enter it. The only ones who enter are the Communists and their sympathizers and collaborators, who soon start shouting: '*Tratharët në lilar!*' ('Hang the traitors!')... '*Pushkatim! pushkatim!*' ('To the wall!').

There are microphones and loudspeakers in the courtroom connected to the local radio stations and in chain with other stations around the country, so the people on the streets and squares of the city, in their homes and everywhere else, can be aware of what is going on in the courtroom. The guards who escort the accused, especially within the courtroom, must fight the crowd that wants to lynch, stone, and kill the prisoners.

Members of the 'court' are exemplary (?) in their punctuality! The trial starts at its scheduled time. As they say: 'You have to finish the [enemies of the people] soon!'

...It can be said that the prosecutor is the owner of the 'court,' so much so that he can also intervene when the 'judge' is speaking.

The 'judge' is only to open the sessions of the 'court,' to introduce the defendants in order and according to the accusations trumped up by security and the prosecutor, to maintain order and hand out decisions of the 'court,' and to declare that the 'court' is closed.

The accusations of the prosecutor against the defendants are discussed, studied, and reasoned in the most absurd philosophical manners; since the prosecutor is always right, the defendant must be guilty of something because he is sitting on the defendants' bench; consequently, he is guilty.

...The prosecutor..finishes by asking the 'court' to impose the 'deserved' sentence: 'Death by the firing squad, hanging, a life term. .101 years ..50 years.. 25, 10, or 5 years in prison...at forced labor, and the confiscation of all their possessions.' At that point, the prosecutor has ended his mission.

The judge calls the defendants, one by one, and they, after listening to what the prosecutor has requested for each one, have to acknowledge and accept their guilt, each one according to the proof introduced before the court by the prosecutor so that the 'people' have mercy and lower the sentences.<sup>7</sup>

Further problems with the Albanian system can be seen in the utter disregard for *Article 115* of the Criminal Code which prohibits the use of violence by investigators when obtaining statements from the accused. There have been widespread accounts of torture being used routinely to obtain confessions. A few examples of the treatment received by former prisoners is seen in their testimony given to an international human rights committee:

One ëmigrë, for example, testified to being bound by his hands and legs for one and a half months, and beaten with a belt, fists, or boots for periods of two to three hours every two or three days. Another was detained in a cell one meter by eight meters large in the local police station and kept in solitary confinement for a five-day period punctuated by two beating sessions until he signed a confession, he was taken to *Sigurimi* [secret police] headquarters, where he was again tortured and

questioned, despite his prior confession, until his three-day trial. Still another witness was confined for more than a year in a three-meter square cell underground. During this time, he was interrogated at irregular intervals and subjected to various forms of physical and psychological torture. He was chained to a chair, beaten, and subjected to electrical shocks. He was shown a bullet that was supposedly meant for him and told that car engines starting within his earshot were driving victims to their executions, the next of which would be his.<sup>8</sup>

There are many reports dealing with the sickening details of various grotesque tortures described in minutiae. Two tortures have been chosen at random to demonstrate the demented nature of the tortures. The first is called, the louse:

The louse, small as it is, may cause terrible tortures. The prisoner, tied to a chair, gets his head shaven with the 'zero' shaver, and if he has started to resist the questioning, denying what he is asked, an officer places on his head a louse contained in a small cup upside down. The louse, after two or three minutes turning around the edge of the cup, tries to get out and pierces its small claws into the prisoner's head skin, causing at first an annoying noise and then strong pains. This forces the prisoner to sign his [confession].<sup>9</sup>

The second is called the cat.

...This torture was performed with women... The prisoner, naked, is placed in a large bag, her hands tied behind her body; a cat is also placed within the bag. The bag is closed, and the cat is beaten with a club, so anyone can imagine what the cat will do to the person within the bag.<sup>10</sup>

Ill treatment did not subside when the accused was found "guilty" and incarcerated in prison or a labor camp. In fact, this inhumane treatment intensified. There were six institutions for political prisoners and fourteen labor camps where political prisoners and common criminals worked together. It has been estimated that there were approximately 32,000 people imprisoned in Albania in 1985.<sup>11</sup> The religious leader in 1992 of Albania's Moslem community, Mufti Haxhi Hafiz Sabri Koci, who spent twenty-one years at hard labor working in the copper mines said: "Even a dog would not have slept where we had to."<sup>12</sup>

The most notorious of the labor camps was located at Spaç in northern Albania where the prisoners constituted an inexpensive supply of labor for the mining industry. Testimony given by former prisoners include the following descriptions:

Living conditions at Spaç are crowded. K [all prisoners' identities were disguised to preclude recriminations by the authorities against their relatives still living in Albania], ...reported that 16 prisoners slept on straw mattresses in a three- by seven-meter room. Another former prisoner, who may have been in one of the other five barracks at Spaç, reported that the men were triple-bunked with 100 prisoners in each room. K added that water was hauled from a river, and that there were no sanitary facilities. Prisoners suffered frequently from diarrhea.

Spaç prisoners are given tea in the morning and at night. For lunch they are served soup with rice and beans or macaroni and sometimes some boiled green onions. The soup is supposed to have meat in it, but ...it usually only 'smelled of meat.<sup>1</sup> In addition, the men receive a glass of watered-down powdered milk and some bread. Those prisoners not working in the mines because of illness or solitary confinement receive smaller portions.

X was imprisoned at Spaç in the early 1970's, having been convicted of planning to leave Albania. According to X, prisoners worked for eight hours in the mines with eight hours' rest. Another emigre, whose brother was in Spaç for 12 years, reported that if a prisoner did not meet his quota within his eight-hour shift, he would be handcuffed and left without food. D, a former Spaç inmate arrested in 1977, stated that shifts would occasionally be back-to-back with only four hours' sleep in between.

Safety precautions in the mines are minimal. D reported that there was no ventilation in the mine shafts, and that workers were not allowed to wait after a blasting for the 'poison' to clear. There are frequent accidents in the mines as well. While D was at Spaç, at least one prisoner was killed by falling rock. B stated that prisoners would purposely break their arms or legs so they could no longer work in the mines.

...X described solitary confinement at Spaç, which...usually lasts for one month. Four solitary cells are arranged along a single corridor. The cells have wooden floors and are suspended over a mountain stream. Each cell's floor has an opening three-fingers wide for air. The cells are extremely cold during the winter because of the flowing water underneath. During the winter, prisoners are provided with blankets at 11:00 P. M. which are then removed at 4:00 A. M. ... The prisoners are only permitted to use the bathroom once a day.

...Most prisoners in Spaç are serving sentences of eight years or more. One emigre reported that if a prisoner dies at Spaç, his family is not informed of his death until the end of the prisoner's sentence.<sup>13</sup>

As is evidenced by the preceding passages, much brutality was encountered by people not only in prison but in their everyday interactions with the Albanian Party of Labor. The most poignant testimony gleaned from interviews with former prisoners concerning the impact imprisonment had upon their life, which went far beyond the actual time served, was this quite sad remark: "[The biggest] problem was that my young children had grown up without knowing me. We are now with our families but we are of two different worlds ~ We are not a part of today's society."<sup>14</sup>

Question Number 10 of the questionnaire in *Appendix A* asked the respondents if they or any members of their families served time in prison. Fifteen percent of these people said that they or members of their families had served time in prison.

The impact imprisonment had upon Albanian society can be seen in the response given by Dhureta Meksi, a forty year-old female who had four persons in her family serve a total of sixty-nine years in prison due to the "...rregimit diklator ti Enver Hoxhis."<sup>15</sup> It is unnecessary to translate this self-evident quotation. This respondent's demographic profile is important since at age forty, she and her family had lived the majority of their lives under the rule of Enver Hoxha.

The Party continually strived for and did manage to have an impact on almost all of their citizens' affairs. This situation did cause many Albanians to wish to leave the country.

To leave the country without permission was considered to be an act of treason. *Article 47* of the Albanian Criminal Code states that "escape outside the state, as well as refusal to return to the Fatherland by a person who has been sent to serve or has been permitted temporarily to go outside the state" is a crime of treason which is punishable by a minimum sentence of ten years or even death. Extreme measures were instituted to keep both Albanian citizens in and foreigners out of Albania.

A former Albanian border guard testified regarding some of the precautions taken at the border to prohibit escape:

An electrically-wired metal fence stands 600 meters to one kilometer from the actual border. Anyone touching the fence not only risks electrocution, but also sets off alarm bells and lights which alert guards stationed at approximately one-kilometer intervals along the fence. Two meters of soil on either side of the fence are cleared in order to check for footprints of escapees and infiltrators. The area between the fence and the actual border is seeded with booby traps such as coils of wire, noise makers consisting of thin pieces of metal strips on top of two wooden slats with stones in a tin container which rattle if stepped on, and flares that are triggered by contact, thus illuminating would-be escapees during the night.<sup>6</sup>

This situation was explained to the people within the context of the siege mentality which was constantly emphasized.

In an act indicative of its xenophobia and economic priorities, the regime invested an estimated 2 percent of net material product in the construction and installation of thousands of prefabricated cement bunkers throughout the country from 1977 to 1981.<sup>17</sup>

There were many instances during the late 1940's and early 1950's, when the West, particularly the United States and Great Britain did attempt to overthrow the Hoxha government. Covert means were used, including the use of Albanian volunteers to parachute into the country. These attempts failed due not only to Albanian vigilance but especially due to the exploits of Kim Philby, the MI6 and KGB double agent who notified Moscow and Albania concerning the dates of the infiltrations. The agents were met by Albanian security forces when they landed.

### **Religion**

Article 18 of the 1944 Albanian Constitution, notes that: "All citizens are guaranteed freedom of opinion and belief....All religious communities are free in matters concerned with their faith as well as in its practice and outward expression." Despite these "assurances," the various religious communities were in fact actually attacked. As time passed, these attacks grew from subtle forms of discrimination to outright and blatant attacks where church property was taken without compensation and many clergy were imprisoned and/or killed.

The official rationale behind this attack on religion is as follows:

The Party of Labor of Albania has always waged a systematic struggle against religion as an ideology of the exploiting classes hostile to socialism and opium of the people. The Party has considered the struggle against religion, against religious prejudices, against backward customs directly or indirectly linked with religion, as essential for the social liberation of the working people, for their ideological revolutionary tempering and for the construction of socialist society.<sup>8</sup>

There is an important factor which should not be overlooked concerning the historical roots of this obsession to rid Albania of religion. As has been discussed previously, Albania has had a long and troubled history where it has been perpetually invaded and occupied by foreign nations who have treated Albania not as an equal but more or less, as a vassal state. This situation of continual dependence and exploitation made its mark upon Enver Hoxha and the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor.

The Albanian historians, Stefanaq Polio and Arben Puto believe that Albania has been:

Divided by two religions — Catholic and Orthodox since the eleventh century — then three, Catholic, Orthodox and Muslim since the fifteenth. ... Religions have arrived with occupying nations, who from West or East brought their own religion with them. From the start, such religions have been mixed up in politics and have always supported the invaders and been instruments of power over the people, and agents of division amongst them.<sup>19</sup>

The religious breakdown of the population prior to the Communists' seizure of power was approximately 70 percent Moslem, 20 percent Orthodox and 10 percent Catholic. Albania was the only predominantly Moslem country in Europe. Prior to independence in 1912, religious services were held in Arabic, Greek, or Latin—not Albanian.

The results garnered from people answering Question Number 9 in the questionnaire in *Appendix A* are quite interesting.

Table 9-1: Religious Background and Present Religion<sup>1</sup>

	Religious Background	Percentage	Present Religion	Percentage
Moslem	119	65	82	45
Albanian Orthodox	37	20	31	17
Greek Orthodox	8	4	7	4
Catholic	7	4	8	4
Atheist	12	7	55	30

<sup>1</sup> Results of questionnaires given in Albania in March and April 1994.

An additional factor which troubled the Communists was the question of nationality. The Ottomans associated religion with nationality. Therefore, Moslems were thought of as Turks, Orthodox as Greeks and Catholics as "Latins."

Enver Hoxha believed that this situation was of a serious nature which needed to be rectified. He said on many occasions that "the religion of Albanians was Albanianism." In other words, the protection and support of nationalism was tantamount. Further evidence of the "pragmatic" approach advocated can be seen in this quotation from the Albanian poet, Migjeni: "Today the first word the children prattle is not the name of god, but 'Maize! Maize!,' that is the word of the day, the synonym for life."<sup>20</sup>

Enver Hoxha began his attacks upon religion slowly. The redistribution of the land in 1945 confiscated much of the church property in the country. The Catholic clergy was persecuted more than the other religions because they had a stronger association with a foreign power, i. e., the Vatican. "The church's links with the Vatican were also seen as dependence on an outside body regarded as intrinsically hostile to communist doctrine. The fact that some of the stiffest opposition to the establishment of communist rule had come from Catholic areas may have helped to reinforce the regime's determination to destroy the Roman Catholic church root and branch."<sup>21</sup>



Ramadan Marmalluku explains the historical roots of the mistrust concerning religious institutions and foreign influence:

There can be no doubt that in certain phases of Albanian history the church, specifically the Roman Catholic church in the north and the Orthodox church in the south, had a divisive effect on society. Deliberately or unconsciously, the Orthodox church served as a catspaw for the aims of the Greek Orthodox church, while the Roman Catholic church did the same for the Vatican. The altar screen, as well as shielding the mysteries of religion from public view, simultaneously veiled the interests of Greece or Italy.

The Muslim religion also for a while continued to identify with the Ottoman empire and to link the fate of the Albanian people with its interests.<sup>22</sup>

In 1946, the Jesuit order was banned in Albania and in 1947, the Franciscans were likewise dissolved. By the end of 1946, it has been estimated that twenty Catholic priests had been executed and more than forty imprisoned.<sup>23</sup> Despite this persecution, freedom of religion was still constitutionally guaranteed.

The government stepped up its attacks on religion on January 26, 1949 when it passed *Decree No. 743 (On Religion)*. The decree in effect stated that religious practice could not in any way contradict or countermand the laws of the State. Each religious body had to disassociate itself from any foreign overseeing body, i. e., the Vatican, or the Patriarchate, etc. In other words, the government demanded that each church become a national church subservient to the Albanian Party of Labor.

Each of the religious groups in Albania refused to obey these orders. The government responded by removing any criminal penalties from the Albanian Criminal Code which previously existed to guarantee freedom of religion. Technically, at this time, "freedom" of religion still was part of the 1944 Constitution.

According to the official *History of the Party of Labor*, the Party's strategy at this time for combating religions was as follows:

...the Party and the state did not prohibit religious beliefs, the presence of religious communities, or the performance of religious rites. Neither could they prohibit these customs related to religion, which did not

constitute direct violations of the state laws, even though they were reactionary in essence. The Party could not insult the feelings of a mass of working people, especially in the countryside, who were closely linked with the Party and the people's power, but continued to believe in one or the other religion, although they did not display any exaggerated fanaticism. The eradication of the religious outlook would come as a result of convincing the masses ideologically.

.. In order to liberate people from religious beliefs and backward customs, the Party carried on extensive atheist-scientific propaganda work by means of the radio and the press, books, lectures and talks, films, etc. By disseminating culture, education and scientific knowledge, the school played a major role in this direction.<sup>24</sup>

This last point concerning the use of the schools is very important. The rationale of Enver Hoxha was quite simple and ingenious in an evil sort of way. The strategy was twofold: first, inculcate the atheist propaganda into the minds of the children at school. This was extremely effective since Albania had such a youthful population and the highest birthrate in Europe. The average age of the Albanian population was only twenty-six years in 1985. Over time, this strategy would have the effect of more and more Albanian citizens not knowing about religion, especially after the closing of all churches and mosques in 1967. The second aim of this method was to have the children inform on their parents as to who was practicing religion. The fear of being informed upon caused many parents to be hesitant to teach their children about religion. Peter Rama, a seventy-seven year old elder at Annunciation Orthodox Church in Tirane said in 1992 that: "We were afraid to tell our children that secretly we continued to pray....We feared they might talk about it outside."<sup>25</sup>

Another devious method used to attack religious practices was done during periods of religious holy days, such as Ramadan or Lent. In many public places, such as schools and factories, many forbidden foods (dairy products, meat, etc.) were distributed at these times of fasting. Those people who refused to eat these foods were denounced.

The challenge to religion intensified to all-out war after Enver Hoxha's speech of February 6, 1967. No longer was this affront to religion merely an underground war. From this point onward, the battle lines were drawn and only frontal attacks would take place. The clandestine nature of the Albanian strategy which in theory was to be a

methodology of convincing the people to abandon religion on the basis of intellectual arguments showing the "illogicality" of this "backward mysticism" without ever having the need to resort to violence, was abandoned.

Some authors note the parallels between the intensification of the war against religion in Albania and simultaneous strategies being employed by Mao Zedong in China, Albania's closest ally at this time. Although there are similarities, there are enough differences to preclude any direct parallels. Nonetheless, it is safe to assume that Enver Hoxha was influenced to some degree with regards to religion based on events transpiring in China.

The official explanation regarding the catalyst of the war on religion is quite implausible. The Party of Labor wants readers to believe that it was a spontaneous movement directed by the youth of the country.<sup>26</sup> The explanation given was that:

The youth and other masses of the people in villages and cities rose to their feet, demanding that the churches and mosques, temples and monasteries, all the 'holy places' be closed down; that the clergy give up their parasitic life and become working people living like everyone else, by their own work and sweat.<sup>27</sup>

Of course, such an explanation is ludicrous or at the very least, quite far-fetched. The result of this "spontaneous, unprovoked movement" was the closing of all 2,169 churches and mosques in Albania. "Thus, Albania became the first country in the world without churches and mosques, without priests and hodjas."<sup>28</sup> Monsignor Dias, the Papal Nuncio for Albania appointed by Pope John Paul II, said that of the three hundred Catholic priests present in Albania prior to the Communists coming to power, only thirty survive.<sup>29</sup>

Question Number 19 of the questionnaire in *Appendix A* deals with the opinions of the people regarding the closing of churches and mosques in 1967. Ninety-four percent felt the closing of the churches was negative and only six percent felt that this was a positive step. Many of the respondents made similar statements to these opinions mentioned here: "It was imprisonment of the spirit" and "I think our land is damned" and "He [Hoxha] wanted to create a new religion, Communism." On the positive side, one person responded with the

opinion that "I think the disappearance of religion is not so bad because it helped in the [growth of] unity of the people and...not with force, everybody did it voluntarily."<sup>30</sup>

*Decree No. 4337* was passed in the People's Assembly on November 13, 1967. This decree officially canceled the legal status of religion that was "guaranteed" by the 1946 Constitution which was in effect at this time. The constitutional question regarding religion was answered in the 1976 Constitution which should be considered the Magna Carta of Enver Hoxha's beliefs, policies, and dreams for Albania and its future development.

*Article 37* of the Albanian Constitution declares that "the State recognizes no religion whatever and supports atheist propaganda for the purpose of inculcating the scientific materialist world outlook in people." Thus, Albania took the most extreme step possible by outlawing religion and by constitutionally advocating and demanding its citizens adhere to a policy of atheism. Anton Logoreci notes that "This extinction of religious life exemplified the regime's unwillingness to tolerate the existence of extraneous institutions of any kind, however weak, obedient or subservient they might be."<sup>31</sup>

The significance of a victory over religion was elaborated upon by Enver Hoxha in 1973 during a speech given to the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania. Enver said:

Was not the crushing blow dealt to religious dogma, that ancient plague, that poisonous black spider, in our country the most heroic, the most daring, the wisest, the most well-considered and the most skilful [sic] act? Was the abolition of the power of religion, along with its apparatus and personnel, an insignificant, conservative act? That was a centuries-old, spiritual and material structure. Our Party and people destroyed this structure within a few decades, but the fight to eradicate this cancer from the mentality of the people is still far from ended. A cure for cancer has not yet been discovered, but for religion it has been, and if a struggle is waged in this direction, consistently and with conviction, the cure will no longer take centuries but a few decades, a few generations. The fight against religious ideology is closely connected with the fight against imperialism and revisionism, with the fight for socialism and communism.<sup>32</sup>

Despite the strict enforcement of these policies and extreme penalties, including death for people caught breaking these laws, religion

was still not completely eradicated from the country. A task such as this was extremely formidable. Enver Hoxha himself admitted the difficulty in achieving such a "goal." "We must be realistic," taught Comrade Enver Hoxha. "The struggle against outdated customs, traditions, norms and religious world outlooks... is not over. This is a protracted, complicated and difficult struggle."<sup>33</sup>

The attack on religious influences in Albanian society had been taken an additional step previously on September 23, 1975 when *Decree No. 5339* was passed which required: "Citizens who have inappropriate names and offensive surnames from a political, ideological, and moral standpoint are obliged to change them." *The Dictionary of People's Names* was published in 1982 which listed 3,000 approved names. An article entitled "Toward the Creation of a Totally Atheistic Society" was published in *Rruga e Partise* in March 1986 which explains the government's rationale behind insisting on non-religious names:

Everyone chooses names for one's children according to one's wishes, names that are beautiful and have a musical sound, etc. But since we have such beautiful national names, we would not be justified to use foreign names, which express nostalgia for religion and a fascination for things foreign. ..Therefore, it is legitimate to insist on the use of national names, so that...the names of people do not become an indicator of the religious affiliations and divisions of yesteryear in the eyes of future generations.<sup>35</sup>

A concurrent development to the changing of personal names was *Decree No. 225* which called for the changing of geographic names of religious origin. This law had an effect primarily on villages named after a saint. An example was the village of Shënkoll (St. Nicholas) which was changed to Ylli I Kuq (The Red Star).<sup>36</sup>

There is little need for elaborate commentary debating the nature of Enver Hoxha's regime in terms of human rights and religion. Hoxha's record on both issues was unequivocally deplorable. His policies concerning both subjects were products of his rigid adherence to ideology, as well as a method of keeping the population in check by using methods of force which ensured the maintenance of power; for himself and his Party. In terms of the overall analysis of this study, Hoxha's record on both human rights and religion must be considered abhorrent and a negative development in Albania's history.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Syrja Pupovci, "A Constitutional-Legal Parallel Between the Constitutions of the SFR of Yugoslavia and the PSR of Albania Regarding the Freedoms and Rights of Man and Citizen," in *Yugoslav-Albanian Relations*, trans. Zvonko Petnicki and Darinka Petkovic (Belgrade: Review of International Affairs, 1984), 186-187.

<sup>2</sup> Amnesty International, *Albania: Political Imprisonment and the Law*. (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1984), 7.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Alexander Dako, interview by author, Tape recording, Tirane, 12 April 1994.

<sup>5</sup> Minnesota International Human Rights Committee, *Human Rights in the People's Socialist Republic of Albania*. (Minneapolis: Minnesota Lawyers International Human Rights Committee, 1990), 46.

<sup>6</sup> Dako

<sup>7</sup> Nika Stajka, *The Last Days of Freedom*, trans. Jose Roig (New York: Vantage Press, 1980), 51-53.

<sup>8</sup> Minnesota International Human Rights Committee, 46-47.

<sup>9</sup> Stajka, 62.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 63.

<sup>11</sup> Minnesota International Human Rights Committee, 49.

<sup>12</sup> Henry Karnm, "Albania's Clerics Lead a Rebirth," *New York Times*, 27 March 1992, p. A3

<sup>13</sup> Minnesota International Human Rights Committee, 50-53. Several former prisoners confirmed this testimony concerning the deliberate breaking of bones by prisoners to avoid work. Group interview with members of the Association for Ex-Political Prisoners, Tiranë, 5 April 1994.

<sup>14</sup> Anonymous member of the Association for Ex-Political Prisoners, interview by author, Tape recording, Tirane, 5 April 1994.

<sup>15</sup> Results of questionnaires given in Albania, March and April, 1994.

<sup>16</sup> Minnesota International Human Rights Committee, 50-53.

<sup>17</sup> *Albania: A Country Survey*, ed. Raymond Zickel and Walter Iwaskiw, 2d ed. (Washington: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1994), 115.

<sup>18</sup> Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies of the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania, *History of the Party of Labor of Albania*, 2d ed. (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1982), 435.

<sup>19</sup> Stefanaq Polio and Arben Puto, *The History of Albania: From its Origins to the Present Day*, trans. Carol Wiseman and Ginnie Hole (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), 281.

<sup>20</sup> Enver Hoxha, *Selected Works, 1960-1965*, vol. 3 (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1980), 433.

<sup>21</sup> Anton Logoreci, *The Albanians: Europe's Forgotten Survivors*. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1977), 154.

<sup>22</sup> Ramadan Marmalluku, *Albania and the Albanians*, trans. Margot and Bosko Milosavljevic (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1975), 75-76.

<sup>23</sup> Gjon Sinishta, *The Fulfilled Promise* (San Francisco: n.p., 1976), 51.

<sup>24</sup> Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies of the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania, 436-437.

<sup>25</sup> Kamm, p. A3.

<sup>26</sup> Unbelievably, this explanation of the Party was believed by some people since one of the respondents to the questionnaire in *Appendix A* repeated this scenario concerning the closing of the churches and mosques.

<sup>27</sup> Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies of the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania, 437.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 438.

<sup>29</sup> Kamm, p. A3.

<sup>30</sup> Results of questionnaires given in Albania, March and April, 1994.

<sup>31</sup> Logoreci, 155.

<sup>32</sup> Enver Hoxha, *Selected Works, 1966-1975*, vol. 4 (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Press, 1982), 791-792.

<sup>33</sup> Logoreci, 155.

<sup>34</sup> Minnesota International Human Rights Committee, 86.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 87.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., 89-90.





## Chapter 10:

### *Albanian Economy*

Enver Hoxha and the Albanian Party of Labor leadership maintained three major goals throughout its period in power and the economic system it produced was a direct product of attempts to meet these goals subject to various constraints. These aims were to remain in power, to achieve the fastest possible rate of growth, particularly in industry and to ensure that the Albanian Party of Labor had the strongest possible direct influence on all economic outcomes. A major constraint on these goals was Enver Hoxha's determination to enter into external economic relations only when he was convinced that the power to make his own decisions on domestic matters would not be impaired.

Although independent, Albania continued until the end of the 1970's (in varying degrees) to remain under the influence of its major ally. The position Albania found itself in at the time of Enver Hoxha's death was the ultimate end of Albanian Socialism. Albania at that time was in the position which Enver Hoxha desired and had planned for during the previous decades of his power. It is true that more up-to-date technology was needed but for the most part, Albania succeeded in its goal of having built an economic base and becoming somewhat economically self-reliant. The issue of modern technology is crucial and will be discussed in more detail later in this study.

Economic planning in Albania depended quite often since the end of World War II on the current state of Albanian foreign policy in relation to the major Albanian ally at the particular time. Changes in alliances caused *ad hoc* changes in Albanian economic planning to take place. A simple way to look at these patterns of alliance in terms of economic development is to say that Albania exploited an alliance to its

utmost economic advantage and then moved on to "greener pastures." It moved progressively through the various alliances until it was strong enough to rely primarily upon itself.

There was considerable logic behind Albania's seemingly bold move to rely upon its own resources, which goes well beyond the ideological basis often attributed to it. Albania was extremely well-endowed with natural resources. This fact allowed Albania to emphasize the development of three crucial industries: electricity generating, mining, and engineering. These industries enabled Albania to achieve many of its self-sufficiency goals. Overall, the Albanian economy under the leadership of Enver Hoxha made the transition from foreign aid dependence to near economic self-sufficiency due to reliance on its own forces. Further, this development was a natural evolutionary process. The point which can not be emphasized enough is that any assessment of the Albanian economy must be prefaced with the necessity of only making comparisons and judgments within the parameters of the Albanian historical experience. For example, it would be totally unfair and unrealistic to make judgments of Albanian economic development by comparing Albania during the period in question with almost any other country. In most areas, especially in any economic sphere, Albania had a quite rudimentary starting position. It basically had no industry prior to World War II. "The epoch of steam and electricity had nearly not affected it at all.... Industry, in the true sense of this word, was inexistent [sic]."<sup>1</sup> Likewise,

"by 1938 one substantial cement factory had been built in Shkodër; there were several cigarette manufacturing plants, a brewery, and several small plants for the production of soap, furniture, cardboard, handmade tools, and carts. The country's electricity needs were provided by 13 generators."<sup>2</sup>

Per capita output of electricity was approximately 9 kilowatt-hours in 1938, whereas Italy had 357 kilowatt-hours, Yugoslavia had 75 kilowatt-hours and Greece 38 kilowatt-hours.<sup>3</sup>

As noted previously, Albania can have its alliance patterns broken down into four primary components: alliance with Yugoslavia (1944-1948); alliance with the Soviet Union (1948-1961); alliance with China (1961-1978); self-reliant Albania with no overriding alliances (1978-

1985). The transition from one stage of alliance pattern to another shows the transformation of Albania from a small state that felt compelled to ally with a larger state in order to ensure its independence to a state that superficially seemed to change alliances due to ideological differences. In reality, these changes were made for nationalistic and economic reasons as well as to allow the regime to remain in power. Albania was a state that due to the world situation at the time and its ideological position played a role significantly out of proportion with its size. This situation changed to the post-1978 state that believed strongly enough in its own abilities to provide for its needs to forego being allied in a major way with any country.

Prior to World War II (in most cases, 1938 will be the year used as a measuring stick for pre-war statistics because a relatively complete set of data exists for this year), the Albanian economy was in shambles. Evidence of the primitive state of the economy can be seen in the agricultural and industrial sectors. For instance, ninety percent of the total national income was derived from agriculture despite having only seven to nine percent of the land under cultivation. In addition, in 1938, eighty-eight percent of the population lived in rural areas, but fifty-three percent of the peasants had no land. More than forty percent of the cultivable land was held by large landowners and only three percent of the peasants.<sup>4</sup> The level of mechanization was extremely primitive as there were only thirty-two tractors in the entire country.<sup>5</sup>

A striking indication of the primitive conditions which existed in pre-war Albania is in the area of roads or lack thereof.

"The trip from Tiranë to Vlorë, for example, involved a sea journey; and although Shkodër's tradesmen exported skins by boat to Italy, their compatriots in Gjirokastër had to cross the Strait of Otranto to buy them from the Italians....There were also no roads across the Greek or Yugoslav borders capable of handling commercial traffic."<sup>6</sup>

The total contribution of industrial production to net material product was only 4.4 percent (another source says this figure was actually less than 4 percent) in 1938. There were only one hundred fifty industrial enterprises in the entire country, and almost half of these employed fewer than ten workers. Plus, in 1927 and 1928, the per capita average annual income was only \$40.07, as compared to Bulgaria

\$67.57, Greece \$75.75, Yugoslavia \$76.93, and Romania \$77.74. Thus, prior to World War II, due to the primitive state of the Albanian economy, Albanians earned approximately only one-half to two-thirds of that of its poor Balkan neighbors.<sup>7</sup>

This bleak economic picture regressed further during World War II and Albania found itself in a quite precarious economic position when Enver Hoxha and the Albanian Party of Labor assumed power. The fighting destroyed much of what useful material existed for economic purposes. In fact, Albania's damage per capita has been estimated as the highest in Europe.

"During the war 7.3 percent of the country's population were killed, the most active part of the labour forces. The material loss of Albania per head of population was equal to 960 current dollars, whereas Yugoslavia's was 705 dollars, Greece's 837 dollars, Bulgaria's only 68 dollars etc."<sup>8</sup>

The only positive developments were in the area of infrastructure and mining. Roads (1,500 kilometers), bridges (several hundred), and Durrës harbor were built by the Italians. Italian geologists did extensive surveying of the country (Italy had serious wartime needs for all types of raw materials, many of which Albania had in abundance. These include particularly oil, chromium, copper, etc.) which made known the vast amounts of Albania's natural resources. The factor of Italy's extensive geologic surveying is often overlooked but it is a crucial point in terms of being able to objectively assess Albania's economic planning decisions.<sup>9</sup>

Superficially, it may seem an absurd byproduct driven by Communist ideology for a small country like Albania to embark on an industrialization program, particularly a plan which stresses heavy industry. However, it seems clear that the existence of abundant natural resources (mineral resources, oil, and a potentially huge amount of hydroelectric power-generating capacity) is the crucial factor which makes a decision to concentrate on the development of heavy industry plausible. In fact, the huge amount of natural resources which Albania is blessed with in such a small territory makes the decision to commit to a plan of heavy industrialization not only justifiable but logical, as long as there are limits placed on the degree to which the industrialization program is extended.

Italy, during King Zog's period, did dominate Albania's economy, making it for all intents and purposes a vassal state of Italy. In fact, an Albanian writer summarized the Party of Labor's opinion of the economic sphere during this period by saying:

...small Albania, completely backward, from the social, economic and technical point of view, but rich in mineral resources, betrayed and abandoned by the landowners and the bourgeoisie in power, was turned into a merchandise to be bartered in the capitalist market, it became a political toy in the hands of the imperialist powers, especially of Italian imperialism which plundered and robbed our country in various ways."<sup>10</sup>

The Italian-Albanian Pact signed on November 27, 1926 was a particularly exploitative agreement favoring Italian interests.

The *Societa per lo Sviluppo Economico dell'Albania* (SVEA) was created for the purpose of administering the money [aid given to Albania by Italy], which was to give the Italians an important means of influencing the Albanian government, effectively tying the Albanian economy to Italy not least because SVEA reserved the right to determine the pattern of expenditure."

Many buildings were built in Tiranë by the Italians, most notably Hotel Dajti and the Ministry buildings surrounding *Sheshi Skenderbëu*.

A quite revealing set of statistics are Albania's foreign trade figures for the period from 1927 to 1939 which was the period in which Italy steadily gained an ever-increasing share of Albania's resources.

**Table 10-1:** Albanian Foreign Trade, 1927-1939<sup>1</sup>

Year	Imports	Exports	Trade Balance	Value of Exports Percent of Imports
1927	24682	11107	-13575	45
1928	32312	14694	-17618	45.5
1929	38644	14683	-23961	38
1930	33289	12352	-20937	37.1
1931	29513	7509	-22004	25.4
1932	22814	4500	-18314	19.7
1933	15938	5746	-10192	36.1
1934	12332	4284	-8048	34.7
1935	13730	6037	-7693	44
1936	16778	7435	-9343	44.3
1937	20316	10175	-10141	50.1
1938	22668	9129	-13539	40.3
1939	40601	9467	-31134	23.3
Average	24894	9009	-15885	36.2
Key:	in thousand	Albanian	gold francs	

<sup>1</sup> Stavro Skendi, *Albania* (London: Atlantic Press, 1957), p. 225. See Marmalluku, *Albania and the Albanians*, pp. 36-38. Italian aid was approximately 181 million Albanian gold francs during King Zog's reign.

A demonstrative illustration of the primitive state of industrialization in pre-World War II Albania can be seen in the following account of Albania's participation in an international exhibition in Paris in November 1937:

...Different countries of the world presented their industrial achievements. Ironically, at that exhibition Albania participated with a so-called pavilion which, in derision, the press of the time described as 'The Albanian pantry.' In that 'pantry,' instead of industrial products, feudo-bourgeois Albania presented to the world her beans and eggs. So scandalous was her participation at that exhibition that one of the feudo-bourgeois papers [*Drila*, November 5, 1937] of Albania was obliged to write: 'What have our agricultural products to do with an exhibition of art and technique? What are our eggs, cheeses and stale beans doing in the Albanian section of the Paris exhibition?' But what else could Albania, to which industry and modern technology of production were entirely unfamiliar, offer to the eyes of the world? How else could Albania of that time be represented at an international exhibition when her overall annual industrial production amounted to less than what she produces now [*circa.* 1979] in two or three days?<sup>12</sup>

Communism, on the theoretical level, seems to be an aberration for the Albanian situation since there were few, if any, of the historical conditions present which traditionally are necessary for a Communist government to be in power. The most obviously lacking component was the virtual absence of a working class.<sup>13</sup>

It was against this chaotic and primitive backdrop that the Albanian Party of Labor began its task of economic development in Albania. As suggested earlier, a plan which is centrally planned is advantageous in certain circumstances. Gramoz Pashko, a noted Albanian economist agrees with the inherent logic of central planning initially when beginning to build an economic base. Pashko comments:

Under circumstances of widespread misery and abject poverty a centralized system can offer a very suitable mechanism for mobilizing resources for growth and organizing their allocation. Moreover, this model of growth is easily acceptable psychologically.<sup>14</sup>

One of the most concise and succinct statements detailing Enver Hoxha's objectives for the building of Albania's economy by



concentrating on industrialization was made at the First Congress of the Party in November 1948 when it was announced that the:

...fundamental economic objective was to raise the country from its profound backwardness, through a vigorous development of the forces of production.

The essence of this task was the socialist industrialization and the electrification, of the country. The absolute necessity for industrialization was dictated by the need to create an entirely new material-technical base for the people's economy, to extend the production of goods within the country, to prepare the conditions for the reorganization of agriculture on a socialist basis, to increase the numbers of the working class so as to strengthen its leading position. Socialist industrialization would directly serve the safeguarding of the gains and the development of the revolution, the construction of socialist society.

Socialist industrialization had to be carried out at rapid rates so as to overcome the backwardness inherited from the past within the shortest possible time, to ensure the independent development of the economy and to achieve an appreciable rise in the material and cultural level of the working masses.<sup>15</sup>

The building of the Albanian economy began in earnest with the passing of the *Agrarian Reform Law* in August 1945. This law removed from the country all of the sprawling estates owned by the *beys* and large landowners. All forests and pasture land and all land owned by people with non-farm income was expropriated without compensation. Farmers who derived their entire income from fanning and worked the land with machinery were allowed to keep up to forty hectares of land. Those farmers who did not use machinery and the land of all religious institutions was limited to twenty hectares. Landless peasants were each given five hectares per family, with more being given for each married son who lived on the family's property. The total hectareage and property redistributed as a result of these reforms was 172,659 hectares of land, 474,227 olive trees and 5,923 draft animals.<sup>16</sup>

This law is significant because it demonstrated to the peasants the viability of the new government. It also was a practical strategy in terms of gaining popular support for the government because this law allowed the Albanian peasants to achieve one of their traditional dreams

— to own their land. Albania was transformed from a land of large estates to one of 70,000 small farms. Prior to this law, 52.43 per cent of all land in Albania was owned by large landowners, 28.07 per cent of the land was owned by small farmers and the state owned 18.71 per cent. After the *Reform Law* was passed, the *beys* owned only 16.38 per cent of the land, small farmers owned 43.17 per cent and the previously landless peasants owned 34.63 per cent.<sup>17</sup>

An illustration of the difficult lives small landless farmers led prior to the implementation of the land reforms can be seen in the following summary.

...land rent paid with one-third of the produce was the most common arrangement, since in this way the owner seldom gave the farmer more than the land. The renting farmer, poor as he was, was unable to buy work animals, so he usually rented them. In addition to the one-third of the produce paid by the farmer to the owner, the farmer had to deliver one-tenth of the produce to the government. To these obligations was added the obligation of the farmer to work for the owner a number of days per year (12 to 53 days), the obligation to pay in kind (grain, eggs, chickens) to the guardian of the village (*pojaku*), and the obligation to pay the owner rent for pasture according to the number of livestock. Often the renting farmer, in order to meet expenses, was obliged to borrow money at a high interest rate, sometimes 35 to 100 percent and even more. Oppressed [sic] by high taxes, the farmer was unable to cultivate the land properly. With one pair of oxen and sometimes only one ox, he was unable to plow the land. For this reason the major part of the land was left as pastures, shrubs, or swamps.<sup>18</sup>

There can be little doubt that the above passage describes a rural society firmly in the grip of feudalism. There is little difference between Albania prior to the *Reform Law* of 1945 and the "classic" version of feudalism seen in the Middle Ages. This is why the land reforms were such a significant development in terms of gradually leading Albania into the twentieth century.

The industries which did exist immediately after the war were nationalized at rapid rates. For instance, in 1944, only three percent of Albania's industry was nationalized. This amount rose to seventeen percent in 1945 and skyrocketed to eighty-nine percent by 1946.<sup>19</sup>

The growth of Albania's industry was quite amazing, in both speed and in extent. When one considers the extent of damage done in

Albania during World War II, it is quite impressive that Albania was able to recover from this damage and by 1946 equal her pre-war level of industrial production. However, even more impressive is the fact that by 1948, Albania doubled its pre-war industrial production. All must agree that this was a quite encouraging beginning for the new people's government.

Albania received much assistance from foreign sources after World War II. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration gave Albania \$26.3 million during 1945 and 1946 (the United States' share of this aid was \$20.4 million).<sup>20</sup>

The period from 1945-1948 was marked by extremely close relations between Albania and Yugoslavia. This relationship was due to reasons other than mere proximity. The Yugoslav Communist Party gave great assistance to the Albanian Party of Labor at its founding in 1941, throughout the war and in its struggle against the other political groups present in Albania to assume power after the National Liberation War was over.

The Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Aid was signed on July 9, 1946 between Yugoslavia and Albania which laid down the principles for economic cooperation between the two countries. This move was followed by an agreement signed between the two nations on November 27, 1946 which ostensibly detailed the framework for coordinating economic plans and forming a joint customs and monetary union. However, this plan subordinated Albania's economy and other interests to the degree that in reality Albania became a satellite of Yugoslavia and lost much, if not all, of its autonomy in practically all spheres. This led to much of the factionalism and Party in-fighting between Enver Hoxha and Koçi Xoxe which was detailed in Chapter Three.

There were two major disagreements between Albania and Yugoslavia in this period. The first centered upon the formulae used to calculate Albanian earnings in the joint Albanian-Yugoslav companies. Albania believed that the value of its raw material exports were severely underestimated which deprived it of much needed income. The second disagreement was one of a philosophical nature. The Albanians wanted aid from Yugoslavia in order to begin building its economic base. Albania envisioned an arrangement whereby Yugoslav aid would be used

to fund investment initially in light industry as well as to build an oil refinery. Yugoslavia's plan, however, was for Albania to instead concentrate on supplying it with raw materials and to develop its agricultural output.

Albania entered into the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance with Bulgaria in December 1947. The Soviet Union was having difficulties at this time with Yugoslavia and it is quite likely Albania acted with the U. S. S. R.'s blessing, if not actual instructions, to make this treaty with Bulgaria to show Tito that he no longer enjoyed the privileged and exclusive status in Albania that he may have believed he did. Nicholas Pano states:

...the Yugoslavs, through Xoxe, sought to have inserted in the treaty a clause which in effect stated that any joint action undertaken by Albania and Bulgaria should have prior Yugoslav approval. Although Xoxe in a midnight confrontation with Hoxha threatened to disrupt the ceremony at which the pact was to be signed, Hoxha remained firm and forced his pro-Yugoslav colleague to back down. During his stay in Sofia Hoxha also enraged the Yugoslavs by his failure to mention the name of Tito in public.<sup>21</sup>

Prior to the actual break with Yugoslavia, Enver Hoxha did manage on July 12, 1947 to gain through his maneuverings a grant of 2 billion *dinars* to allow for the completion of the 1947 Nine-month Plan. Nonetheless, this situation of animosity toward Yugoslavia existed until July 1, 1948 when Albania led the socialist bloc in denouncing Yugoslavia and abrogating all treaties and agreements after its expulsion from the COMINFORM.

The period from 1948-1961 was the period in which Albania's prime economic benefactor was the Soviet Union. It was also the period of Albania's most impressive growth. Albania became a member of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). This association caused Albania to conduct all of its foreign trade with Communist nations, over half with the Soviet Union itself from 1949-1951.

The evolution of the industrialization plan which Albania followed throughout the years Enver Hoxha was in power could be defined as having five major features:

- 1.) The simultaneous and harmonious development of industry and agriculture, considering the industry as the leading branch of the economy and the economy as its basic branch;
- 2.) The priority development of heavy industry, which is the heart of socialist industrialization;
- 3.) The rapid rates of development of industry;
- 4.) The development of industry in those directions which guarantee and strengthen the principle of relying on our own forces;
- 5.) The priority development of the heavy industry, without neglecting the light and consumer goods industry.<sup>22</sup>

The first component consisting of the crucial link between industry and agriculture can be explained in this simple way. A superficial analysis would give credence to the notion that industry is the more important of the two branches of the economy. However, industry can not exist without agriculture. Industry needs raw materials which agriculture provides and most importantly, agriculture is necessary to feed the working class, who without food could not work and industry would cease to exist.

The importance of agriculture can best be seen in the "advice" given by Stalin to Hoxha: "'The peasantry,' Comrade Stalin told me, 'must not leave an inch of land unfilled. The peasants must be persuaded to increase the area of arable land.'"<sup>23</sup> This comradely "advice" was strictly followed as much virgin land was tilled and sown with crops. By 1957, irrigation canals were built which irrigated 97,100 hectares of land. This was 336 percent as much irrigated land as existed in 1938. Likewise, land improvements were made in the area of land reclamation by draining swamps. By 1955, 52,704 hectares of land were reclaimed, or 10,541 percent compared to 1938.<sup>24</sup> The total area of arable land in Albania increased from 391,000 hectares in 1950 to 713,000 hectares in 1985.<sup>25</sup>

Agricultural productivity improved not only because of an increase in the hectareage tilled but due to the employment of more scientific techniques. Two representative results of additional technology were the increase in yields, both in crops and in dairy farming. For instance, in 1973, an average yield of 20 quintals of wheat

per hectare was achieved as compared to 10 quintals in 1938. The average produced in 1983 was 45.8 quintals per hectare.<sup>26</sup> Likewise, "the average milk yield per cow was 280 kilograms in 1938, 525 kilograms in 1960, 922 kilograms in 1970, and 1,142 kilograms in 1973."<sup>27</sup>

In 1976, according to official reports, the greatest achievement of Albanian agriculture occurred; Albania became self-sufficient in bread grain. If true, this is one of the most practical accomplishments of the self-reliance policy. This is extremely impressive, especially when one considers the mountainous terrain (most of which is unsuitable for large-scale agriculture) which comprises the majority of Albania.

The following table gives many pertinent statistics concerning the topic of bread grain.

**Table 10-2:** Bread Grain Production<sup>1</sup>

	1950	1960	1970	1980	1985
Quintals Per Hectare Yield For Bread Grain	9.1	7.9	17.3	25.1	30.9
Tons of Bread Grain Produced	201,000	197,000	494,000	790,000	887,000

<sup>1</sup> Ministria e Ekonomise Drejtoria e Statistikes. *Vjetari Statistikor i Shqiperise 1991*, p. 182.

The stress placed upon achieving self-sufficiency in the production of bread grain can best be viewed by this excerpt from Enver Hoxha's *Report to the Seventh Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor*.

Achieving self-sufficiency in bread grain is a task of great economic, political, and strategic importance. Home production of grain ensures the people's bread and imparts a powerful impulse to the entire economy, further cements the foundations of the independence of our socialist Homeland, is a guarantee that we shall be able to cope with any situation, in good times and bad, makes the country independent of imported grain once and for all, and releases large sums of foreign currency which can be used for other purposes.<sup>28</sup>

Professor Evan Rroço, the Assistant Rector of the Agricultural School of the University of Tiranë in an interview stated that in his opinion the greatest success of agriculture in Albania during the Hoxha period was in irrigation. Due to the large size of the collective farms, it was quite easy to build an efficient irrigation system.<sup>29</sup> Conversely,

the greatest failure was due to commands of higher authority. No one had the possibility to decide on his own.. You had only to obey. You had no freedom to act as you know how to do it. .. Suggestions could be given. .. Suggestions could only be technical. Suggestions could never be, for example, that the system of cooperatives was not a good one — never!"<sup>30</sup>

The most revealing information gleaned from a discussion with Professor Rroço concerned the alleged self-sufficiency of grain. Rroço said that 1975, 1976 and 1983 were years of exceptionally good harvests.

Between these years, the propagandists say [that] we were self-sufficient in grain. I am not sure. A lot of grain coming [sic] from China, etc. Only two or three years were we self-sufficient in the whole forty or so years of Albanian Party of Labor rule<sup>31</sup>

Evan Rroço was an agronomist in the district of Lezhe from 1983-1987. Doubt was cast upon the accuracy of agricultural statistics submitted during Party Congresses. For instance, during the "...Party Congress, I heard [the] Chief of the Party in Lezhe saying that the district of Lezhe had reached the figures of the plan in maize production. I was sure that we had failed."<sup>32</sup>

These revelations concerning the accuracy of statistics and the issue of self-sufficiency are important in terms of accurately assessing Albanian agriculture's performance during these years. However, it is

safe to assume that even if there were discrepancies concerning actual performance, one could truly say that improvements had nonetheless taken place. Thus, when one considers the starting point agriculture began from after the National Liberation War, agriculture was successful. However, it could have quite likely achieved more success than was actually attained.

The second component of Albania's industrialization plan was the cornerstone of Albania's entire strategy behind the planned society. It also was the area where socialism differed most markedly from capitalism. Heavy industry produced the means of production. Therefore, it was indispensable to a socialist economy. There has been a definite progression in terms of prioritizing certain branches of industry over others at a given time, as part of this rational attempt at planning Albania's economy:

So, for a certain time the heavy industry has developed chiefly as an extractive industry, passing progressively into the development of the various branches of heavy industry, such as the ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy which is the nerve center of the industry of machine construction.<sup>33</sup>

Albanian economists, H. Banja and V. Toci believe that light industry develops first in a capitalist economy due to the ability to make more immediate profits coupled with much less investment. Only after sufficient profits have been made, does heavy industry begin to be intensively developed. The converse holds true in a socialist economy, as existed in Albania, where the development of light industry follows naturally after a fully-formed strong heavy industry is in place.

The third component of Albania's economic plan was based strictly on the development plans advocated by Josef Stalin. The rapid rate of development of heavy industry was the catalyst which spurred growth of the entire Albanian economy. Stalin is quoted as saying:

...the fast rhythm of the development of industry in general, and of the production of the means of production in particular, constitutes the principal factor, the key of the industrialization and transformation of the whole of the people's economy on the basis of socialist development.<sup>34</sup>



Needless to say, there was no deviation from the policies of Josef Stalin in Enver Hoxha's Albania.

The fourth component of Albania's plan for economic development based on the principles of self-reliance was the culmination of many years of Albanian experience. Self-reliance was so vital to Albanian thinking that "Our Party has defended and defends the principle that self-reliance is not a temporary and conjunctural policy, but an objective necessity for every country, big or small."<sup>35</sup> All branches of industry are interdependent upon each other. If one branch were to fail this would have a concomitant effect upon the other branches of the economy. In addition, the development of the economy under the auspices of self-reliance

...guarantee and strengthen the industrial and economic independence under every international circumstance, improve the ballances [sic] of import-export and meet the principal and most urgent needs of the people and economy. The development has to follow those directions which become a secure shield against any possible threat to the liberty, independence and social order of the homeland <sup>36</sup>

Thus, the development of the economy while following the principles of self-reliance is inextricably linked with Albania's concept of independence and the maintenance of sovereignty.

A curious fact concerning self-reliance is that the root of this philosophy seems to have been derived from "advice" given to Enver Hoxha by Josef Stalin in July 1947 during a visit to Moscow. Stalin told Hoxha that: "Albania must march on its own feet...because it has all the possibilities to do so." Hoxha replied: "Without fail we shall forge ahead."<sup>37</sup>

The fifth and final component of the Albanian strategy for the development of industry deals with the delicate balance between prioritizing heavy industry while concurrently developing light industry, albeit at a slower pace. The linchpin of the Albanian economy, heavy industry, usually was located near the source of the raw materials or near large cities, the source of the large workforce necessary to sustain a large enterprise. A different approach was taken in regards to light industry, which usually did not have as much of a need to be located in any particular location. The Albanian plan called for careful geographic

distribution of the various light industries so as to not neglect any district. Thus, previously backward districts were brought increasingly into the mainstream of Albanian society, as well as the economy.

The best example of the growth of Albanian industry can be seen in the following table which shows production figures (in millions of *leke*) at 1986 prices.

**Table 10-3:** Industrial Production Figures (at 1986 Prices)<sup>1</sup>

	1950	1960	1970	1980	1985
Total Industrial Production	422	2,572	6,662	14,145	16,082
Means of Production: Group A	219	1,258	3,794	9,024	10,224
Consumer Goods: Group B	203	1,313	2,868	5,121	5,858

<sup>1</sup> Ministria e Ekonomise Drejtoria e Statistikes. *Vjelari Statistikor i Shqiperise 1991*, pp. 146-147.

A Two-Year Plan was adopted for the years 1949-1950. This period was marked by the beginning of the construction of the first of many large industrial projects within the country. These include the "V.I. Lenin" hydroelectric plant, the "J. V. Stalin" textile combine, and the sugar-processing plant near Maliq, etc. The results of the Two-Year plan could be characterized as follows:

Compared with the level of 1938, the volume of the total industrial output at the end of 1950 was 4 times greater, while in comparison with 1948, it was 155 per cent greater. During the two-year plan, the industrial production increased at an average annual rate of 10.5 per cent. The mineral and electric industry took a faster development. In 1950 as against 1938, the mineral production increased 4.6 times and as against 1948 2.2 times, while the electric industry quintupled its production compared with the prewar period.<sup>38</sup>

The First Five-Year Plan (1951-1955) emphasized the development of heavy industry over the development of agriculture and in what would become a recurring trend set ambitious plan targets. It was intended to transform Albania from an agrarian backward country into an agrarian-industrial country. This plan called for an increase in overall industrial production at an average annual rate of 27.7 per cent, consumer goods would increase by 26.5 per cent and producer goods would increase by 31 per cent. The actual increase in overall industrial production was an annual average increase of 22.8 per cent, consumer goods output increased by an average of 24.3 per cent and producer goods increased at an average rate of 20.7 per cent annually.<sup>39</sup> Despite the fact that the lofty goals of the plan targets were not achieved, nonetheless, impressive rates of growth were attained.

The segment of the economy to show quite marked growth during this plan period was the mineral extracting industry. A systematic and well-organized plan was implemented which stressed the need for the growth of this industry due to its great potential as a lucrative source of export capital.

The coal industry increased its production nearly 5 times as compared with 1950; extraction of chromium ore in the same period was 17 times greater; production in the mechanical industry about 5 times greater; production of electric industry 5 times etc.<sup>40</sup>

The chromium industry was so crucial to Albanian economic development that it deserves some singular consideration. While in Tiranë, this writer had the opportunity to interview Skender Dëde, author of many books dealing with chromium in its various facets, as well as the scientist behind the development of the industry as a whole. Dëde believes the most positive development in the Hoxha period was the establishment and development of the Albanian chromium industry. The reason for this view was that the earnings which chromium generated paid for the development of other industries. In fact, Dëde went as far as to say that a definite plus for the chromium industry was that it was state-controlled rather than in private hands. In Skender Dëde's opinion, insufficient investment would be made in the industry if it was privately owned. State control allowed sufficient investment to take place not only in extraction but in research and development as

well.<sup>41</sup> Overall, as one might expect of one who led the development of the industry, in what amounted to his life's work, Dëde was extremely positive toward the results shown by the chromium industry. However, Dëde did mention one negative aspect of the industry which was the fact that the world price of chromium ore never entered into any decision-making process concerning the industry. Skender Dëde's opinion was that expanding extraction in a time of global demand and also lessening production in a slack period of demand would have allowed the greatest possible profit to be made by the industry. However, the socialist system which guaranteed employment could never afford to lay off workers during low world prices. Therefore, the Albanian chromium industry always pursued a policy of producing as much ore as possible.<sup>42</sup>

An additional area in which definite success was attained during the First Five-Year Plan was in the area of employment. Due to the increased industrialization, the number of workers in 1955 was 53,400 which was twice the number of 1950.<sup>43</sup>

Wages paid to the various segments of the workforce were gradually leveled in an effort to limit as much as possible any differences in perception between the various types of work, between what is called in the West — "blue and white collar" work. Enver Hoxha discussed this topic in his *Report to the Seventh Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor* in November 1976. Hoxha said: "The ratio between the average workers' wages and the highest salaries of officials is now 1 to 2, from 1 to 2.5 in the past. This is a correct, revolutionary course which our Party is consistently implementing."<sup>44</sup>

This social experiment was not viewed by all Albanians as a success. Alexander Dako, an eighty-year old Harvard University-educated engineer expressed his disdain for this policy in an interview in Tiranë. Mr. Dako said: "Wages were low and they were kept low so people would only be concerned with what they would eat tonight. [They had] no time to discuss political questions. This was a policy of Enver Hoxha's."<sup>45</sup>

The Second Five-Year Plan (1956-1960) produced similar results as the First Five-Year Plan. The plan set the target of fourteen per cent average annual growth in industrial production for the period. The average annual increase for each of the five years was seventeen per

cent.<sup>46</sup> Albanian economists claim that by 1960 the economic base of socialism was built. This led Albania to the stage of "full construction of socialist society."

The Second Five-Year Plan was the last plan in which Albania had the Soviet Union as its major benefactor throughout the entire plan. Due in large part to the generous Soviet aid, the plan was fulfilled approximately one year ahead of schedule. Albania had succeeded in achieving in 1959 the rate of industrial production projected to be achieved in 1960. Industrial production was 2.2 times greater in 1960 than in 1955 and 25 times greater than in 1938. The production of the means of production increased at an average annual rate of 18 per cent while the production of consumer goods increased at the average annual rate of 16.1 percent for this five-year period. Likewise, the mining industry continued its impressive growth by doubling its production in 1960 as compared to 1955.<sup>47</sup>

The death of Josef Stalin in 1953 marked a turning point, not only for Albanian-Soviet relations in general but in the economic sphere specifically. The focus of Soviet aid changed completely due to the change in the Soviet leadership. Stalin had promoted the thesis of the priority of concentrating resources toward the growth of heavy industry over other sectors of the economy. Khrushchev and other members of the Soviet Party hierarchy were diametrically opposed to this strategy and philosophy.

The Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in June 1956 gave the first public signal of this new development strategy. The strategy was that the Soviet Union as the leading socialist country, through the instrument of the COMECON, would accelerate its own economic development in order to catch up to and as Khrushchev promised, "bury the West." The method to be implemented to achieve this end was in essence to subordinate the economies of the small countries of the socialist bloc to the needs of the economy of the Soviet Union.

It was reported by both Enver Hoxha and the Soviets themselves that this new philosophy was explained to Hoxha personally by Nikita Khrushchev during his visit to Albania in 1959. The division of labor advocated was to have Albania concentrate on the production of cash crops, especially citrus fruits and industrial crops, as well as the

extraction (through drilling for oil and mining) of raw materials. Khrushchev believed that the goal of Albania should have been to become the "flower garden" of the socialist world. Naturally, this philosophy infuriated Enver Hoxha.

A justification for Albania's stand in the area of a divergence of opinion with Khrushchev concerning Albania's development can be seen in this passage given by Professors of Economics, H. Banja and V. Toci:

Had Albania followed the 'advice' of modern revisionists, Titoites, Khrushchevites and others, she would not have today her fenous and nonferrous metallurgy, her copper and iron-nickel would be destined as raw material for the metallurgy of the revisionist countries; she would not have her deep processing oil industry, her oil would be sent for processing to other countries; she would not have her pesticides and chemical fertilizer industry and would depend on the import for these products; she would not have been able to develop the electric power industry on the basis of the water resources and mineral oils of the country, and would not proceed to the electrification of the country either, which the revisionists considered as *Utopia* in the conditions of Albania, she would not have her mechanical industry, able to produce to a large extent the spare parts needed for motor-vehicles, tractors and other branches of the people's economy; she would not have the cement industry and that of other construction materials, she should rely on the generosity of others to obtain these products.

In other words, had Albania acted on the modern revisionists' 'advice,' she would not have today an independent national economy, which stands on its own feet, an economy with complex, heavy and light, extracting and processing industry, and with an advanced agriculture, capable of satisfying the country's need for cereals and other products. If such a thing was permitted it would endanger the freedom and the independence of the country and would favour the departure of Albania from the socialist path. 'If the Party, Comrade Enver Hoxha has said, had followed the course indicated by the Tito and Khrushchev cliques, it would have been a suicide and a betrayal of the high interests of the Homeland, the people and socialism.'<sup>48</sup>

Khrushchev's ideas and plans for Albania failed to provoke the Albanians to become irrational. Enver Hoxha did not merely become angry and unquestioningly though albeit reluctantly accept his fate as one might expect a leader of a small country to do due to a lack of viable alternatives. A shrewd strategy was followed whereby Hoxha

and Albania exploited the world situation to Albania's utmost advantage. Concurrent to these developments was the battle for supremacy between the Soviet Union and China for leadership of the world's socialist bloc.

Albania in 1959 alone garnered \$83.8 million in aid and "loans" (which would never be repaid) from the Soviet Union, \$35 million from other socialist countries (COMECON members) and \$13.8 million from China.<sup>49</sup> Once again, Hoxha used the leverage he possessed by "being on the fence" between formally allying with one or the other of the nations vying for leadership of the Communist bloc to gain as much aid as possible to use in developing the economic base of Albania. It is unnecessary to emphasize how much \$132.6 million in incoming capital meant to a small economy. This unquestionably was a brilliant piece of diplomacy. It followed the general trend in Albanian economic relations which effectively gained as much aid as possible before severing an alliance and adopting a new primary benefactor. Formal diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Albania were severed on December 3, 1961.

The Chinese almost immediately began to take the place of the Soviet Union as Albania's primary benefactor. China provided \$123 million in aid to Albania to offset the withdrawn Soviet and COMECON aid which was necessary to complete the Third Five-Year Plan. Among the many reasons why China seemed to be a more appealing trading partner at this time include the following reasons noted by Adi Schnytzer:

the PLA leadership's desire for independence in determining development policy would undoubtedly be more easily reconciled with alliance with China than the U. S. S. R., and Soviet ideas of 'integration' through COMECON. Further, while China could scarcely be expected to be as lavish with aid as the Soviet Union had been, the small size of the Albanian economy made it likely that the drain on China's resources of aid that was significant to Albania would be small in Chinese eyes. Further, it was not unlikely that China would provide more heavy industrial plant than the Soviet Union had wished to do.<sup>50</sup>

One of the great accomplishments, with the most far-reaching implications in many spheres of Albanian life; economic, cultural, social, educational, etc. which Albania achieved throughout the entire period of

Enver Hoxha's years in power was the electrification of the country. Prior to the government of Hoxha, many remote mountain villages not only did not have electricity, it is quite likely that they did not even know of its existence.

According to the schedule implemented by Enver Hoxha in 1960, Albania was to achieve by 1985, the complete electrification of all the villages and inhabited centers. Later, in December 1967, since only twenty-nine percent of villages were electrified, the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor moved this date up to November 1971, the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the Albanian Communist Party. However, due to the high priority given to this project, Albania achieved total electrification ahead of schedule on October 25, 1970.<sup>51</sup> The significance of this achievement can not be underestimated. This was one of the most significant factors in Albania's history in terms of bringing Albania into the modern world.

A somewhat bombastic quotation praising the electrification of Albania is germane to this discussion due to its succinct message:

...Albania was... one of the first countries with complete electrification. To reach this end it spent only 25 years, starting from the torch and lantern, from a time when in many foreign countries people were using the neon lights on the shop windows and when for a century they had been living in the epoch of the electrification, but are still far behind the complete electrification of all the villages.<sup>52</sup>

The introduction of electricity to remote villages allowed for the first time, electric lights, radio, power tools, etc., to name a few ways in which the lives of the inhabitants were transformed. Radio, for example, was an item whose use was made possible due to electrification. This was a powerful tool for Enver Hoxha to use in terms of gaining a firmer grasp of the people through the use of propagandist<sup>^</sup> media. The Party of Labor was now able to increase its presence in every village and town in Albania

During the Chinese period of alliance, Albania adopted the principles of self-reliance and achieved steady growth. An indication of the high level of growth, as well as an effective method of putting Albanian growth into some sort of perspective, may best be seen by comparing growth rates in Albania with those of other countries. The



period in question is 1965-1975, during which the growth rates in industrial production in Albania:

...as against the rates of the German Democratic Republic, were 68.7 per cent higher; as against those of Czechoslovakia 61.2 per cent higher; of Hungary 74.2 per cent; Yugoslavia 54.3 per cent; Greece 16.2 per cent; Soviet Union 36.7 per cent; the Federal German Republic approximately 2.2 times, Italy approximately 1.6 times; France approximately 1.2 times.<sup>53</sup>

A summary of the various Five-Year plans implemented in Albania is as follows:

During the nearly 30-year long period covering the six five-year plans (1951-1979), the economy of socialist Albania has developed at high rates. The rates of average annual growth of the economy of the country during this period have been as follows; total social product—8.7 per cent, national income — 7.4 per cent, the total industrial production —12.4 per cent, the total agricultural production—5 per cent, state investments — 9.2 per cent. From 1950 onwards, total social product increased 3.2 times, national income — 2.7 times, total industrial production — 4.6 times and total agricultural production about 2 times more rapidly than the growth of population.<sup>54</sup>

Adi Schnytzer in testimony before the Joint Economic Committee of Congress in 1981 had an interesting opinion concerning Albania's motivations in breaking relations with China. His supposition parallels the beliefs of this writer but is difficult, if not impossible to prove conclusively. Schnytzer believes that: "Given the Albanian propensity for debt annulment in the event of a split with a communist ally, it would not be surprising if the PLA leadership precipitated the final break with China."<sup>55</sup>

Adil Çarçani, the Prime Minister of Albania delivered a report to the Ninth Party Congress in November 1986 commenting on the results of the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1981-1985). The Seventh Five-Year Plan is extremely important due to the fact that it was the first five-year plan based solely upon self-reliance and domestic resources, with no foreign aid. Thus, the success or failure of this five-year plan is indicative to a large degree of the overall success or failure of the policy

of self-reliance, as well as a litmus test of the actual development and vigor of the economy.

Çarçani's report notes both areas which were successful as well as areas which failed to meet the plan targets. The major areas in which the economy was successful in achieving positive results as compared to the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1976-1980) include:

...the social product increased nearly 19 per cent, the national income more than 16 per cent, and the total financial revenue of the state more than 17 per cent. Over the five years taken together, a total of more than 21 thousand million lekë, or approximately as much as was invested from 1956-1970, was invested. About 200 thousand new jobs were opened up in town and countryside.

...During the 7th Five-year Plan the production of electric energy increased 46 per cent and of coal 48 per cent. [Also]... the extraction of chromite, copper and iron-nickel ores, taken together, amounted to more than 14 million tons, compared with about 10 million tons in the 6th Five-year Plan, while the total industrial production of the extraction and processing of these minerals increased 71 per cent.

The engineering industry fulfilled the needs of the country better with spare parts, machinery and equipment, increasing the production of spare parts 50 per cent and that of machinery and equipment 54 per cent, compared with the 6th Five-year Plan.

...The light and food-stuffs industry ...increased production of consumer goods 19 per cent. .. [Likewise, in the field of agriculture], ...the production of field crops for the five years taken together increased 17 per cent.

...In 1985, as against 1980, the total volume of exports increased by about 29 per cent.<sup>56</sup>

The areas which Çarçani mentions as failures or as partial failures include especially the oil and gas extraction industries. These industries were considered as serious failures due to their inability to meet plan targets. The cause for their failure is significant since Prime Minister Çarçani candidly notes the reasons as: "...shortcomings and weaknesses which have been displayed in management and organization, in technical

and labour discipline, in scientific studies and prospecting, especially for the discovery of new fields, etc."<sup>57</sup>

Partial failures were noted in the field of agriculture, particularly in the areas of corn production, livestock farming, and fruit-growing. Çarçani concludes that it "...is not a consequence of unfavourable weather conditions only, but also of shortcomings and weaknesses in the field of management and organization of the work."<sup>58</sup> Likewise, although exports were improved, Çarçani notes that "...all the possibilities to increase exports and reduce imports were not utilized."<sup>59</sup>

The branch of the industrial portion of the economy which was most affected by the adoption of the policy of self-reliance was the Engineering Industry. This industry was responsible for the production of the spare parts needed to keep the economy running. The following table lists the percentage of industrial production (at 1986 prices) produced by the Engineering Industry.

Table 10-4: Engineering Industry Production Figures<sup>1</sup>

	1950	1960	1970	1980	1985
Percentage of Production by Engineering Industry	2.8	2.7	7.3	12.5	14.6

<sup>1</sup>Ministria e Ekonomise Drejtoria e Statistikes. *Vjetari Statistikor i Shqiperise 1991*, p. 154.

The adherence and increasing dependence on the policy of self-reliance caused a concomitant increase in the percentage of total industrial production produced by the Engineering Industry.

It seems appropriate at this point in the discussion of Albania's economy during Enver Hoxha's years in power to draw some conclusions regarding the overall success or failure of Albania's plan for achieving economic development. The most basic starting point to objectively judge whether economic development occurred is to define

economic development and then proceed to see if Albania successfully or unsuccessfully met the criteria listed in the definition.

Adi Schnytzer's book, *Stalinist Economic Strategy in Practice: The Case of Albania* makes an interesting and well thought-out framework by which to begin to interpret and assess Albania's history of economic development. The thesis of Schnytzer's book is that Josef Stalin made his last major statement on economic development in *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U. S. S. R.* Schnytzer believes that this book was Stalin's blueprint for the development of socialist economies throughout the world. This plan was to emphasize the growth of heavy industry at all costs and treat all other sectors of the economy as a residual.

The most unique aspect of Albania's economic planning methodology has undoubtedly been the 1976 Constitution which prohibits any foreign aid, loans, or credits of any kind. This situation kept Albania relatively free of foreign debt. Oxford University economist Michael Kaser testified before the Joint Economic Committee of Congress in 1977 concerning the constitution. Its significance includes the fact that:

No government in the world has ever asked its legislature constitutionally to disbar it from raising an external loan. But Albania, after a decade of encouraging self-reliance, has converted exhortation and policy into its fundamental law.<sup>60</sup>

Enver Hoxha detailed Albania's new development strategy at the Seventh Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor on November 1, 1976. Albania's plan was:

To go at rapid rates with the socialist construction of the country for the transformation of socialist Albania into an industrial-agricultural country, with advanced industry and agriculture, according to the principle of self-reliance, for the further allround strengthening of the economic independence of the country; to further improve the socialist relations of production and superstructure; to strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat and enhance the defense potential of the homeland; to raise the material and cultural level of the working masses higher by carrying further the narrowing of distinctions between town and countryside. This is to be achieved on the basis of the consistent waging

of the class struggle and the mobilization of all forces and energies of the people under the leadership of the party.<sup>61</sup>

Albania continued to diversify its trade relations with other countries after the break with China. This diversification of trade was coupled with an expansion of relations with countries "irrespective of differences in social order."<sup>62</sup> However, priority was given to bilateral cooperation with neighboring countries.

Belgrade and Tiranë soon began to cooperate with each other more since they both realized that Moscow was their common enemy. Trade between Albania and Yugoslavia increased dramatically in this period (until 1981). In 1978, \$28 million in trade took place. This figure rose to \$60 million in 1979, and \$115 million in 1980.<sup>1,3</sup> Relations were also expanded greatly in this period between Albania and Greece, Italy, Turkey, and Austria.

Albania's trade with the COMECON (all except the Soviet Union) grew significantly in the first years following the break with China. In 1978, the amount of reciprocal trade was \$170 million. It rose to \$220 million in 1979, and \$260 million in 1980. The COMECON was an important trade ally for Albania not only for the amount of trade conducted between the two parties but because it would accept "qualitatively inferior Albanian goods which were unsellable in Western markets."<sup>64</sup>

By the end of 1980, Albania had succeeded in diversifying its trade sufficiently to counteract the effects upon the Albanian economy of the withdrawal of Chinese trade. At this time, Yugoslavia accounted for nineteen percent, industrialized West forty percent, and COMECON forty-one percent of Albania's total foreign trade.<sup>65</sup>

Riots occurred in the Kosovë region of Yugoslavia in March and April 1981 when the predominantly ethnic Albanian inhabitants (77 percent of the population) called for an upgrade in political status for the region from an "autonomous" province under Serbian jurisdiction to full-fledged republic status. Kosovars complained about racial discrimination. The Yugoslav government retaliated by calling in the army and brutally ended the revolt. The events in Kosovë caused a severe cooling in relations between Yugoslavia and Albania. Trade

continued but it was reduced from \$134 million in 1981 to \$88.3 million in 1984.<sup>66</sup>

In order to gain some much needed perspective concerning the overall condition of the Albanian economy it is helpful to look at Albania's exports and imports.

Table 10-5: Albanian Exports and Imports in Millions of *Lekë*

	1950	1960	1970	1980	1985
Exports	46	350	617	2,487	2,101
Imports	159	583	1,035	2,499	2,520

Source: Ministria e Ekonomise Drejtoria e Statistikes. *Vjetari Statistikor i Shqiperise 1991*, pp. 296, 298

An area which has not been addressed but which is crucial to an understanding of Albania's economy is to look at the actual workings of the system of economic planning. As one might surmise, Albania's economy was based on highly bureaucratic central planning.

The system of plan formation had three major steps. In March of the pre-plan year, a draft of the plan was sent from Tiranë to the enterprises (the quota phase). The enterprise then sent their revisions back to Tiranë (the preliminary plan phase) so that the State Planning Commission could coordinate the various plans and pass the final version on to the Council of Ministers for approval by November 15th. The final approved plan was sent back to the enterprises as law.

This Stalinist approach to economic planning and development was in effect for over forty years with few changes. One interesting change which was made was in the plan indicator system. The number of indicators used to determine the plan were reduced to increase "efficiency." For instance, the number of industrial production indicators were reduced from 550 to 77, agricultural indicators were reduced from 320 to 42, and investment and construction indicators were also reduced from 500 to 100. Unfortunately, the exact nature of these indicators was never clearly disclosed. For purposes of this study, this is not a detriment because the significance lies merely in the

fact that the number of these indicators were greatly reduced. It can be safely assumed that this reduction could have no other effect besides reducing bureaucracy and most likely increased efficiency. Less time was spent compiling and analyzing plan indicators and supposedly more time was spent on actual work.<sup>67</sup>

Another important change made was to diminish the importance of the position of the enterprise director. The Albanian Party of Labor hoped that this change would enable it to mobilize the workers to press for higher plan targets than would normally be acceptable to management. Management was traditionally reticent to make high plan targets due to fear of failing to achieve the targets. Management preferred to make reasonably low plan targets then surpass these targets and thus, be considered extremely successful. The concept of Albanian enterprise management changed from *udheheqje unike* (literal translation of "one-man management") to *drejtim unik* (literal translation of "single guidance").<sup>68</sup>

Albanian economic planning was quite rigid in terms of strictly following the precepts prescribed by many of the "classic" Communist theorists. Friedrich Engels, for example, wrote considerably about the components necessary to "correctly" implement a rational socialist economy. *Anti-Duhring*, in particular, explained many of these principles. It seems that many of the ideas discussed in Engels' chapter on production were adopted in a wholesale fashion by Albanian economic planners. For instance, Friedrich Engels wrote:

Only a society which makes it possible for its productive forces to dovetail harmoniously into each other on the basis of one single vast plan can allow industry to be distributed over the whole country in the way best adapted to its own development, and to the maintenance and development of the other elements of production.

Accordingly, abolition of the antithesis between town and country is not merely possible. It has become a direct necessity of industrial production itself.

There has been a conscious effort made at implementing the territorial distribution of industries in a rational manner. The only exceptions to this general mode of planning have been the industries and other types of development made in particularly backward districts

which were made in an effort to bring the development of these districts more in line with the rest of the country. In the socialist mode of planning, there should be as high a degree of equity amongst regions as is humanly possible. A very succinct summarization of the principles of this rational distribution plan is given by Banja and Toci. The similarity between Engels' formulae and those presented by Banja and Toci will be apparent. These principles are:

...setting up the industry near the sources of raw materials, near the thermo-energetic sources and the centres of consumption of the production, reduction of the transport, lowering of the social expenses of the production, uniform distribution of industry in various districts of the country and the abolishment of the backwardness inherited from the past, specialized and complex development of industry in every district, its development in harmony with agriculture and as a powerful support for the intensification of the agricultural production and the all-round progress of the countryside.<sup>TM</sup>

The works of Joseph Schumpeter are extremely relevant to the case of Albanian Socialism. Schumpeter's last writing was entitled "The March into Socialism" in which he defines centralist Socialism (which existed in Hoxha's Albania) as:

...that organization of society in which the means of production are controlled, and the decisions on how and what to produce and on who is to get what, are made by public authority instead of privately-owned and privately-managed firms."<sup>71</sup>

Socialism was further elaborated upon by Schumpeter in his work entitled *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*. The Schumpeterian thesis began by saying "...that there is a strong case for believing in its [Socialism's] superior economic efficiency."<sup>72</sup> An area in which theoretically Socialism would have an edge over capitalism is in the mechanism of trade cycles:

...The planning of progress, in particular the systematic coordination and orderly distribution in time of new ventures in all lines, would be incomparably more effective in preventing bursts at some times and depressive reactions at others than any automatic or manipulative variations of the rate of interest or the supply of credit can be. In fact,



it would eliminate the cause of the cyclical ups and downs whereas in the capitalist order it is only possible to mitigate them.<sup>73</sup>

Schumpeter continues by qualifying his statements concerning Socialism:

Of course, all that I have said so far refers exclusively to the logic of blueprints, hence to 'objective' possibilities which Socialism in practice may be quite unable to realize. But as a matter of blueprint logic it is undeniable that the Socialist blueprint is drawn at a higher level of rationality. This, I believe, is the correct way of putting the matter. It is not a case of rationality versus irrationality.<sup>74</sup>

Joseph Schumpeter's theories concerning the theoretical advantage of Socialism or one may say, of central planning are quite important and relevant to any discussion of Albania's economy during the period in which Enver Hoxha and the Albanian Party of Labor were in power. This view is the same as mentioned earlier by Gramoz Pashko. In a situation where there is little, if any, economic base in existence it seems extremely logical to mobilize the resources which do exist in an orderly and planned fashion rather than in a merely *ad hoc* random manner.

An "official" statement claiming the superiority of a planned economy rather than a market economy reads as follows:

Planned economy, in addition to avoiding unnecessary waste of social work, ensures a more rational and profitable exploitation of all sources both within the particular enterprises and the national economy as a whole, and constantly finds out new sources and reserves for increasing production.

At variance with the capitalist principle of profitability, the socialist planned development assures the best form of profitability, that is, a profitability viewed from the angle of the society as a whole.<sup>75</sup>

Arnold Toynbee presented an economic view which has some relevance to the Albanian case in his work entitled: *A Study of History*, particularly in the section, "The Mechanicalness of Mimesis." Toynbee elucidates the best description of a general model which this writer has found. Toynbee's view of mimesis is a trickle-down theory where a

few smart people in society have an idea and the rest of the society follows their example under their leadership.

Growth is the work of creative personalities and creative minorities; they cannot go on moving forward themselves unless they can contrive to carry their fellows with them in their advance; and the uncreative rank and file of mankind, which is always the overwhelming majority, cannot be transfigured *en masse* and raised to the stature of their leaders in the twinkling of an eye. That would be in practice impossible... The leader's task is to make his fellows his followers; and the only means by which mankind in the mass can be set in motion towards a goal beyond itself is by enlisting the primitive and universal faculty of mimesis. For this mimesis is a kind of social drill; and the dull ears that are deaf to the unearthly music of Orpheus' lyre are well attuned to the drill sergeant's word of command. When the Piper of Hamelin assumes King Frederick William's Prussian voice, the rank and file, who have stood stolid hitherto, mechanically break into movement, and the evolution which he causes them to execute brings them duly to heel; but they can only catch him up by taking a short cut, and they can only find room to march in formation by deploying on the broad way which leadeth to destruction. When the road to destruction has perforce to be trodden on the quest of life, it is perhaps no wonder that the quest should often end in disaster.

Moreover, there is a weakness in the actual exercise of mimesis, quite apart from the way in which the faculty may be exploited. For, just because mimesis is a kind of drill, it is a kind of mechanization of human life and movement.<sup>76</sup>

Enver Hoxha and the rest of the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor definitely became infected with the mechanicalness of their followers. Hoxha insured the complicity of Albanian society by using force and implementing many purges of any real or imagined opposition. There is no question that in many respects the Albanian people were an alienated proletariat as Toynbee describes. The population lost its capacity for self-determination in terms of freedom of action or the ability to voice any dissent against the decrees of Enver Hoxha or government policy; the ability to achieve economic development to its fullest potential due to the exclusion of foreign contacts necessary for the influx of modern technology; and in the area of freedom of religion since the closing of all churches and mosques in 1967. This is quite

similar to the theory of the "herd mentality" propounded by Freud in Chapter Eleven.

There is no question that the Albanian economy had its share of problems, especially in the latter years of Enver Hoxha's leadership. The economy desperately needed an infusion of modern Western technology. The Albanian technology was obsolete when it was received from the Chinese and Soviets and certainly could not compete with the world's most modern methods in 1985. This shortcoming was made even more severe when coupled with the problem of the high growth rate of the population. Population growth in Albania in 1985 was three to four times higher than anywhere else in Europe. The average age of the population was twenty-six years old with one-third of the people under the age of fifteen. Prior to the downfall of the Communist government when emigration was strictly limited, the Albanian population was projected to increase from three million in 1985 to four million by the year 2000, an increase of thirty-three percent. This situation when added to the factor of antiquated technology means that if the status quo which existed in Enver Hoxha's lifetime had been perpetuated and change had not been fundamental and rapid, the economy would have unquestionably regressed and much of the progress would have been lost.

Despite the obvious shortcomings of the Albanian economy, it is undeniable that economic development did occur in Albania under Enver Hoxha. Although it is true the trends which the economy exhibited toward the end of Hoxha's life suggest stagnation and would have resulted in the unquestionable regression of the economy if left unchanged, nonetheless, the Albanian economy must be considered a success within Albanian parameters. When one considers that pre-war Albania had practically no industry, the strides forward which were made are extremely impressive, especially taking into consideration the ideological and legal (constitutional) constraints limiting Albania's development. In fact, due to the circumstances Albania found itself in after World War II, the Albanian Party of Labor's decision to implement a centralized economy made quite a lot of sense. A centrally planned economy when installed in a situation of limited prior development, as in Albania, is probably the best method to insulate an economy from

undesirable external influences, as well as manipulating high priority domestic resource allocation to achieve a desired end.

The respondents to Question Number 16 of the questionnaire in *Appendix A* definitely seem to disagree with many of the opinions of this writer concerning the nature of industry under Enver Hoxha. Ninety-four percent of the respondents believe that Albanian industry was negative and only six percent feel that it was a positive development. Two quotations of respondents, in particular should be mentioned here, namely: "It was an old technology, so the industry had no future," and "I think [industry] equals Century XVIII."<sup>77</sup> There is no doubt that the technology was antiquated. Nonetheless, the opinion of this writer is unshaken in the belief that in the overall Albanian historical context, the industrial development which did occur was a positive development in Albania's history. Unquestionably, improvements could and should have been made but nonetheless, industry was a positive aspect of Enver Hoxha's period in power.

There seems to be both advantages and disadvantages to Albania's self-reliance strategy. It seems to make quite a lot of sense to extensively develop the hydroelectric power capacity which enabled Albania to supply all of its own domestic power needs and earn hard currency exports of surplus power to foreign countries. Likewise, it was quite rational to prioritize the development of the mining and oil extraction industries in light of the abundant Albanian resources which of course were a great source of hard currency earnings due to exports.

However, it seems rather inefficient to devote so much effort in supplying most of the needed spare parts domestically by the engineering industry. Although this approach was favored due to ideological considerations, in a strict efficiency context, it was irrational to do so. Undoubtedly, most of Albania's spare parts needs could have been acquired at a lower cost from foreign suppliers due to the primitive technology of the Albanian machine industry. Overall, though, the advantages of self-reliance within the Albanian context appear to be outweighed by the disadvantages caused by inefficiency. The crucial factor is the extent to which this policy of self-reliance was stretched.

A key factor which can not be overlooked is the issue which Prime Minister Adil Çarçani raised in *his Report to the Ninth Party Congress*, namely, the failures or partial failures which did occur were

due to "shortcomings and weaknesses in the field of management and organization of work." Or one could say that failures were due to weaknesses caused by an overly centralized economic planning system. If this premise is accepted as a matter of fact, then a simple solution would seem to be to lessen planning controls in order to insert more local autonomy and theoretically, achieve additional efficiency due to a lessening of bureaucracy.

However, not only is this "logical" solution not proposed, but a more radical and contradictory "solution" is advocated. Instead of less centralized Party control over the economy, more centralized control is called for. The explanation given by Adil Çarçani for this radical course is:

The Party demands that a real and radical change must be made in the field of control. As Comrade Ramiz Alia pointed out in his Report, the task is presented that control must be strengthened everywhere and over everything, and in particular, the internal control must be strengthened in enterprises and cooperatives and self-control strengthened in the districts and ministries. In this question there is still backwardness. In some cases it is reduced simply to financial control and auditing. As a result of all this, the effectiveness of control for the accomplishment of the tasks of the plan in quantity, quality and assortment, in distribution according to contracts, as well as in all the other economic and financial indices is still low. This has dictated the need that...we must take measures to ensure that all the links of the management of the economy, from the brigade, sector, department, enterprise and agricultural cooperative and up to the ministry, are set in motion more effectively for internal control and self-control, by concentrating it on systematically checking up on the accomplishment of targets of the plan.<sup>78</sup>

The "solution" which Ramiz Alia and Adil Çarçani advocate concerning increasing Party control over the economy was definitely a mistaken one. This approach was doomed to failure and is a microcosm of the theory advocated by this study that centralized planning is efficient to a certain point of development due to its ability to coordinate disparate resources and sectors of the economy. However, after this level of development is achieved, continued centralized control with little local autonomy is counterproductive. Therefore, an increase in centralized control is increasingly counterproductive.

This is an example where further efficiency and development would take place if centralized control was abandoned to a large degree, as well as, a policy of increased foreign interaction was adopted to increase the level of technology attained.

Another problem which plagued the Albanian economy in the last years prior to Enver Hoxha's death was worker absenteeism. During 1983,

...770,000 workdays were lost because of workers' failing to turn up, the equivalent of 2,5000 workers missing work everyday. During the first half of the current year [1984], there were 340,000 workdays lost, or 2,200 workers missing every day.<sup>79</sup>

It is quite evident the effect that this high absentee rate would have upon economic productivity.

The position which Albania found itself in 1985 was precisely where Enver Hoxha wanted it to be. The Party of Labor and Hoxha had guided the country through the alliances with Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and China respectively as a natural evolutionary process toward its ultimate goal of having no overriding alliances, maintaining sovereignty and independence, and being self-sufficient. Albania exploited each of its alliances to gain the most materially it could without compromising its ideological principles. However, whenever an alliance partner placed too much pressure upon Albania politically (to make changes) or economically (to repay debts or to emphasize a specific area of the economy, such as agriculture or light industry, at the expense of heavy industry), then Albania decided it was best to move forward and leave a relationship which impeded upon its decision-making ability.

This study does not wish to give the false impression that Enver Hoxha was omniscient and somehow "knew" the course alliance patterns and the economy itself would take on its path toward autarky. Naturally, the changes in alliances were made due to the prevailing political climate and due to simple pragmatic considerations of remaining firmly entrenched in power. However, Hoxha did know that someday he wanted Albania to be at the point it found itself in at the time of his death. The three major goals Enver Hoxha pursued throughout his life were to remain in power, achieve the fastest rate of growth possible

without sacrificing ideological integrity, particularly in industry and to maintain the strongest possible direct influence on the economy were achieved. Therefore, although a citizen of the West would be dissatisfied with the Albanian economy as compared to their own economy, all objective observers must agree that Enver Hoxha and the Albanian Party of Labor have been quite successful in the overall sense, within of course the Albanian historical context, in achieving what they set out to accomplish upon assuming power in 1944. However, with less rigidity, even further more spectacular accomplishments could have been achieved.

The factors of less rigidity, in terms of central planning, ideological considerations due to self-reliance, and most importantly, isolation, were the greatest shortcomings of the Enver Hoxha-inspired development plan of the Albanian economy. Had a more pragmatic policy been adhered to which allowed for an influx of modern technology, there is no question that the Albanian economy could have achieved even more impressive results since the economic base was clearly established.

On the positive side, an objective analysis must conclude that Enver Hoxha's plan to mobilize all of Albania's resources under the regimentation of a central plan was effective and quite successful. One must always keep in mind that Albania was a tribal society, not necessarily primitive but certainly less developed than most. It had no industrial or working class tradition and no experience using modern production techniques. Thus, the results achieved, especially in the phases of initial planning and construction of the economic base were both impressive and positive.

The prioritization of heavy industry which enabled Albania to take advantage of the large number of natural resources it possessed was extremely logical. These resources allowed the melding of ideology with pragmatism. In fact, had these resources not existed, a plan calling for heavy industrialization would have been ludicrous.

On the negative side, Hoxha's dogmatic approach which precluded any concessions to pragmatic concerns, such as the need for an infusion of modern technology, etc. kept Albania from progressing as far as it conceivably could have. Once the economic base was established, Albanian economists claim this occurred in 1960, but

without question it certainly occurred by 1970, it made the most sense to move away from the rigid course and open the door for modern technology to enter into Albanian industry. The reason for this "non-decision" against any influx of modern methods was of course due to Enver Hoxha's personal concerns for the maintenance of his own power and the power of the Albanian Party of Labor. Although one can explain the reasons behind Hoxha's methods in rigid implementation of ideology, it nonetheless was a grave mistake.

Therefore, despite the self-imposed restraints placed upon the Albanian economy, considering the pathetic starting point it began from, the Albanian economy must be considered a success at the time of Hoxha's death. It is true, that the growth rates of industrial production were continually lowering. Yet, growth was still occurring. One must add, however, this situation could not have remained unchanged for much longer (after 1985) without its inevitable collapse taking place.



*Notes*

<sup>1</sup> Hasan Banja, Establishment and Prospects of Development of Socialist Industry in the People's Republic of Albania (Tiranë: Naim Frasheri Publishing House, 1969), 9.

<sup>2</sup> Adi Schnytzer, *Stalinist Economic Strategy in Practice: The Case of Albania* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 16.

<sup>3</sup> H. Banja and V. Toci, *Socialist Albania on the Road to Industrialization*, (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1979), 20.

<sup>4</sup> Ramadan Marmullaku, *Albania and the Albanians*, trans. Margot and Bosko Milosavljevic (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1975), 36.

<sup>5</sup> *Albania: A Country Survey*, ed. Raymond Zickel and Walter Iwaskiw, 2d ed (Washington: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1994), 106.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.; Marmullaku, 37.

\* H. Banja and V. Toci, 23-24.

<sup>9</sup> The importance of Italian geologic surveying was emphasized by Bernd Fischer in a conversation with the author at the national convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Philadelphia, Pa., 19 November 1994.

<sup>10</sup> H. Banja and V. Toci, 15.

<sup>11</sup> Orjan Sjöberg, *Rural Change and Development in Albania* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 23.

<sup>12</sup> H. Banja and V. Toci, 9-10.

<sup>13</sup> For a good discussion of the lack of a working class, See Besim Bardhoshi and Theodor Kareco, *The Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of Albania During Thirty Years of People's Power* (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1974), 12-14.

<sup>14</sup> Gramoz Pashko, "The Albanian Economy at the Beginning of the 1990's," in *Economic Change in the Balkan States: Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia*, ed. Orjan Sjöberg and Michael Wyzan (New York: St Martin's Press, 1991), 128.

<sup>15</sup> The Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania, *History of the Party of Labor of Albania*, 2d ed (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1982), 244-245.

- <sup>16</sup> *The Development of Agriculture in the People's Republic of Albania*. (Tiranë: Naim Frasheri State Publishing House, 1962), 8.
- <sup>17</sup> Marmalluku, 93-94.
- <sup>18</sup> Pandi Geco, *Albania, A Physical and Economic Survey*, trans. U. S. Government (Tiranë: n.p., 1959), 120.
- <sup>19</sup> H. Banja and V. Toci, 29.
- <sup>20</sup> Schnytzer, 66.
- <sup>21</sup> Nicholas Pano, *The People's Republic of Albania* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), 79.
- <sup>22</sup> H. Banja and V. Toci, 37-46.
- <sup>23</sup> Enver Hoxha, *With Stalin* (Tirane: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1979), 153.
- <sup>24</sup> Geco, 124-125.
- <sup>25</sup> Ministria e Ekonomise Drejtoria e Statistikes. *Vjetari Statistikor i Shqiperise 1991* [1991 Statistical Yearbook of Albania] (n.p., 1991), 178.
- <sup>26</sup> Kozma Skarco, *Agriculture in the People's Socialist Republic of Albania*. (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1984), 66, 78.
- <sup>27</sup> Ibid., 66.
- <sup>28</sup> Hoxha, *Selected Works*, Vol 5, p. 29.
- <sup>29</sup> Interview with Evan Rroço, Tiranë, Albania, April 5, 1994.
- <sup>30</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>31</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>32</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>33</sup> H. Banja and V. Toci, *Socialist Albania on the Road to Industrialization*, pp. 40-41.
- <sup>34</sup> Ibid., p. 42.
- <sup>35</sup> Ibid., p. 54.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Hoxha, *With Stalin*, p. 84.

<sup>38</sup> H. Banja and V. Toci, *Socialist Albania on the Road to Industrialization*, p. 68. In fact, another source states that industrial production was even higher — 414.5 percent compared to 1938 (in prices of 1956) during the Two-Year Plan. Source: Pandi Geco, *Albania, A Physical and Economic Survey*, Trans. by U. S. Govt. (Tiranë: Publisher unknown, 1959), p. 82.

<sup>39</sup> *Albania, A Country Survey*, pp. 109-110.

<sup>40</sup> H. Banja and V. Toci, *Socialist Albania on the Road to Industrialization*, p. 70. The most important mineral resource in Albania is chromium. It is enlightening to view the progress made in the mining of this mineral. In 1938, only 7,000 tons were mined. The amount extracted in 1939-1940 rose to 17,900 tons. By 1955, there was 122,100 tons of chromium mined in Albania. Source: Pandi Geco, *Albania, A Physical and Economic Survey*, p. 95. It is interesting to note the large discrepancy between the chromium extracted in 1955 according to Geco and the amount listed by Skender Dëde. Dëde claims that at the peak of chromium production, 1,200,000 tons were extracted in a single year. Source: Interview with Skender Dëde, Tiranë, Albania, April 10, 1994.

<sup>41</sup> Interview with Skender Dëde, Tiranë, Albania, April 10, 1994.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Pandi Geco, *Albania, A Physical and Economic Survey*, p. 82.

<sup>44</sup> Enver Hoxha, *Selected Works*, Vol. 5, (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1985), p. 39.

<sup>45</sup> Interview with Alexander Dako, Tiranë, Albania, April 12, 1994.

<sup>46</sup> *Albania: A Country Survey*, p. 110.

<sup>47</sup> H. Banja and V. Toci, *Socialist Albania on the Road to Industrialization*, p. 72.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., pp. 7-8.

<sup>49</sup> *Albania: A Country Survey*, p. 111.

<sup>50</sup> Adi Schnytzer, *Stalinist Economic Strategy in Practice: The Case of Albania*, p. 71.

<sup>51</sup> Polio and Puto, *The History of Albania*, p. 280.

- <sup>52</sup> H. Banja & V. Toci, *Socialist Albania on the Road to Industrialization*, p. 101.
- " Ibid., P. 104.
- <sup>54</sup> Hasan Banja, *The Construction of the Economic Base of Socialism and its Perfection in the People's Socialist Republic of Albania*. (Tirane: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1982), pp. 13-14.
- <sup>55</sup> U. S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *The Impact of the Sino-Albanian Split on the Albanian Economy*, by Adi Schnytzer (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 648.
- <sup>56</sup> Adil Çarçani, *Report on the Directives of the 9th Congress of the Party For the 8th Five-Year Plan (1986-1990) of the Development of the Economy and Culture of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania*. (Tirane: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1986), pp. 6-9, 14.
- <sup>57</sup> Ibid., p. 7.
- <sup>58</sup> Ibid., p. 12.
- <sup>59</sup> Ibid., p. 14.
- <sup>60</sup> U. S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, "Trade and Aid in the Albanian Economy," by Michael Kaser (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 1332.
- <sup>61</sup> Enver Hoxha, *Report Submitted to the Seventh Congress of the Party of Labor of Albania* (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1976), p. 33.
- <sup>62</sup> *Zeri i popullit*, November 29, 1979, p. 1.
- <sup>63</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>64</sup> Elez Biberaj, "Albanian-Yugoslav Relations and the Question of Kosovë," *East European Quarterly* 16 no. 4 (January 1983): p. 496.
- <sup>65</sup> Trade figures obtained in *Borba*, November 4, 1981 as cited in Biberaj, *Albania and China* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), p. 148.
- <sup>66</sup> Biberaj, *Albania and China*, p. 150.
- <sup>67</sup> *Probleme Elconomike*, no. 1, 1973, pp. 55-76.
- <sup>68</sup> *Zeri i popullit*, January 4, 1976, p. 1.

<sup>69</sup> Friedrich Engels, *Anti-Duhring* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969), pp. 351-352.

<sup>70</sup> Banja & Toci, *Socialist Albania on the Road to Industrialization*, pp. 134-135.

<sup>71</sup> Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, And Democracy* 3rd ed., (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1962), p. 415.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., p. 188.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., p. 195.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., p. 196.

<sup>75</sup> *Answers to Questions About Albania*. (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1969). p. 175.

<sup>76</sup> Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History* Abridgement of Vols. I-VI by D. C. Somervell (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 276.

<sup>77</sup> Results of questionnaires given in Albania, March and April, 1994.

<sup>78</sup> Çarçani, *Report on the Directives of the 9th Congress of the Party for the 8th Five-Year Plan (1986-1990) of the Development of the Economy and Culture of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania*, pp. 69-70.

<sup>79</sup> Louis Zanga, "More Efficiency Urged For the Albanian Economy." Radio Free Europe RAD Background Report/216, November 30, 1984, p. 5.

## Chapter 11:

### *Enver Hoxha, the Man and Myth*

Enver Hoxha was born October 16, 1908 in Gjirokaster, a medium-sized town in southern Albania. His family were landowners and Moslem, as was 70% of the population. Hoxha grew up in a world of blood feuds when Albania was still part of the Ottoman Empire. It was, claimed one author: "...a world of Islam, male chauvinism and cultural and philosophical backwardness."<sup>1</sup> It is this type of societal backdrop which formed Hoxha's character and which influenced to a large degree, his future behavior. It could well be argued that the Albanian people's malaise, if not actual support of Hoxha and the Albanian Party of Labor is a byproduct of the Albanian cultural and historical background.

Enver Hoxha received his education at the Lycée français in Korçë. His most notable accomplishment there was becoming fluent in French. In 1931, at the age of twenty-three, Hoxha was awarded a scholarship by the Albanian government to study engineering at the university in Montpellier, France. While in France, Hoxha became a Communist. Eventually, King Zog's government became aware of Hoxha's political affiliations and discontinued his scholarship in February 1934.

Hoxha spent the next few years working abroad. He worked in Paris as a writer for the newspaper of the French Communist Party, *L'Humanité*. Hoxha under the pseudonym Lulo Malessori, viciously attacked Zog and his government. One of his constant themes was Zog's increasing dependence upon Italy whereby Albania was becoming less and less an equal "partner." He later worked in Brussels as the personal secretary for an Albanian diplomat and studied law. In 1936,

Hoxha returned to Korçë and became a teacher at the Lycée and was active in anti-Zog and later, anti-fascist movements on behalf of a Korçë Communist group of which he was a member.

As World War II dragged on and the fascist grip on Albania intensified, there was a movement among the various Communist factions throughout the country to bury their respective differences for the greater cause of ridding their homeland of the Italian, and later German, invaders. The first step toward this goal was taken on November 8, 1941 in Tiranë when the Albanian Communist Party was formed. Representatives of the various Communist factions and groups from throughout Albania were present at the ultra-secret meetings held from the 8th through the 14th of November. Enver Hoxha was elected as secretary of the provisional Central Committee because he alone had not become embroiled in petty disputes amongst the various factions and all of the groups could agree on him as their leader. Little did anyone know at the time, that this decision would remain unchanged until Hoxha's death in 1985.

Enver Hoxha remains an enigmatic figure, not only because of the secretive nature of the Albanian regime and Albanian society but because of the contradictory facets of his character. Vladimir Dedijer, in his book, *Tito* relates the quotation of Molotov to Stalin about Hoxha in 1947: "He is very handsome and leaves a good impression. He is quite cultured, but you feel Western influence on his upbringing."<sup>2</sup> Molotov's brief analysis is a good starting point to try to understand Hoxha's complex character.

Hoxha was cultured and intelligent, unlike most of the East European leaders after the war. He was a good politician (or one could say actor) in the sense that he could turn on or off his charm whenever it was propitious. Hoxha had a burning desire to prove that he was always right plus the stubbornness to go on until he wore his opponents down. These are very useful qualities in gaining and holding onto power. The drawback is that they antagonize and infuriate one's rivals.

Ismail Kadare, Albania's greatest writer, said of Hoxha: "He [Hoxha] knew how to dress well, and had very refined manners. . . All the other Communist leaders, even the French ones, were so boorish. . . For the Albanians, who have always been a rather elitist people, it counted a great deal."<sup>3</sup>

Josef Stalin and Enver Hoxha had a strange symbiotic relationship which necessarily needs to be analyzed. For instance, it was Stalin who saved Hoxha from being overthrown and most likely killed by Tito in 1948 by expelling Yugoslavia from the COMINFORM, but it also was Stalin who had given Tito *carte blanche* to "swallow up" Albania making it the seventh republic of Yugoslavia. Later, Stalin also gave the "green light" to Dimitrov and Tito to form their Balkan federation and annex Albania.

Enver Hoxha was the most loyal follower of Stalin. In fact, he was the quintessential Stalinist.<sup>4</sup> Many of the descriptions Nikita Khrushchev used to denounce Josef Stalin in his "secret" speech to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956 could easily be applied to Enver Hoxha. It is valuable to look at the statement Hoxha made in the March 7, 1953 issue of *Zeri i popullit* where he said:

*Emri i Stalinit është i lidhur ngushtësisht me të gjitha fitoret e popullit tone, është i lidhur me jetën tonë. Gjithçka gëzon sot populli në Atdheun tonë të lirë, la detyrojnë Atit e mësonjësit tonë të shtrënjtë Stalinit të Madh. Stalini na dha lirinë, dritën dhe jetën tonë të re.<sup>5</sup>*

To paraphrase Hoxha: Stalin's name is tied closely with all the victories of our people. Everything that our people enjoy we dedicate to our teacher, the Great Stalin. Stalin gave us light, freedom, and our new life.

One of the most revealing examples of the similarities between Stalin and Hoxha is in the announcements of their deaths. The announcement of Stalin's death appeared in *Zeri i popullit* on March 6th. The crucial passage was as follows: "...*Josif Visarionoviç Stallini vdiq me 5 mars në orën 9.50....Zemra...pushoi së rrahuri.*"<sup>6</sup> The relevant passage in the April 11, 1985 issue of *Zeri i popullit* which announced Hoxha's death was: "...*sot, me 11 prill 1985, ora 2.15, pushoi së rrahuri zemra e...shokut Enver Hoxha.*"<sup>7</sup> Even if the reader does not know the Albanian language, it is clear that the verbiage used is practically identical. Both quotations tell that at a certain hour, the Leaders' "hearts stopped beating." In other words, in death as in life, Enver Hoxha was a Stalinist through and through.



Thus, it is not surprising that Albania was one of the few places in the world where a mammoth statue of Stalin was the center of attention in the main square of the capital as late as 1990. Despite Hoxha's devotion, Stalin remained suspicious of his Balkan ally. Molotov's reference to the "Western influence" in Hoxha is quite revealing.

First of all, Albania and the Albanian Party of Labor had no historical ties to the Soviet Union and had liberated itself from the Germans and Italians in World War II without Soviet troops setting foot in Albania-unlike all the other East European nations. Thus, Albania and Hoxha had no direct "debt" to pay in the form of fealty to the "beloved leader" of Eastern Europe. Likewise, as a non-Slavic nation, Albania also had no historical "debt" to pay to Russia as the protector of the Slavic peoples.

Secondly, despite coming from the most backward country in Europe, Enver Hoxha was not just "quite" cultured but a very cultured intellectual. He was by far the best-read head of state in Eastern Europe. In addition to his fluency in French, Hoxha had a working knowledge of Italian, Serbo-Croatian, English and Russian. He read the Western press and referred to *Le Monde* and the *International Herald Tribune* quite often. There is evidence that Hoxha read the memoirs of many world statesmen, both the well-known ones, such as Churchill and the lesser-known ones, like Harry Hopkins (Roosevelt's aide).

Hoxha discloses in his writings that amongst his favorite writers were Molière, Shakespeare, Byron (who wrote quite a bit about Albania) and Goethe. Further proof of Hoxha's wide range of reading is seen in his keynote speech during the Cultural Revolution in 1967 concerning the role of women in Albanian society. For example, the five key sources of oppression of women which Hoxha cites are: Ecclesiastes, St. John Chrysostom, St. Thomas Aquinas, Nietzsche, and Freud.

Peter Prifti, a noted expert on Albania reflects on the Albanian leader by saying that:

Hoxha seems to be well informed about literature, the theater, and philosophy, particularly the philosophy of education...He might well be pictured as holding the sword of dictatorship of the proletariat in one hand and the Western 'lamp of learning' in the other."<sup>8</sup>

In short, Hoxha's reading interests are not what one would expect from the "average" Balkan ex-Moslem Stalinist.

Logic dictates that Stalin would be more suspicious of a leader who showed the propensity for original thought than the typical sycophantic and boorish "leaders" heading the other nations of Eastern Europe in the immediate post-war period. Most of these other "leaders," directly or indirectly, owed their positions not to their intrinsic personal qualities, but to their allegiance to Josef Stalin and the ease of malleability which they had demonstrated in the past during their rise to power.

Enver Hoxha was an extremely shrewd leader who had the uncanny ability to use events over which he had no personal control to his advantage. Evidence of this trait can be seen in the tensions between Stalin and Tito in 1948 which saved Albania from becoming part of Yugoslavia. The tensions between Khrushchev and Mao Zedong in 1960-1961 enabled Albania to switch from the ideological chaos in the Soviet Union (which allowed the blasphemous term [to Hoxha], 'peaceful coexistence' to become part of Soviet-American relations) to the radical Stalinist-type rule of China. In all of these instances, if the countries involved had not had more pressing issues to concern themselves with, then Albania might very well not have been in a position of self-determination. Albania could quite possibly have reverted back to the historical trend of being dominated by foreign countries.

Hoxha was extremely single-minded. He knew the end that he wished to achieve and used all methods in his power to ruthlessly accomplish them. "Enver Hoxha...orders purges like other people order out for pizza—that is, whenever the urge hits him."<sup>9</sup> Purges enabled Hoxha to liquidate any real or imagined opposition to him or the Albanian Party of Labor throughout his entire reign of power. The purge of Koçi Xoxe allowed Hoxha to end Yugoslav influence in the Albanian Party of Labor. Pro-Soviet factions were removed in the purges of Liri Belishova and Koço Tashko. Prominent Communists such as Beqir Balluku and Mehmet Shehu were purged a few years later.

Hoxha's brutality is seen in his desire to see one "traitor" Panajot Plaku (who escaped to Yugoslavia) hung from a lamppost in the middle of Tiranë.<sup>10</sup> Likewise, Hoxha stated in the *Titoites* (Albanian edition)

concerning the treatment of Mehmet Shehu: *"u ful ne dhe si qen"* or "he was buried like a dog."<sup>11</sup> Enver Hoxha's unwavering commitment to the employment of brutal purges were an extremely effective tool in controlling any opposition and securing his position of power. Often, no real opposition existed, or only opposition of a quite limited sort, so the purge provided a reason to shift gears and move forward to a new alliance or a justification for the present situation.

One result of Hoxha's shrewd and ruthless behavior is that at the time of his death in 1985, he was one of the world's longest reigning leaders. "This achievement is all the more remarkable since he held this position against three of the most redoubtable destabilising forces imaginable: Balkan tribal intrigue, Anglo-American subversion and invasion, and Kremlin plotting."<sup>12</sup>

Hoxha's reign of power was marked by his extreme suspicion of everyone with whom he came into contact. He spoke at length in his memoirs of his suspicions of his colleagues within the Albanian Party of Labor and his methods of "unmasking" spies and traitors. A curious aspect of Hoxha's suspicious nature can be seen when Chen Boda, Mao's secretary was purged as a foreign agent in China. Hoxha attacked the Chinese for being so lax as to allow Chen to remain in a position of authority undiscovered for such a long period of time. However, Hoxha failed to see the irony when he stated the "fact" that every single Minister of the Interior of Albania from the Party of Labor's assumption of power to the end of 1981 was a foreign agent.<sup>13</sup> Hoxha called the entire affair a conspiracy and refused to place any blame on himself for letting this type of situation exist for thirty-five years or to admit that the allegations were false. The questions which come to mind when considering Hoxha's suspicious nature is was Hoxha too suspicious, or simply, was it vigilance or paranoia?

The most blatant case of the ultra-suspicious nature of Enver Hoxha can be seen in the example of the "suicide" in December 1981 of Mehmet Shehu. Shehu was Hoxha's right-hand man since World War II. It was widely believed that Shehu had the inside track toward becoming Hoxha's successor, that is until 1981. At the 4th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor, September 24, 1982, Enver Hoxha delivered a speech which must rank amongst the world's most interesting lectures. The reason that this speech is so

interesting is that it is a testament to paranoia and suspicion. The speech was entitled, "A Synopsis of the Secret Activity of the Enemy Mehmet Shehu." It is an example of a recurring theme in Enver Hoxha's speeches and writings, which was to provide a rationale, explanation, or even a possible case for vindication after the fact. A footnote to the speech explains that the entire Central Committee unanimously approved the speech after Enver Hoxha delivered it.

Mehmet Shehu's work as a spy began when he went to school as a boy and attended Harry Fultz's American School in Tirane; one of the finest schools in Albania. After the Spanish Civil War, in which Shehu was a volunteer:

...Shehu went to a refugee camp in France where he stayed for three years, at a time when many of his comrades escaped from it. In the camp he was recruited as an agent of the British Intelligence Service also.

...During the National Liberation War, Mehmet Shehu and his wife, Fiqret Sanxhaktari, were recruited as agents of the Yugoslavs, too, by Dusan Mugosa [a long-time Yugoslav archenemy of Enver Hoxha]. To this end, the former was given the secret pseudonym MISH (Mehmet Ismail Shehu),<sup>4</sup> and the latter the pseudonym FISARI (Fiqret Sanxhaktari).

One of Mehmet Shehu's duties was to lead the delegation from time to time at the United Nations in New York. On one occasion, he traveled to New York aboard the luxury liner "Queen Elizabeth." Aboard the ship, were also Tito, Harry Fultz and Randolph Churchill. A single sentence of the account written by Hoxha describing Shehu's trip is a microcosm of Enver Hoxha's thinking. Hoxha said:

...it emerges that during the one-week trip Mehmet Shehu, being their agent, might very well have had and certainly did have secret meetings and talks with Tito, Fultz and R. Churchill, together or one at a time, informed them of the situation in and the stands of our Party, the acute contradictions which were arising with the Soviet Union and the stand which the leadership of our Party intended to take in Moscow.<sup>15</sup>

The key phrase here is that Shehu "might very well have had and certainly did have secret meetings." There is not a shred of proof presented by Hoxha, either in this short passage or in the preceding or

following paragraphs: merely, "might have had or certainly have had." A pure case of paranoia, suspicion, and self-vindication by naming someone else as the scapegoat and spy.

The twenty-eight pages of text of this anti-Shehu speech are chock full of examples of this sort of reasoning. One final example which must be mentioned deals with the alleged plots Mehmet Shehu was involved in to kill Enver Hoxha in order to turn Albania toward the West. This fear of assassination plots against Hoxha had some validity because he had made many enemies during his years in power. However, this fear is more significant in terms of the overall theme of imperialist-revisionist encirclement and siege mentality which will be discussed more thoroughly later in this volume.

Hoxha told the story of Shehu's involvement in an assassination conspiracy:

In 1972 Mehmet Shehu went to Paris for an operation, accompanied by the same team [other 'spies' Hoxha purged] that accompanied him to the UNO [United Nations], plus his wife Fiqret Shehu. There he made contact with a top figure of the American CIA, who said to him: 'What are you doing? You are getting old, you must act!'...The CIA recommended that he should act, but without compromising himself. It proposed three variants for the elimination of Enver Hoxha: 1) in a motor accident; 2) through shooting with a rifle from a distance; or 3) with delayed-action poison. It was left to Mehmet Shehu to put into action the variant he considered most feasible.

...Mehmet Shehu received the same instructions from the Yugoslav UDB, which was completely in agreement with the CIA.. Hence, Mehmet Shehu was directed and ordered by the American CIA to work out concrete plans to overturn the situation in Albania in favour of the West.<sup>16</sup>

Enver Hoxha simply refused to take any personal responsibility for allowing a situation as "serious" as this supposedly was to continue for over four decades. Proof of this inability to take any personal responsibility is seen in this explanatory note to the text of Hoxha's speech on Shehu. The note reads:

The dangerous plot of Mehmet Shehu, like the previous plots and groups of conspirators, was discovered by the forces and the vigilance of the Party and its leadership with Comrade Enver Hoxha at the head, and not

by the state security, which was headed by active secret agents, mainly of the Yugoslav UDB, such as Koçi Xoxe, Mehmet Shehu, Kadri Hazbiu and Feçor Shehu who for nearly four decades withheld from the Party information about the secret activities carried out by each of them in succession, thus covering up their dirty crimes which they committed against our country and people. The discovery and defeat of this plot was a shattering blow which destroyed the diabolic plans of the imperialists and revisionists against socialist Albania.<sup>17</sup>

Unquestionably, Enver Hoxha was obsessed with the existence of alleged enemies, spies and traitors, who seemingly had permeated every facet of Albanian life throughout the forty-plus years of Hoxha's rule. One of the most succinct descriptions of this phenomenon in Hoxha's persona was given by a Yugoslav "enemy":

Foreign enemies are an obsession Enver Hoxha and his regime have never been able to rid themselves of. The whole world conspires against little Albania: capitalist and imperialists, neighbouring revisionist Yugoslavia and the far-off clique in Peking, the Moscow revisionists, Italian and Spanish Euro-communists and many others.

Indeed, it is extremely rare for Enver Hoxha to cite any country as Albania's friend. His 40 books, his speeches, articles and writings all dwell on Albania's enemies. This siege syndrome is one of the most distinguishing features of present-day Albania. It is entrenched, with no visible prospects of change as long as Enver Hoxha is in power. A few years ago it was reinforced by a 'bunkerization campaign.' Small concrete bunkers resembling flying saucers suddenly sprung up all over Albania and have become an integral part of the Albanian landscape. More iron and concrete is said to go into building these bunkers than into housing construction! And foreign journalists have reported cases in the interior of housing too built complete with emplacements.

A whole country under siege and fear of attack—but from whom?

Not even an Albanian could provide a specific answer to this question. From birth the regime has nurtured the idea of a foreign threat in his mind, preparing him for a life 'with pick in one hand and rifle in the other.' For 35 years, the public media have bombarded the population with messages, emphasizing the need for 'vigilance and caution' calling on the people to prepare to defend their country. The written press, radio, television, and street propaganda maintain a constant parade of changing enemies intent on devouring Albania.

The Albanian blockade is highly visible everywhere inside the country. Entering Shkodra, for example, the traveler is greeted by the slogan:

"Let us fulfill our obligations and break the blockade!" and in Tirana:

"We will smash the blockade and the imperialist and revisionist encirclement!"

But, who, since World War II has ever threatened to blockade, much less actually laid siege to Albania?

Enver Hoxha one day proclaimed his country under blockade, and that was that. The invention of enemies and the fight against them may be said to be the basis of Enver Hoxha's rule. For 40 years now Enver Hoxha has changed and abused imagined enemies abroad and liquidated or 'thrown in the rubbish bin' whoever he feels may be against him at home.<sup>18</sup>

Yet another example of the suspicion which surrounded Hoxha was demonstrated through the alleged use of a "double," an impostor of about the same age and height who with the aid of plastic surgery was made to look nearly identical to Hoxha. This story is told by Lloyd Jones in his book, *Biografi: A Traveler's Tale*. Jones claims that an obscure country dentist named Petar Shapallo took Enver Hoxha's place at many official functions which lessened the risk of assassination to Enver Hoxha's person by one of the large number of enemies which existed. The shadow life which Shapallo allegedly led is best envisioned by viewing the directions and parameters he had to live under:

He [Shapallo] was told to favour his left leg when walking. In the event of an unscheduled encounter with the public he was told to reminisce about his childhood. He should begin by staring off into the distance and recite, 'When I was a boy...'

Shapallo was the perfect shadow. He lost weight when the Great Leader dieted; together their hairlines receded, and when the Great Leader sprained an ankle, Shapallo limped. On film, Shapallo is the slow-moving shadow turning to wave to the crowd; there, he pauses from his stride to take a bouquet of flowers from a small girl. Here he strikes a serious pose [etc.]."

It is easy to see that if this story is true that the life of Shapallo would have been quite unbearable despite the fact that he superficially lived a quite comfortable life in the special compound reserved for high Party officials in Tirane. All remnants of Shapallo's previous personal life were allegedly wiped away. This included the deaths of his family and the plastic surgeon, hairdressers and tailors who had mysterious automobile accidents. The ultimate degradation can be seen in the following passage:

Shapallo had been instructed on the protocol should he be cut down by an assassin's bullet. And he had been instructed to keep in mind that he should make light of his injuries while he lay in public view, since the real Emperor would survive. In the messy event of a car bomb, then all that went out the window<sup>20</sup>

An interesting theory concerning Enver Hoxha's mental state was advanced by Dr. Afrim Dangëllia, an Albanian psychiatrist in an article entitled, "Personaliteti Paranojak I Një Diktatori" which was published on August 22, 1991, in the newspaper *Republika*. Dr. Dangëllia made an assessment of Hoxha's personality and declared that, in his medical opinion, Hoxha possessed a paranoiac personality. A most astute comment was made when Dr. Dangëllia said: *".../ cili i rëndoi tiparet paranojake të personalitetit të tij, të gjitha këto, e radhisin atë si një paranojak klasik i tipit të Hitlerit, Stalinit, Çaussheshkut e Sadam Hyseinit."*<sup>21</sup> In other words, Hoxha possessed a paranoiac type personality quite similar to the classic type of Hitler, Stalin, Ceausescu and Saddam Hussein.

Many people interviewed, both in person and via questionnaires, mentioned that Enver Hoxha reminded them of Adolf Hitler. In the vast number of cases, this parallel was extremely negative toward Hoxha. However, one person interviewed had an extremely different perspective toward a comparison of these two men. Aleksander Dholo, an economist said that one could consider Hitler a positive force in German history up until approximately 1941. The reasoning behind his view was that after the crushing Versailles Treaty, Hitler's policies were responsible for the rebuilding of Germany. Hitler gave the German people reason to be proud of their accomplishments. Dholo continued by saying that in his opinion, after 1941, Hitler wanted to control the



world which led to the destruction of Germany and made Hitler the most negative figure in German history. The parallel begun by Dholo was that Enver Hoxha's rule (in 1994 when this interview was conducted) is considered by most people as an abject failure. However, Mr. Dholo is one person who believes that at least the initial period of Hoxha's rule also had positive aspects. Dholo believes that Hoxha transformed Albania through his actions during the National Liberation War and his consolidation of Albanian territory which maintained Albanian sovereignty.<sup>22</sup>

Nimete Minga, a thirty-one year old female geologist, is another person interviewed who would agree with Dholo concerning positive aspects of Hoxha's policies. Minga believed that Albania was in a better situation with Hoxha than it would have been without him as leader. Her reasoning is that Albania needed a strong leader since prior development was so slow and at such a low level.

There is some definite merit to a portion of Dholo's interpretation. One can argue that Enver Hoxha, like Hitler, in the early period of his rule, while admittedly using questionable methods, did accomplish many positive results in reshaping an entire society. Where this writer would go one step further than Dholo, is in the area of where the negative aspects of the regime began. Naturally, one could discuss at length the negative aspects of many of the short-sighted policies and inhumanities suffered by large segments of the population. However, the development which served to cement the negative character of Hoxha's regime was the 1976 Constitution. This document sought to institutionalize the dogmas of self-reliance and most importantly, isolation. Of all of the various components of Albanian society during these years, isolation was without question the most damaging. If isolation did not occur, many of the negative assessments of the Hoxha years could be avoided.

Ritual is one of the traditional methods which Communist states use to demonstrate support for their policies or for foreign guests. Hoxha was aware that the ritual of protocol is hollow; he called it a "facade" and a "masquerade." In 1977, Hoxha denounced the Chinese and North Koreans for bringing out the people "like a mob of sheep which gamboled and bleated" to greet Tito. But, he could not refrain from mentioning with delight his pleasure when the Chinese had 3,000

people greet the arrival in Peking of an Albanian delegation. Hoxha knew the truth of the situation but still blatantly applied double standards.<sup>24</sup>

Enver Hoxha was without question a Stalinist, but he was a unique sort of Stalinist. Evidence of Hoxha's devotion to Stalin can be seen in Hoxha's many speeches, articles, and books. A brief passage which is demonstrative of the everlasting admiration and fealty which Hoxha felt toward his mentor is as follows:

Stalin was neither a traitor to Marxism-Leninism, nor a clown of fairs. He was a great Leninist, he spoke less and did more for the Soviet Union and for the revolution. When Stalin spoke the bourgeoisie and imperialists did not applaud, nor burst into laughter, but shivered under their skin.<sup>25</sup>

However, the most "typical" and "definitive" description of Stalin can be found in Hoxha's book, *With Stalin*, where Hoxha says that Stalin was:

...the modest, kindly, wiseman, ...this outstanding revolutionary, ...this great Marxist. He loved the Soviet people whole-heartedly. To them, he had dedicated all his strength and energies, his heart and mind worked for them. And in every talk with him, in every activity he carried out, from the most important down to the most ordinary, these qualities distinguished him.<sup>26</sup>

On the one hand, Hoxha was a traditional Stalinist in the sense that he advocated very rigid implementation of centralized planning and used brutal methods to dispose of real and imagined enemies in order to remain firmly entrenched in power. On the other hand, he was not a Stalinist in the sense that he was a cultured and well-read man. He was also in much closer contact with the people than was Stalin. Hoxha was a good public speaker and very adept at speaking with both the urban intellectual and the peasant sharing anecdotes. "In all this he was helped by his unusual combination of being both an intellectual and charming and good looking. He shared Stalin's quality of brutality, but he was not brutish."<sup>27</sup> In short, Hoxha had an abundance of charisma.

The unusual qualities which Enver Hoxha possessed which enabled him to be a powerful leader were shown in interviews

conducted by this writer. Starting on April 11, 1994, the ninth anniversary of the death of Hoxha and continuing for three days, this writer interviewed approximately one hundred people of various ages and occupations throughout Tiranë. This admittedly unscientific study produced quite unexpected results and is demonstrative of the effect Hoxha had upon the psyche of the Albanian people and nation which lingers even to this day.

The beginning of each interview began with the statement of fact that this was the anniversary of Hoxha's death and the question was asked if the person could recount their thoughts upon hearing the news that Enver Hoxha had died. Only two people responded by saying that they cheered and were extremely happy when they heard of Hoxha's death. 98% of the respondents said that they genuinely grieved and almost unanimously said that they cried and were totally shaken and quite afraid for their future well-being (this scenario was identical to the one which occurred upon Stalin's death).

This is a good example of the need for objectivity in the historian's attempt to follow in the footsteps of Marc Bloch by practicing the "historian's craft." A preconceived notion of this writer prior to undertaking these interviews was that in 1994, with no need to worry about being overheard by the *Sigurimi*, the nearly unanimous "in" or "trendy" response would have been the opposite; that nearly everyone would have responded that they were delighted to hear the news that Hoxha had died ~ somewhat reminiscent of *The Wizard of Oz* when all the people were overjoyed to learn that the wicked witch was dead. With no pressure to respond in any prescribed fashion, there was a near unanimity of feeling in such broad strata of society — a fact that this writer believes demonstrates the incontrovertible reality of Hoxha's effect upon the Albanian people. In fact, Hoxha was so revered by some segments of the population, that Ramiz Alia ordered the date of Enver Hoxha's death not be put on his tombstone, due to the "...principle that such a man could never die."<sup>28</sup>

The consensus of opinion was that there were problems at that time in Albania but few people in 1985 seemed to hold Enver Hoxha responsible. Any problems which existed were believed to have been caused by district Party leaders. Hoxha was considered by most at that time as an honest man who had the best interests of Albania at heart.

Most seemed to believe that change was imminent after his death. Most believed that change would be for the worse.<sup>29</sup>

As time passed, the opinions of many people changed dramatically. Initially, however, most of the people had known no other leader than Hoxha. In a country with as young a population as Albania, this factor is especially critical.

People who had in one way or another suffered at the hands of Hoxha had, as one might expect, a quite different point of view. These people, as a whole, were quite happy when they heard the news that Enver Hoxha had died. However, they had to be extremely cautious so that others would not know their true feelings. Many mentioned that they tried to cry in an effort to appear grieving but were unable to do so. Likewise, many anticipated that change would follow Hoxha's death. They thought that this change would be positive, dramatic, and swift. There was near unanimity among Hoxha opponents concerning their utter disappointment when there was little change following his death.

An interesting interview was conducted on April 4, 1994 with Natasha and Sonja Beribashi, a family that had previously lived in internal exile. In fact, Sonja, twenty-one years of age, had been born into this situation. The family's life has been very difficult. For instance, the mother, Natasha was formerly a mathematics professor who was dismissed from her position because her father, Phoni Qirko, a member of the Albanian Party of Labor, had been purged due to disagreements with Enver Hoxha after the 1956 Tiranë Party Conference. For his "crimes," Qirko was exiled to Skropar, in southern Albania. Later, in 1974, Natasha's twenty-two year old brother, Artan Qirko tried to escape from Albania but was caught and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. Due to this "negative" family history, Natasha was exiled to a remote village where she no longer could teach and was employed doing manual labor in a workshop. Natasha's husband was forced to divorce her in order to avoid being sent into exile as well.

Sonja told of her experiences in school where she was treated differently than the other students. An example of substandard treatment that these internal exiles withstood was when they received money from relatives abroad. The Beribashi family had relatives in the United States

who occasionally would send them \$100.00. The exchange rate was seventy *lekë* per dollar but since they were in exile, the exchange rate for them was only thirty *lekë* per dollar. As they succinctly summarized the situation, it was a "...failure for him [their relative who sent them money] and for us."<sup>30</sup>

Many Albanians think that Enver Hoxha was a tyrant and a brutal man and are glad that they now possess more personal freedom in many areas of their lives than they held previously. However, they nonetheless are quite proud of Enver Hoxha because he was THEIR tyrant (this scenario again is quite reminiscent of Josef Stalin).

The responses given to Question Number 36 of the questionnaire which appears in *Appendix A* supports this idea of Hoxha as tyrant. Sixty-eight percent of the respondents said Hoxha was a tyrant and thirteen percent felt that he was a hero. The remainder of the responses on this question were a mixture of in-between answers and were inconclusive.<sup>31</sup>

This point raises the question of whether Enver Hoxha was indeed a tyrant? To analyze this question, as well as attempt to answer it, a good starting point is to look at Aristotle's treatise, *Politics*. Aristotle discusses at length the aims and characteristics of a tyrant and a tyranny. According to Aristotle, there are three aims of a tyrant. These are:

- (1) the humiliation of his subjects; he knows that a mean-spirited man will not conspire against anybody;
- (2) the creation of mistrust among them; for a tyrant is not overthrown until men begin to have confidence in one another; and this is the reason why tyrants are at war with the good; they are under the idea that their power is endangered by them, not only because they will not be ruled despotically, but also because they are loyal to one another, and to other men, and do not inform against one another or against other men;
- (3) the tyrant desires that his subjects shall be incapable of action, for no one attempts what is impossible, and they will not attempt to overthrow a tyranny, if they are powerless. Under these three heads the whole policy of a tyrant may be summed up, and to one or other of them all his ideas may be referred: (1) he sows distrust

among his subjects; (2) he takes away their power; (3) he humbles them

In addition to the aims of a tyrant, Aristotle notes several important characteristics which tyrants possess.

A tyrant should...endeavor to know what each of his subjects says or does, and should employ spies,...for the fear of informers prevents people from speaking their minds, and if they do, they are more easily found out.<sup>33</sup>

In addition, "he [the tyrant] should impoverish his subjects; he thus provides money for the support of his guards, and the people, having to keep hard at work, are prevented from conspiring."<sup>34</sup> Likewise, "...the characteristic of a tyrant is to distrust his friends, because he knows that all men want to overthrow him, and they above all have the power."<sup>35</sup>

Furthermore, the tyrant conspires to remove any and all of his potential rivals. Aristotle explains:

The story is that of Periander, when the herald was sent to ask counsel of him, said nothing, but only cut off the tallest ears of corn till he had brought the field to a level. The herald did not know the meaning of the action, but came and reported what he had seen to Thrasybulus, who understood that he was to cut off the principal men in the state...Ostracism is a measure of the same kind, which acts by disabling and banishing the most prominent citizens.<sup>36</sup>

The above passages of Aristotle's writings serve well to illuminate his vision of what constitutes a tyrant; but are there any corollaries to the person of Enver Hoxha and life in Albania during this period? Muharrem Stafa, a businessman and former bureaucrat under Hoxha, said in an interview that "I was shocked with the ignorance and incompetence of officials in various Ministries. They held their positions solely due to their loyalty to Enver Hoxha."<sup>37</sup>

The *Sigurimi* had great power throughout the Enver Hoxha era. Anton Logoreci mentions that the "...*Sigurimi's* principal tasks are to eliminate all forms of opposition to the party and government and prevent counter-revolution." He estimates that there were 13,000 uniformed *Sigurimi*, along with numerous undercover agents and a

network of informers. The effect of the *Sigurimi's* presence upon the people is noted by a Swedish visitor in 1966, Bjorn Hallstrom, who mentions that the people in a public park ran away from him as if he were a leper for fear of being seen speaking with a foreigner.<sup>38</sup> This situation seems to be exactly like that described by Aristotle.

There is no doubt that the Party pervaded nearly all aspects of Albanian life. In fact, the situation was such that there was no attempt to camouflage this activity. Enver Hoxha openly espoused his views on the subject on December 14, 1963 in his closing speech at the 11th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor. Enver said:

The leadership of the Party knew everything about people's lives, knew what each of them thought. The Party also knew that they were not all pure gold, there were people with wrong ideas, there were heroes, convinced and disciplined people, reliable people, but there were also intriguers, windbags, cowards, etc....Take the case of Anastas Lulo [a former leader of a Communist group, prior to the founding of the Albanian Communist Party, later denounced by Hoxha]; the Party worked on him for a long time, and when it saw that he and his associates were becoming dangerous in their activity, it crushed them. But, as a result of the work and care of the Party, many people were corrected and tempered.<sup>39</sup>

Further evidence is given by the world-renowned writer Ismail Kadare in his book, *The Palace of Dreams*. Kadare cloaks his allegory in the time-period of the Ottoman Empire. This device not only allows the book to be published but quite likely saves the life of Kadare. Undoubtedly, *The Palace of Dreams* is one of the world's best examples of an expose and critique of totalitarianism. It is every bit as good, though not as well known as George Orwell's *1984*. The following excerpt is a direct attack upon the Albanian Party of Labor and Enver Hoxha:

The task of our Palace of Dreams [Albanian Party of Labor], which was created directly by the reigning Sultan [Hoxha], is to classify and examine not the isolated dreams of certain individuals...[but]all the dreams of all citizens without exception....The idea behind the Sovereign's [Hoxha] creation of the Tabir [the Party] is that Allah looses a forewarning dream on the world . It is up to us [Hoxha, the

Party, and all Albanians] to find out where the dream has come to earth — to flush it out from among millions, billions of others, as one might look for a pearl lost in the desert. For the interpretation of that dream, fallen like a stray spark into the brain of one out of millions of sleepers, may help to save the country or its Sovereign from disaster; may help to avert war or plague [encirclement and 'siege mentality'] or to create new ideas.

So the Palace of Dreams is no mere whim or fancy; it is one of the pillars of the State ...For we know there are forces [imperialists and revisionists, etc.] outside the Palace which for various reasons would like to infiltrate the Tabir Sarraïl with their own agents, so that their own plans, ideas, and opinions might be presented

...Never forget that the Tabir Sarraïl is an institution totally closed to the outside world {Albania as a whole} <sup>40</sup>

It is a well-established fact that the Hoxha regime through the apparatus of the *Sigurimi* and its network of informers kept a detailed dossier on all Albanian citizens. The dossiers determined where, in what field, and even if, one would be allowed to go on for higher education. They also were instrumental in determining if one would be imprisoned or would suffer some sort of hardship, etc. Thus, the importance of these documents can not be understated.

An Albanian emigre, Dr. Ilia Çoka tells of his dealings with the official in the village where he worked for eight and one-half years who was responsible for compiling the dossiers on the inhabitants of the village. Dr. Çoka's story was:

...This person who was making these files asked me to go see him in his office. He was a very ignorant person but I went because I was afraid...[He] asked me to play chess with him. He was bored with his work there. I told him, 'yes,' and we started to play chess together.

The problem was if I play chess...I try to win. I realized in my mind...I was nearly winning so I was 'uncareful.' I let him win three times and he was very proud and told everyone in the village that he beat the doctor. He won the chess but I won his heart. He wrote that I was from the city but I was not proud and that I was a good guy....He wrote a very good report for me. <sup>1</sup>



The minutiae of detail in these records is accurately portrayed in the following account from *The Palace of Dreams*:

The hundreds of pages were full of details about the greengrocer's daily life. Everything was included, or almost everything: the kinds of fruit and vegetables he sold — cabbages, cauliflowers, peppers, lettuces; the times when they were delivered; how they were unloaded; how fresh the various items were; quarrels with suppliers; fluctuations in prices; customers and what they said, and how it reflected family problems, economic difficulties, hidden illnesses, conflicts, crises, alliances; scraps of overheard gossip; things that drunks, road-sweepers and idlers said as night fell; the sayings of unknown passerby which for some reason or other had remained in his memory; and again all the vegetables and what they tasted like at the beginning and at the end of the season; how they were moistened to make them seem fresh; the doltishness of the peasants who brought them in; haggling over prices; the throw-outs; how dew made lettuces weigh more; the whims and fancies of housewives; the squabbles; the rows — and all of these things gone over and over interminably.<sup>42</sup>

Kadare is attacked by some writers as an apologist for Enver Hoxha and the Albanian Party of Labor. The chief attack against Kadare is that he was able to get so many books published under Hoxha because they were too flattering, etc.

Kadare expresses the view that, if dissidence is not an option, the writer can act as a kind of corrective for the totalitarian regime. "You have to find the means of reconciliation....So I thought that if you showed a tyrant with a mask which would reform his face, he would then reform himself. In my novel, Hoxha is shown as a kind who is against repression, and I was sure that he would then be obliged to play that role."<sup>43</sup>

There is no doubt that the people as a whole had a very difficult existence monetarily and materially during Hoxha's rule. The group which had a much higher standard of living were the hierarchy of the Albanian Party of Labor. Dritero Agolli, a poet who formerly wrote of the positive nature of Enver Hoxha, denounced the lifestyle of the Party hierarchy at the Party Congress in June 1991 when he said: "These high people, whose skin was so shiny from the food they ate... in their secret villas became indifferent to the poverty of the people."<sup>44</sup>

This writer personally viewed the beautiful seaside villas maintained for the exclusive use of Enver Hoxha and other dignitaries (a good example are the villas at *Ujë e Ftohtë* [the place of the cold water—a beautiful spot on the Adriatic coast]). Also, the people who had to line up as early as 5 a.m. for bread and milk etc. were too preoccupied with obtaining the requisite necessities for maintaining the life of themselves and their families to be overly concerned with overthrowing Enver Hoxha and the government. Therefore, this characteristic of a tyrant which Aristotle describes does apply in the case of Enver Hoxha.

There is no question that Enver Hoxha meets the criteria set by Aristotle pertaining to the distrust of friends and associates and the consideration of all people as potential rivals. Likewise, the cutting out of rivals and banishing of rivals did occur frequently throughout this period. As documented throughout this book, Enver Hoxha made liberal and repeated use of the purging of real or imagined rivals throughout his time as leader of the Albanian Party of Labor and the state. Liquidation of opponents made possible the maintenance of power. In fact, Nexhmije Hoxha discussed the subject of "enemies" when she wrote:

It is in our interests to have the minimum number of enemies, therefore efforts are made for their re-education, both when they are in prison and when they are not, nevertheless the control, vigilance must never be slackened.<sup>45</sup>

An additional method which Hoxha utilized in the finest Stalinist tradition was the act of banishment to remote villages. The people banished to internal exile were oftentimes not the actual perpetrators of the "crimes," but usually were the relatives of the "criminal." This action was a powerful tool of social control because many people would think twice before attempting to take any action. For example, many of the people banished to remote villages were relatives of people who escaped to Yugoslavia or Greece. It was a well-known fact that these people were ostracized within the community as "enemies of the people." The brutal aspects of this policy were seen in the effect of punishing children for the "crimes" of their parents or grandparents.

A touching account of this situation can be seen in the story of the banishment of the Viktor Dosti family to the village of Gradishta which was documented in the *New York Times Magazine*. For

example, Abas Kupa, a royalist and leader of *Legaliteti* who opposed the communists during World War II was considered a traitor by the followers of Hoxha. Nine year old Valjeta Dosti Kaftalli was a student at the Gradishta school. During a history class, the teacher said "Abas Kupa is one of the greatest enemies of the Albanian people ...Abas Kupa is our enemy, and so is this girl...This girl is the granddaughter of Abas Kupa."<sup>46</sup> It is not necessary to comment upon the unquestionably devastating effect this would have upon the child.

There are no official statistics concerning the number of people sentenced to internal exile but a human rights monitoring group, the Albanian Helsinki Committee estimates that at least 26,000 people were imprisoned or exiled for political crimes. The practice of punishing the entire family led Arben Puto, an historian and former Communist to say: "This was the dictatorship's strongest instrument. You were not condemned alone. Your whole family would be sent away."<sup>47</sup> Families were usually sentenced without trial to at least one five-year term of exile. During this term, they were paid only a quarter to a third of the wages the "free" peasants were paid. A mandatory roll call twice daily was held, as early as 4 a.m. and again at 6 or 7 p.m.<sup>48</sup>

Most likely, the worst aspect of this punishment was the ostracism from the rest of the community. Vera Dema, a former victim of exile in Gradishta said: "No one spoke a word to us there, except the gypsies [traditionally, gypsies were the lowest 'caste' in East European society], who were not afraid of the consequences...Once they said to me: 'You're the enemy. We would rather drown ourselves than be you.'"<sup>49</sup>

Thus, Enver Hoxha meets the criteria of Aristotle's tyrant.

The "cult of personality," despite denials by Communist apologists to the contrary, definitely did exist. Evidence was still able to be seen in 1994. This writer saw first-hand the name of Enver carved into mountainsides and remnants of slogans honoring Enver still lingering on buildings which, due to the sheer number, are difficult to remove. Dritero Agolli, said at the Tenth Congress of the Party of Labor of Albania in 1991, amidst booing by hard-line factions of the Party, that:

"The class struggle resulted in the cult of Enver Hoxha, the cult of the party and the cult of the security organs . People were afraid of these cults, and their morality was destroyed.. It led to the destruction of the personality of man."<sup>50</sup>

Moving from the premise that Enver Hoxha was a tyrant, it is interesting to see how other historians, philosophers, and thinkers in general, have analyzed historical figures, particularly the "great man," "hero," as well as the "world-historical individual," in history. Additionally, it is important to answer the question of whether a tyrant can be a "great man," "hero," or "world-historical individual," or are the various terms, by definition, contradictory?

Sigmund Freud in his book, *Moses and Monotheism*, posits the question: "How is it possible that one single man can develop such extraordinary effectiveness, that he can create out of indifferent individuals and families one people, can stamp this people with its definite character, and determine its fate for millennia to come?"<sup>51</sup> The answer seems to be partially rooted in the history and culture of both Enver Hoxha and the Albanian people. The Albanians are a people who have had a history of being dominated by foreigners and, despite being one of the oldest groups of people in Europe, have had only one other leader of stature besides Hoxha. That was Gjerg Kastrioti Skenderbëu, or Scanderbeg who died in 1468. The historical and cultural legacy of being dominated by the Ottoman Empire (for instance, except for an extremely brief period, Albanian was not allowed to be taught in schools) and Albania's geographical position of being in the backwaters of the Balkans had unfortunately relegated the mindset of tiny Albania to a position of inferiority as compared to the other nations of the world. This writer believes this to be true despite the fact that few if any Albanian would admit that this analysis is an accurate portrayal of events and circumstances. Enver Hoxha changed the self-image of Albania and the Albanian people. Tangible, positive results were accomplished due to his policies. Hoxha instilled a "siege mentality" in the country as evidenced by the concrete bunkers located in every corner of Albania. Although a Western observer might say that these bunkers were useless against ultra-modern weapons, they nonetheless had the psychological effect of enabling the people to weather any storm and the physical effect of mobilizing the people against a common

enemy, foreigners. Most Albanian people believed wholeheartedly that all foreigners coveted Albanian territory.

The extent to which the "siege mentality" dominated the mindset of the Albanian leadership throughout the entire period of Enver Hoxha's rule is seen in the amount of money spent on national defense.

**Table 11-1:** Percentage of Total National Budget Spent on Defense<sup>1</sup>

	1950	1960	1970	1980	1985
Percentage of Budget Spent on Defense	21.9	8.3	9.6	11.8	11.4

<sup>1</sup> Ministria e Ekonomise Drejtoria e Statistikes. *Vjetari Statistikor i Shqiperise 1991* (Location of publishing unknown [likely Paris], 1991) pp. 330-331.

The overall high rate of defense spending is significant for any country, particularly for such a small nation. The outlandishly high rate in 1950 is evidence of the uncertainty gripping the country concerning the instability *vis a vis* Yugoslavia. Tito's expulsion from the COMINFORM did not totally alleviate Albanian fears. Also, the concurrent Greek civil war did not do much to encourage a sense of security. The idea of encirclement by hostile enemies was quite strong in this period.

The relative decrease in defense spending in the period between 1960 and 1970, though still high, is demonstrative of a sense of relative security due primarily to the existence of a strong alliance partner and protector. Likewise, the increase of defense spending in the period between 1980 and 1985 corresponds to the theory of self-reliance, as well as the absence of an ally.

Mehmet Shehu, in a speech delivered to the 7th Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor in 1976, stated :

We have been and continue to be surrounded in a state of siege, but we have never been afraid and never will be afraid. We have so far met the

encirclement and blockade with complete success and will continue to meet it with complete success in the future.<sup>52</sup>

Likewise, Enver Hoxha reiterated Shehu's theme when he said:

There will always be great danger as long as the capitalist encirclement lasts, as long as our country is completely surrounded geographically by fascists who send spies and diversionists into our country, who are constantly ferreting out and drawing into their service elements of the internal reaction and weaklings who cannot stand up to the revolutionary vigour of our Party and the laws of the dictatorship of the proletariat.<sup>53</sup>

The issue of defense was of vital importance to Enver Hoxha. Hoxha gave a speech on September 18, 1970 entitled: "It is in the Party-People State Power Unity That Our Strength Lies" which elucidates upon the notion that defense and the linking of the people with the Party is a paramount concern. Hoxha said:

The Party has never separated the building of socialism from the sacred duty of defending our socialist Homeland. It has striven with success to have the question of defence taken in the hands of the broad masses of the people. In all this work we have been guided by great Lenin's teaching according to which every good citizen should also be a good soldier, and every good soldier should be at the same time a good citizen. On this road the whole of our people, old and young, men and women, are advancing today. Without making it a secret, we publicly declare that we are proud of the fact that every citizen of the People's Republic of Albania learns how to use all sort of arms, studies military art, is eager to know his motherland span by span, loves it and is ready to embellish and defend it from any foe and in any circumstances. With us army and people are one, they are united like flesh to bone around the Party. Our army is an army of the revolution, it is characterized by real proletarian democracy, iron discipline and fiery patriotism. As such should we always have and strengthen our People's Army, in this way should we constantly enhance the vigilance and combative preparedness of all of us to guarantee the protection of all the victories our people have achieved and will be achieving in the days to come.<sup>54</sup>

Further, Hoxha instructed a Communist visitor from Ceylon in 1969 of the importance of vigilance:

...We must, without fail, always be vigilant. For us Albanians, in particular, it is essential to be prepared, because our country is

completely encircled by imperialist and revisionist states which are continually trying to damage and destroy us. Therefore, if we slackened our vigilance even for a moment or toned down our struggle against enemies in the least, they would strike immediately like the snake that bites you and injects its poison before you are aware of it.<sup>55</sup>

The vehicle of "siege mentality" was very effective. These are some of the reasons why Enver Hoxha was so revered by the people, not merely due to the propaganda and isolation that the Albanian Party of Labor produced and enforced.

A hypothesis developed by Freud concerning the relationship between the leader and the group is germane to this discussion of the relationship between Enver Hoxha and the Albanian people.

...As soon as living beings are gathered together in certain numbers, no matter whether they are a herd of animals or a collection of human beings, they place themselves instinctively under the authority of a chief. A group is an obedient herd, which could never live without a master. It has such a thirst for obedience that it submits instinctively to anyone who appoints himself its master.

Although in this way the needs of the group carry it half-way to meet the leader, yet he too must fit in with it in his personal qualities. He must himself be held in fascination by a strong faith [in an idea] in order to awaken the group's faith; he must possess a strong and imposing will, which the group, which has no will of its own, can accept from him.. Leaders make themselves felt by means of the ideas in which they themselves are fanatical believers.<sup>56</sup>

The above passage concerning the herd mentality of the group is undemocratic. Although the idealistic readers of this book may disagree, Freud's concept definitely seems to apply to Enver Hoxha and the Albanian people. Considering Albania's past of being continually conquered for centuries, being independent for such a small period of their history, their tribal background, having so few leaders of any great stature (most leaders having been ineffectual or non-existent), the Albanian people can relate to a strong leader. In fact, Albanians cherish, despite the many flaws this leader may possess, a strong leader who maintains their independence against long odds while stressing nationalism and instilling in the people a sense of self-worth due to their accomplishments in revitalizing and building their nation.

The process of building a sense of nationalism and identity amongst the population was very successful as evidenced by responses to Question Number 8 of the Questionnaire in *Appendix A*, which asked what the respondents considered themselves to be. Seventy-nine percent thought of themselves as Albanians, eight percent as Tosks, seven percent as Ghegs, four percent as Greeks, and one percent thought of themselves as internationalists and cosmopolitans.<sup>57</sup>

Likewise, the results to Question Number 31 of the questionnaire in *Appendix A* confirm that the sense of nationalism was strong amongst the people in this period. Seventy-eight percent of the respondents felt that nationalism was strong and only twenty-two percent disagreed with the majority.<sup>58</sup>

Further "proof" is given by Freud when he states that "...the great majority of people have a strong need for authority which they can admire, to which they can submit, and which dominates and sometimes even ill-treats them."<sup>59</sup> This description seems to be extremely appropriate to any discussion of the relationship between Enver Hoxha and the Albanian people. The people were definitely "ill-treated" at times but Hoxha's precepts were followed devotedly, albeit sometimes reluctantly. Nevertheless, a sense of pride in Hoxha was a common denominator among many Albanians, particularly when Hoxha was alive.

The historian Thomas Carlyle formulated his theories of the "great man" in history in his book *Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic In History*. The essence of the "great man" for Carlyle is the historical individual who is:

the Commander over Men, he to whose will our wills are to be subordinated, and loyally surrender themselves, and to find their welfare in doing so, may be reckoned the most important of Great Men. He is practically the summary for us of *all* the various figures of Heroism; Priest, Teacher, whatsoever of earthly or spiritual dignity we can fancy to reside in a man, embodies itself here, to *command* over us, to furnish us with constant practical teaching, to tell us for the day and hour what we are to *do*.<sup>60</sup>

The question which arises at this juncture is: does this definition apply to the personage of Enver Hoxha? Ramiz Alia, for one, seems to think that it does indeed apply to Enver Hoxha:



The figure of Enver Hoxha is great and many-sided. There is no field of the political, ideological, and social activity of the Party and state in which his philosophical thinking, organizational strength and leading activity have not been expressed.

A man who combined the qualities of the Marxist thinker and leader of the revolution, the military commander and statesman, the diplomat and publicist, the erudite intellectual and educator of the masses, the fiery orator and friend of the common folk is rare indeed<sup>61</sup>

Thomas Carlyle took the extreme position that "great men" were born and were destined to achieve greatness regardless of the historical circumstances presented to them. Other thinkers tend to agree with Carlyle to a point but think it is necessary to modify Carlyle's position. George Plekhanov, for instance, wrote in *Fundamental Problems of Marxism*, "the primary thesis of materialism, as I have said again and again, is that history is made by human beings. Now, if it is made by human beings, it must obviously be made by 'great men' among the rest."<sup>62</sup> Plekhanov elaborates by saying:

Carlyle, in his well-known book on heroes and hero-worship, calls great men beginners. This is a very apt description. A great man is precisely a beginner because he sees further than others, and desires things more strongly than others.<sup>63</sup>

To this point, Plekhanov agrees with Carlyle. Modification of Carlyle's thesis begins when Plekhanov puts forth the "classic" Marxist notion that no individual, regardless of his superior talent, will, or even in an ideal situation can alter the main course of historical development. The view of history being determined by economic necessity is stressed. Since history is made by men, men will be the vehicle by which the productive forces are channeled toward the desired end (usually revolution). Plekhanov definitely subscribes to the view put forth by Friedrich Engels in a letter to W. Borgius:

It is naturally a matter of pure chance that a particular man, and no other, should come to the front at a given time and in a given country. But if we were to suppress this individual, a substitute for him would be needed, and a substitute of one sort or another would be forthcoming in

the end. It was a chance matter that the military dictator needed by the French republic, when exhausted by years of warfare, should have been Napoleon, the Corsican. But that, in default of Napoleon, some other dictator would have taken his place, is proved by the fact that the necessary individual, Julius Caesar, Augustus, Cromwell, or another, has always been forthcoming when needed.<sup>4</sup>

Not all theorists, of course, agree with Plekhanov and Engels. Leon Trotsky, for one, claims in his *Diary* that:

had I not been present in 1917 in St. Petersburg, the October Revolution would still have taken place — on the condition that Lenin was present and in command. If neither Lenin nor I had been present in Petersburg, there would have been no October Revolution: the leadership of the Bolshevik Party would have prevented it from occurring — of this I have not the slightest doubt."<sup>65</sup>

Trotsky elaborates further on this point by adding: "thus it is by no means excluded that a disoriented and split party [without Lenin's leadership] might have let slip the revolutionary opportunity for many years."<sup>66</sup>

George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel is the final theorist to be discussed in terms of the relationship between his thought and the historical persona of Enver Hoxha. One of the most intriguing concepts postulated by Hegel was that of the World-historical individual. Hegel gives the following definition in *The Philosophy of History*.

A World-historical individual is not so unwise as to indulge a variety of wishes to divide his regards. He is devoted to the One Aim, regardless of all else. It is even possible that such men may treat other great, even sacred interests, inconsiderately; conduct which is indeed obnoxious to moral reprehension. But so mighty a form must trample down many an innocent flower -- crush to pieces many an object in its path.<sup>67</sup>

In the case of Albania and Enver Hoxha, many an innocent flower was trampled upon in the greatest traditions of the philosophers, John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham. What is best in life is what is best for the most. One may argue that only the few (members of the Albanian Party of Labor and its supporters and their families) benefited from the changes wrought in Albania; however, one must look at the big picture

and view the situation from the overall historical perspective of Albania's centuries-old history.

According to Hegel, a situation in Albania existed which:

...presented those momentous collisions between existing, acknowledged duties, laws, and rights, and those contingencies which are adverse to this fixed system; which assail and even destroy its foundations and existence; whose tenor may nevertheless seem good — on the large scale advantageous — yes, even indispensable and necessary ... They involve a general principle of a different order from that on which depends the *permanence* of a people or a State. This principle is an essential phase in the development of the *creating* Idea, of Truth striving and urging towards [consciousness of] itself. Historical men — *World-Historical Individuals* -- are those in whose aims such a general principle lies.<sup>68</sup>

Enver Hoxha could also be described as an historical figure whose objective

...was not, then, his private gain merely, but an unconscious impulse that occasioned the accomplishment of that for which the time was ripe. Such are all great historical men — whose own particular aims involve those large issues which are the will of the World-Spirit. They may be called Heroes, inasmuch as they have derived their purposes and their vocation, not from the calm, regular course of things, sanctioned by the existing order; but from a concealed fount...from that inner Spirit.

...They were thinking men, who had an insight into the requirements of the time — *what was ripe for development*. This was the very Truth for their age, for their world; the species next in order, so to speak, and which was already formed in the womb of time. It was theirs to know this nascent principle; the necessary, directly sequent step in progress, which their world was to take, to make this their aim, and to expend their energy in promoting it. World-historical men — the Heroes of an epoch — must, therefore, be recognized as its clear-sighted ones.<sup>69</sup>

A common factor between the writings of both Carlyle and Hegel is the sense that the "hero" acts in response to the social needs of the culture of which he or she is a product. There can be no question that much of the "positive" results which did occur in Albania could be described as being a result of this notion of acting in response to the social needs of the Albanian people which the Albanian culture produced.

An example of the all-encompassing interest Enver Hoxha had in the welfare of the people and his sense of justice can be seen in the rapport Hoxha had with people. He encouraged the entire population to feel free to write directly to him with any problems, concerns, and even complaints. However, with Hoxha's track record regarding purges and elimination of opponents, the true "open-mindedness" of Hoxha is somewhat questionable. Nevertheless, the friendly, accessible image of "Father of Albania," which Hoxha tried to portray is described in a speech Hoxha gave to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania on April 11, 1975:

The letters which the common people send me are invaluable to me. Not only do I read them with great care, but I reflect on them deeply to make a preliminary analysis of the character of the problem, whether personal or of general interest, of the character of the person who writes it, as far as I can gather from the letter, and from this to consider to what extent the things written there are really true. This is the preparatory work I do and, in general, I point out to those who are going to verify the content of the letter, which points they must check up on for me.

To receive and read the letters of the people is fascinating to me. It would be physically impossible for me to meet and talk face to face with as many people as I would like, and the people would not be able to tell me orally as much as they raise in their letters. What broad horizons the letters from the people open, what interesting things they reveal about people, about their character, their work, the justice and injustice, the favouritism and underhand dealings of some of them! What valuable things they make known, intentionally or unintentionally, about the social situation, the spirit which prevails, the good and weak aspects of the organs of the state and the Party in the places where the authors live and from which they write these letters.

It sometimes happens that a simple letter provokes such an impulse in me that it helps me to understand a situation in a district that no report of the party committee has presented previously. An ordinary peasant from Zalldardha, Dibra district [a particularly backward district], in a short letter he sent me recently, said that 'on the orders of the chairman of the cooperative, the brigade-leader with several agricultural workers went to my house and seized the manure from my personal plot,' and he demanded justice.

You see how simple this letter is, but the injustice and the crime committed against this person are very clear.

In the margin of this letter I wrote to the first secretary of the Party Committee of the Dibra district, 'Is this true and why are things like this permitted? Are measures taken against such crimes? Are the things the peasant says about the chairman of the cooperative true? If so, what class struggle are you waging? Please, reply to all these questions, giving me your opinion on what measures you will take.'

The first secretary of the district answered in detail, making an analysis of the situation of the Party in the district, and told me of the measures he thought we at the centre and they at the level of the district should take. These measures are important not only for the life of the Party in the Dibra district, but for the entire Party. And just the simple letter of a cooperativist brought this about.

Listen: the event the peasant described turned out to be true and the culprit was handed over to the court.<sup>70</sup>

There could be no better example of a benevolent leader who always had the welfare of his people at heart than someone who would bring perpetrators to justice, even amongst Party members, who would dare to steal the manure of a poor and humble peasant. This is the image Enver Hoxha liked to portray. Supplementary material garnered through interviews and through questionnaires distributed in Albania seems to support the idea that many people believed that this was the real persona of Enver Hoxha. The situation is quite reminiscent of the "benevolent" attitude Stalin allegedly displayed toward his people. In many ways, the image of Hoxha as "Father of the Albanian People" was well established in the mindset of many Albanian people.

Further support is given to this image which Enver Hoxha strived to foster, namely, that he had the interests of the Albanian people always as his number one priority by his long-time bodyguard, Sulo Gradeci. Gradeci's book, *30 Vjet Pranë Shokut Enver* (30 Years With Comrade Enver) is a collection of propagandist<sup>^</sup> mutterings and ramblings which likely was ghost-written as several people said Gradeci was illiterate. However, there were two episodes in particular, detailed in the book which describe one side of Hoxha's character which needs to be explored, even if one does not believe this version completely.

Hoxha, according to Gradeci, applied the theory of thrift and austerity that he wanted the people to follow to his own personal life.

in the area of clothes, Enver always passed on to his sons any clothes that had any wear left in them. Specifically, Gradeci said:

*Sa për kostumet, ato ktheheshin kur u vinte koha dhe shoku Enver i vishte kryesisht në dimër, kur mbante edhe pallton e madhe. Vite më parë, kur djemtë, Iliri e Sokoli [Enver's sons], ishin nëpër shkolla, shumë nga veshjet e shokut Enver përshtateshin për djemtë.<sup>7</sup>*

There is little doubt that this thoughtfulness toward the people as a whole is admirable. However, the extremes to which Hoxha took these measures were truly "unbelievable." Gradeci tells of a situation which "proves" beyond any shadow of doubt that Enver Hoxha thought of the people before his own personal considerations. Gradeci explains the devotion Hoxha portrayed in a truly terrible situation:

*"Vërtetmua më vdiq dhe kam dhimbje e detyrime, por e kam llogaritur gjithçka, edhe puna të bëhet, edhe kujtimin e motrës ta nderoj. S'kishte pse të shtyhej mbledhja. ""*

The situation described above deals with Hoxha's actions when his sister, Fahrija dies. Hoxha said in other words that the pain was indescribable, but because of his duty to the people and in honor of his sister he would not cancel a meeting but merely delay it. This writer will leave judgment of this situation to the discernment of the reader.

It seems quite conceivable that Enver Hoxha, who grew up in a pseudo-mystical backward society, realized at an early age that he possessed abilities that might allow him to advance to a position of leadership in Albania, especially given the paucity of talented rivals. It also seems quite possible that Hoxha sincerely believed that he was "chosen" to lead the Albanian people out of their perpetual position of being the pawn of greater powers and move them to the position of "respect" they "enjoyed" at the time of Hoxha's death of being the "only genuine Marxist-Leninist state in the world."

Coupling these beliefs with Enver Hoxha's megalomaniacal personal quest for power and the natural occurrence of the progression from youth to maturity or the progression of the young person being drawn to radical ideas and the older person making the transition towards a conservative position parallels the situation which occurred in

the life of Enver Hoxha. Hoxha began in his youth truly believing in the need to transform his backward nation and desired to bring Albania into the Twentieth Century, kicking and screaming, even crying if necessary, and continued throughout his life as he got older to become more conservative (as conservative as a radical can be) and did what was necessary to perpetuate his personal control over the Albanian Party of Labor and Albania. Evidence of this desire to maintain his vision and the course which he set for Albania is seen in the adoption of the new constitution in 1976 which makes official all of the policies which Enver Hoxha had formulated.

In fact, the following quotation taken from *Twenty Five Years of Struggle and Victory on the Road to Socialism* is a succinct summary of Enver Hoxha's opinion concerning the development which took place in Albania during his tenure as First Secretary of the Albanian Party Labor:

We are fully entitled to be proud of the successes achieved and of the battles won in all fields. Albania is no longer that backward country of the wooden plough and thatched roofed huts, of the pinetorch and kerosine [sic.] lamp, of illiteracy and malaria. Today new socialist Albania is marching with giant strides and with an irresistible revolutionary vigor towards the complete building of socialist society. We have an industry equipped with most modern machines, a developed socialist agriculture, a very advanced and complete educational system. The former country of poor shepherds, of exhausted peasants and of the savage vendetta, has become today a country of a developed culture and art whose content may be envied even by those who measure their civilization by centuries.<sup>73</sup>

Questionnaire-generated opinion research demonstrated that eighty-two percent replied negatively and eighteen percent positively to Question Number 22 of the questionnaire in *Appendix A* concerning their opinion of Enver Hoxha. Many respondents grouped Hoxha with Stalin and Hitler. One person said that "He was very nice but he had black[ness] and ugliness in his heart." Another negative comment was that "I curse the mother that gave birth to Enver Hoxha and his birthday October 16, 1908." On the positive side, one person said that "He [Hoxha] preserved our state,...peace and sovereignty." The ultimate compliment paid to Hoxha was by this respondent who said: "Once or

twice per century an extraordinary person is born, it is extremely rare that this person [Hoxha] was born in Albania."<sup>74</sup>

The most interesting results are the sort of summation given to the positive and negative developments occurring in the Hoxha period by the respondents to Question 29 of the questionnaire in *Appendix A*. The positive aspects mentioned by respondents were: education, electrification of the country, land reclamation, and industry. The negative aspects mentioned were: isolation (by far this was the most common item listed), class struggle, low pay, loss of personal freedom, and the closing of churches.<sup>75</sup>

In an effort to draw some conclusions concerning Enver Hoxha, both personally as well as the legacy he left to both Albania and its people, it is best to begin with the thoughts of two people who were extremely close to him.

Ramiz Alia, Hoxha's hand-picked successor, had these thoughts concerning Hoxha in 1991:

I wish to stress once again that Enver Hoxha is an historical personality with strong roots in the people, and that history does not judge with the mentality of manipulated crowds. Statues may be removed, but the figure of Enver Hoxha cannot be toppled because he personifies the biography of the people and the history of the new Albania. The APL and the entire Albanian people are proud to have had a leader like Comrade Enver.<sup>76</sup>

Likewise, Enver's wife, Nexhmije believes that Enver did make some mistakes but that overall his legacy is one of which Albania should be proud. At the Tenth Party Congress in June 1991, Nexhmije Hoxha said:

I have kept silent. ... I ask the people and Enver to forgive me. I cannot deny that mistakes were made, and Enver had his own responsibility as the main leader. But he was the leader of a party that made it their collective task.

His work is neither a Bible nor a Koran, and we are not dogmatic believers ... But the work of Enver must not be rejected altogether as obsolete.<sup>77</sup>



There is truth present in the statements of Ramiz Alia and Nexhmije Hoxha. Enver Hoxha did do a lot for Albania, both of a positive and negative nature. Hoxha's dogmatism, in many ways already elaborated upon, was a severe detriment to the progress which potentially could be achieved and was, in some instances, a positive attribute. A less strong-willed and less ruthless leader would not have accomplished many of the positive achievements which did occur during Enver Hoxha's tenure as First Secretary of Albania. He certainly made many mistakes and hurt many people due to his dogmatic stubborn approach to dealing with problematic situations. A total lack of democratic tradition precluded the possibility of employing successfully a pluralistic approach, especially initially.

It is important to summarize the position in which Enver Hoxha is placed in Albanian history *vis a vis* the historical writers previously discussed.

Thomas Carlyle's "great man" was destined to achieve greatness regardless of the circumstances which presented themselves. This writer does not believe that this theory can be defended *in toto* in Hoxha's case because circumstances are of paramount importance in determining if an opportunity exists for decisive action to occur. George Plekhanov's modification of Carlyle's thesis is an improvement since it recognizes the stark reality that a given set of circumstances may deny an individual the opportunity to achieve greatness.

Leon Trotsky comes much closer to the truth. In terms of Enver Hoxha, it is extremely likely that Albania would have reverted to its centuries-long tradition of being dominated by foreign powers had Enver Hoxha not been present on the scene, which reminds one of Leon Trotsky's comments on the irreplaceability of Lenin for the success of the Russian Revolution.

The theory discussed in this chapter which has the most validity and applicability to the historical situation presented by Enver Hoxha and Albania in this period is George W. F. Hegel. The position adopted by this study is that Enver Hoxha can be considered a World-historical individual. Enver Hoxha's "One Aim" was definitely to bring Albania into the twentieth century no matter what. The methods employed, which were oftentimes extremely brutal, were subjugated to the overall aim of modernizing Albania.

In conclusion, within the framework of Hegel's World-historical individual, Enver Hoxha has successfully accomplished his goal. Albania is now much more modern than it was when Hoxha began as leader. It is true that much remains to be done for Albania to "catch up" with other nations of this world. However, as has been continually stressed throughout this study, an objective analysis can only be made within the Albanian historical context. When one considers the situation Enver Hoxha "inherited" in 1944, Albania's progress certainly could be considered successful.

*Notes*

<sup>1</sup> *The Artful Albanian: The Memoirs of Enver Hoxha*, ed. Jon Halliday, (London: Chatto & Windus, 1986), 2.

<sup>2</sup> Vladimir Dedijer, *Tito* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953; repr., New York: Arno Press, 1972), 303.

<sup>3</sup> Jean-Christophe Castelli, "Albania's Reluctant Hero," *Vanity Fair*, May 1991, 168.

<sup>4</sup> See Khrushchev's description of Stalin given previously on pp. 61-63. This quotation can easily have the name Hoxha interchanged for that of Stalin. This interchangeability gives credence to the theory of the immense similarities between the two men.

<sup>5</sup> *Zeri ipopullit* (Tirane), 7 March 1953, p. 1.

<sup>6</sup> *Zeri ipopullit* (Tirane), 6 March 1953., p. 1.

<sup>7</sup> *Zeri ipopullit* (Tirane), 11 April 1985, p. 1.

<sup>8</sup> Peter Prifti, *Socialist Albania Since 1944* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978), 33-34.

<sup>9</sup> John Lieber, "Neo-Stalinist Albania," *New Republic*, 3 February 1982, 21.

<sup>10</sup> Enver Hoxha, *Selected Works, 1980-1984*, Vol. 6 (Tirane: 8 Nentori Press, 1987), 576.

"Arshi Pipa, "The Political Culture of Hoxha's Albania," in *The Stalinist Legacy*, ed. Tariq Ali (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1984), 458; Hoxha, in *Selected Works, 1980-1984*, vol. 6, 594.

<sup>12</sup> Halliday, 3.

<sup>13</sup> Enver Hoxha, *The Titoites* (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Press, 1982), 629.

<sup>14</sup> Hoxha, *Selected Works, 1980-1984*, vol. 6, 568-569.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 580.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 584-585.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 594-595 n.

<sup>18</sup> Miodrag Djukic, *Anti-Yugoslav Pretensions of Enver Hoxha*, (Belgrade: Tanjug News Agency, 1984), 58.

- <sup>19</sup> Lloyd Jones, *Biografi: A Traveller's Tale*, (San Diego: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1994), 5-6.
- <sup>20</sup> Ibid., 179.
- <sup>21</sup> Afrim Dangëllia, "Personaliteti Paranojak I Një Diktatori" [The Paranoid Personality of One Dictator], *Republika* (Tiranë), 22 August 1991, p. 3; Afrim Dangëllia, interview with author, Tape recording, Tiranë, 11 April 1994.
- <sup>22</sup> Aleksander Dholo, interview with author, Tape recording, Tiranë, 10 April 1994.
- <sup>23</sup> Interview with Nimete Minga, Tiranë, Albania, April 8, 1994.
- <sup>24</sup> Halliday, 8.
- <sup>25</sup> Enver Hoxha, *Twenty Years of New Socialist Albania* (Tiranë: Naim Frasheri State Publishing House, 1964), 48.
- <sup>26</sup> Enver Hoxha, *With Stalin* (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1979), 78.
- <sup>27</sup> Halliday, 16.
- <sup>28</sup> Henry Kamm, "Still in Power But a Convert, Albanian Says," *New York Times*, 16 March 1992, p. A7.
- <sup>29</sup> Interviews with various people in Tiranë, Vlorë, Durrës, Gjirokastër, and Krujë, Albania, 9-18 April 1994.
- <sup>30</sup> Natasha and Sonja Beribashi, interview by author, Tape recording, Tirane, 4 April 1994.
- <sup>31</sup> Results of questionnaires given in Albania, March and April, 1994.
- <sup>32</sup> *Aristotle's Politics*, trans. Benjamin Jowett (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931) V, 11, § 15-16, 227-228.
- <sup>33</sup> Ibid., V, 11, §7, 225-226
- <sup>34</sup> Ibid., V, 11, §8, 226.
- <sup>35</sup> Ibid., V, 11, §10, 226.
- <sup>36</sup> Ibid., III, 13, § 17-19, 130.
- <sup>17</sup> Muharrem Stafa, interview by author, Written notes, Tiranë, 7 April 1994.

<sup>38</sup> Anton Logoreci, *The Albanians: Europe's Forgotten Survivors* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1977), 192-193.

<sup>39</sup> Enver Hoxha, *Speeches and Articles, 1963-1964*, vol. 2 (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1977), 141.

<sup>40</sup> Ismail Kadare, *The Palace of Dreams* trans, from the French of Jusuf Vrioni by Barbara Bray (New York: William Morrow and Co. , 1993), 24,25,26.

<sup>41</sup> Ilia Çoka, interview by author, Tape recording, Cleveland, Ohio, 25 August 1993.

<sup>42</sup> Kadare, 197-198.

<sup>43</sup> Castelli, 169.

<sup>44</sup> Chuck Sudetic, "Albania's Communists in Upheaval," *New York Times*, 12 June 1991, p. A3.

<sup>45</sup> Nexhmije Hoxha, *Some Fundamental Questions of the Revolutionary Policy of the Party of Labor of Albania About the Development of the Class Struggle* (New York: Gamma Publishing Co., 1977), 26-27.

<sup>46</sup> Brenda Fowler, "Banished For Their Fathers' Sins," *New York Times Magazine* 17 May 1992, 32. This writer had the opportunity to meet personally with Viktor Dosti and his family in their Tiranë apartment to discuss internal exile under Enver Hoxha.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 35.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 35, 49.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., 49.

<sup>50</sup> Sudetic, p. A3.

<sup>51</sup> Sigmund Freud, *Moses and Monotheism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1939), 136.

<sup>52</sup> Stephen R. Bowers, "Stalinism in Albania," *East European Quarterly*, 22, no. 4 (1989), 450.

<sup>53</sup> Enver Hoxha, *Selected Works, 1948-1960*, vol. 2 (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1975), 243.

<sup>54</sup> Enver Hoxha, "It is in the Party-People State Power Unity That Our Strength Lies," Speech given in Tiranë, 18 September 1970 (Tiranë: Nairn Frasheri State Publishing Enterprise, 1970), 33-34.

- <sup>55</sup> Enver Hoxha, *Selected Works, 1966-1975*, vol. 4 (Tirane: 8 Nentori Press, 1982), 562.
- <sup>56</sup> Sigmund Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1959), 13.
- <sup>57</sup> Results of questionnaires given in Albania, March and April 1994.
- <sup>58</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>59</sup> Freud, *Moses and Monotheism*, 139-140.
- <sup>60</sup> Thomas Carlyle, *Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic In History* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941), 196.
- <sup>61</sup> Ramiz Alia, *Enver Hoxha and His Work Live and Will Live For Ever* (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1985), 19-20.
- <sup>62</sup> George Plekhanov, *Fundamental Problems of Marxism* (New York: International Publishers, 1969), 69.
- <sup>63</sup> George Plekhanov, *The Role of the Individual In History* (New York: International Publishers, 1940), 59-60.
- <sup>64</sup> Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Selected Works In One Volume* (New York: International Publishers, 1968), 705.
- <sup>65</sup> Leon Trotsky, *Trotsky's Diary in Exile*, trans. Elena Zarvdnaya (Cambridge: Harvarad University Press, 1958), 46.
- <sup>66</sup> Leon Trotsky, *History of the Russian Revolution*, trans. Max Eastman, 3 vols. (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1957), 1:330.
- <sup>67</sup> George W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, Trans. J. Sibree (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1956), 32.
- <sup>68</sup> Ibid., 29.
- <sup>69</sup> Ibid., 30.
- <sup>70</sup> Hoxha, *Selected Works, 1966-1975*, vol. 4, 927-928.
- <sup>71</sup> Sulo Gradeci, *30 VjetPranë Shokut Enver* [30 Years With Comrade Enver] (Tirane. 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1988), 149.

"ibid., 268.

<sup>73</sup> Enver Hoxha, *Twenty Five Years of Struggle and Victory on the Road to Socialism* (Tiranë: Naim Frashëri Publishing House, 1969), 8-9.

<sup>74</sup> Results of questionnaires given in Albania, March and April, 1994.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

<sup>76</sup> *Zeri i popullit* (Tiranë), 21 February 1991, p. 1.

<sup>77</sup> Sudetic, p. A3.

## Chapter 12:

### *Conclusion*

Ramiz Alia gave an excellent summary of the accomplishments of Enver Hoxha to the Ninth Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor on November 3, 1986 (the first Party Congress in which Enver Hoxha was not present). Alia told the delegates that:

Comrade Enver we have among us no longer, but we have his immortal work, we have his wise teachings and instructions, we have his rich theoretical heritage, which inspire us at every moment and guide us in every step.

...The name of Albania and the name of Enver Hoxha are inseparable. The whole of its recent history bears the brand of his outstanding personality, of his theoretical thinking and his political activity. When our people say that they are loyal followers of Enver they express the great fact that their character and features, their way of thinking and acting, their ideal and aims, have been formed in the school of his revolutionary struggle. The figure of Enver Hoxha is the figure which symbolizes and embodies the ardent love of country and dedicated revolutionary militancy, the popular wisdom and brilliant mind of the cultivated man, the modest son of the people and the outstanding statesman.

The struggle and teachings of Enver Hoxha remain the foundation-stone of the general line of the Party, they represent the cardinal points of orientation and reference for its daily activity. **Loyalty toward these teachings and their consistent implementation are the assurance of the present and the guarantee of the future, are decisive conditions for the triumph of the cause of socialism and communism in Albania** [bold type in original].



...Comrade Enver Hoxha wanted and made Albania completely free and independent, completely sovereign. All his theoretical thinking, all his activity, all the struggle against Anglo-American, Yugoslav, Soviet and other interference, express that great concept that the full independence of a country is achieved when it has no obligations of any kind to foreign powers, which condition its internal and external policy, when its political independence is accompanied with an independent economy and defence, when the people are the sovereign owners of their national wealth and determine their own fate. It was Enver Hoxha who formulated and applied the Party's policy of self-reliance. Only such a policy could have fully ensured the freedom and national sovereignty of Albania, its independent political, economic and cultural development, and could have defended it against foreign pressures and dictates.

...Our people dreamed of seeing their country industrialized, of having enough bread from their own land, of receiving education and culture and enjoying the fruits of contemporary civilization. The Party, with Enver Hoxha at the head, made this dream a reality. The idea and the ways for the industrialization of the country and the socialist transformation of the countryside, which Comrade Enver worked out in detail so thoroughly and extensively, were as original as they were vital to the salvation of the country. It was his idea to set up industry on the basis of the exploitation of the natural assets of the country, to create an independent energy base as the decisive factor for the development and progress of industry itself, as well as of agriculture and all the other branches, to train the qualified technical cadres who could bring into use and run the industry to be set up; it was he who worked out the great program to ensure the people's food within the country, and all those fundamental lines on which our socialist economy has advanced<sup>1</sup>

The truth of the reality of the situation which existed in Albania for the forty-plus years of Enver Hoxha's leadership was not as rosy as the picture painted above by Ramiz Alia. Alia 5TT986 fails to discuss any mistakes made by Hoxha. A significant increase in candidness is seen in Alia's speech at the Tenth Party Congress in 1991 which will be mentioned shortly.

The most important factor to take note of in Alia's 1986 speech is: "...Enver Hoxha wanted and made Albania completely free and independent, completely sovereign." This concept of independence which is so crucial to the Albanian consciousness, was definitely maintained and defended by Enver Hoxha. It certainly ranks as Hoxha's greatest accomplishment. In the view of this author, a people and a

state can do without many things, it can substitute one thing for another for many commodities, but one priceless, irreplaceable item is independence. As a result of Hoxha's policies, Albania enjoyed its longest period of independence in its history. Its place on the map is secure. This statement is one that could never be made prior to Hoxha's arrival on the scene of Albanian affairs. This achievement is more impressive when one considers the centuries-long history of Albania being dominated by foreign powers as well as its geographical location in the turbulent "powderkeg of Europe," known as the Balkans.

A most astute summary of Enver Hoxha's legacy was given by Louis Zanga who covered the Albanian scene for many years for Radio Free Europe. Zanga had this to say of Hoxha:

Generally considered the most puritanical, ruthless, and xenophobic leader in modern European history, he will go down in Albanian history mainly for having provided the country with 40 years of national independence, the longest period yet, a feat that is especially important in such a fiercely nationalistic country such as Albania, no matter what other judgments one may pass on him.<sup>3</sup>

Ramiz Alia's speech in 1991 to the Tenth Albanian Party of Labor Congress was more objective. The roots of this newly-found outlook may have been due to mere reflection or possibly the impact of events which transpired on Christmas 1989 in Romania. This "new" Alia puts the period of the Party of Labor's leadership and the role of Enver Hoxha into perspective. Alia adopts the position, with which this writer strongly concurs, that both positive and negative events, both achievements and mistakes, had taken place in Albania. Crucial passages from this speech include:

Until recently, the portrayal of positive aspects predominated: the victories won in the struggle for national liberation and the major transformations that took place in different fields of social activity. Indeed, there were many of these. This is a fact. Did we do well to look only at our successes? No doubt, we did not do well.

Just as we did not do well to look only at our successes, it is equally damaging and unfair to deny everything and to paint a picture as if the

PPSh [Albanian Party of Labor] did nothing but err throughout these 45 years. Extremes never reflect the truth.<sup>3</sup>

Mistakes were made. The cause of these mistakes can be explained by saying that:

...the main reason lies in the line that was followed and the implementation of a specific policy that at first was effective and yielded results, but then stalled. This policy was connected with excessive centralized planning and bureaucratic administrative management and with fetishes about the relations between heavy industry and the production of consumer goods, industry, and agriculture, etc. This policy involved the extreme enforcement of the principle of relying on our own resources, which, especially after the breach of relations with China, left Albania without foreign support and without an open door. The results did no harm to the world. On the contrary, it was our country that suffered and whose difficulties worsened.

It is not only in the economic field that there were errors and weaknesses in the party's work in the past. They were also present in political, social, ideological, and cultural policy ...The violations of human rights in the name of class struggle, the slogans about the multiple imperialist-revisionist blockade and siege, and the extension of circles of enemies on the basis of their family connections at a time we talked of unity and even ideological homogeneity, were mistakes with dire consequences.<sup>4</sup>

Alia also discussed the role of Enver Hoxha:

I think there must be no equivocation in assessing the personality of Enver Hoxha. Silence does not defend him, but is an abandonment of him, leaving him to the mercies of fate. I can say that the only way to ensure continuing respect for the personality of Enver Hoxha is to maintain a critical attitude to his mistakes and to affirm his virtues.

When we talk about mistakes in the past work of the party and state, the bureaucratic centralization that stifled initiative and self-motivation at the grass roots, extreme collectivization and the egalitarianism that diminished an individual's interest in his work, ...sectarianism in the conduct of the class struggle, ...the damage done by the enforcement of the policy of relying on our own resources, etc., there is no doubt that Enver Hoxha bears responsibility for these things.

However, it must also be said that no single person, whoever he may be, can bear total responsibility for the mistakes or shortcomings that time

brings to light. Enver Hoxha worked with a collegial leadership. He had around him many friends and officials who influenced decisionmaking for good or ill<sup>5</sup>

Ramiz Alia's analysis is important since it assesses Enver Hoxha both positively and negatively. Therefore, this study will follow Alia's cue and do the same for the entire period of Albanian history being analyzed within these pages.

The negative aspects of the Hoxha period are many and varied. The worst development on the negative side was the isolation which occurred due to the ideological rigidity espoused by the doctrine of self-reliance. This isolation did not, as Alia quite aptly summarized hurt the world, it only hurt Albania. The extremely limited amount and extent of outside contacts caused Albania to begin to stagnate and if left unchecked, much of the progress made previously would have been lost.

An issue which was also extremely negative on the domestic front was the abuse of human rights and the attack against religion, all having taken place due to ideology. This suffering need not to have occurred and served no viable purpose. The only benefit Enver Hoxha received from these actions was to gain a more firm grip of control upon the people. Likewise, the grip of Communist ideology also deprived several generations of the ability to enjoy freedom of thought and expression.

In terms of foreign relations, only the alliance with Yugoslavia can be perceived as a negative alliance. Although Albania did receive substantial aid from the Yugoslavs which was important to begin the process of organizing society, the treaty remains negative in the overall view. The reason for the negative verdict is due to the question of infringement of sovereignty. The customs unions and joint ventures formed during this period threatened Albania's sovereignty. If Tito had gotten the opportunity he was looking for, Albania quite likely would have become the Seventh Republic of Yugoslavia, ending its independence.

A positive development that is only slightly less significant than the maintenance of independence and sovereignty is the establishment of

an educational system and the subsequent extermination of illiteracy. This newly literate society suddenly became able to function in the tasks required of a workforce in the newly built industrial and agricultural systems. The importance of a literate population needs not be elaborated upon.

The role of women in society and health care for all citizens are both extremely positive developments of Enver Hoxha's Albania. The significance of these two factors is easily seen when one considers the historical antecedents of both issues. Likewise, the development of the economy, both in industry and agriculture was a positive step forward for Albania during the tenure of Hoxha.

Inadequacies existed in all of these various topics being discussed herein. Certainly, Albanian industry and agriculture were not at the limit of their potential development. Technology was backward, due in large part to the negative policy of isolation and self-reliance. However, the significance lies in the fact that now entities known as systems of industry and agriculture were in existence.

A result of Hoxha's policies with strong positive repercussions was that a strong sense of nationalism was fostered. Most importantly, for the first time ever in the history of the Albanian territory, Albania began to function as a nation. Albanian people began to be proud that they were Albanian. Many Albanians mentioned in interviews that life was difficult under Enver Hoxha's rule but one source of pride was that Albanians were now masters of their own destiny. This factor was an extremely important building block used by Hoxha to instill nationalism and pride in being an Albanian.

An interesting sentence appeared in a *Zeri i popullit* editorial written to explain the legacy of Enver Hoxha. The excerpt was: "Enver Hoxha appeared on the stage of Albanian history when time needed him more than ever."<sup>6</sup> Naturally, this phrase appeared in a cloak of sophistic praise which was overdone as one would expect in an editorial eulogizing the deeds of the "immortal" leader. Despite this fact, this writer believes strongly in the truth in the premise of the timeliness of Enver Hoxha's appearance upon the Albanian stage. The question of timeliness reminds one of the comments made by Leon Trotsky



regarding the irreplaceable nature of Lenin to the Russian Revolution. The same can be said of Enver Hoxha's relationship to the transformation which took place in Albania. Trotsky said of Lenin: "thus it is by no means excluded that a disoriented and split party [without Lenin's leadership] might have let slip the revolutionary opportunity for many years."<sup>7</sup> This author believes that only a rare individual like Hoxha could have seized the opportunity presented and implemented his policies on a disunited tribal Albania seething with various antagonistic factions.

Enver Hoxha was a rare individual. He was both an Aristotelian tyrant and a Hegelian World-historical individual. This combination need not be considered contradictory. Enver Hoxha had as his "One Aim" to modernize Albania and rebuild it in his image, according to his whims, as well as to protect its national sovereignty. These policy goals superseded any other consideration.

In conclusion, Enver Hoxha can be considered a leader who accomplished great things for Albania while concurrently enmeshing Albania in policies that were not only counterproductive but self-destructive. In 1973, Enver Hoxha suffered a serious heart attack. This occurrence likely led him to think of his own mortality and he began to plan ways to perpetuate his policies. The best example of this can be seen in the 1976 Constitution which was the legal framework for Hoxha's policies to be implemented, both in 1976 and for the future.

The 1976 Constitution was the turning point where Hoxha's policies changed from continual forward progress to a policy of self-induced degeneration. Had Hoxha not implemented the policy of self-reliance which led to isolation, Albanian progress in all areas would have been almost assuredly greater.

Overall, to paraphrase a statement made by Nimete Minga in an interview, Albania was better off with Enver Hoxha than without him. As a result of the strong-armed methods of Hoxha, progress was made and most importantly, the base for further development was in place at the time of his death in 1985. A leader who advocated a system which was less regimented was doomed to failure in Albania in this period, in the opinion of this writer. Alexander Dubcek's "Communism with a

Human Face" would never have worked in Albania. Likewise, democracy or any form of pluralism were strictly out of the question due to a total lack of democratic tradition. This view is given support by the difficulties and turmoil Albania has experienced in 1997 due to the failed investment schemes.

Thus, in the long term, Albania is better for having had Hoxha at the helm for forty-plus years. Hoxha was a stern disciplinarian who would accept no deviation from his prescribed course of action as he steered Albania through a stormy post-war and Cold War period.

An analogy which is appropriate to describe the Albanian experience is to think of growing up and especially one's teen-age years. The teen-age years are amongst the most difficult years of one's life. These years are a period in which many difficult changes occur and need to occur in order for future development to take place. Usually, a person will realize that significant positive change has taken place in this period, though no one usually wishes to repeat this growing process. All in all, a person usually is a better person once they have been tempered by the difficulties life presents.

The same sort of analogy can be applied to the relationship between Enver Hoxha and the Albanian people. The Hoxha years were a difficult period for the people in some respects but they were important because they fostered growth. Almost all future development in Albania will have been made possible due to the growth which took place in the Hoxha period. The Albanian people became literate, became conscious of themselves as a nation, had the building blocks of modern society put into place, lived longer and healthier lives, and had the territorial integrity of Albania preserved for future generations. Thus, Enver Hoxha and his leadership can be considered a positive stage in Albania's progression from a backward, feudal society (which is the condition Albania was in at the beginning of the period) into a modern nation, though less developed, but certainly of the twentieth century.

The best way to put Albania's development from 1944 to 1985 in perspective is to look at the following quotation from Enver Hoxha in which he was speaking to a group of people of Albanian nationality from several countries who were visiting Albania in 1969. The message

of the speech is significant because it attempts to put Albanian achievements in their proper perspective; that is, the perspective of the necessity to assess achievement within Albanian parameters.

Enver Hoxha told the visitors:

The Albanian communists are ordinary people, prepared to make sacrifices. The enemies curse them, call them 'barbarians,' 'criminals' and all sorts of other epithets. They slander the communists in this way because they are men of the people who changed the face of that backward Albania which many of you remember very well from 30 to 40 years ago. How greatly this Albania of ours has changed! True, the time has been short and we do not boast about the progress we have made but the truth is that changes are great. You, in particular, understand these changes correctly, because you compare the situation with what it was before. Of course, you do not compare these things with the palaces which you see in the centre of Ankara, in the Champs-Elysees of Paris, or with the sky-scrapers of New York, which were not built in 25 years, but began to be built centuries ago with the sweat, blood and the sufferings of the working people for the benefit of the magnates, the wealthy, the millionaires. Looking at Albania from this correct angle, the differences within 25 years are like the difference of night from day.

.. It is true that we received credits from the Soviet Union of the time of Stalin and from China for the projects we have built or are building, but you and the whole world must know that the valuable and necessary credit which has been given us is infinitesimal in comparison with the investments of billions of leks and the great economic strength which the Albanian people have created with their own toil and sweat.

In light of that past, Albania under Enver Hoxha made considerable progress. This progress will make future progress possible. Despite the many mistakes which were made, like the above-mentioned person going through their teen-age years, Albania under Hoxha came of age by travelling the path from infancy, to adolescence, to adulthood. Albania developed from a pseudo-feudalistic 16th or 17th Century state with a precarious sovereignty to a completely sovereign independent nation of the 20th Century, whose position on the map of Europe was secure. That is the legacy and greatest triumph of Enver Hoxha.



*Notes*

<sup>1</sup> Ramiz Alia, Report on the Activity of the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania and the Tasks for the Future: Submitted to the 9th Congress of the Party of Labor of Albania, November 3, 1986 (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1986), 5, 6-7, 8-9, 10-11.

<sup>2</sup> Louis Zanga, "Albania Begins the Post-Hoxha Era," *Radio Free Europe RAD Background Report*, no. 33, 18 April 1985, 1.

<sup>3</sup> Ramiz Alia, Speech given at the Tenth Albanian Party of Labor Congress, Tiranë, 11 June 1991: quoted in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, EEU-91-119, p. 1

"Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 1-2.

<sup>6</sup> "The Ideal of the Party and Comrade Enver Hoxha are Ever Lasting," *Zeri i popullit* (Tiranë), quoted in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, , 18 April 1985, p. B5.

<sup>7</sup> Leon Trotsky, *History of the Russian Revolution*, trans. Max Eastman, 3 vols. (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1957), 1:330.

<sup>8</sup> Enver Hoxha, *Speeches and Articles, 1969-1970*, vol. 4 (Tiranë: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1980), 334-335, 337.

## Appendix A:

*Pyetësor — Questionnaire*

1. Emri, Mbiemëri—Name\_\_\_\_\_.
2. Mosha — Age\_\_\_\_\_.
3. Maskull ose Femër--Male or Female\_\_\_\_\_.
4. Profesioni — Occupation\_\_\_\_\_.
5. Shkolla qe ka Kryer - Level of Education (Highest Grade Completed)
6. Fshati ose Qyteti Ku Jeton (Ke Jetuar) — Village or Town Lived in
  - A. Nga Gjyshi ~ By your Grandfather\_\_\_\_\_.
  - B. Nga Prindërit — By your Parents\_\_\_\_\_.
  - C. Ti Vetë - By Yourself\_\_\_\_\_.
7. A kane marrë pjesë prindërit tuaj ne Luftën Nacional-Çlirimtare? -  
Did you or your parents participate in the War of National Liberation?  
Po -- Yes\_\_\_\_\_Jo -- No\_\_\_\_\_.  
Në se ndonjëri mori pjesë, me cilin grup te rezistencës ishte ~ If  
anyone participated (Family member or yourself), which  
resistance group was this with?  
Komunist - Communist\_\_\_\_\_Balli Kombëtar\_\_\_\_\_  
Legaliteti — Legalite\_\_\_\_\_Tetjera — Other\_\_\_\_\_

8. Si e quan veten ti? — Which of the following do you consider yourself to be?  
 Gegë — Gheg\_\_\_\_ Toskë — Tosk\_\_\_\_ Shqiptar -Albanian  
 Grek — Greek\_\_\_\_ Apo ndryshe nga më sipër ~ Other\_\_\_\_\_.
9. Cili ishte besimi fetar i familjes tuaj para 1967? ~ What is your family's religious background?  
 Musliman — Muslim\_\_\_\_ Orthodox Shqiptar — Albanian  
 Orthodox\_\_\_\_ Orthodox Grek — Greek Orthodox\_\_\_\_  
 Katolik - Catholic\_\_\_\_ Tjetër - Other\_\_\_\_.  
 Cili është besimi juaj fetar tani — What do you consider your religious background to be?\_\_\_\_\_.
10. A keni qënë ju ose ndonjë pjesëtar tjetër i familjes tuaj në burg? -  
 Have you or any member of your family served time in prison?  
 Po ~ Yes\_\_\_\_ Jo — No\_\_\_\_.  
 Për sa vite — Number of years\_\_\_\_. Per krime ordinere si  
 vjedhje, korrupsion etj, apo për shkak të aktivitetit tuaj kundër-  
 PPSH/kunder qeverisë së atëherëshme ose për shkak të aktivitetit  
 tuaj pro-fetar? — Was this due to criminal activity (theft,  
 corruption, etc) or due to anti-government/antiparty, or pro-  
 religious activities?\_\_\_\_\_.
11. Si e përshkruani ju aleancën e Shqipërisë me Jugosllavinë në vitet  
 1945-1948 — Aspektet pozitive dhe negative të saj? — How would  
 you describe Albania's alliance with Yugoslavia 1945-1948 —  
 positive and/or negative aspects?\_\_\_\_\_.
12. Si do ta përshkruanit ju aleancën e Shqipërisë me Bashkimin  
 Sovjetik 1948-1961 — Aspektet pozitive dhe negative? — How  
 would you describe Albania's alliance with the Soviet Union  
 1948-1961 -positive and/or negative aspects?\_\_\_\_\_.
13. Cilat janë përshtypjet tuaja për Stalinin — Aspektet pozitive dhe  
 negative? — What are your impressions of Josef Stalin — positive  
 and/or negative aspects?\_\_\_\_\_.

14. Si do ta përshkruanit ju aleancën e Shqiperise me Kinën 1961-1978 — Aspektet pozitive dhe negative? — How would you describe Albania's alliance with China 1961-1978 — positive and/or negative aspects?\_\_\_\_\_
15. Cilat janë përshtypjet e tua për parrullën e PPSH dhe Enver Hoxhës "mbështetje në forcat tona?" — What are your impressions of the phrases "self-reliance" or "relying on one's own forces" which were slogans of the APL under Enver Hoxha?\_\_\_\_\_.
16. Cilat janë përshtypjet e tua për industrinë Shqiptare në kohën e Enver Hoxhës — Aspektet pozitive dhe negative? — What are your impressions of Albanian industry under Hoxha — positive and/or negative aspects?\_\_\_\_\_.
17. Cilat janë përshtypjet e tua për bujqësisë Shqiptare në kohën e Enver Hoxhës — Aspektet pozitive dhe negative? — What are your impressions of Albanian agriculture under Hoxha — positive and/or negative aspects?\_\_\_\_\_.
18. Cilat janë përshtypjet e tua për arsimin në kohën e Enver Hoxhës - Aspektet pozitive dhe negative? ~ What are your impressions of Albanian education under Hoxha — positive and/or negative aspects?\_\_\_\_\_.
19. Cilat janë përshtypjet e tua lidhur me mbylljen e gjithë kishave dhe xhamiave dhe ndalimit me ligj të praktikimit të fesë me 1967 në Shqipëri (duke e shpallur Shqipërinë kështu të parin vend ateist në botë) — spektet pozitive dhe negative? — What are your impressions of the closing of all churches and mosques and the abolition of religion in 1967 (making Albania the only officially atheistic nation in the world) — positive and/or negative aspects?\_\_\_\_\_.

20. Cilat janë përshtypjet e tua për sistemin shëndetësor në kohën e Enver Hoxhës ~ Aspektet pozitive dhe negative? ~ What are your impressions of the Albanian health care system under Hoxha — positive and/or negative aspects?\_\_\_\_\_.
21. A pati ndonjë ndryshim në rolin e femrës në shoqërinë Shqiptare gjatë kohës së sundimit të PPSH? — Was there any change in the role of women in Albanian society under the APL? Po — Yes\_\_\_\_\_Jo - No\_\_\_\_\_? Nëse pati, cilat ishin ndryshimet më të rëndësishme? —If so, what were the most significant changes?\_\_\_\_\_.
22. Cilat janë përshtypjet e tua për Enver Hoxhën — Aspektet pozitive dhe negative? — What are your impressions of Enver Hoxha — positive and/or negative aspects?\_\_\_\_\_.
23. A beson ti se Enver Hoxha do të merrte mendimin kolegjial të by-rose politike, për një çështje të caktuar, përpara se të deklaronte qëndrimin e tij? - Do you believe that Enver Hoxha would first seek to determine what the prevailing opinion was on an issue, among the members of the Politbureau, before declaring his position? — Po — Yes\_\_\_\_\_Jo ~ No\_\_\_\_\_.
24. Cilat janë përshtypjet e tua për Mehmet Shehun — Aspektet pozitive dhe negative? — What are your impressions of Mehmet Shehu — positive and/or negative aspects?\_\_\_\_\_.
25. A beson ti se e ashtuquajtura vetëvrasje e Mehmet Shehut kishte për qëllim të sigurote transferimin e butë të pushtetit nga Hoxha tek Alia? — Do you believe that Shehu's alleged suicide was motivated by the quest to insure the smooth transferral of power from Hoxha to Alia? Po -Yes\_\_\_\_\_Jo - No\_\_\_\_\_.
26. Lidhur me punët e brendëshme të PPSH, mundej që Mehmet Shehu të lejohej të dilte në pension, në kundërshtim me ekzekutimin që iliubë? ~ Within the internal workings of the APL, could Mehmet

Shehu have been permitted to retire as opposed to being executed? Po —Yes\_\_\_\_\_.Jo ~ No\_\_\_\_\_.

27. Cilat janë përshtypjet e tua për Ramiz Alinë — Aspektet pozitive dhe negative? — What are your impressions of Ramiz Alia — positive and/or negative aspects?\_\_\_\_\_
28. Sipas mendimit tuaj, Ramiz Alia hoqi dorë nga pushteti me qëllim që të parandalonte shpërthimin e një lufte civile? — In your opinion was Ramiz Alia's decision to relinquish power a move designed to prevent the outbreak of a civil war?  
Po - Yes\_\_\_\_\_Jo -No\_\_\_\_\_.
29. Shkruaj një listë të zhvillimeve që ndodhën në Shqipëri gjatë viteve të Enver Hoxhës dhe PPSH cilin ndryshim ju e konsideroni më pozitivin dhe cilin ndryshim ju e konsideroni më negativin? — List developments which occurred in Albania during Enver Hoxha's years as leader of the APL which you consider to the most positive and the most negative?\_\_\_\_\_
30. Sipas mendimit tuaj, sikur Enver Hoxha mos të ishte ngritur në fuqi pas luftës së dytë botërore, Shqipëria do të ishte tani në një gjendje më të mirë apo më të keqe? — In your opinion, if Enver Hoxha had never risen to a position of power in post-WWII Albania-would Albania have been in a better or worse situation?
31. Kishte një ndjenjë krenarie kombëtare dhe nacionalizmi gjatë viteve të Enver Hoxhës? Nëse kishte një ndjenjë të tillë, ishte kjo e fortë apo e dobët? — Was a sense of Albanian nationalism present during Hoxha's years in power? If so, was this feeling strong or weak?\_\_\_\_\_.
32. A jeni dakord me thënien e mëposhtme — "Shqipëria ruajti sovranitetin e saj territorial dhe panvarësinë e saj, ndërsa populli i saj jetoi në kushte të vështira jetese?" — Do you agree or disagree

with the following statement — "Albania maintained its territorial sovereignty and independence while most of its inhabitants encountered difficult living conditions?"

Në se jeni dakord me thënien e mësipërme cilës prej thënieve që pasojnë ju i jepni më tepër rëndësi: — If you agreed with the above statement, which of the following would you place greater importance with:

- A. Ruajtja e sovranitetit tokësor — Maintaining Sovereignty;
- B. Përmirësimit të kushteve të jetesës -- Improving Living Conditions.

Ne se ju nuk jeni dakord me thënien e parë, mos i jepni përgjigje kësaj pyetjeje. ~ If you disagreed with the above statement — SKIP this question.\_\_\_\_\_.

33. Me cilin prej emrave të më poshtëm ju do ta krahasoni/shoqëroni më tepër Enver Hoxhën? — With whose name would you most closely associate Enver Hoxha?  
 A. Stalin -- Stalin C. Çauşesku — Ceaucescu E. Tito ~ Tito  
 B. Dubček — Dubcek D. Mao-Ce-Dun — Mao Tse-tung F. Hrushov — Khrushchev G. Gorbaçov — Gorbachev.\_\_\_\_\_.
34. Me cilin prej emrave të mësipërm do ta krahasoni/shoqëroni Ramiz Alinë? — From the above list, with whose name would you most closely associate Ramiz Alia?\_\_\_\_\_.
35. Sipas mendimit tuaj, cila prej thënieve të mëposhtme e karakterizon Shqipërinë më mirë, gjatë viteve të Enver Hoxhës: - In your opinion, which of the following best describes Albania during the years Enver Hoxha was in power:  
 A. Shqipëria për herë të parë në historinë e saj ishte vërtet e pavarur ekonomikisht dhe politikisht. — Albania, for the first time in its history was truly economically and politically independent.  
 B. Themelimi i një baze industriale nuk do të arrihej brenda një periudhe kaq të shkurtër, nëse Shqipëria nuk do të ishte një shtet socialist. ~ The establishment of an industrial base could not have been achieved in such a short time if Albania had not been a socialist state.

C. Shqipëria ishte nje burg pa mure. -- Albania was a prison without walls.

36. Ku do ta vinit ju Enver Hoxhën në historinë e Shqipërisë — si hero, diçka e ngjashme me Skënderbeun, apo si një tiran, apo të dyja?  
here would you place Enver Hoxha in Albanian history - as a hero, somewhat similar to Skenderbeu, or as a tyrant, or both?

Komente -- Comments:

**Table 1-1:** Age and Gender Statistics for 183 Questionnaires

	Male	Percentage of Male Respondents (in %)	Female	Percentage of Female Respondents (in %)	Percentage of Total Within Age Group
Total	98	54	85	46	N/A
Age 20-30	23	40	35	40	31.6
Age 30-40	14	56	11	44	13.6
Age 40-50	27	57	20	43	25.6
Age 50-60	23	59	16	41	21
Age 60-70	9	75	3	25	6.5
Age 70-80	2	100	0	0	1





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