Bill Bland: The Soviet Campaign Against Cosmopolitanism: 1947-1952

A paper presented to the Stalin Society, London, on 1 November 1998
by Bill Bland. First Published on the web February 2000 by ALLIANCE ML (NORTH AMERICA)



“The word ‘cosmopolitan’ is derived from two Greek words, ‘kosmos’ meaning ‘world’ and ‘polites’ meaning ‘citizen.'”

(Eric Partridge: ‘Origins: A Short Etymological Dictionary of Modern English’; London; 1958; p. 122, 508).

In its etymology, therefore, a cosmopolitan is a “citizen of the world,” rather than a citizen of a particular country.

Now, in ordinary usage the word “cosmopolitan” carries positive connotations, connotations of sophistication. One’s first reaction to the Soviet campaign against cosmopolitanism, therefore, may well be to wonder why on earth the Communist Party should want the Soviet working people to be boorish.

The explanation lies in the fact that Marxism-Leninism is a science, the science of politics, and to Marxist-Leninists the term “cosmopolitan” has a more specific, more negative, connotation than in everyday language.

The Treatment of the Anti-Cosmopolitan Campaign in the Western Media

The most common “explanation” of the anti-cosmopolitan campaign put forth in the Western media was that anti-cosmopolitanism was a euphemism for anti-Semitism.

Critics speak of:

“The anti-Semitism lurking behind the term as used by Stalin.”

(Timothy Brennan: ‘At Home in the World: Cosmopolitanism Now’; Cambridge (USA); 1997; p. 21).

But this “explanation” cannot be made to fit the known facts.

Firstly, we know that Stalin strongly condemned anti-Semitism:

“Anti-Semitism, as an extreme form of racial chauvinism, is the most dangerous vestige of cannibalism…Hence Communists, as consistent internationalists, cannot but be irreconcilable, sworn enemies of anti-Semitism….Under USSR law active anti-Semites are liable to the death penalty.”

(Josef V, Stalin: ‘Anti-Semitism’, in: ‘Works’, Volume 13; Moscow; 1955; p. 30).

Secondly, even Jewish writers like Benjamin Pinkus, Professor of Jewish History at the Ben-Gurion University in Israel, admit that:

“….It is important to emphasise that in these attacks (the anti-cosmopolitanism campaign Ed.) there was no anti-Jewish tone, either explicitly or implicitly.”

(Benjamin Pinkus: ‘The Jews of the Soviet Union: The History of a National Minority’ (hereafter listed as ‘Benjamin Pinkus (1989)’; Cambridge; 1989; p 152).

Thirdly, the artists most strongly criticised in the anti-cosmopolitanism campaign, the poetess Anna Akhmatova and the satirist Mikhail Zoshchenko were not Jewish:

“The chief victims . . . were two non-Jews – the satirist M. Zoshchenko and the poetess A. Ahianatova.”

(Benjamin Pinkus (1989): ibid.; p. 151).

Fourthly, Jews:

“Took an active part in the anti-cosmopolitanism campaign”;

(Benjamin Pinkus (1989): ibid.; p. 157)


“The philosopher and member of the Academy of Sciences Mark Mitin; the journalist David Zaslavsky, and the orientalist V(ladimir –Ed.) Lutsky.”

(Benjamin Pinkus (1989): ibid.; p. 157)

Marxism-Leninism and National Distinctions

To Marxist-Leninists, a cosmopolitan is one who disparages national distinctions.

It is true that Marxist-Leninists envisage that, in the socialist world of the future, national distinctions of language and culture would eventually disappear:

“I have always adhered and continue to adhere to the Leninist view that in the period of the victory of socialism on a world scale, the national languages are inevitably bound to merge into one common language, which, of course, will be neither Great Russian nor German, but something new.”

(Josef V. Stalin: Reply to the Discussion on the Political Report of the Central Committee to the 16th Congress of the CPSU (B), in: ‘Works’, Volume 13; Moscow; 1955; p. 5).

However, Marxist-Leninists recognise that until that time in the distant future distinctions of national language and culture will remain. As Stalin told the 16th Congress of the CPSU in June 1930:

“National differences cannot disappear in the near future, . . . they are bound to remain for a long time even after the victory of the proletarian revolution on a world scale.

(Josef V. Stalin: ibid.; p. 4-5).

“We have abolished national privileges and have established national equality of rights. We have abolished state frontiers in the old sense of the term, frontier posts and customs barriers between the nationalities of the USSR. . . . But does this mean that we have thereby abolished national differences, national languages, culture, manner of life, etc.? Obviously it does not mean this.”

(Josef V. Stalin: Political Report of the Central Committee to the CPSU (B), in: ‘Works’, Volume 12; Moscow; 1955; p. 376).

Indeed, the policy of Marxist-Leninists is to do everything possible to encourage the fullest flowering of national languages and cultures. As Stalin told the students of the University of the Peoples of the East in May 1925, the tasks of the Communist Party are:

“To develop national culture, to set up a wide network of courses and schools for both general education and vocational-technical training, to be conducted in the native languages. The slogan of national culture became a proletarian slogan when the proletariat came to power. .Proletarian universal culture does not exclude, but presupposes and fosters the national culture of the peoples.”

(Josef V. Stalin: ‘The Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East’, in: ‘Works’, Volume 7; Moscow; 1954; p.138, 140, 142).

And as he said in his political report to the 16th Congress of the Party in June 1930:

“It may seem strange that we who stand for the future merging of national cultures into one common (both in form and content) culture, with one common language, should at the same time stand for the flowering of national cultures at the present moment. . . . But there is nothing strange about it. The national cultures must be allowed to develop and unfold, . . in order to create the conditions for merging them into one common culture with one common language in the period of the victory of socialism all over the world. . . . It is just this that constitutes the dialectics of the Leninist presentation of the question of national culture.”

(Josef V. Stalin: Political Report of the Central Committee to the 16th Congress of the CPSU (B), in: ‘Works;’, Volume 12; Moscow; 1955; p. 380).

It is on the basis of these Marxist-Leninist principles that the Soviet Communist Party opposed cosmopolitanism, which, as we have seen, disparages national cultures.

The Soviet Campaign against Cosmopolitanism

Criticism of cosmopolitanism in Russia did not begin with the socialist revolution. The 19th century literary critic Vissarion Belinsky wrote:

“The cosmopolitan is a false, senseless, strange and incomprehensible phenomenon. . . . He is a corrupt, unfeeling creature, totally unworthy of being called by the holy name of man.”

(Vissarion Belinsky, in: Benjamin Pinkus (1989): op. cit.; p. 153-54).

Already during the Second World War, Aleksandr Fadayev, Chairman of the Union of Soviet Writers, had written:

“The German invaders were deliberately encouraging rootless cosmopolitanism, which stems from the so-called idea that everybody is a ‘citizen of the world.”‘

(Aleksandr Fadayev, in: Norah Levin: ‘The Jews in the Soviet Union since 1917’; London; 1990; p. 464).

Later it was pointed out that the concept of a cosmopolitan Europe was a continuation of the Nazi ideology of a “new order in Europe”:

“Yesterday this reactionary cosmopolitan idea of a world state meant the Hitlerite ‘new order in Europe’, trampling on the national sovereignty and independence of the European peoples.”

(R. Miller-Budnitskaya: ‘Cosmopolitanism of the Literary Hollywood’, in: ‘Novy Mir’, no. 6, 1948, in: Benjamin Pinkus; ‘The Soviet Government and the Jews: 1948-1967: A Documentary Study’ (hereafter listed as ‘Benjamin Pinkus (1984)’; Cambridge; 1984; p. 183).

Already in an article in June 1945, the writer N. Baltiisky declared that:

“Communism has nothing in common with cosmopolitanism, that ideology which is characteristic of representatives of banking firms and international consortiums, great stock exchange speculators and international suppliers of weapons and their agents. Indeed, these circles operate according to the Roman saying ubi bene, ibi patria (where there is profit, there is one’s motherland — Ed.).”

(N. Baltiisky, in: Benjamin Pinkus (1989): op. cit.; p. 151).

It was in 1946, however, that anti-cosmopolitanism took the form of a systematic, intensive campaign. In the spring of 1946, for example, at the 11th Plenary Session of the Union of Soviet Writers, the Union’s Chairman, Aleksandr Fadayev, launched a severe criticism:

“Against Yitzhak Nusinov ‘s treatment of Pushkin in his book ‘Pushkin and World Literature. . Fadayev denounced the ‘denationalisation’ of Pushkin by Nusinov.”

(Nora Levin: op. cit.; p. 468).

Fadayev charged that:

“The fundamental idea of the book is that Pushkin’s genius does not express the uniqueness of the historical development of the Russian nation, as a Marxist ought to have shown, but that Pushkin’s greatness consistsd in his being ‘European.'”

(Benjamin Pinkus (1989): op. cit.; p. 152).

The campaign against cosmopolitanism

“spread throughout the Soviet mass media – radio, press. literature, cinema, theatre, scientific and popular lectures, wall-notices at places of work.”

(Benjamin Pinkus (1989): ibid.; p. 155).

The campaign was not directed against foreign influences in general. As the writer Ilya Ehrenburg expressed it:

“It is impossible to toady to Shakespeare or Rembrandt, because prostration before them cannot humiliate the worshipper.”

(Ilya Ehrenburg, in: Nora Levin: op. cit.; p. 466).

It was directed against presenting inferior foreign works of art, even those with an anti-socialist content, as admirable. A leading article in ‘Bolshevik’, the theoretical organ of the CPSU, during 1947 said:

“Traces of subservience to bourgeois Western culture have found expression . . in . . . bowing and scraping . . . to bourgeois Western scholarship.”

(‘Bolshevik’ No. 16, 1947, in: Benjamin Pinkus (1989): op. cit.; p. 152).

In the campaign it was made very clear that opposition to cosmopolitanism was in no way to be confused with opposition to internationalism. Speaking to a conference of music workers in 1948, Andrei Zhdanov, the Central Committee Secretary responsible for cultural affairs, stressed:

“Internationalism in art does not spring from the depletion and impoverishment of national art; on the contrary, internationalism grows where national culture flourishes. To forget this is to…become a cosmopolitan without a country. It is impossible to be an internationalist in music or in anything else unless one loves and respects one’s own people. . . . Our internationalism in music and respect for the creative genius of other nations is therefore based on the enrichment and development of our national musical culture, which we can then share with other nations.”

(Andrei A. Thdanov: Concluding Speech at a Conference of Soviet Music Workers, 1948, in: ‘On Literature, Music and philosophy’; London; 1950; p. 62-63).

A milestone in the anti-Cosmoplitanism campaign was the August 1947 report by Zhdanov, which strongly criticised certain Soviet writers and artists who were alleged to have sunk into cosmopolitanism:

“Leningrad’s literary journals started giving space to cheap modern bourgeois literature from the West. Some of our men of letters began looking on themselves as not the teachers but the pupils of petty-bourgeois writers and began to adopt an obsequious and awestruck attitude towards foreign literature.”

(Andrei A. Zhdanov: Report on the Journals ‘Zvezda’ and ‘Leningrad,, in: ibid.; p. 31).

The campaign against cosmopolitanism, of course, defended not only the national culture of Russia, but that of:

“All the nations in the Soviet Union.”
(Benjamin Pinkus (1989): op. cit.; p. 154).

The campaign was greatly intensified in the first months of 1949, to become:

“an attack on an organised group, which had supposedly practised . . . an attempt to create a kind of literary underground.”

(Benjamin Pinkus (1989): ibid.; p. 155).

At this time it was directed particularly at an organised group of revisionist dramatic critics who were slating good Soviet plays and praising worthless foreign plays for their “sophistication”:

“An anti-patriotic group has developed in theatrical criticism. It consists of followers of bourgeois aestheticism. . . . These critics. . represent a rootless cosmopolitanism which is deeply repulsive and inimical to Soviet man.. .The sting of aesthetic-formalist criticism is directed not against the really harmful and inferior works, but against the progressive and best ones.”

(‘On an Anti-Patriotic Group of Theatre Critics’, in: ‘Pravda’, 28 January 1949, in: Benjamin Pinkus (1984): op. cit. ; p. 183-84).

“This group, hostile to Soviet culture, set itself the aim of vilifying the outstanding events of our literature and the best in Soviet dramaturgy.'”

(Benjamin Pinkus (1989): op. cit.; p. 155).

The anti-cosmopolitanism campaign:

“lasted in a subdued form until the second half of 1952.”

(Benjamin Pinkus (1984): op. cit.; p. 164).

The Domestic and International Background to the Campaign

It is clear from what has been said that the Soviet campaign against cosmopolitanism was fully in accord with Marxist-Leninist principles, which stand in our era for the fullest development of national cultures, not for their impoverishment.

The question arises, however: why was it felt necessary to organise an intensive campaign against cosmopolitanism precisely in 1947-52?

The reasons are partly domestic, partly international.

In the Soviet Union, revisionists in the cultural field felt that after four years of bloody war, moves towards light, escapist culture would have popular support. The Russian-born American journalist Alexander Werth noted:

“In Moscow, in particular, there were extraordinary signs of frivolity and escapism. The famous chansonnier and diseur Alexander Vertinsky, after spending more than twenty years as an idol of the Russian emigres in Paris, New York and Shanghai, turned up in Moscow. His recitals of ‘decadent’ songs drew immense crowds….Although he was never reviewed or advertised in the press, posters announcing Vertinsky recitals were stuck up all over Moscow….Both songs and films were tending to become escapist, . . . In 1944 the cinemas were showing American films, among them a particularly inane Deanna Durbin film. It was even widely suggested that light reading would be encouraged. Thus, there was a scheme for starting a library of thrillers and detective stories in Russian — mostly translated from English.”

(Alexander Werth: ‘Russia at War: 1941-1945’; London; 1965; p. 939-41, 942).

In the international field, we know now from official documents that in May 1945, within weeks of Germany’s surrender, Churchill was already planning

“..a massive attack against the Red Army leading to the elimination of Russia”,

(‘Guardian’, 2 October 1998; p. 7).

to be:

“supported by 100,000 defeated German soldiers.”

(‘Guardian’, 2 October 1998; p. 7).

However, the chiefs of staff committee considered the plan unworkable, as:

“beyond our power”;

(‘Guardian’, 2 October 1998; p. 7).

Nevertheless, in March 1946 Churchill made his famous speech at Fulton, Missouri, heralding on the one hand

“Special relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States.”

(‘Keesing’s Contemporary Archives’, Volume 6; p. 7,771).

and on the other hand declaring cold war on the Soviet Union:

“A shadow has fallen upon the scenes so lately lightened by the Allied victory…An iron curtain has descended across the continent.”

(‘Keesing’s Contemporary Archives’, Volume 6; p. 7,771).

In March 1947 US President Harry Truman initiated the “Truman Doctrine”

“ prevent the further spread of communism”,

(‘Encyclopedia Americana’, Volume 18; New York; 1977; p. 328).

In June 1947 US Secretary of State George Marshall announced the Marshall Plan,” euphemistically titled the “European Recovery Programme” (ERP), presented as generous American “aid” to war-devastated Europe, but by which:

“…containment was extended effectively to Western Europe.”

(‘Encyclopedia Americana’, Volume 27; New York; 1977; p. 176).

In July 1947, the Soviet government broke off negotiations with the Western Powers on the “Marshall Plan”:

“…and announced that the machinery envisaged under the Plan would infringe on the national sovereignty of the participants.”

(Adam B. Ulam: “Stalin: The Man and his Era”; London; 1989; p. 659).

Indeed, the Marshall Plan soon became a US intelligence operation. In June 1948, the US National Security Council:

“Approved a top secret document . . . establishing a covert arm within the existing CIA. The new covert organisation was soon named the ‘Office of Policy Coordination’. From its creation in 1948 until 1952 when the Marshall Plan was terminated, the OPC operated as the plan’s complement.”

(Sallie Pisani: ‘The CIA and the Marshall Plan’; Edinburgh; 1991; p. 70).

It was:

“Under State Department control but funded by the CIA.”

(John Ranelagh: ‘The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA’; London; 1986; p. 116).

being in reality:

“An American initiative in the cold war with Russia.”

(John Gimbel: ‘The Origins of the Marshall Plan’; Stanford (USA): 1970; p. 4).

In September 1947, the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) was founded, and at its inaugural meeting Zhdanov declared:

“That two blocs had materialised since the end of the war, an imperialist and anti-democratic bloc led by the USA, and an anti-imperialist and democratic bloc led by the Soviet Union. . . . The first bloc was planning an aggressive war against the second.”

(Andrei A. Zhdanov: Speech at Founding Session of Cominform, September 1947, in: ‘Keesing’s Contemporary Archives’, Volume 6; p. 8,920).

The new international situation was summed up by Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov on the 30th anniversary of the October Revolution in November 1947:

“Today the ruling circles of the USA and Britain are at the head of an international group which has made it its purpose to . . . establish the dominance of these countries over other nations.”

(Vyacheslav Molotov: Speech of November 1947, in: ‘Keesing’s Contemporary Archives’, Volume 6; p. 8,940).

In March 1948, a military alliance known as:

“the ‘Brussels Treaty’ was signed by Britain, France, and the ‘Benelux’ countries (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg).”

(Richard B. Morris & Graham W. Irwin (Eds.): ‘An Encylopaedia of the Modern World: A Concise Reference History from 1760 to the Present Day’; London; 1970; P. 586).

In April 1949, the foreign ministers of twelve states — Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and the USA — signed a broader military alliance: the North Atlantic Treaty, establishing the ‘North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’ (NATO). (‘Statesman’s Year Book: 1998-1999’; London; 1998; p. 37).


“was the logical extension of the ‘Brussels Treaty.”

(D. C. Watt, Frank Spencer & Neville Brown: ‘A History of the World in the 20th Century’; London; 1997; p. 650).

It was therefore clear to the Soviet government that it was faced with a real threat of aggression from the Western Powers, and that cosmopolitanism was an ideological weapon in that threat.

The Soviet campaign against cosmopolitanism of 1947-52 was thus a campaign of defence for itself and other countries whose independence was threatened by imperialism.

In his speech at the inaugural session of the Cominform, Zhdanov asserted:

“One of the directions of the ideological campaign which accompanies the plans for enslaving Europe is an attack on the principle of national sovereignty, an appeal for the renunciation of sovereign rights set off by the idea of a ‘world government.'”

(Andrei A. Zhdanov: Speech at Founding Session of Cominform (September 1947), in: ‘Keesing’s Contemporary Archives’, Volume 6; p. 8,020).

A typical article in the campaign declared:

“Cosmopolitanism is the militant ideology of imperialist reaction in our time. By disseminating the corrupt ideology of cosmopolitanism., the American imperialists are trying ideologically to disarm freedom-loving people who stand up for their national independence, to foster in them indifference to their own motherland, to cultivate national nihilism, and to weaken their vigilance. . .
The ideologists of American imperialism declare that in our century such concepts as the nation, national sovereignty, patriotism, etc., are ‘out-worn’, and must be thrown overboard.

The right-wing socialists, the faithful servants of American imperialism, are active preachers of cosmopolitanism.”

(E. Dunayeva: ‘Cosmopolitanism in the Service of Imperialist Reaction’; in: ‘Current Digest of the Soviet Press’, Volume 2, No. 16 (3 June 1950); p. 18).

and some articles went so far as to compare cosmopolitanism with atomic and bacteriological weapons:

“Cosmopolitanism occupies a prominent place in the arsenal of contemporary imperialism, along with the atom bomb and bacteriological warfare.”

(E. A. Korovin: “For a Patriotic Science of Law’, in: ‘Current Digest of the Soviet Press’, Volume 2, No. 2 (25 February 1950); p. 13).


These days, some forty years on from the great Soviet campaign against cosmopolitanism, we hear little mention of the term.

But that is not because cosmopolitanism has disappeared. On the contrary, it has merely acquired a new name: globalisation.

Indeed, globalisation has become a new branch of sociology, known as ‘World System Theory’, attributed to the American sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein.


Sovereignty is simply:


(‘Oxford English Dictionary’, Volume 16; Oxford; 1989; p. 79).

and one of the principal attributes of a state’s sovereignty is the power to impose measures of protection.



“Can be defined as any policy measure which discriminates between home and foreign supplies”;

(H. Peter Gray: ‘Free Trade or Protection? A Pragmatic Analysis’; Basingstoke; 1985; p. 1).

to the disadvantage of the latter. Protection may be carried out by the imposition of “tariffs” or duties, a tariff or duty being:

“A tax levied on imported goods . . designed to protect domestic producers against competition from imports”,

(‘Encyclopedia Americana’, Volume 26; New York; 1977; p. 295).

by the imposition of quotas, a quota being:

“the maximum number of . . . imports allowed to enter a country within a set period.”

(‘Oxford English Dictionary’, Volume 13; Oxford; 1989; p. 52).

or by the imposition of export subsidies, that is,

“financial aid furnished by a state or a public corporation”;

(‘Oxford English Dictionary’, Volume 17; Oxford; 1989; p. 60).

to an exporter.

In general, technically advanced capitalist countries, imperialist countries, benefit from and want a maximum of free trade, defined as a:

“system by which foreign goods are allowed to enter a country in unlimited quantities and without payment”;

(‘Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English’; Harlow; 1987; p. 412).

of any taxes. This is because in the absence of protection, superior technique of production gives countries possessing them an advantage over more technically backward countries.

On the other hand, more technically backward countries benefit from and want the sovereign right to impose protective measures, since without them their industries cannot compete with cheaper imports from the more technically advanced countries. These are the essential motives behind the drive by imperialist states to build and extend “free trade areas,” a free trade area being an area of the world with right to impose protective measures. Furthermore, such a free trade area enables the participating states to pool their resources for more effective competition with their rivals.

Since the Second World War, three rival blocs of imperialist powers have developed in the world: these are, in fact:

“Three growing superstates and blocs: the EC (European Community — Ed.) led by Germany; the USA-dominated North American Free Trade Agreement with Canada and Mexico; and the Pacific area headed by Japan.”

(John Boyd: “Britain and European Union: Democracy or Superstate? (After Maastricht)”; Merseyside; 1993; p. 14).

Each of these three blocs came to sponsor globalisation measures centred upon itself.

European Sponsored Globalisation

Proposals for a United States of Europe go back many years. Lenin commented on these proposals:

Temporary agreements between capitalists and between the powers are possible. In this sense the United States of Europe is possible as an agreement between the European capitalists . . . but what for? Only for the purpose of jointly suppressing socialism in Europe, of jointly protecting colonial booty against Japan and America. . . . Under capitalism, the United States of Europe would mean the organisation of reaction to retard the more rapid development of America.”

(Vladimir I. Lenin: ‘The “United States of Europe” Slogan’. in: ‘Selected Works’, Volume 5; London; 1935; p. 140-41).

The proposals for a United States of Europe made practcal advances only after World War II.

In April 1951,

“Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxmbourg and the Netherlands signed the Treaty of Paris, establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The treaty provided for pooling of coal and steel production and was regarded as a first step towards a united Europe.”

(“Statesman’s Yearbook: 1998-1999′; London; 1998; p. 42).

In March 1957,

“The European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAAC or Euratom) were . . . created under separate treaties signed in Rome. . . . The treaties provided for the establishment by stages of a common market with a customs union at its core.”

(“Statesman’ s Yearbook: 1998-1999”; London; 1998; p. 42).

According to the preamble to the Treaty of Rome, its aims were:

“To lay the foundations of an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe.”

(Preamble: Treaty of Rome, in: Richard Owen & Michael Dynes: ‘The Times Guide to the Single European Market: A Comprehensive Handbook’; London; 1992; p. 50).

At first, British imperialism stood aside from the developing EEC, in favour of continuing dependence on United States imperialism, the so-called ‘special relationship’:

“Atlanticism remained the main pillar of British ruling class strategy.”

(Dave Packer: ‘Wnere is Europe going?’, in: ‘Maastricht: The Crisis of European Integration’; London; 1993; p. 9).

Indeed, in November 1959, the British imperialists:

“Joined Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland . . . to form a European Free Trade Association EFTA’s members undertook to remove all tariff and quota restrictions on industrial trade among them in 10 years.”

(‘Encyclopedia Americana’, Volume ; New York; 1977; p. 706).

EFTA came formally into existence in May 1960. (‘Statesman’s Yearbook: 1998-1999’; London; 1998; p. 56).

But by this time it was already clear:

“That EFTA did not have the size or political clout to make it a credible competitor or alternative to the EC.”

(Thomas Pedersen: ‘The Wider Western Europe: EC Policy towards the EFTA Countries’; London; 1988; p. 3).

So in 1961, barely a year after Britain had been instrumental in setting up EFTA:

“British capitalism made a belated turn towards Europe.”

(Dave Packer: op. cit.; p. 9).

“To apply for full membership.”

(Richard Owen & Michael Dynes: op. cit.; p. 51).

of the EEC.

In 1963:

“The British application was vetoed by de Gaulle . on the grounds that Britain’s ties were transatlantic rather than European. It was renewed by Harold Wilson in 1966, and again vetoed by de Gaulle.”

(Richard Owen & Michael Dynes: op. cit.; p. 51).

In April 1965:

“The common institutions of the three Communities were established by a treaty signed in Brussels.”

(‘Europa World Year Book: 1998’, Volume 1; London; 1998; p. 152).

In July 1968,

“The removal of internal tariffs was completed, accompanied by the erection of a common external tariff to protect the new common market.”

(Richard Owen & Michael Dynes: op, cit.; p, 50).

In January 1973, Britain, Denmark and Ireland:

“Finally became EC members”;

(Richard Owen & Michael Dynes: op, cit.; p, 51).

Greece joined the EEC in January 1981, Portugal and Spain in January 1986, Austria, Finland and Sweden in January 1985. (‘Statesman’s Yearbook: 1998-1999’; London; 1998; p. 42).

The heart of the Single European Act, signed in December 1985:

“Was the commitment to a single European market by 31 December 1992, and the agreement that the EC had the right to lay down policy throughout the Community in areas from taxation to tourism.”

(Richard Owen & Michael Dynes: op, cit.; p. 58).

The Madrid summit of June 1989 gave:

“The go-ahead to develop a three-stage plan for economic and monetary union, with phase one beginning on 1 July 1990.”

(Richard Owen & Michael Dynes: op, cit.; p, 58).

Cooperation between the EFTA and the EEC culminated in May 1992 in the Treaty of Oporto setting up the “European Economic Area” (EEA) between the European Community (EC) and EFTA. (Therese Blanchet, Risto Piiponen & Maria Westman-Clement: ‘The Agreement on the Economic Economic Area (EEA)’; Oxford; 1994; p. 1);

For the EFTA countries, membership of EEA, would it was thought:

“Ease the way towards full menbership of the Union”:

(Therese Blanchet, Risto Puponen & Maria Westman-Clement: ibid.; p.x).

The Treaty of Maastricht, of December 1991:

“Established a ‘European Union’. . . . The aims of the Union were defined as . . . the creation of an area without internal frontiers and, . . . a single currency; . . . the introduction of a citizenship pf the Union.”

(Richard Owen & Michael Dynes: op, cit.; p. 60).


“European central bank and the currency union are to be established by 1999.”

(T. David Mason & Abdul M. Turay (Eds.): ‘Japan, NAFTA and Europe: Trilateral Cooperation or Confrontation?’; Basingstoke; 1994; p. 3).

The Maastricht Treaty marked

“A fundamental change in the constitutional basis of the British state. Considerable political power will be shifted from Westminster to the European Commission, which is not elected nor can it be removed by democratic means.”

(‘Maastricht: The Crisis of European Integration’; op. cit.; p. 3).

It went:

“Further than any previous treaty towards a European state. It establishes the concept of ‘European citizenship’, sets out procedures and timetables for a single currency as part of an economic and monetary union, establishes a common policy on judicial affairs, and provides for a common foreign, security and defence policy…Economic power will be shifted from both the national governments and national banks to a completely unaccountable European central bank.”

(Dave Packer: op. cit.; p. 6).

Of course:

“Integration will be on the terms of the richest and most powerful member — Germany.”

(Dave Packer: ibid,; p. 10).

which forms the heartland of:

“A German-dominated Europe.”

(Dave Packer: ibid.; p. 10).

Furthermore, Maastricht must be seen as:

“a weapon directed against the working class. .Cutting ‘excessive government spending’ (Article 104c) has already led to the first anti-Maastricht strikes in Italy and Greece. In Italy, massive cuts in the welfare state brought hundreds of thousands on to the streets, protesting at attempts to roll the wheel of history backward towards the 19th century.”

(Dave Packer: ibid; p. 10).

From November 1993, the EEC:

“Was formally changed to the European Community (EC) under the Treaty on European Union. . . . The new Treaty established a European Union (EU) which introduced citizenship thereof and aimed to increase inter-governmental cooperation in economic and monetary affairs, to establish a common foreign and security policy, and to introduce cooperation in justice and home affairs.”

(‘Europa World Year Book: 1998’, Volume 1; London; 1998; p. 152).

Before Britain joined the European Communities, the British government’s 1971 White Paper pledged:

“There is no question of any erosion of essential national sovereignty.”

(White Paper: ‘The United Kingdom and the European Communities’, in:
‘Keesing’s Contemporary Archives’, Volume 18; p. 24,862).

and promised that:

“Our economy will be stronger and our industries and people more prosperous if we join the European Communities than if we remain outside them.”

(White Paper: ‘The United Kingdom and the European Communities’, in: ‘Keesing’s Contemporary Archives’, Volume 18; p. 24,864).

In fact, in joining the EC:

“Britain gave up sovereign rights over trade, agriculture, steel, shipbuilding, energy, transport, . . fishing rights and monopoly mergers. Britain also accepted the burden to subsidise the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and abandoned former trading partners by foregoing the sovereign right to purchase cheaper food products from around the world.”

(John Boyd: op. cit.; p. 3).


“. . the economic promise offered by EC membership proved to be a mirage”;

(Brian Burkitt, Mark Baimbridge & Stephen Reed: ‘From Rome to Maastricht:
A Reappraisal of Britain’s Membership of the European Community’; London;
1992; p. 3).


“The EC proved to be a major contributory factor in Britain’s relative economic decline”,

(Brian Burkitt, Mark Baimbridge & Stephen Reed: ibid.; p. 6).

After Britain joined the EC:

“The relative decline of British manufacturing not only continued but accelerated…Before membership, the UK enjoyed annual surpluses in manufacturing trade with . . . the EC.”

(Brian Burkitt, Mark Baimbridge & Stephen Reed: ibid.; p. 3, 10-11).


“In the 1980s Britain finally became a substantial net importer of manufactures after being in. . .surplus since the industrial revolution.”

(Brian Burkitt, Mark Baimbridge & Stephen Reed: ibid.; p. 19).


“Largely because of EC membership Britain and its people have experienced:

an industrial decline without precedent in world history – over 4 million employees being removed from manufacturing according to the 1991 census; fewer than one in four men now works in manufacturing and more than half are employed in the service sector; 80% of working women are in service industries and only one in eight in manufacturing; the manufacturing workforce fell by 338,000 in 1991, and by 263,000 in 1992;….the near disappearance of the merchant fleet and virtual abandonment of the western ports’… the demise of the fishing fleet and fishing ports with foreign fleets fishing out of British waters under the Common Fishing Policy of the EC.”

(John Boyd: op. cit.; p. 27-28).

Furthermore, instead of the benefits promised to British manufacturers by the opening up of the European market:

“Britain now experiences huge trade deficits. . . . The 1992 trade deficit with the EC was £5,074 millions and of this £3,000 millions was with Germany.”

(John Boyd: ibid.; p. 28).

American-Sponsored Globalisation

In January 1988, a:

“Free-trade agreement between the USA and Canada . . . was signed.”

(‘Europa World Year Book: 1998’, Volume 1; London; 1998; p. 203).

In June 1990, US:

“President George Bush set forth his vision of free trade from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego.”

(Sidney Weintraub: ‘NAFTA: What comes next?’; Westport (USA); 1994; p. 80).

and in December 1992 the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement was extended to include Mexico 1992 by

“The ‘North American Free Trade Agreement’ (NAFTA)”;

(Sidney Weintraub: ibid.; p. xxi).

The Canada-US Free Trade Agreement and NAFTA:

“Impose strict and binding controls on Canadian governments from which the only escape is repudiation”;

(Preface to: Maude Barlow & Bruce Campbell: ‘Take back the Nation: 2: Meeting the Threat of NAFTA’; Toronto; 1993; p. vii).

As a result:

“NAFTA has become the supreme law of Canada with powers to override both federal and provincial legislation. . . . NAFTA is resigned to transfer power away from democratically-elected governments and place it in the hands of transnational corporations”;

(Maude Barlow & Bruce Campbell: ibid.; p. 92).

so that:

“Canada faces extinction as an independent nation.”

(Preface to: Maude Barlow & Bruce Campbell: ibid.; p. vii).

The principal benefits of NAFTA have accrued to US manufacturers who have transferred some or all of their production facilities south of the border into northern Mexico, where:

“The labour costs were one-tenth the US level”,

(Maude Barlow & Bruce Campbell: ibid.; p. 74).


“Labour productivity was surprisingly higher than in the US.”

(Maude Barlow & Bruce Campbell: ibid.; p. 74).

The blatant loss of sovereignty which globalisation has brought on Mexico is well illustrated by the case of the Mexican gynaecologist, Dr. Alvarez Macham, who in 1990:

“Was seized by Mexican bounty hunters from his office in Guadalajara and delivered to (US — Ed.) federal agents waiting across the border. The United States action . . . was later upheld by the (US — Ed.) Supreme Court.”

(‘New York Times’, 22 June 1993; p. A11).

Japanese-sponsored Globalisation

Held back by its defeat and occupation in the Second World War, the most recent imperialist power to sponsor globalisation has been Japan:

“Barely a generation ago, Japan accounted for less than 2% of the world economy, while the United States accounted for about 35%. By 1980 Japan’s share of the world economy had ballooned to about 19%. . . . In the meantime, America’s share had dropped to about 20%.”

(Ellen I. Frost: ‘For Richer, for Poorer: The New US-Japan Relationship’; New York; 1987; p. 6).

In other words, in relation to each other:

“Japan has gotten richer and the United States has gotten poorer”;

(Preface to: Ellen I Frost: ibid.; p. ix).

In September 1980:

“A non-governmental international seminar to explore the Pacific Community idea . . . was held at the Australian National University in Canberra . . . and with it the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC) was born. The original participants in the Canberra seminar were the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the five ASEAN* countries, South Korea, Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Tonga.”

(Pekka Korhonen: ‘Japan and the Pacific Free Trade Area’; London; 1994; p. 177).


“is a regional intergovernmental organisation formed by the governments of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.”

(‘Statesman s Year-Book: 1998-1999’; op. cit.; p. 75).

Then, in November 1989:

“The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation’ (APEC) was founded to devise programmes of cooperation between member nations. . . . It was institutionalised in June 1992 after a meeting in Bangkok, at which it was agreed to set up a secretariat in Singapore. APEC is now the primary vehicle for promoting open trade and practical economic cooperation in the region. . . . Its member economies had a combined GDP (Gross Domestic Product — Ed.) of over $13 trillion in 1995. . It had 19 member countries in Jan. 1998. Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea (Republuc of), Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and the USA.”

(‘Statesman’s Yearbook: 1998-1999’; ibid.; p. 74).

The second meeting of APEC economic leaders in 1994 adopted:

“The Declaration of Common Resolve, whereby it was agreed to achieve the goal of free and open trade and investment in the region no later than 2010 for the industrialised economies, 2020 for the developing economies The Osaka Action Agenda, adopted by leaders in Osaka, Japan, in 1995, draws up a blueprint for implementing the commitment to this goal.”

(‘Statesman’s Yearbook: 1998-1999’; ibid.; p. 74).

and resolved that:

“APEC can be a major force for global trade liberalisation.”

(Asia-Pacific Econonic Cooperation: 1994; in: Pekka Korhonen: op. cit.; p. 168).

It is clear that any Asian Pacific regional free trade area would be dominated by Japanese imperialism:

“There is little doubt about the importance of the role which Japan will play in the Asian Pacific region. . . . As a dominant trade partner for almost all the countries in the region, as well as a major source of aid, finance and technology, its presence is already one of the vital determinants of the region’s future.”

(Shibusawa Masahide: ‘Japan and the Asian Pacific Region: Profile of Change’; London; 1984; p. 157).

In the June 1993 issue of “Atlantic Monthly,” an open letter was published from Akio Morita, Chairman of the Sony Corporation, proposing that:

“North America, Europe and Japan might be able to work together to remove barriers to the free-market system and make it more open, more inclusive and freer than it is at present.

The proposal I ask you to consider is that we begin to seek the way and means of lowering all economic barriers between North America, Europe and Japan — trade, investment, legal and so forth — in order to begin creating the nucleus of a new world economic order that would include a harmonised world business system with agreed rules and procedures that transcend national boundaries.”

(Akio Morita: Open Letter to the G7 Leaders, in: ‘Atlantic Monthly’. June 1993; p. 88).

The Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is:

“The rich nations’ club…95.4% of the largest transnational corporations in the world today are headquartered in member countries of the OECD.”

(Tony Clarke: ‘The Corporate Rule Treaty: The Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) seeks to consolidate Global Corporate Rule’, in: ‘Revolutionary Democracy’ Volume 4. No. 1 (April 1998); p. 4, 5).

In May 1995 the OECD instructed the organisation to prepare a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), the aim of which would be:

“To establish a whole new set of global rules of investment that will grant transnational corporations the unrestricted ‘right’ and ‘freedom’ to buy, sell and move their operations whenever and wherever they want around the world, unfettered by government intervention or regulation.”

(Tony Clarke: ibid.; p. 4).

In short, the aim of the MAI is:

“. . to impose tight restrictions on what national governments can and cannot do in regulating their economies.”

(Tony Clarke: ibid.; p. 4).

In fact, the MAI:

“Amounts to a declaration of global corporate rule.”

(Tony Clarke: ibid.; p. 5).

Under the MAI:

“Foreign-based corporations or investors are to be accorded special rights and privileges. Not only will governments be required to provide corporations from other countries treatment that is ‘no less favourable’ than that given to companies within their own countries, but that treatment must include ‘equality of competitive opportunity.'”

(Tony Clarke: ibid.; p. 6-7).

The MAI:

“Includes a number of measures which serve to strengthen the political power of corporations.”

(Tony Clarke: ibid.; p. 8).

giving them, for instance:

“The power to directly sue governments over any breach of MAI provisions which causes (or is likely to cause) loss or damage to the investor or his investment.'”

(Tony Clarke: ibid.; p. 10).

World System Theory

As we have seen, the concepts of cosmopolitanism/globalisation form the basis of a new branch of sociology called “world system theory and pioneered by Immanuel Wallerstein:

“As Immanuel Wallerstein and others have observed, what we are now witnessing is the development of a ‘world system’, whose defining characteristic is the transoational role of capital.”

(Joseph A. Camiltari & Jim Falk: ‘The End of Sovereignty: The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World’; Aldershot; 1992; p. 77-78).

For Wallenstein:

“the ‘world economy’ is now universal, in the sense that all national states and national economies are in varying degrees integrated into its central structure.”

(Joseph A. Camilleri & Jim Falk: ibid.; p. 78).

In many respects, the view that the world is moving towards a transnational economy is a revival of Karl Kautsky’s theory of ultra-imperialism. In Lenin’s words:

“Kautsky writes that from the purely economic point of view it is not impossible that capitalism will yet go through a new phase, that of the extension of the policy of the cartels to foreign policy, the phase of ultra-imperialism, i.e., of a super-imperialism, a union of world imperialism and not struggles among imperialisms; a phase when wars shall cease under capitalism, a phase of ‘the joint exploitation of the world by internationally united finance capital’. .
Monopoly cannot . . . eliminate competition in the world market completely and for a long period of time (and this, by the by, is one of the reasons why the theory of ultra-imperialism is so absurd.”

(Vladimir I. Lenin: ‘Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism’, in: ‘Selected Works’, Volume 5; London; 1935; p. 86, 91).

Because capitalism develops unevenly in different enterprises, different regions and different countries, international agreements to share out markets, dependencies, can be no more than temporary:

“The only objective, i.e., real, social meaning Kautsky’s ‘theory;’ can have is that it is a most reactionary method of consoling the masses with hopes of permanent peace being possible under capitalism…Deception of the masses – there is nothing but this in Kautsky’s ‘Marxian; theory…

We will presume that these imnperialist countries form alliances against one another in order to protect and extend their possessions, their interests and their spheres of influence. . .This alliance would be an alliance of ‘internationally united finance capital’. . . . Is it conceivable’ . . that such alliances would be more than temporary?

The question only requires stating clearly enough to make it impossible for any but a negative reply to be given; for there can be no other conceivable basis under capitalism for the sharing out of spheres of influence, of interests, of colonies, etc., than a calculation of the strength of the participants, . . . their general, economic financial, military strength, etc. And the strength of these participants in the share out does not change to an equal degree, for under capitalism the development of different undertakings, trusts, branches of industry or countries cannot be even. . .

Therefore, ‘inter-imperialist’ or ‘ultra-imperialist’ alliances, in the realities of the capitalist system … are inevitably nothing more than a ‘truce in periods between wars.”

(Vladimir I. Lenin: ‘Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism’, in: ‘Selected Works’, Volume 5; London; 1935; p. 109-10).


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